En 1966, les données stratégiques changent et Israël fait savoir à Washington ses craintes face à la modernisation de l’armée égyptienne avec 60 nouveaux missiles stratégiques vers mai/juin 1967 (Annexe 125, p. 2, point 5) 546 . Du côté du Caire, le sujet du réacteur de Dimona pousse les décideurs à percevoir cette menace de manière deux fois plus importante que par le passé. Nasser presse Moscou et lui demande d’intervenir auprès de Washington. C’est alors que la question des armes nucléaires au Moyen-Orient prend une place dans les discussions entre le Kremlin et la Maison Blanche et se discute au plus haut niveau entre le département d’État et l’ambassadeur de l’URSS à Washington (Annexe 126) 547 . Un mois avant la guerre, un rapport rédigé par Christian Rostow -conseiller du Président Johnson- daté du 8 mai 1967, montre que le dossier de Dimona pose une sérieuse inquiétude dans les relations entre Washington et le monde arabe (Annexe 128) 548 . Car, dix jours avant la guerre, Israël possède deux bombes nucléaires (William E. Burrows, Robert Windrem, 1994, p. 282-283) 549 . Tel-Aviv ne voit plus la menace égyptienne telle qu’il la percevait avant que l’État hébreu ne possède effectivement la bombe atomique. Il faut défendre Dimona. Dès le 19 mai, les Israéliens commencent à se préparer à la guerre. Tel-Aviv commande 20000 masques à gaz pour ses militaires (Annexe 106) 550 . Le 22 mai 1967, le Président Johnson écrit au raïs lui demandant d’éviter une guerre dans la région. Washington propose alors l’envoi du vice-Président américain pour une tournée dans les capitales arabes afin de trouver une possible issue à la crise (Annexe 105) 551 . Le mois de mai 1967, est celui où des avions égyptiens de reconnaissance survolent le site de Dimona. La guerre devient inévitable.
Annexe 125, Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State. Tel Aviv, May 24, 1966, 1137Z. FRUS,1964-1968, Volume XVIII. Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67. N. 293.Department of StateWashington, DC. Source : National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 UAR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo, London, and Paris. 1229. Israeli strategic missiles. CA-11071, May 10, 66.Circular airgram CA-11071, May 10, instructed Barbour to renew the U.S.-Israeli missile discussions of April 1964 with Eshkol, in particular to try to halt any delivery to Israel of missiles falling under the initial French-Israel contract for 25 missiles mentioned to Feldman by Eshkol. (Ibid.) For Feldman's reports of his discussions of this subject with Eshkol, see Documents 36 and 37.
Annexe 126, Memorandum of Conversation. Subject : Nuclear Weapons in the Near East .Participants : Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, USSR. The Secretary. Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVIII. Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67. N. 294. Department of State, Washington, DC. May 26, 1966, 5 p.m. Source : National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 NEAR E. Confidential. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S on May 28. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The memorandum is Part III of VI.
Annexe 128, Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson N. 416. SUBJECT : Israeli Aid Package.FRUS, 1964-1968, Volume XVIII. Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67. Department of State, Washington, DC. Washington, May 8, 1967. Source : Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten “L” on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by the President.
William E. Burrows, Robert Windrem, Critical Mass, The Dangerous Race for Superweapons” in A Fragmenting World, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994.
Annexe 106, Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hoopes) to Secretary of Defense McNamara. Washington, May 22, 1967. Source : Washington National Records Center, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468, Israel 400.137. Secret. Subject: Gas Masks for Israel.
Annexe 105, Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic. N. 34. Washington, May 22, 1967, 8:49 p.m.Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967. Released by the Office of the Historian. Documents 1-36. Prewar Crisis, May 15-June 4, 1967. Source : National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Eugene Rostow and cleared by Walt Rostow. Repeated to USUN Eyes Only for Ambassador Goldberg. Walt Rostow sent a copy to the President at 4:30 p.m. with a covering note stating that he had dictated it and sent it to Eugene Rostow's Middle East task force that afternoon. Rostow added: “From previous experience I know Nasser is vulnerable to direct communication from the President of the United States.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. I) Another memorandum from Walt Rostow to Johnson that evening states that Eugene Rostow and Battle recommended sending messages to Prime Minister Eshkol and Syrian Prime Minister Atasi in case Nasser should release the President's message to him. (Ibid.) Messages from Johnson to Atasi and Eshkol urging restraint were transmitted in telegrams 199728 to Damascus and 199729 to Tel Aviv, both dated May 22. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR). 199704. Deliver following through quickest means to President Nasser from President Johnson: “May 22, 1967.