English summary

In all the regional history of the Middle East and since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, one important chapter is missing : Israeli nuclear weapons. It gives a clear vision and explains how conflicts between Arabs and Israelis have been managed during the past fifty years. However, this missing chapter heavily affects the relations between countries in the area. It also affects the international powers' role and especially conflict resolution in the region. Given the secrecy surrounding it, research on Israeli nuclear weapons is difficult. There is not much scientific literature on this subject. Among the considerable quantity of existing works and in the research devoted to the history of conflicts in the Middle East, those on this hidden part of the history are rare. This missing chapter is deliberately surrounded by a policy of ambiguity and is well hidden by the Israelis themselves. The problem of the investigation is that it could lead to error. In fact, does any one knows the truth of this matter ? The main problem of our research lies in the fact that the object is not easily accessible. It is well hidden and surrounded by a national, regional and an international taboo. There are very few witnesses to it and often integrated, by the rare witnesses, in a subtle game of evocation. Unlike other nuclear weapon’s holders, the case of Israel is at the same time singular and striking. That’s due to its non-transparency and its ambiguity on a historical and technical level. All occurs as if the Israeli government -while affirming its intention not to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East- had held onto its intention indirectly to let the world knows how it’s nuclear arsenal would be used, if necessary. In our investigation, we don’t seek to bring scoops or revelations on weather or not Israel has nuclear capacities. That is no longer a secret. What we intend here is a question of How. We try to emphasise how leaders, as actors, are often far from their calculations. That’s to say how deterrents seeking to deter, do not. How the actor supposed to be deterred, is not either ? Before 1967, Nasser wanted to set an international inspection of Israel’s nuclear plant to lift the threat which weighs down on Egypt. His actions failed and led to the war. Egypt then was confronted to a situation of military humiliation. As an outcome of the 1967 war, Israel sought that safety it obtained and deterrence is a great success. In 1973, Tel-Aviv discovered that it did not work and it failed to deter the Arabs. After his military defeat in 1967, Nasser, two years later, started the war of attrition (1969-1970). Sadat, in 1973, in spite of a military situation in its discredit, defied Israel’s nuclear arsenal. He initiated the war. Cairo, during the war, confronted a situation in which its 3rd army came very close to a historic military disaster. Saddam Hussein, in 1991, sent 36 Scuds missiles into Tel-Aviv. Although the Israeli threat of using nuclear weapons was made before the Gulf war. With its nuclear capacities, Israel is still under threat by its neighbours and Palestinian activists. Security is not really acquired. Even more, a withdrawal from Sinai, a premature withdrawal from south Lebanon, a withdrawal plan from Gaza or the perspectives of withdrawal from the Golan heights ; the nuclear weapon did not preserve the regional hegemony hoped by the Israelis. The Israeli bomb remains what it is, opaque, invisible and not recognizable. The official position of the Jewish State on this subject is always ambiguous. The Israeli decision-makers do not cease repeating that they will not be the first to introduce the nuclear weapons in the Middle East. But Israel, never really defined what it intends by “introducing“. At a first glance, we are tempted to conclude that Israeli deterrence is a great success. This is the thesis of Elli Lieberman (1995) . But more closely, things seems less obvious. The observation show that instead of preventing conflicts, the Israeli Rational Deterrence, paradoxically, caused military confrontations. We show how Israel’s nuclear arsenal not only does not guarantee the safety wanted by Israelis but also, how this object causes wars as it is the case in 1967. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gros Stein, underline that the Israeli deterrence, according to empirical studies', is a simple failure. Lebow and Stein, think that deterrence had rarely succeed. That conclusion explains why certain leaders are defying deterrence. Even in military and political situation of vulnerability combined with a credible threat from the deterrent, challengers defy credible threats explain Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gros Stein, (1990, pp. 336-369) . With the ambiguity and the “non-deterrables”, we conclude that Israeli deterrence failed in deterring the Arabs.

Assumption : We suppose that Israeli deterrence failed. We then explain that there are two major factors behind this failure : ambiguity and non-deterrable actors. These two major elements affect the credibility of Israel’s nuclear posture. In other words, in this quite precise case, the credibility of a Rational Deterrence is not entirely acquired. In this case, challengers are even less deterred with a strategy of nuclear ambiguity. We wish, to prove in which context, how and why Israeli deterrence missed its principal goal. To study our assumption, we limit our investigation to the period from 1955 to 2005. It is to say that the Israeli nuclear option is as old as the State of Israel itself created in 1948. We investigate its history. We study its implications in the decisions and the choice of the decision-makers in particular at the time of wars. We illustrate, throughout this work, the efforts of Israelis to acquire nuclear weapons. We highlight the international and regional context. We study the game of interaction between the trio Washington, Tel-Aviv and Arab capitals. We affirm the following points : (1) Israeli Rational Deterrence failed in deterring Arabs. (2) Deterrence is a vast, vague and not easily applicable concept. The attacks or the wars known as preventive are there to mitigate the failure of the Rational Deterrence Theory. (3) Rationality, as deterrence, is a vague concept as well. What is regarded as irrational by the deterrent (the strong) actor, can be regarded as purely rational from the point of view of its challenger (the weak). The standards, the values and the social context of an actor do not give a common ground of calculations for each of the two camps : the strong and the weak one.(4) The Six day war in 1967, took place following the opening of the nuclear power plant of Dimona. (5) The war of 1973, took place mainly by the will of Sadat to defy Israeli deterrence. (6) The nuclear weapons, in the Israeli case, are obsolete. That means that if they are used against one of the Arab capitals, because of the geographical proximity, they will not save the State of Israel and its population. (7) The Israeli nuclear program was set up following the Soviet threats during 1956 war, and not Arabic one. (8) The United States, between 1955 and 1965, took an ambiguous position with respect to the proliferation of the nuclear weapons and in particular with the Middle East. Washington turned a blind eye towards the Israeli nuclear program. (9) The Israelis, -for whom deterrence is regarded as acquired after the 1967 war-, following the war of 1973, are highly convinced that their doctrine and their strategy of deterrence definitively failed to deter the Arabs.(10) Finaly, preventive attacks means that the strong failed to deter a non-deterrable and weak actors.