

Université Lumière Lyon II

Institut d'études politiques de Lyon

École doctorale "Sciences humaines et sociales" (SHS)

Centre de Politologie de Lyon CERIEP

**La politique de l'ambiguïté comme facteur d'échec de la
dissuasion au Moyen-Orient. Étude du cas israélien 1955-2005.**

Annexes – Volume II

Thèse de doctorat en Science politique

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Mars 2005

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

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Documents 1-36

Prewar Crisis, May 15-June 4, 1967

1. President's Daily Brief

Washington, May 15, 1967.

[Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Middle East Crisis, Vol. 6, Appendix A. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. 1 page of source text not declassified.]

2. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, May 15, 1967, 1920Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 32-1 ISR-SYR. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated Priority to Amman and to Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, Beirut, Kuwait, Dhahran, London, USUN, CINCSRIKE, CINCEAFSA, Jerusalem, Aden, and Sanaa. Received at 5:14 p.m. Passed to the White House and USIA at 5:40 p.m.

3604. Ref: Cairo 7494./2/

/2/Telegram 7494 from Cairo, May 15, reported that UAR military forces had been placed on alert and that extensive movement of troops and materiel was in process. (Ibid.)

1. Bitan (Fon Off) advises Battle saw Harman this morning and expressed concern at reports Egyptian troop concentration in Canal area which blocked to normal traffic and interpreted development as **Egyptian demonstration solidarity with Syrians who apprehensive possible Israeli intentions.**/3/

/3/No memorandum of this conversation between Battle and Ambassador Harman has been found. Secretary Rusk told Battle that morning that "we should have a very frank talk with the Israelis" and that "it was very important for the Israelis to sit tight." (Notes of telephone conversation at 9:46 a.m. on May 15, prepared by Rusk's personal assistant Carolyn J. Proctor; *ibid.*, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Calls) Telegram 194189 to Tel Aviv, May 15, instructed the Embassy to approach the Israeli Government at the highest level and express the U.S. hope that the Israelis would "maintain steady nerves in interest avoiding serious deterioration area situation." (*Ibid.*, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

2. Bitan said that following talks with PM Eshkol and FM Eban he authorized give following GOI reaction this representation.

A. There no Israeli troop concentration Syrian, Egyptian or other frontier. (This corresponds with US Attaches reconnaissance to this hour.)

B. GOI hopes infiltration and sabotage will stop.

C. If there no further sabotage there no reason anyone to worry.

D. GOI interpretation Egyptian demonstration troop activities is that Syrians trying involve Egypt in Syrian-Israeli issue and if Egyptian concentration true Syrians could represent this as support.

3. GOI has no objection foregoing being transmitted to Cairo.

4. Situation with Syria is obviously precarious and, if additional serious sabotage incidents such as attacks on settlements, main roads etc. continue it impossible predict GOI will sit idly by without reacting. However, I believe GOI aware risks escalation, disposed make minimum effective response, and exercise what to them would seem maximum patience. I doubt that they will be very impressed in any event with Nasser's foot shuffling one way or the other.

Barbour

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

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Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

Washington, May 23, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt W. Rostow, Vol. 28. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The memorandum is unsigned, and bears no drafting information. It was sent to the President with a brief covering memorandum from Walt Rostow stating that two memoranda from Helms, which the President had requested that morning, were attached. The second memorandum has not been identified.

SUBJECT

Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capabilities

1. The judgment of the intelligence community is that Israeli *ground forces* "can maintain internal security, defend successfully against simultaneous Arab attacks on all fronts, launch limited attacks simultaneously on all fronts, or hold on any three fronts while mounting successfully a major offensive on the fourth." *In the air*, the judgment is less clear: the Israelis "probably could defeat the Egyptian air force if Israel's air facilities were not damaged beyond repair."
2. Those judgments rest essentially on the proposition that the quality of Israel's military leadership, its ability to organize operations and maintain its equipment in a high state of readiness, and the high morale and intelligence of the individual Israeli ground soldier will make up for Israel's quantitative inferiority in men and equipment. The Israelis have consistently stressed intensive training, with emphasis on armor, standardization of weapons, rapid and reliable communications, and a very strong tactical intelligence effort. Egyptian capabilities in these areas appear to be inferior.
3. Moreover, in the air, the Israelis have been acutely conscious of the difficulty of defending their air facilities, and have made strenuous efforts to overcome the fact that their bases are very short warning time from the Arab borders. They have "hardened" their fields with dispersed pens, for example. Israeli pilots and tactics are considered superior, and, in terms of *operationally assigned* fighter aircraft rather than total inventory, Israel has a slight edge--256 to 222.
4. Israeli planning is based on a short war, conducted by ground forces with air cover. If this assumption should prove wrong, Israel might well be in trouble, since the Arabs' quantitative superiority would come into play. At M+48 hours, for example, Israel would have 280,000 men vs. the Arabs' 117,000 deployed in the vicinity of the Israeli borders. But the *total* strength of the Arab armies is nearly 500,000, vs. the same 280,000 on the Israeli side.
5. This is not to say that the rout of the Egyptians in 1956 will be repeated. The Egyptian forces have improved substantially in the past eleven years, and they have acquired considerable operational know-how by rotating combat units in Yemen. Nevertheless, **we consider that the Israeli forces have retained an over-all superiority.**

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War,
1967

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Documents 1-36

Prewar Crisis, May 15-June 4, 1967

8. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, May 17, 1967, 7 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate. Drafted and approved by Rusk; cleared by Battle; and cleared with changes by Walt Rostow.

196541. Please deliver following personal message from President to Prime Minister Eshkol:

"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am following very closely the tense situation in the Near East and am deeply concerned about the maintenance of peace in that area. We have made known our concern in Damascus and Cairo and are working closely with other countries in the United Nations. Our efforts will continue.

I know that you and your people are having your patience tried to the limits by continuing incidents along your border. In this situation, I would like to emphasize in the strongest terms the need to avoid any action on your side which would add further to the violence and tension in your area. I urge the closest consultation between you and your principal friends. I am sure that you will understand that I cannot accept any responsibilities on behalf of the United States for situations which arise as the result of actions on which we are not consulted.

With personal regards.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson"

Rusk

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

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Documents 1-36

Prewar Crisis, May 15-June 4, 1967

7. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson^{/1/}

Washington, May 17, 1967.

^{/1/}Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. I. Secret.

SUBJECT
Urgent Message to Eshkol

We had hoped yesterday that tension in the Israel-Syria-UAR triangle was dropping after an ostentatious Egyptian show of putting its forces around Cairo on alert. Last night, however, we and the Israelis learned that the Egyptians have moved forces into the Sinai. Now they have moved forces in front of the UN Emergency Force on the Israel-UAR border and all but ordered it to withdraw.

The UAR's brinksmanship stems from two causes: (1) **The Syrians are feeding Cairo erroneous reports of Israeli mobilization to strike Syria.** Regrettably, some pretty militant public threats from Israel by Eshkol and others have lent credibility to the Syrian reports. (2) Nasser probably feels his prestige would suffer irreparably if he failed a third time to come to the aid of an Arab nation attacked by Israel. Moderates like Hussein have raked him over the coals for not coming to Jordan's aid in November or to Syria's when Israel shot down 6 of its MIG's last month.

In this highly charged atmosphere, it's probably impossible for Israel to get away with a limited retaliatory strike for the next terrorist attack from Syria. But the Syrians may try harder than ever by turning loose the terrorists either to force Israel to eat crow by taking further sabotage attacks without reacting or to drag them and the UAR into a fight. Eshkol may even decide that Egypt's move to the border pushes him too far.

Secretary Rusk personally recommends the attached message^{/2/} to Eshkol urging him not to put a match to this fuse. A week ago, I would have counseled closing our eyes if Eshkol had decided to lash back at the Syrians. We just don't have an alternative way to handle these terrorist raids that are becoming more and more sophisticated. Unfortunately, however, his own public threats seem to have deprived him of the flexibility to make a limited attack today.

^{/2/}The draft message as approved by the President, with an attached note directing that it should be sent LDX to Ben Read, is *ibid*.

I have worked with State to make this message as sympathetic as possible while trying still to strengthen Eshkol's hand against his hawks. Arthur Goldberg is aware of the Secretary's proposal and approves. We will follow events closely to be sure the message isn't overtaken by events before delivery.

Approve^{/3/}

^{/3/}Neither option is checked. On the memorandum "Call me. L." appears in Johnson's handwriting next to the two options. A note in Rostow's handwriting at the top of the page states that the President approved by telephone at 6 p.m.

See me

Walt

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 1-36

Prewar Crisis, May 15-June 4, 1967

34 Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic/1/

Washington, May 22, 1967, 8:49 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR. Secret; Flash; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Eugene Rostow and cleared by Walt Rostow. Repeated to USUN Eyes Only for Ambassador Goldberg. Walt Rostow sent a copy to the President at 4:30 p.m. with a covering note stating that he had dictated it and sent it to Eugene Rostow's Middle East task force that afternoon. Rostow added: "From previous experience I know Nasser is vulnerable to direct communication from the President of the United States." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. I) Another memorandum from Walt Rostow to Johnson that evening states that Eugene Rostow and Battle recommended sending messages to Prime Minister Eshkol and Syrian Prime Minister Atasi in case Nasser should release the President's message to him. (Ibid.) Messages from Johnson to Atasi and Eshkol urging restraint were transmitted in telegrams 199728 to Damascus and 199729 to Tel Aviv, both dated May 22. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL ARAB-ISR)

199704. Deliver following through quickest means to President Nasser from President Johnson:

"May 22, 1967

Dear President Nasser:

I have spent much of these past days thinking of the Middle East, of the problems you face, and the problems we face in that area.

Various of our common friends, including Ambassador Battle, have told me of your concern that the United States may have indicated an unfriendliness toward the UAR. This, I would wish you to know directly, is far from the truth.

I have watched from a distance your efforts to develop and modernize your country. I understand, I think, the pride and the aspirations of your people-their insistence that they enter as soon as possible the modern world and take their full part in it. I hope that we can find public as well as private ways to work more closely together.

I also understand the political forces at work in your region, the ambitions and tensions, the memories and the hopes.

Right now, of course, your task and mine is not to look back, but to rescue the Middle East-and the whole human community-from a war I believe no one wants. I do not know what steps Secretary General U Thant will be proposing to you; but I do urge you to set as your first duty to your own people, to your region, and to the world community this transcendent objective: the avoidance of hostilities.

The great conflicts of our time are not going to be solved by the illegal crossings of frontiers with arms and men-neither in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America. But that kind of action has already led to war in Asia, and it threatens the peace elsewhere.

I had expected that I might ask our Vice President to go to the Middle East to talk with you and other Arab leaders, as well as with the leaders of Israel. If we come through these days without hostilities, I would still hope that visit by my most trusted friend could result immediately.

Each of us who has the responsibility for leading a nation faces different problems shaped by history, geography, and the deepest feelings of our peoples. Whatever differences there may be in the outlook and interests of your country and mine, we do share an interest in the independence and progress of the UAR and the peace of the Middle East.

I address you at this critical moment in the hope that you share that assessment and will find it possible to act on it in the hours and days ahead.

Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson"

Rusk

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 37-71

37. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Hoopes) to Secretary of Defense McNamara^{1/}

Washington, May 22, 1967.

^{1/}Source: Washington National Records Center, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 72 A 2468, Israel 400.137. Secret.

SUBJECT
Gas Masks for Israel

Israel asked on 19 May to buy for cash^{2/} on an urgent basis 20,000 US Army M-17 gas masks to be air shipped to Israel for immediate distribution. The US Army can make 20,000 masks available immediately from its stocks. These are being prepared for shipment and could be dispatched as quickly as the GOI can arrange air charter.

^{2/}The words "for cash" are a handwritten addition on the memorandum.

The Egyptians have used chemical agents, including nerve gas, in the Yemen recently. Israeli intelligence reports that Egypt has brought gas shells or bombs forward to the Sinai in its recent deployments. Although we believe it highly unlikely that Egypt would use gas against Israel, this possibility cannot be altogether discounted.

Secretary Rusk is aware of and supports the Israeli request to purchase American masks, even though all concerned (including the Israelis) recognize that the number of masks involved is too small to do much good and that by themselves could not assure adequate protection against the type of gas which may be used. This would be essentially a psychological gesture.

Under the circumstances I recommend we respond affirmatively to Israel, on the condition that it not publicize this action as evidence of US support for the GOI in the current crisis.^{3/} We do not believe however that a public disclosure stating (without linkage to the US) that Israeli troops were being equipped with gas masks would, on balance, be detrimental. On the contrary, it might force the Egyptians into a denial of any intention to use gas. Under Secretary Rostow is concurrently examining measures at the UN also designed to force an Egyptian denial of intent.^{4/}

^{3/}Neither the "approved" nor "disapproved" option was checked.

^{4/}Rostow discussed this in a May 20 memorandum to Rusk. He stated that according to an Israeli intelligence report, Egyptian troops in the Sinai were equipped with gas masks, and canisters of gas had been seen. Whether or not this was true, he continued, "we know that the Egyptians have used several kinds of poison gas in their aerial bombing of the Yemen, and that some of the gas at least is extremely lethal, and of Soviet origin and manufacture." He suggested several possible actions, including the possibility of briefing the Secretary-General before his trip to Cairo. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Middle East Crisis Files, E. 5190, Box 19, NE Situation, May-June 1967, Folder 1)

Townsend Hoopes

Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 37-71

38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union/1/

Washington, May 23, 1967, 2:45 a.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Toon; cleared by Stoessel, Leddy, and Davies; and approved by Eugene Rostow. Repeated Immediate to USUN.

199746. Within past few hours, situation in Middle East has seriously worsened. **Nasser has announced that Gulf of Aqaba will be closed to Israeli flagships, and while we have Israeli commitment to consult with us before attempting to run the blockade, we cannot hope to restrain Israeli action much beyond next 24 hours.** Obviously, Nasser must be restrained from further hostile action if we are to avoid serious flare-up.

We are concerned lest Soviets may not be fully aware of recent Nasser moves and the dangers they hold for peace in the area. Accordingly we believe it would be useful for you to see Gromyko soonest to express our grave concern at deterioration of situation, cataloging for his information following recent moves giving rise to this concern:

1. Egyptians have mounted massive military buildup in Sinai despite fact Israelis at that time had taken no action on their side of frontier that would justify this move.
2. This buildup has increased Egyptian military strength in area from normal level of 30,000 to 50,000.
3. Egyptians have demanded withdrawal of UNEF and SYG has complied.
4. Egyptians have moved naval units south into Red Sea toward entrance to Gulf of Aqaba.
5. Nasser has just announced Gulf would be closed to Israeli flagships, adding that if **"Israelis want war, we welcome it."**

You should inform Gromyko that Sovs themselves have said war in Middle East is in interest of no one. We are doing what we can to avoid flare-up. Purpose of this demarche is to share with Soviets evidence available to us that gives rise to concern. We assume Soviets as anxious as we to avoid further worsening of situation, and that they are aware of our repeated public commitments to support the territorial integrity and political independence for all countries in the Near East, and our opposition to aggression and the use of force and the threat of force against any country.

Rusk

SECRET/NODIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: August 13, 1969

SUBJECT: 1969 Dimona Visit

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Charles H. Reichardt, Director of Intelligence, AEC
 Mr. Charles A. Sommer, Deputy Director of Intelligence, AEC
 Mr. George B. Pleat, Chief of Dimona Inspection Team
 Robert H. Munn, NEA/IAI

The substantive portion of Tel Aviv's 3055 of August 8 was made available to the AEC officers for their comment. Their general feeling is that it would be pointless to engage in debate with the Israelis on the details of whether or not the team's requirements were actually met, since Ambassador Barbour has already made the substantive points outlined in State 124641 in his discussion with the Prime Minister (Tel Aviv 2941 of July 31). The AEC officers had not seen this cable but were apprised of its content. They concur that it would be useful to record a reply to the Israeli description of the "visit" by reaffirming the views expressed by Ambassador Barbour.

Dr. Reichardt will send the Department general comments on the situation in a covering memorandum to be forwarded with copies of the Dimona Inspection Report, which will be forthcoming within a few days. He dictated a draft in my presence. The following will, however, add to his very diplomatic language.

In response to my question of how the frame of reference or guidance for the US team is formulated, the AEC officers reviewed briefly the history of the inspections. From a number of sources, the team has drawn the inference that the US government is not prepared to support a real "inspection" effort in which the team members can feel authorized to ask directly pertinent questions and/or insist on being allowed to look at records, logs, materials and the like. The team has in many subtle ways been cautioned to avoid controversy, "be gentlemen" and not take issue with the obvious will of the hosts. On one occasion it seems that the team was criticized roundly by the Israelis for having "acted like inspectors" and the criticism was passed on rather than refuted.

NEA/IAI:RHMunn:hml

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(Dealing Office and Officer)

SECRET/NODIS

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SECRET/NODIS

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In the absence of a positive mandate to inspect with all that word implies, the team has felt constrained to accept the ground rules made evident by their host, leading to the present situation in which a "visit" is conducted rather than an "inspection." The team therefore did not make an issue of the fact that the program drawn up by Israel shifted timing and focus in important ways which limited their access to key facilities. Nor did they take issue with their host's obvious pushing and hurrying past points at which they indicated a desire for a closer look. The fact that the team avoided creating issues can give rise to the semantic interpretation that what went on satisfied them, which is in essence what the Israelis replied to the Embassy. There is no doubt whatever in the mind of the chief of the team but that his hosts effectively tailored the occasion as a "visit" to suit their own purposes: they took great care to emphasize at the outset that it was a visit and nothing more, and obviously relied on the good manners and restraint of the team members to avoid challenges of substance.

COMMENT

It is clear to me from the discussion that visits conducted under these approaches may even be counter-productive, leaving Israel in the position of pointing them out as evidence of "cooperation" or "US satisfaction" at some key juncture in the future. It also seems to me that we have within our own purview the ability to make the occasions more meaningful by instructing the team to take a positive approach to inspection, asking for all the access and information they deem required, and leaving it to the Israelis either to accede or make positive denials of what is requested. At the least, that course would place responsibility where it must rest rather than avoiding the real issues in a manner which prejudices our interests.

cc: NEA - Mr. Davies
INR - Mr. Hughes
AEC - Dr. Reichardt

SECRET/NODIS

Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961-1962

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 293-314

302. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, June 20, 1962.

/1/Source: Department of State, NEA/NE Files: Lot 65 D 5, Israel, 1962. U.S. Milit. Asst.--Gen. 2-As. Secret. Drafted by Strong.

SUBJECT

Possible Sale of Hawks to Israel

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. Denis Speares, British Embassy
NE--Mr. Robert C. Strong

Referring to Mr. Strong's remarks on this subject on June 6,/2/ Mr. Speares said his Embassy had instructions to state the following:

/2/The memorandum of conversation between Strong and Speares on June 6 is *ibid.*, Central Files, 784A.56/6-662.

1. The Foreign Office was disturbed the USG was even thinking of providing missiles to Israel. The UK had earlier agreed with the US not to supply such weapons to Israel in advance of their supply to the Arabs by the Soviets. In any case, the UK cannot be put in the position of blocking its own firms from making such weapons while leaving the commercial advantage to the US. On June 13 the Israel Ambassador in London asked for basic information and advice regarding missiles. There are growing signs of Soviet intentions to sell missiles to Arab states. Thus the UK cannot now turn down the Israel request out of hand.

2. The Foreign Office would be glad to have assurances that the UK will receive as much advance information as possible of US intentions. Otherwise it cannot bind its own firms.

3. The Foreign Office agrees the Israeli case for ground-to-air missiles is becoming stronger but there is no need for action until there is firm evidence the Soviets are selling to the UAR. The UK has in mind giving a limited amount of basic information and advice to Israel but without commitment of future supply. The UK must consider the nature and extent of the information and advice to be provided and will inform the US when the decision is taken.

4. Otherwise the UK policy on the sale of guided missiles in the Near East is unchanged. The UK will keep in touch with the US.

Mr. Speares added that he had read Mr. Strong his instructions, which were stated rather boldly, in order to be sure that nothing was lost in the recital. In his opinion, the intentions of the Foreign Office are to try to assure that the two governments remain in step both with regard to information to be provided Israel and in any commitment to supply missiles. Mr. Speares was most anxious to have an early reply.

Mr. Strong promised to inform his superiors promptly and would pass a reply as soon as possible; however, he could not predict when a reply would be forthcoming as the whole spectrum of US policy in the Near East had come under review in Athens and a good deal of work remained to be done.

Decisions

At its 1373rd meeting, on 9 November 1967, the Council decided to invite the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Israel and Jordan to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: Letter dated 7 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8226)".¹¹

At its 1375th meeting, on 13 November 1967, the Council decided to invite the representative of Syria to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

Resolution 242 (1967)

of 22 November 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area,

¹¹ *Ibid.*

Décisions

A sa 1373^e séance, le 9 novembre 1967, le Conseil a décidé d'inviter les représentants de la République arabe unie, d'Israël et de la Jordanie à participer, sans droit de vote, à la discussion de la question intitulée "La situation au Moyen-Orient : Lettre, en date du 7 novembre 1967, adressée au Président du Conseil de sécurité par le représentant permanent de la République arabe unie (S/8226)".

A sa 1375^e séance, le 13 novembre 1967, le Conseil a décidé d'inviter le représentant de la Syrie à participer, sans droit de vote, à la discussion de la question.

Résolution 242 (1967)

du 22 novembre 1967

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Exprimant l'inquiétude que continue de lui causer la grave situation au Moyen-Orient,

Soulignant l'inadmissibilité de l'acquisition de territoire par la guerre et la nécessité d'œuvrer pour une paix juste et durable permettant à chaque Etat de la région de vivre en sécurité,

Soulignant en outre que tous les Etats Membres, en acceptant la Charte des Nations Unies, ont contracté l'engagement d'agir conformément à l'Article 2 de la Charte,

1. *Affirme* que l'accomplissement des principes de la Charte exige l'instauration d'une paix juste et durable au Moyen-Orient qui devrait comprendre l'application des deux principes suivants :

- i) Retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit;
- ii) Cessation de toutes assertions de belligérance ou de tous états de belligérance et respect et reconnaissance de la souveraineté, de l'intégrité territoriale et de l'indépendance politique de chaque Etat de la région et de leur droit de vivre en paix à l'intérieur de frontières sûres et reconnues à l'abri de menaces ou d'actes de force;

2. *Affirme en outre* la nécessité

a) De garantir la liberté de navigation sur les voies d'eau internationales de la région;

b) De réaliser un juste règlement du problème des réfugiés;

c) De garantir l'inviolabilité territoriale et l'indépendance politique de chaque Etat de la région, par

¹¹ *Ibid.*

through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting.

Decision

On 8 December 1967, the following statement which reflected the view of the members of the Council was circulated by the President as a Security Council document (S/8289):¹²

"As regards document S/8053/Add.3,¹² brought to the attention of the Security Council, the members, recalling the consensus reached at its 1366th meeting on 9 July 1967, recognize the necessity of the enlargement by the Secretary-General of the number of observers in the Suez Canal zone and the provision of additional technical material and means of transportation."

des mesures comprenant la création de zones démilitarisées;

3. *Prie* le Secrétaire général de désigner un représentant spécial pour se rendre au Moyen-Orient afin d'y établir et d'y maintenir des rapports avec les Etats intéressés en vue de favoriser un accord et de seconder les efforts tendant à aboutir à un règlement pacifique et accepté, conformément aux dispositions et aux principes de la présente résolution;

4. *Prie* le Secrétaire général de présenter aussitôt que possible au Conseil de sécurité un rapport d'activité sur les efforts du représentant spécial.

Adoptée à l'unanimité à la 1382^e séance.

Décision

Le 8 décembre 1967, le Président a fait distribuer, en tant que document du Conseil (S/8289¹²), la déclaration ci-après qui reflétait l'avis des membres du Conseil :

"En ce qui concerne le document S/8053/Add.3¹², soumis à l'attention du Conseil de sécurité, les membres de celui-ci, rappelant le consensus intervenu à sa 1366^e séance, le 9 juillet 1967, reconnaissent la nécessité de l'accroissement, par le Secrétaire général, du nombre des observateurs dans le secteur du canal de Suez et de la mise à la disposition de ceux-ci de matériel technique et de moyens de transport supplémentaires."

THE CYPRUS QUESTION¹³

Decision

At its 1362nd meeting, on 19 June 1967, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled "Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):¹⁴ report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/7969)".¹⁵

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Resolutions or decisions on this question were also adopted in 1963, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

¹⁴ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1963*.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967*.

LA QUESTION DE CHYPRE¹³

Décision

A sa 1362^e séance, le 19 juin 1967, le Conseil a décidé d'inviter les représentants de Chypre, de la Turquie et de la Grèce à participer, sans droit de vote, à la discussion de la question intitulée "Lettre, en date du 26 décembre 1963, adressée au Président du Conseil de sécurité par le représentant permanent de Chypre (S/5488¹⁴) : rapport du Secrétaire général sur l'Opération des Nations Unies à Chypre (S/7969¹⁵)".

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Question ayant fait l'objet de résolutions ou décisions de la part du Conseil en 1963, 1964, 1965 et 1966.

¹⁴ Voir *Documents officiels du Conseil de sécurité, dix-huitième année, Supplément d'octobre, novembre et décembre 1963*.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *vingt-deuxième année, Supplément d'avril, mai et juin 1967*.

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1964-1968, Volume XVIII
Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67

Department of State
Washington, DC

182. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/

Washington, March 8, 1965, 8:57 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Text received from the White House, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Jernegan. The substance of the telegram was apparently decided at a meeting of the President, McNamara, Rusk, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy between 6:01 and 7 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has been found. Briefing memoranda and draft cables prepared for the meeting are *ibid.*, National Security File, Country File, Harriman Israeli Mission (II), and in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470.

896. For Komer.

1. Since Israelis have delayed several days in making counter proposal, you should now approach Eshkol as soon as possible and seek his prompt agreement on carefully defined and limited agreement foreshadowed in Deptel 865./2/

/2/Document 175.

2. Terms and conditions of proposal are as follows:

(1) The US recognizes Israeli tank needs have increased because of prospective Jordan sale and possibility of non-delivery of 90 remaining German tanks. Accordingly, the US is now prepared to ensure sale on favorable credit terms of tanks to meet these changes as follows:

(a) 100 tanks for later delivery to match new Jordan sales, and

(b) 90 tanks for delivery in calendar year '66 if German agreement is not completed.

We can make these deliveries in form of **M-48A1 or M-48A3 tanks**, but you should point out that what we offer Israel we may have to offer Jordan.

(2) The USG is prepared to ensure opportunity for Israel to buy "a few" planes for later delivery, if not from Western sources, then from the United States. The USG does not believe it is in the interest of either government to decide now on exact model of airplane. FYI. "A few" means less than 20, which is the upper limit of possible sales under proposed Jordan agreement, and you should make this number privately known to Eshkol. End FYI.

(3) We wish to have a private agreement with Prime Minister Eshkol that Israel will not attack Jordan arms sale and that friends of Israel in the US will be given clear private guidance on this point. We ask this private agreement because we understand from Harriman/Komer mission that Government of Israel does plainly prefer US to USSR as Jordanian arms supplier. You should re-emphasize our understanding of this point and make it clear to Eshkol that if he takes a different view, now and not later is the time to say so.

(4) US undertakings on tanks and aircraft for Israel, as stated above, must be kept wholly secret for as long as possible in interest of both governments, and there must be agreement to consult fully on means of handling public statements when they become necessary.

3. You and Ambassador are authorized to develop argumentation for this straightforward agreement in the light of your own understanding of thinking of GOI. The following arguments seem important to us:

(1) Unless Israelis will tell us that they prefer Soviet arms to Jordan, we must move promptly with Hussein. But we greatly prefer not to make a deal with Hussein unless we have an understanding with Eshkol, and therefore such understanding is increasingly urgent unless Israelis wish to take responsibility for driving Hussein to the Soviets.

(2) The offer to find necessary tanks up to a total of 190 should more than meet immediate Israeli concerns deriving from Jordan sale and possible German shortfall.

(3) Similarly, offer to join in finding "a few" aircraft represents precisely what Eshkol asked for in his aside to you. First military analysis suggests that B-66 is not at all what Israelis really want, in either political or military terms. It would outrage Cairo but not offer best capabilities. There are a number of other planes, both US and European, which deserve careful study before a decision is made. In this situation it is much better not to decide on specific aircraft or means of ensuring sale. We have taken full note both of Eshkol's aside to you and of his statement that Israelis can find the funds they need. We believe him on both counts. He in turn should believe us when we say that we will help. This offer in fact goes beyond any commitment we will now make to Jordan.

(4) You should make it absolutely clear that broader agreement initially proposed by Harriman now seems to us wholly impracticable. Our offer to supply arms in the future was carefully hedged and made contingent upon Israeli acceptance of undertakings on Jordan waters and on nuclear development which are flatly unacceptable to the GOI. We recognize and accept that it is impossible for Eshkol to abandon final sovereign right of decision. But what is true for Prime Minister is just as true for the President. We therefore conclude that it is much better for both governments to reach a clear agreement now on the issues which need decision and to proceed as friends in the future, treating wider issues on their merits. We both will be free to press our view on these wide issues, always within the framework of recognition by both governments of their deep common interest in preserving the peace both by limiting the arms race and by avoiding a dangerous imbalance of power. FYI. If necessary to reach agreement, we could consider a reaffirmation of US policy in this sense, just as we are ready to reaffirm our policy on Jordan waters as stated in Shriver letter and our readiness to press Hussein for agreement to keep tanks east of the river. End FYI.

4. You should make it very clear to Eshkol that if this generous solution to the immediate problem is not acceptable, your mission will be at an end and it may become necessary for

USG to make its own decision on Jordan even without Israeli support. You should make it clear as your own personal judgment that, without agreement, Washington would have to reach and publicize its own judgment that Israelis themselves prefer US supply to Jordan, as against Moscow. The US and Israel have now spent a month exploring alternatives and we are not prepared to allow the Government of Israel to bargain indefinitely in search of advantage from a US decision which in and of itself already serves true Israeli interest.

5. Finally, you should make it very clear indeed that we are not ready to accept a shift in the arena of discussion either by a special Israeli emissary to Washington or by an attempted end-run through friends of Israel in the United States. Such tactics are certain to react adversely to the interests of Israel. We have now made this point clear on about five occasions to friends of Israel in Washington and we are not pleased by continuing efforts to use these side channels.

Rusk

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
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Department of State
Washington, DC

49. Memorandum for the Record/1/

Washington, April 30, 1964.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Jernegan.

SUBJECT

Standing Group Meeting on Israeli Requests for U.S. Tanks/2/

/2/A draft summary record of the meeting by NSC Executive Secretary Bromley Smith indicates that the meeting was at 5:15 p.m. It presents the conclusions set forth in this memorandum in summary form and adds that the Standing Group agreed on a further effort to persuade Nasser to refrain from a missile program. (Ibid., Files of Robert Komer, Israel Security (Tanks), Nov. 1963-June 1964)

The Group met in the White House Situation Room on April 30. Those present were: Mr. McGeorge Bundy, White House, (in the Chair); Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman; Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance; Deputy Director of CIA Ray Cline; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Sloan; Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, JCS; Mr. Robert W. Komer, White House; Mr. Bromley Smith, White House; and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John D. Jernegan. After discussion of the papers presented, it was decided:

1) The United States could not afford the losses in the Arab States which would be caused by its agreement to furnish the requested tanks to Israel; 2) nevertheless, Israel had a valid need for the tanks and failure to meet it in some way would generate unacceptable pressures against the Administration and in particular against the Foreign Aid Bill; 3) therefore, the United States should make a strong affirmative effort to assist Israel in obtaining tanks from other nations, the most promising sources being Great Britain, France, and West Germany; 4) it would be highly desirable to communicate the decision on this matter to the Israelis before the visit to Washington of Prime Minister Eshkol on June 1 and to be able to assure them that there were good prospects for purchases outside the United States; 5) knowledgeable, high level representatives of the Department of Defense should proceed promptly to London, Paris and Bonn to explore the question with top officials of the three governments; 6) since European tanks were likely to cost more and be less immediately available than American

tanks, the United States should be prepared to offer additional economic aid to Israel to compensate for this extra cost and delay; the United States should also seek other means of showing its friendship and support for Israel at the time of Mr. Eshkol's visit--in this connection there was discussion of the possibility of proposing a cooperative project in desalination with nuclear power.

It was agreed that it was important to satisfy the Government of Israel that its needs would be fully met. It was further agreed that the initial investigation regarding tank availability in Europe should be kept very quiet.

Dwight Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" Address to the UN General Assembly, December 8 1953

Madame President, Members of the General Assembly:

When Secretary General Hammarskjöld's invitation to address this General Assembly reached me in Bermuda, I was just beginning a series of conferences with the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of Great Britain and of France. Our subject was some of the problems that beset the world.

During the remainder of the Bermuda Conference, I had constantly in mind that ahead of me lay a great honor. That honor is mine today as I stand here, privileged to address the General Assembly of the United Nations.

At the same time that I appreciate the distinction of addressing you, I have a sense of exhilaration as I look upon this assembly.

Never before in history has so much hope for so many people been gathered together in a single organization. Your deliberations and decisions during these somber years have already realized part of those hopes.

But the great tests and the great accomplishments still lie ahead. And in the confident expectation of those accomplishments, I would use the office which, for the time being, I hold, to assure you that the Government of the United States will remain steadfast in its support of this body. This we shall do in the conviction that you will provide a great share of the wisdom, of the courage and the faith which can bring to this world lasting peace for all nations and happiness and well-being for all men.

Clearly, it would not be fitting for me to take this occasion to present to you a unilateral American report on Bermuda. Nevertheless, I assure you that in our deliberations on that lovely island we sought to invoke those same great concepts of universal peace and human dignity which are so cleanly etched in your Charter.

Neither would it be a measure of this great opportunity merely to recite, however hopefully, pious platitudes.

I therefore decided that this occasion warranted my saying to you some of the things that have been on the minds and hearts of my legislative and executive associates and on mine for a great many months-thoughts I had originally planned to say primarily to the American people.

I know that the American people share my deep belief that if a danger exists in the world, it is a danger shared by all-and equally, that if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope should be shared by all.

Finally, if there is to be advanced any proposal designed to ease, even by the smallest measure, the tensions of today's world, what more appropriate audience could there be than the members of the General Assembly of the United Nations?

LANGUAGE OF ATOMIC WARFARE

I feel impelled to speak today in a language that, in a sense, is new-one, which I, who spent so much of my life in the military profession, would have preferred never to use. That new language is the language of atomic warfare

The atomic age has moved forward at such a pace that every citizen of the world should have some comprehension, at least in comparative terms, of the extent of this development, of the utmost significance to every one of us. Clearly, if the people of the world are to conduct an intelligent search for peace, they must be armed with the significant facts of today's existence.

My recital of atomic danger and power is necessarily stated in United States terms, for these are the only incontrovertible facts that I know. I need hardly point out to this assembly, however, that this subject is global, not merely national in character.

On July 16, 1945, the United States set off the world's first atomic test explosion. Since that date in 1945, the United States of America has conducted forty-two test explosions.

Atomic bombs today are more than twenty-five times as powerful as the weapons with which the atomic age dawned, while hydrogen weapons are in the ranges of millions of tons of TNT equivalent.

Today, the United States' stockpile of atomic weapons, which, of course, increases daily, exceeds by many times the explosive equivalent of the total of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and every gun in every theaters of war through all the years of World War II.

A single air group, whether afloat or land based, can now deliver to any reachable target a destructive cargo exceeding in power all the bombs that fell on Britain in all of World War II.

In size and variety the development of atomic weapons has been no less remarkable. This development has been such that atomic weapons have virtually achieved conventional status within our armed services. In the United States services, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force and the Marine Corps are all capable of putting this weapon to military use.

But the dread secret and the fearful engines of atomic might are not ours alone.

In the first place, the secret is possessed by our friends and Allies, Great Britain and Canada, whose scientific genius made a tremendous contribution to our original discoveries and the designs of atomic bombs.

The secret is also known by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has informed us that, over recent years, it has devoted extensive resources to atomic weapons. During this period, the Soviet Union has exploded a series of atomic devices, including at least one involving thermo-nuclear reactions.

MONOPOLY IS NOW ENDED

If at one time the United States possessed what might have been called a monopoly of atomic power, that monopoly ceased to exist several years ago. Therefore, although our earlier start has permitted us to accumulate what is today a great quantitative advantage, the atomic realities of today comprehend two facts of even greater significance.

First, the knowledge now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others, possibly all others.

Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a consequent capability of devastating retaliation, is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression.

The free world, at least dimly aware of these facts, has naturally embarked on a large program of warning and defense systems. That program will be accelerated and expanded.

But let no one think that the expenditure of vast sums for weapons and systems of defense can guarantee absolute safety for the cities and the citizens of any nation. The awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb does not permit of such an easy solution. Even against the most powerful defense, an aggressor in possession of the effective minimum number of atomic bombs or a surprise attack could probably place a sufficient number of his bombs on the chosen targets to cause hideous damage.

Should such an atomic attack be launched against the United States, our reaction would be swift and resolute. But for me to say that the defense capabilities of the United States are such that they could inflict terrible losses upon an aggressor - for me to say that the retaliation capabilities of the United States are so great that such an aggressor's land would be laid waste - all this, while fact, is not the true expression of the purpose and the hope of the United States.

To pause there would be to confirm the hopeless finality of a belief that two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently to eye each other indefinitely across a trembling world. To stop there would be to accept helplessly the probability of civilization destroyed-the annihilation of the irreplaceable heritage of mankind handed down to us generation from generation - and the condemnation of mankind to begin all over again the age-old struggle upward from savagery toward decency and right and justice.

NO VICTORY IN DESOLATION

Surely no sane member of the human race could discover victory in such desolation. Could anyone wish his name to be coupled by history with such human degradation and destruction?

Occasional pages of history do record the faces of the "Great Destroyers" but the whole book of history reveals mankind's never-ending quest for peace and mankind's God-given capacity to build.

It is with the book of history, and not with isolated pages, that the United States will ever wish to be identified. My country wants to be constructive, not destructive. It wants agreements, not wars, among nations. It wants, itself, to live in freedom and in the confidence that the people of every other nation enjoy equally the right of choosing their own way of life.

So my country's purpose is to help us move out of the dark chamber of horrors into the light, to find a way by which the minds of men, the hopes of men, the souls of men everywhere, can move forward toward peace and happiness and well-being.

In this quest, I know that we must not lack patience.

I know that in a world divided, such as ours today, salvation cannot be attained by one dramatic act.

I know that many steps will have to be taken over many months before the world can look at itself one day and truly realize that a new climate of mutually peaceful confidence is abroad in the world.

But I know, above all else, that we must start to take these steps - now.

The United States and its Allies, Great Britain and France, have, over the past months, tried to take some of these steps. Let no one say that we shun the conference table.

On the record has long stood the request of the United States, Great Britain and France, to negotiate with the Soviet Union the problems of a divided Germany.

On that record has long stood the request of the same three nations to negotiate an Austrian peace treaty.

On the same record still stands the request of the United Nations to negotiate the problems of Korea.

CONFERENCE WITH THE RUSSIANS

Most recently, we have received from the Soviet Union what is in effect an expression of willingness to hold a four-power meeting. Along with our Allies, Great Britain and France, we were pleased to see that this note did not contain the unacceptable preconditions previously put forward.

As you already know from our joint Bermuda communique, the United States, Great Britain and France have agreed promptly to meet with the Soviet Union.

The Government of the United States approaches this conference with hopeful sincerity. We will bend every effort of our minds to the single purpose of emerging from that conference with tangible results toward peace-the only true way of lessening international tension.

We never have, we never will, propose to suggest that the Soviet Union surrender what is rightfully theirs.

We will never say that the peoples of Russia are an enemy with whom we have no desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful relationship.

On the contrary, we hope that this coming conference may initiate a relationship with the Soviet Union which will eventually bring about a free intermingling of the peoples of the East and of the West-the one sure, human way of developing the understanding required for confident and peaceful relations.

Instead of the discontent which is now settling upon Eastern Germany, occupied Austria and the countries of Eastern Europe, we seek a harmoni-ous family of free European nations, with none a threat to the other, and least of all a threat to the peoples of Russia.

Beyond the turmoil and strife and misery of Asia, we seek peaceful op-portunity for these peoples to develop their natural resources and to elevate their lot.

These are not idle words of shallow vision. Behind them lies a store of nations lately come to independence, not as a result of war but through free grant or peaceful negotiation. There is a record already written of assistance gladly given by nations of the West to needy peoples and to those suffering the temporary effects of famine, drought and natural disaster.

These are deeds of peace. They speak more loudly than promises or pro-testations of peaceful intent.

WOULD EXPLORE EVERY CHANNEL

But I do not wish to rest either upon the reiteration of past proposals or the restatement of past deeds. The gravity of the time is such that every new avenue of peace, no matter how dimly discernible, should be explored.

There is at least one new avenue of peace which has not yet been well explored - an avenue now laid out by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In its resolution of November 18, 1953, this General Assembly suggested - and I quote - "that the Disarmament Commission study the desirability of establishing a subcommittee consisting of representatives of the powers principally involved, which should seek, in private, an acceptable solution - and report such a solution to the General Assembly and to the Security Council not later than 1 September, 1954."

The United States, heeding the suggestion of the General Assembly of the United Nations, is instantly prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be "principally involved," to seek "an acceptable solution to the atomic armaments race which overshadows not only the peace but the very life of the world.

We shall carry into these private or diplomatic talks a new conception.

The United States would seek more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes.

It is not enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.

The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon for the benefit of all mankind.

The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no dream of the future. That capability, already proved, is here now - today. Who can doubt, if the entire body of the world's scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material with which to test and develop their ideas, that this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient and economic usage.

To hasten the day when fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds of people and the governments of the East and West there are certain steps that can be taken now.

I therefore make the following proposals:

The governments principally involved to the extent permitted by elementary prudence, to begin now and continue to make joint contributions from their stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic energy agency. We would expect that such an agency would be set up under the aegis of the United Nations.

The ratios of contributions, the procedures and other details would properly be within the scope of the "private conversations" I have referred to earlier.

The United States is prepared to undertake these explorations in good faith. Any partner of the United States acting in the same good faith will find the United States a not unreasonable or ungenerous associate.

Undoubtedly initial and early contributions to this plan would be small in quantity. However, the proposal has the great virtue that it can be under-taken without irritations and mutual suspicions incident to any attempt to set up a completely acceptable system of world-wide inspection and control.

The atomic energy agency could be made responsible for the impounding, storage and protection of the contributed fissionable and other material. The ingenuity of our scientists will provide special, safe conditions under which such a bank of fissionable material can be made essentially immune to surprise seizure.

The more important responsibility of this atomic energy agency would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the power-starved areas of the world. Thus the contributing powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind.

OUTLINES PLAN FOR CONGRESS

The United States would be more than willing - it would be proud - to take up with others "principally involved" the development of plans where-by such peaceful use of atomic energy would be expedited.

Of those "principally involved" the Soviet Union must, of course, be one.

I would be prepared to submit to the Congress of the United States, and with every expectation of approval, any such plan that would:

First, encourage world-wide investigation into the most effective peace-time uses of fissionable material;

Second, begin to diminish the potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles;

Third, allow all peoples of all nations to see that, in this enlightened age, the great powers of the earth, both of the East and of the West, are interested in human aspirations first rather than building up the armaments of war;

Fourth, open up a new channel for peaceful discussion and initiate at least a new approach to the many difficult problems that must be solved in both private and public conversations if the world is to shake off the inertia imposed by fear and is to make positive progress toward peace.

Against the dark background of the atomic bomb, the United States does not wish merely to present strength, but also the desire and the hope for peace.

The coming months will be fraught with fateful decisions. In this Assembly, in the capitals and military headquarters of the world; in the hearts of men everywhere, be they governed or governors, may they be the decisions which will lead this world out of fear and into peace.

To the making of these fateful decisions, the United States pledges before you - and therefore before the world - its determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma - to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.

I again thank the delegates for the great honor they have done me in inviting me to appear before them and in listening to me so courteously.

Thank you.

**FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968, Volume XVIII
Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67**

**Department of State
Washington, DC**

/4/Text of the statement, which President Kennedy made at a news conference on May 8, 1963, is printed in *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963*, p. 373.

/5/Reference is to a letter from Kennedy given to Eshkol on October 3, 1963; for text, see *Foreign Relations, 1961-1963*, vol. XVIII, Document 332.

Israel has presented a sizeable request for military assistance. On the list in 1963 were a public security guarantee, secret contingency planning, naval equipment, surface-to-surface missiles, grant-aid United States tanks (300 now, 200 later), etc. Our November exchanges with the Israelis indicated that these requests are out of line with Israel's actual military needs.

Israel needs gradual modernization of its tank and anti-tank defenses. In other respects it has a healthy margin of superiority for some years to come. The UAR's showcase missiles are in fact only that, not a military threat, and will probably remain so unless Israel gets into serious missilery and the UAR then turns to the Soviets for help. The UAR missiles point up, however, the domestic psychological problem Israel's leaders face.

The Israelis and others have made efforts to downgrade our capability and commitment to defend Israel. Without going so far toward Israel that we break the bond of confidence we have developed with the Arabs and risk creating a vastly dangerous USSR/Arab versus United States/Israel lineup, we can lay more effective emphasis on what we have very generously done and are doing to help. And there are certain new moves we can make in 1964 that will please Israel and help meet its domestic political problem (and ours). Details of both are in the second enclosure.

In addition, however, we need to work at measures to curb the arms race and enhance stability. To that end:

a) We should continue active exploration of arms limitation and control. Secretary Rusk has spoken to Foreign Minister Gromyko about the possibility of mutual restraint in the disposition of obsolete weapons. Our Ambassador in Cairo has begun to probe his Soviet colleague on aspects of arms control in the area. We have talked to Nasser secretly about the United States becoming a kind of guarantor for working arrangements to control the escalation of arms. There is discussion of arms control, as well as nuclear free zone possibilities, in the United Nations context. From all of these not much has opened up so far, but the time might come when we could do something serious with the Russians about restraint. Our capability to deal with all parties in this field is enhanced by our traditional Near East arms policy.

b) We should make clear on appropriate public occasions that we will defend the independence of all Near East states and will resist aggression in any form.

c) If we facilitate solution of Israel's tank problem, we should get assurance in return that Israel will not plunge the Near East into either the sophisticated missile or the nuclear weapons field.

Arab Refugees: 1964 will be the year of turn-around on this problem. President Kennedy's talk with Ben-Gurion in May 1961/⁶ and letters to Arab leaders launched a major initiative designed, if successful, to eliminate, over several years, this problem that bulks so large in the Arab-Israel dilemma.⁷ Negotiations over the next several months will show whether this can proceed fruitfully.

⁶For a memorandum of Kennedy's meeting with Ben Gurion on May 30, 1961, see *ibid.*, vol. XVII, Document 57.

⁷United States supported the 1961 appointment of a Special Representative of the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) to conduct indirect negotiations between Israel and the Arab states toward a resolution of the Palestinian refugee question. After meeting with Arab and Israeli leaders, Special Representative Joseph E. Johnson submitted his proposals to the PCC on August 31, 1962. For an August 7, 1962, memorandum from Rusk to Kennedy summarizing the background of the initiative and Johnson's proposals, see *ibid.*, vol. XVIII, Document 15. Extensive documentation concerning the initiative is *ibid.*, volumes XVII and XVIII.

The chances, frankly, are not good. Neither the Arabs nor Israel accepted Dr. Joseph Johnson's proposals, and Israel's public rejection of any settlement based on existing United Nations resolutions has further compounded the problem. If we fail, we could probably buy time by continuing to support UNRWA indefinitely (an unpopular course in Congress), or perhaps could phase it out gradually over a period of years. We must expect, however, a storm in the United Nations should the Arabs read this as our goal. We have already tightened UNRWA's belt. The climax will come next fall when the General Assembly must determine UNRWA's future.

Whatever the outcome, a heavy investment of United States influence will be required if area stability is to be preserved over this important issue.

Oil: From the oil producing countries (organized through OPEC) we now face the most intensive pressures for major concession revisions that have ever been put forward. Our influence will be needed on all sides to help maintain the rapport and trust needed between the companies and governments to prevent changes that would entail either chaos or injury to United States private investment in this vital sector. The threat of Arab sanctions against Western oil interests in reaction to Israel's diversion of Jordan waters may not materialize but is another aspect showing the context in which our interests in the Near East must be viewed.

Intra-Arab Relations: Arab actions on these five problems will be shaped by the state of their own relations. Divided and quarreling as they are today, Arab politicians find a hard line against Israel inescapable. This increases the risk of irrational explosion on any of the big problems.

Without the UAR, no Arab state or combination of states could really damage Israel. Knowing this, other states--most actively, Syria--seek to embroil the UAR with Israel on, for example, Jordan waters and Palestine refugees. A major object of our policy toward the UAR is to persuade Nasser that he is wise to keep Israeli issues "in the icebox," as his Ambassador says. Similarly, our purpose in Yemen is to prevent a conflagration that might involve other Arab states and ultimately Israel.

In intra-Arab tensions, as in other problems cited here, the key is balance and a careful husbanding of limited and hard-won U.S. influence.

Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume XVIII, Near Esst, 1962-1963

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 18-44

21. Letter From President Kennedy to Prime Minister Ben Gurion/1/

Washington, August 15, 1962.

/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Israel, 8/10/62-8/16/62. No classification marking. A handwritten note reads: "orig given to State Dept. officer at Israel mtg. cc to S/S 8/16."

Dear Mr. Prime Minister: I take considerable pleasure in our recent exchange of letters. I am confident you share my view that not only have the mutual interests of Israel and the United States been advanced but that in these matters we have achieved a high degree of understanding and confidence.

I have noted of late with deep satisfaction that Israel's frontiers have been calmer and that the disturbing rash of incidents of the spring and early summer has been largely dissipated. It is a hopeful sign that both Syria and Jordan have given the United States categorical assurances that they wish to avoid trouble on their borders with Israel and to cooperate fully with the United Nations instruments. If means can be found to perpetuate these Arab resolves, and in light of your assurances to me, a significant step will have been taken toward the permanent peace we all seek.

As you know, Mr. Prime Minister, the Department of State and members of my staff have been reviewing intensively certain matters that are of prime importance to Israel's security and well-being as well as to the improvement in the atmosphere in the Near East and in prospects for peace. I refer to Israel's requests for a security guarantee and for the Hawk missile, and to the mission of Dr. Joseph E. Johnson as Special Representative of the Conciliation Commission for Palestine. I have now examined these questions. It is my conclusion that they are of such significance, and the time factor is of such urgency, as to justify dispatching a special emissary in the next day or two to discuss them with you in the necessarily detailed manner impossible in the form of letters.

I have therefore requested Mr. Myer Feldman, my Special Assistant, to prepare to fly to Israel, without publicity, in order to acquaint you privately and in confidence with our viewpoints, to learn your thinking, and to seek to find, with you, the bases for an understanding. Mr. Feldman has my complete confidence and is fully knowledgeable of my thinking. I shall be most appreciative therefore if you will explore these matters with him. I am convinced that our mutual interests will be well served by achievement of an understanding. I hope to hear from you shortly of your willingness to receive Mr. Feldman.

I know of your concern, and that of the people of Israel, that the security and economic stability of Israel not be endangered in the process of resolving the Arab refugee problem. I wish to assure you that the United States Government will use its influence only in support of those proposals which do not involve serious risks for Israel.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy/2/

/2/Printed from a copy that indicates Kennedy signed the original.

Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961-1962

Released by the Office of the Historian

Documents 66-97

95. Paper Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/

JCSM-523-61

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5611/8-1461. Secret. A table of contents and summary are not printed. The source text is undated, but a covering memorandum on the copy in Department of Defense files indicates that Lemnitzer sent the paper to McNamara on August 8 with a recommendation that it be sent to the Department of State for comment. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 65 A 3464) The source text was transmitted to the Department of State under cover of a letter of August 14 from Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric to Secretary of State Rusk requesting Department of State consideration of the non-military points being recommended in the paper.

A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE ACQUISITION BY ISRAEL OF A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

I. The Problem

1. To:

- a. Develop a strategic analysis of the impact of the acquisition by Israel of a nuclear weapons capability on the United States and Free World security posture and deployments.
- b. Determine actions which should be taken by the United States relative to this capability.

II. Basic Assumption

2. There will be no arms control or nuclear weapons control measure established between the present time and the time when Israel could acquire a nuclear capability.

III. Technical Considerations Bearing on This Problem

3. Recent information confirms that Israel is engaged in construction of a 26 MW heavy water reactor and supporting facilities in the Negev at Dimona. Israeli officials state that the Dimona installation is to be a national laboratory for atomic research with the primary mission of achieving experience for the future construction of nuclear power stations. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The Dimona site will provide the Israelis with the necessary experience to develop plutonium production capability beginning with the processing of ore and proceeding through the separation of plutonium.
4. Extensive evidence exists that France has supplied plans, materials, equipment, and technical assistance to the Israelis, and is also training Israeli personnel. It is suspected that France will furnish ore probably under safeguards, in addition to the 85 tons which were reported to have been shipped from France to Israel. Israel has no large scale native source of uranium ore, and they have attempted to purchase ore from sources not requiring safeguard provisions. It is reported that an attempt is being made to purchase ore from Argentina. The Israelis have obtained assistance from Norway, including 20 tons of heavy water.
5. [7-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
6. The United Arab Republic (UAR) has a nuclear research program in operation, based on Soviet UAR agreements concluded in 1956. The urge behind the UAR program of atomic research appears to spring from a desire for prestige within the Arab world. The two megawatt Soviet-supplied research reactor now being

completed poses no military threat. Since the disclosure of the Israeli reactor site at Dimona, UAR press statements have implied that future UAR development might be of a military nature. However, it does not at this time seem probable that the UAR will be in a position to build or to operate a large reactor either for power or for weapons production, without substantial assistance from foreign experts.

IV. Impact of the Acquisition of a Nuclear Capability by Israel

7. General

a. The direct impact of Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons will be felt in the Middle East, specifically the Arab World. The indirect impact will be felt by each of the major world powers; however, these nations will be affected because of their interests in the Middle East, not because of any direct Israeli military threat or military advantage on a global scale.

b. In other words, Israel's military power, with or without nuclear weapons, must be viewed in relation to the basic issue which dominates Israel's foreign policy, i.e., her existence in the Middle East in opposition to the Arab States. Behind this basic issue are deep-seated disputes which do not seem capable of early solution; such as the question of boundaries, Arab refugees, freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba, Jordan River water problem, and the use of the Suez Canal. In 1948 and again in 1956 these disputes resulted in armed conflict with Israel showing a military superiority over her Arab neighbors. The UAR has sought, and is receiving increased military aid from the USSR.

8. Impact on Israel

a. It is not likely that Israel would use nuclear weapons to initiate a war in the Middle East, primarily due to the knowledge that such action would probably bring about severe international reactions, particularly from the United States and the USSR.

b. It may be expected, however, that Israel will use a nuclear capability as a powerful psychological weapon in an attempt to solve her basic problems with the Arab world. Israel may be expected to press its interests more vigorously and be less inclined to give concessions.

9. Impact on the Arab World

a. The acquisition of an Israeli nuclear weapons capability would further aggravate the existing Israel-Arab tensions, and the Arab world may be expected to blame the United States as well as the French for Israeli accomplishments in this field and to condemn the actions as a further manifestation of Western imperialism. Of all the Arab Governments the UAR will feel the most threatened and will probably take the lead in seizing the initiative for the Arab World leadership.

b. Under UAR leadership, the Arabs may impose sanctions against French and possibly US and other Western interests in the area. The transit of the Suez Canal and access to the Middle East oil are two examples of US interests which may be jeopardized. The UAR could exploit this issue in order to achieve a degree of cooperation among the separate Arab States.

c. The USSR would almost certainly not provide nuclear weapons to the UAR, or assistance in developing a capability for the production of fissionable material.^{/2/} However, the UAR would be expected to look to the USSR for compensating military aid and political support. It is almost certain that the USSR would accuse the United States of complicity with France in the nuclear arming of Israel and would cite this as new proof of the Colonialist and anti-Arab character of Western policy.

^{/2/}SNIE 100-8-60, paragraph 1C. [Footnote in the source text. SNIE 100-8-60, "Implications of the Acquisition by Israel of a Nuclear Weapons Capability", December 9, 1960, is not printed.]

10. Impact on the Soviet Bloc

a. The USSR will vigorously agitate the issue of a prospective Israeli nuclear capability. It may, for example, increase pressures on the United States and the United Kingdom for an agreement banning nuclear tests or even adopting broader prohibitions in the nuclear weapons field.

On the other hand, to justify a possible USSR desire to merge the test ban issue with the over-all disarmament problem, they may use the Israel nuclear potential as a pretext for discounting the test ban talks. The USSR will probably re-emphasize a former appeal for a nuclear free zone in the Middle East, to include Turkey. It will further exploit the matter to build up neutralist and Western support for its current proposals on general and complete disarmament./3/

/3/SNIE 100-8-60, paragraph 15. [Footnote in the source text.]

b. Apart from such manipulations, the Soviets will, in fact, be anxious to head off Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons. They are opposed to the spread of nuclear weapons. In addition, they recognize that this development will increase pressures from Communist China for Soviet assistance in achieving nuclear capability, and produce demands from the UAR along the same lines. On this account, it is possible that the Soviets would be led to make concessions in their negotiating position on nuclear testing; they would doubtless also calculate that the United States and the United Kingdom would themselves be under pressure to make concessions. In any event, they will probably make diplomatic approaches to the United States, designed to generate US pressure upon France and Israel./4/

/4/SNIE 100-8-60, paragraph 16. [Footnote in the source text.]

11. *Impact on the Free World*

a. Knowledge that Israel is well on the way to becoming a nuclear power is likely to bring greatly increased pressure in the West to check the spread of nuclear armaments. This pressure may be particularly strong from the smaller NATO countries and the neutral nations.

b. However, if Israel develops a demonstrable nuclear weapons capability, certain inhibitions against such development might disappear from small countries whose advanced industrial capacity could support such a development. Sweden, Switzerland and possibly Japan are examples.

c. The reaction of the emerging African nations will be particularly complicated. Disclosure of covert French support to Israel in this enterprise is likely to result in a wave of criticism of France, with such nations as the UAR, Guinea, Mali and Ghana advancing the concept of peaceful African solidarity. On the other hand, Israel's nuclear achievements may enhance its prestige among those African nations that have looked to Israel for technical assistance.

12. *Specific Impact on the United States*

a. The acquisition of a nuclear capability by Israel would not present a direct military threat against the United States or any US alliance. This acquisition would, however, have a definite and serious impact on US policies toward the Middle East and possibly toward France.

b. Further, this acquisition might tend to complicate any negotiations for a nuclear test ban agreement or other arms control measures, which might be in progress at the time.

c. Specifically, it is to the advantage of the United States to:

(1) Prevent armed conflict among Middle East nations.

(2) Decrease tensions in the Middle East so that solution of basic problems can be attempted through peaceful means.

d. Acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by either Israel or a nation of the Arab world would thus impede progress toward these US objectives. Moreover, if France, as the catalyst in this development, should attain strong influence over Israeli policy, differences between the US and French views within NATO, might be projected into the Middle East.

V. United States Actions Required To Counteract an Israeli Nuclear Capability

13. The United States should initiate the following courses of action toward the Middle East:

- a. Attempt by all feasible means, official, quasi-official and private, to convince Israel and France that the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by Israel would be against the best interests of the Free World, the Middle East and of Israel.
- b. Pursue this same policy toward the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by the Arab world, particularly the UAR.
- c. Attempt by all feasible means to convince Israel that it will be to her greatest benefit to use all available talent and material now assigned to the nuclear program on peaceful nuclear projects that will benefit Israel most in economic-political affairs.
- d. Maintain the capability to deploy sufficient force to the Middle East-Mediterranean-North Africa area to persuade both Israel and the Arab nations against the use of force to settle their intra-Middle East problems.
- e. Take the initiative, by using all available political and economic means, while maintaining a creditable US military capability, to resolve the sources of tension in the Middle East.
- f. *[4 lines of source text not declassified]*
- g. Prepare for the psychological impact on the Middle East and Africa of a nuclear weapons detonation by Israel. The objective should be to prevent Sino-Soviet orientation of the nations of these areas because of this development.

96. Editorial Note

On August 9, 1961, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Meyer sent the following telegram to Secretary Rusk, who was then in Paris attending a NATO Foreign Ministers conference:

"Dept continues to believe PCC-sponsored fact-finding mission to Near East capitals very desirable primarily to improve our posture when Arab refugee problem comes before UNGA this fall. In view shortage time we see no hope for securing services of a neutral Special Representative. Among Americans we consider Joseph Esrey Johnson of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace particularly well qualified. Before approaching him we would appreciate your concurrence and your permission to indicate to him your personal interest in his accepting this assignment. We have in mind a low-key two or three week visit by Special Representative to Near Eastern capitals and a report upon which constructive PCC proposals can be made to forthcoming UNGA." (Tosec 35; Department of State, Central Files, 325.84/8-961)

Rusk approved in principle having a personal message sent to Joseph Johnson. (Memorandum from Swank to Meyer, August 11; *ibid.*, NEA/NE Files: Lot 70 D 229, Refugees, PCC) On August 12, upon Rusk's return to Washington, Meyer sent a memorandum to the Secretary requesting that he telephone his personal friend Joseph Johnson to discuss the assignment. (*Ibid.*) On August 17, Rusk met with Johnson to express his personal appreciation for Johnson's accepting the assignment. (Memorandum of conversation; *ibid.*, Central Files, 325.84/8-1761)

Also on August 17, in circular telegram 277, the Department of State informed Near Eastern and selected European posts that Johnson had agreed to accept the assignment as PCC Special Representative and that PCC concurrence was being sought. The Department contemplated that Johnson would "take low key soundings at Foreign Minister level" tentatively beginning in Cairo about August 24, with subsequent visits to Beirut, Amman, and Tel Aviv. (*Ibid.*) The United Nations announced Johnson's appointment as the Special Representative of the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine on August 24. (Airgram to Amman and other posts, August 31; *ibid.*, 325.84/8-3161)

John F. Kennedy: 1961-63

107 - The President's News Conference of

March 21st, 1963

Source : The Public Papers of the Presidents, Public papers for President J. F. Kennedy 1961-1963

THE PRESIDENT. Good evening.

[1.] Last night I returned from a 3-day meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica, with the Presidents of the five Central American Republics and Panama. This was a most useful meeting. For the first time a President of the United States journeyed to Central America and conferred with all of the leaders of this vital area, which in terms of history, geography, common interest, and common goals is as closely allied with the United States as any area in the world. We agreed to continue our efforts under the Alliance for Progress to build and strengthen the machinery for economic cooperation with and among the nations of Central America and Panama, including the creation of a unified economic community in Central America. And we also agreed on the necessity for measures to halt the flow of agents, money, arms, and propaganda from Cuba to Central America.

Every nation present was determined that we would both protect ourselves against immediate danger and go forward with the great work of constructing dynamic, progressive societies, immune to the false promises of communism. This is the fourth Latin American country which I have visited. Here, as in all the others, we found a spontaneous outpouring of friendship and affection for the United States; and here, as in all the others, we saw impressive evidence of the work now being made and done under the Alliance for Progress.

Each trip makes it clear that Latin Americans, by an overwhelming majority are ready to work, to sacrifice, to fight if necessary, to maintain their own freedom and to build societies which serve the welfare of all their people. They lack only the full measure of resources necessary to build a hemisphere where all can be secure and free. They know that they bear the fundamental responsibility for their own welfare and progress, but the receptions we have received in Costa Rica, in Mexico, in Venezuela, and in Colombia demonstrate that they also know that we in the United States today have a deep concern for their problems, a common dedication to their aspirations, and a faithful commitment to help them in their efforts. For all these reasons, I return from San Jose with increased confidence that we will continue to live in a hemisphere of independent, firm, and faithful friends.

[2.] Q. Mr. President, did the Soviets honor their commitment on withdrawing troops from Cuba and where do we go from here?

THE PRESIDENT. We estimate that they have withdrawn approximately 3,000 troops in these past weeks. We are waiting to see whether more will be withdrawn, as we would hope they would be. The month of March is not finished yet and we should have a clearer idea as to what the total numbers should be in the coming days.

[3.] Q. Mr. President, could we speak, for a moment, about your travel plans. One, on your forthcoming trip to Italy and Germany, do you plan to visit Berlin? And second, do you intend to make a trip to South America later in the year?

THE PRESIDENT. I would hope that when I go to Germany that I would go to Berlin. I have no plans for any trip to Latin America this year. Though we have an agreement to visit Brazil, that trip has been postponed and no final date has yet been set.

[4.] Q. Mr. President, the TFX contract is causing a lot of controversy on Capitol Hill. Senator Symington told the Senate today that the investigation was affecting military morale and ought to be wound up quickly. How do you feel about it?

THE PRESIDENT. I see nothing wrong with the Congress looking at these matters. My judgment is that the decision reached by Secretary McNamara was the right one, sound one, and any fair and objective hearing will bring that out. Mr. McNamara chose the plane he chose because he felt it most efficient, because he thought it would do the job and because he thought it would save the Government hundreds of millions of dollars. Everything I have read about the TFX and seen about it confirms my impression that Mr. McNamara was right. We have a very good, effective Secretary of Defense with a great deal of courage, who is willing to make hard decisions, and who doesn't mind when they are made that a good many people don't like it.

This contract involves a large amount of money and naturally some people would prefer it to go another place than the place which the Secretary chose. I think the Secretary did the right thing and I think this investigation will bring that out, and I have no objection to anyone looking at the contract as long as they feel that a useful function is served.

Q. Do you think the hearing that has been held has been fair and objective?

THE PRESIDENT. I would think that I'm confident that we all know a lot more about the TFX than we did before, and that's a good thing. And my judgment is that the more this hearing goes on, the more convinced people are finally that Secretary McNamara is a very effective Secretary of Defense and that we're lucky to have him.

[5.] Q. Mr. President, the United States has long had a deep interest in South Korea and its independence and democracy. Last weekend there was an announcement by the military government of a bid to continue its power for 4 more years rather than turn affairs back to a civilian government after an election. Would you give us your views on that?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, as you know, the situation has been changing in South Korea very greatly in the last few days, and it's in some position of flux, so I don't think that it would be possible to make any final statement today.

We are continuing to maintain very close contact with what's going on there. We are anxious for stability in the area. We regard South Korea, of course, as an important interest in the security of Asia and therefore we are continuing to follow very closely the present discussions about the return of democratic government in South Korea. But as the situation is still not hardened, I don't think that anything I would say on it would be helpful, at least this week.

[6.] Q. Mr. President, is there anything to the reports that Postmaster General Day will be replaced before the next year's election campaign?

THE PRESIDENT. No. No.

[7.] Q. Mr. President, there were some reports in San Jose that the Central American Presidents wanted to take stronger action or decide upon stronger measures against Cuba than you were. I wonder if you could clarify whether that was the case or not.

THE PRESIDENT. No, no proposal came in any of the meetings that I had with the Presidents. As you know, one of the conclusions reached at San Jose was to take effective measures, by the countries involved, and also to ask the other countries of Latin America to take effective measures to stem the flow of arms and particularly of men who move by subterranean means, frequently, without passports,

from one country or another in Latin America, to Cuba, are trained and then come back for subversive activity. We are going to take effective means to attempt to control that traffic. There was no proposal.

I think they are quite aware that we have taken every conceivable action to isolate Cuba, that that's our ambition as long as Cuba maintains an association with the bloc, the Communists, and is used as a Communist military base.

I don't think that the Presidents of Latin America thought that further action, invasion, or blockade at this time would be fruitful. At least none of them made that proposal to me. And as you know, the burden of such an action would fall on the United States, and I think they're quite aware that the United States would have to carry out the action. We have responsibilities all through the world. You've just mentioned South Korea and Berlin, as an example of two areas where we have vital commitments, so that I think the Presidents of Central America are well aware that the United States is as anxious as they are to prevent the flow of communism in this hemisphere and that we are taking every action that we believe to be responsible and effective to achieve that end.

They also recognize that one of the most effective ways is to meet conditions in their own countries, to make sure that communism doesn't get a grip because of the failure of the economies. In one of the countries that we visited, 400 out of 1,000 children do not attend any school. We cannot expect stable, democratic societies to develop in an atmosphere where half of the population is illiterate.

Now, that's the kind of problem which has traditionally affected and infected Central America. The governments are attempting to meet these problems. We are attempting to help them through the Alliance for Progress. We believe that this is the most important step we can take now, combined with the actions we are presently taking against Cuba, which are well known.

[8.] Q. Mr. President, concerning effective action in another area, the Olympic games, some time ago you expressed concern that the amateur groups were bickering to such an extent that the U.S. might not be able to field a qualified team in the 1964 Olympics in Tokyo. Has that question been settled to your satisfaction? ¹ And two, will the United States grant the usual Federal money to aid in the effort to get the Olympic games to the United States and to Detroit specifically for the first time since 1932, in 1968?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, in the first place, as you know, General MacArthur did the arbitration, and did it most effectively; therefore, we feel that problem is going to be solved, in the question of accrediting amateur athletes.

¹ See 1962 volume, this series, Item 546 [2]. See also Item 7, above.

Secondly, on the question of where the 1968 Olympics will be, that's a matter for the Olympics Committee. If there is a chance to get it to the United States, we will strongly support it, and if Detroit is chosen, I would certainly be wholly in favor of the United States doing everything it could to make it a success. I'm a strong believer in the Olympic games, and I hope the United States has a strong amateur team representing this country, because this is a vigorous society, and we would like to demonstrate it.²

² On September 16, 1963, the President approved a joint resolution "favoring the holding of the Olympic games in America in 1968" (Public Law 88-124, 77 Stat. 156). The International Olympic Committee later announced that Mexico City had been selected as the site for 1968.

[9.] Q. Mr. President, you have been warning with repeated frequency lately about the possible dangers of a recession. Some of your supporters, both in and out of the administration, are expressing concern that your main thrust against it, namely, a large tax cut, may not get through this session. If that should happen to be the case or if you got an inadequate tax cut, do you have another alternative against recession?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, in the first place we don't believe that there will be a recession this year. The most recent economic indicators seem to me to be more encouraging than the ones that we had in

January when we stated that the chances were against a recession in 1963. But we also live with history, and we realize the rhythm of the 1958, and 1960, two recessions, and we don't want to duplicate that.

Now, our tax cut is predicated on the assumption of a \$10 billion tax cut over a period of 18 months, which combined with the budget we had we felt combined thrust to the economy and also a degree of fiscal responsibility. If you are suggesting that I would look with equanimity upon the failure of Congress to act this year on a tax cut, that would be wholly wrong.

If we get through this year in good condition economically, we come into 1964. We know, as I said, something about the rhythm of the business cycle. We had two recessions in 2 years in the end of the fifties.

So I would think that merely because our prospects look good in 1963, I would think that that is all the more pressing for us to take action in time. Now, if we don't take action in time, and we move into a recession, we have to take a good deal more action than we would have if we had taken it before the recession came upon us, and we have to take action to put people to work. We already have too high a rate of unemployment, and if we get into a recession, it would go much higher than that.

So that I would think that everything, most of all common prudence, indicates and dictates that we get a tax cut this year which, combined with the expenditure level we have in the Government, we believe represents the best combination. So I would be very concerned if we did not get it this year.

Q. What I really meant, sir, was what do you plan to do if you don't get the tax cut?

THE PRESIDENT. I plan to get the tax cut.

[10.] Q. Mr. President, are you aware of any international significance to the meeting between Pope John and Mr. Adzhubei, Khrushchev's son-in-law?

THE PRESIDENT. No, some historic interest, but not any underlying international significance. As you know, Mr. Adzhubei stated when he got through that there was no coexistence between the ideologies of Pope John and Mr. Khrushchev, and that has been my view for a long time. But I think that what Pope John is interested in, of course, is seeing--and I think other religious leaders are interested in preventing a nuclear war. So that he believes, I think probably, that communication is one of the means by which we can achieve that objective.

[11.] Q. Mr. President, would you now give us a report on the exploratory talks on the NATO nuclear force, and what you see as the prospects for that force?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, I'm going to see Mr. Merchant¹ tomorrow. I understand he is encouraged by his trip. He is going back again in April. We are hopeful that it may be worked out. As I have said before, this is a proposal that we are making to the Europeans to meet a need which they've suggested. This is not a proposal which we feel essential to the security of the United States. It is a proposal which we have advanced to meet the security needs of Western Europe. So Mr. Merchant will travel again to the countries, the NATO countries, that he did not visit. Now we ought to know by May whether we are going to be able to make some progress.

¹ Livingston T. Merchant, Special Representative for Multilateral Force Negotiations.

In any case, by the Ottawa meeting¹ we should have made some progress on multinational nuclear forces, and we should have a clearer idea on whether we are going to carry through on multilateral nuclear forces.

¹ NATO Ministerial Council meeting in Ottawa, May 22-24.

[12.] Q. Mr. President, sometime in 1963, the Soviets are scheduled to launch two spacecraft and perform a rendezvous and a docking and the men are supposed to change ships. Now I am told if this happens it puts them in a position of being able to mount a nuclear weapon in space, and if that

happens, what would be the American response? Would we try to do likewise? Or would we try to shoot it down?

THE PRESIDENT. These are all presumptions that I wouldn't be able to comment on. The United States is making, as you know, a major effort in space and will continue to do so. We are expending an enormous sum of money to make sure that the Soviet Union does not dominate space. We will continue to do it. And we will continue to take whatever steps are necessary to prevent any action against the United States.

The fact of the matter is the Soviet Union today with a nuclear weapon can reach the United States with a missile. So that I would have to know in more precise detail than you have described the exact nature of our threat before I suggested what our counter action would be.

[13.] Q. Mr. President, Radio Moscow said today that the Cuban exiles who say they shot up a Russian ship and an army camp on Monday, that these men were hirelings of the United States and that they were carrying out secret American orders. What have you to say to this?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, as you know, our best information is that they did not come from the United States. We have already indicated that we do not feel that these kinds of raids serve a useful purpose. It seems to me in some ways they strengthen the Russian position in Cuba and the Communist control of Cuba and justify repressive measures within Cuba which might otherwise not be regarded as essential. So that we have not supported this and these men do not have a connection with the United States Government. I think a raid which goes in and out does indicate the frustrations of Cuban exiles who want to get back home and who want to strike some blow, but I don't think that it increases the chances of freeing Cuba.

[14.] Q. Mr. President, I believe the British Commonwealth-U.S. military survey team is back from India and has made its report to you. And I wonder what your views are now, sir, regarding India's military needs now that the spring is upon the country and the snows have melted and presumably the Chinese menace can be looked at more realistically?

THE PRESIDENT. We haven't completed the report or our consultation with the British as a result of the report.

[15.] Q. Mr. President, the trade of our Western European allies, the four principal ones, reportedly has quadrupled in the last 8 years in trade with the Soviet Union. Is this alarming to the administration and, if so, are any effective measures being taken to curtail it?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, we have attempted, in NATO, to maintain the Co-Com list which is a list of those materials which are shipped from the free world to the Communist world which would help them strategically and would help them in the event of War.

There is pressure always to dilute this list, and a good many of these countries depend upon trade and they want to trade with the Soviet Union. We have kept our trade, as you know, to a minimum, particularly because the Soviet Union does not show a great desire to trade in consumer items but instead wants heavy industrial items which could be important strategically.

We strongly believe in supporting the Co-Com list and we would continue to do so. There are pressures against it. But so far there has been general observance by NATO.

[16.] Q. Mr. President, as you know, the Cleveland-New York newspapers have been out of operation for almost 4 months now. After your last rather strong statement on the situation¹ there was an improvement, but now it has lapsed back again. Is there any comment that you care to make on this?

THE PRESIDENT. No, there seems to be some hope that in the next few days that there will be an acceptance of the offer that Mayor Wagner made in the New York case which I thought was a very fair offer. I understand that the head of the printers is attempting to use his influence as well as the influence of others in attempting to have the printers accept it.

¹See Item 35 [11].

That also leaves the Cleveland strike which has gone on for a longer time than the New York strike. I hope we can get that one adjusted, too, because that city also needs its papers. I am hopeful that if New York moves in the next few days that Cleveland will also.

[17.] Q. Mr. President, the House Un-American Activities Committee has been trying since last October to get some information from the Justice Department and the State Department about traveling United States citizens who are going in and out of Cuba by way of Mexico. They don't seem to be able to get any information on this, but some of these citizens come back and advertise lectures on the advantages of Castro's Cuba.

I am wondering how we can expect offer countries to restrict this type of travel, as you say we plan to do in Nicaragua, I believe

THE PRESIDENT. No, in Costa Rica.

Q. Well--I am wondering how we can expect other countries to stem this travel if we don't try to stem it by enforcing the McCarran-Walter Act?

THE PRESIDENT. I would think the Justice Department would be delighted to give any information. We have taken action, as you know, against some people who have gone to Cuba without a permit, or without permission of the United States Government. There has been some criticism, as a matter of fact, of an action we took against a newspaperman. We would attempt to and I would be delighted--I would ask, if it has not already done so, and I would be surprised if it has not already done so--I would be very surprised if the Justice Department has not made available all the information that the congressional committee requested. But if they have not done so, I will be sure to instruct them to do so.

Q. Mr. President, at the Costa Rica meeting the Declaration of Central America ¹ carries a rather intriguing phrase. It is that: "Cuba will soon join the family of free nations." I wondered if there is anything that you gentlemen know about that that you could tell us that we don't know.

THE PRESIDENT. No, I think the strong conviction is that the people of Latin America want to be free, they don't want to live under a tyranny, and that Cuba will be free. That is the conviction of the people of Central America and Latin America. And that's the conviction of the people of the United States.

¹Printed in the Department of State Bulletin (vol. 48, p. 515).

[18.] Q. Mr. President, the Civil Rights Commission for months has been trying to hold a hearing in Mississippi. Do you feel that this hearing should be delayed any longer?

THE PRESIDENT. No, that is a judgment the Civil Rights Commission should--any time, any hearing that they feel advances the cause or meets their responsibility which has been entrusted to them by the law, then they should go ahead and hold it.

[19.] Q. Mr. President, the TFX fighter plane controversy has drawn more attention to Senator Case's criticism of those politicians who in recent campaigns have urged the public to elect candidates on the grounds that they can bring more big defense contracts into those particular States, the implication being that they could use political influence to do this. Now, do you feel that this sort of a proposition to the public builds confidence that these big defense contracts are being let fairly?

THE PRESIDENT. I think the contracts are being let fairly. But of course, there's great competition, and it's no wonder because thousands of people, jobs are involved. The fact of the matter is defense contracts have been concentrated in two or three States, really, in space contracts, because those States have had the historical experience and also because they have a concentrated engineering and educational infrastructure which puts them in a successful position.

For example, a good percentage of the contracts traditionally in space have gone to the State of California, and in defense, because the great defense plants--for all the reasons, really, since the end of World War II. So Senators and Congressmen who are concerned about unemployment among their citizens, who are concerned about the flow of tax dollars, will continue to press. But the fact of the matter is that we have a Secretary of Defense who's making very honest judgments in these matters, and I know from personal experience that some Senators and Congressmen who recently visited Secretary McNamara, asking to present plans from being turned down, who happen to be members of my own party, and indeed, even more closely related, have been rejected by the Secretary of Defense.

Q. Mr. President, if I may follow that up, Senator Case has proposed that a watchdog committee be created to look into these

THE PRESIDENT. To watch the Congressmen and Senators? Well, that will be fine if they feel they should be watched!

[20.] Q. Mr. President, after all of the years of failure in attempting to reach a nuclear test ban agreement at Geneva, and in view of the current stalemate at the Geneva conference, do you still really have any hope of arriving at a nuclear test ban agreement?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, my hopes are somewhat dimmed, but nevertheless, I still hope. The fact of the matter is that the Soviet Union did accept in September a position which it had denied over the past 2 years or so, of inspection. Now, what we are disagreeing about are the number of inspections, but at least the principle of inspection is accepted. Now, the reason why we keep moving and working on this question, taking up a good deal of energy and effort, is because personally **I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of 4, and by 1975, 15 or 20.**

With all of the history of war, and the human race's history unfortunately has been a good deal more war than peace, with nuclear weapons distributed all through the world, and available, and the strong reluctance of any people to accept defeat, **I see the possibility in the 1970's of the President of the United States having to face a world in which 15 or 20 or 25 nations may have these weapons. I regard that as the greatest possible danger and hazard.**

Now, I am not even talking about the contamination of the atmosphere which would come when all of these nations begin testing, but as you know, every test does affect generations which are still away from us. So I think that when we are now talking, the Soviet Union and the United States, whether we will have seven or three, we've come this far, and I think that we ought to stay at it. So I am not disturbed at all by those who attack every effort we make to get a nuclear test ban.

The fact of the matter is that when the treaty is signed, if it ever is signed, and I hope it is, it must go to the Senate and it must be approved by two-thirds of the Senate. Therefore, it seems to me great protection to all of us. Now, the other point I want to make is that we test and test and test, and you finally get weapons which are increasingly sophisticated. But the fact of the matter is that somebody may test 10 or 15 times and get a weapon which is not nearly as good as these megaton weapons, but nevertheless, they are two or three times what the weapon was which destroyed Hiroshima, or Nagasaki, and that was dreadful enough.

So I think that we have a good deal to gain if we get a test agreement, and so we are going to keep at it. Now, Members of Congress, who may object to that will have their chance to vote "aye" or "nay" if we are successful in a treaty and we present it to the Senate. In the meantime, we are going to stay at it.

[21.] Q. Mr. President, many, if not most, of the witnesses before the Ways and Means Committee and the members of the Joint Economic Committee say that your tax program is too little and too slow. Would you accept an immediate tax cut at the figure they are now using, around \$6 billion or \$8 billion, at once?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, but the only thing is they also then come out against the essential governmental programs. I have seen very few people who have said that they would support what I regard as essential programs, national security, domestic security, and all the rest, and a tax cut of the kind of figures you are talking about. What you are asking us to do is to choose between these programs, which involve, as I have said, the national security in many cases, or domestic welfare. They are asking us to choose between those programs and the tax cut. I think the best combination is the present figure that we have reached of our expenditure level plus the tax cut.

Now, if economic conditions warrant a speedup and the Congress believes it, I would accept that. But I don't think we ought to be under any misapprehension that when they talk about a speedy tax cut they are also talking about a decline in defense expenditures as well as space expenditures, as well as domestic. For example, a bill which I think is vital to this country, which is a bill to provide for building medical schools so we will have at least the same number of doctors in proportion to our population 10 years from now as we do today, is held up now in the Rules Committee seven to seven. I think that bill is very important, not so much for today, but 5 years from now, 10 years from now. It has the support of the doctors. We need doctors in this country. We don't have enough. They are reluctant to vote that out. It is tied seven to seven. I want this tax cut to stimulate the economy, but I also think we ought to have enough doctors. So I think the combination we've got is the best one.

[22.] Q. Mr. President, there have been some published suggestions that you have amended the Monroe Doctrine in your statements made at Costa Rica. Would you care to comment?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I have not heard that suggested and it isn't so. We did not amend the Monroe Doctrine in Costa Rica.

Q. Mr. President, at Costa Rica you agreed to support a number of projects for regional developments, but no figures, dollar figures, were mentioned in connection with any of them. Would you care to explain why we did not agree?

THE PRESIDENT. Yes, because these countries are putting together an integrated economic plan, and they are then going to present it under the procedures of the Alliance for Progress at Punta del Este, to the Nine Wise Men, so called, who will then approve the plan. When the plan is approved, it will then be submitted to us, and we will, if it meets the conditions of self-help, reform, economic growth, and the rest, we will support it. What we have indicated to them is if their plan is sound, if they are making the necessary commitments themselves, the tax revenue, agrarian reform, and all the rest, and if it meets the approval of the Nine Wise Men, who are Latin Americans and North Americans, then we will support the plan. But I think we can decide what that figure of support will be better when we have seen the plan and gotten the approval. But we did not want to leave them in any doubt that they will have, and I think they should, our wholehearted support when the time comes. Anyone, as I have said, who has seen these countries and knows how much they want to do well, how vital they are, must feel that we should be of some help. We can't be satisfied to have the hard conditions of life which so many of them face. So we are going to support them, if the Congress agrees, but we first have to see the details of their plan.

[23.] Q. Mr. President, in regard to the TFX contract, would you describe your personal role, specifically? Did you make any suggestions as to who should get the contract?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I did not. No. This was completely the Defense Department.

Q. Mr. President, do you share the view of some officials in the Pentagon that members of the McClellan committee, particularly those up for reelection next year, may have been politically motivated in attacking the award to General Dynamics?

THE PRESIDENT. As I said, when a contract goes to one State, then the company may involve or the Senators may involve or the Congressmen want it to go to another. I would not get into that question, because I do not think that is the important point. I assume that the McClellan committee, on which I once served, will render a fair judgment.

Number 2, I am confident of the TFX contract because I am confident of Secretary McNamara. Therefore, as I've said, this hearing can go on as long as they feel it serves a useful result, and whatever the motivations may be--and I wouldn't attempt to explore them--I have confidence in the committee and the members involved.

[24.] Q. Mr. President, how do you explain the undue reluctance, it seems to me, in the large segment of Congress to support your domestic programs such as the support for medical schools, the youth service corps, and many of the other programs that you have advanced in order to help segments of our population?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, the fact of the matter is the hospital plan came out of the committee and it came to the Rules Committee. In the Rules Committee, one of the members who supported the plan was sick, and so it came up for a vote. The five Republicans on the committee voted no. Judge Smith and Colmer, of Virginia and Mississippi, voted no. The seven Democrats voted yes. Mr. Madden was sick, so the bill is tied seven to seven. I hope he gets well. I hope he has an opportunity to vote on it again, and then maybe we will have some hospitals.

Reporter: Thank you, Mr. President.

NOTE: President Kennedy's fifty-second news conference was held in the State Department Auditorium at 6 o'clock on Thursday evening, March 21, 1963.

The Public Papers of the Presidents, Public papers for President J. F. Kennedy 1961-1963

John F. Kennedy: 1961-63

316 - Radio and Television Address to the American People on the **Nuclear** Test Ban Treaty.

July 26th, 1963

[Delivered from the President's office at 7 p.m.]

Good evening, my fellow citizens:

I speak to you tonight in a spirit of hope. Eighteen years ago the advent of **nuclear** weapons changed the course of the world as well as the war. Since that time, all mankind has been struggling to escape from the darkening prospect of mass destruction on earth. In an age when both sides have come to possess enough **nuclear power** to destroy the human race several times over, the world of communism and the world of free choice have been caught up in a vicious circle of conflicting ideology and interest. Each increase of tension has produced an increase of arms; each increase of arms has produced an increase of tension.

In these years, the United States and the Soviet Union have frequently communicated suspicion and warnings to each other, but very rarely hope. Our representatives have met at the summit and at the brink; they have met in Washington and in Moscow; in Geneva and at the United Nations. But too often these meetings have produced only darkness, discord, or disillusion. Yesterday a shaft of light cut into the darkness. Negotiations were concluded in Moscow on a treaty to ban all **nuclear** tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. For the first time, an agreement has been reached on bringing the forces of **nuclear** destruction under international control—a goal first sought in 1946 when Bernard Baruch presented a comprehensive control plan to the United Nations.

That plan, and many subsequent disarmament plans, large and small, have all been blocked by those opposed to international inspection. A ban on **nuclear** tests, however, requires on-the-spot inspection only for underground tests. This Nation now possesses a variety of techniques to detect the **nuclear** tests of other nations which are conducted in the air or under water, for such tests produce unmistakable signs which our modern instruments can pick up.

The treaty initialed yesterday, therefore, is a limited treaty which permits continued underground testing and prohibits only those tests that we ourselves can police. It requires no control posts, no onsite inspection, no international body.

We should also understand that it has other limits as well. Any nation which signs the treaty will have an opportunity to withdraw if it finds that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests; and no nation's right of self-defense will in any way be impaired. Nor does this treaty mean an end to the threat of **nuclear** war. It will not reduce **nuclear** stockpiles; it will not halt the production of **nuclear** weapons; it will not restrict their use in time of war.

Nevertheless, this limited treaty will radically reduce the **nuclear** testing which would otherwise be conducted on both sides; it will prohibit the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and all others who sign it, from engaging in the atmospheric tests which have so alarmed mankind; and it offers to all the world a welcome sign of hope.

For this is not a unilateral moratorium, but a specific and solemn legal obligation. While it will not prevent this Nation from testing underground, or from being ready to conduct atmospheric tests if the

acts of others so require, it gives us a concrete opportunity to extend its coverage to other nations and later to other forms of **nuclear** tests.

This treaty is in part the product of Western patience and vigilance. We have made clear--most recently in Berlin and Cuba--our deep resolve to protect our security and our freedom against any form of aggression. We have also made clear our steadfast determination to limit the arms race. In three administrations, our soldiers and diplomats have worked together to this end, always supported by Great Britain. Prime Minister Macmillan joined with President Eisenhower in proposing a limited test ban in 1959, and again with me in 1961 and 1962.

But the achievement of this goal is not a victory for one side--it is a victory for mankind. It reflects no concessions either to or by the Soviet Union. It reflects simply our common recognition of the dangers in further testing.

This treaty is not the millennium. It will not resolve all conflicts, or cause the Communists to forego their ambitions, or eliminate the dangers of war. It will not reduce our need for arms or allies or programs of assistance to others. But it is an important first step--a step towards peace--a step towards reason--a step away from war.

Here is what this step can mean to you and to your children and your neighbors:

First, this treaty can be a step towards reduced world tension and broader areas of agreement. The Moscow talks have reached no agreement on any other subject, nor is this treaty conditioned on any other matter. Under Secretary Harriman made it clear that any nonaggression arrangements across the division in Europe would require full consultation with our allies and full attention to their interests. He also made clear our strong preference for a more comprehensive treaty banning all tests everywhere, and our ultimate hope for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government, however, is still unwilling to accept the inspection such goals require.

No one can predict with certainty, therefore, what further agreements, if any, can be built on the foundations of this one. They could include controls on preparations for surprise attack, or on numbers and type of armaments. There could be further limitations on the spread of **nuclear** weapons. The important point is that efforts to seek new agreements will go forward.

But the difficulty of predicting the next step is no reason to be reluctant about this step. Nuclear test ban negotiations have long been a symbol of East-West disagreement. If this treaty can also be a symbol--if it can symbolize the end of one era and the beginning of another--if both sides can by this treaty gain confidence and experience in peaceful collaboration--then this short and simple treaty may well become an historic mark in man's age-old pursuit of peace.

Western policies have long been designed to persuade the Soviet Union to renounce aggression, direct or indirect, so that their people and all people may live and let live in peace. The unlimited testing of new weapons of war cannot lead towards that end--but this treaty, if it can be followed by further progress, can clearly move in that direction.

do not say that a world without aggression or threats of war would be an easy world. It will bring new problems, new challenges from the Communists, new dangers of relaxing our vigilance or of mistaking their intent.

But those dangers pale in comparison to those of the spiraling arms race and a collision course towards war. Since the beginning of history, war has been mankind's constant companion. It has been the rule, not the exception. Even a nation as young and as peace-loving as our own has fought through eight wars. And three times in the last two years and a half I have been required to report to you as President that this Nation and the Soviet Union stood on the verge of direct military confrontation--in Laos, in Berlin, and in Cuba.

A war today or tomorrow, if it led to **nuclear** war, would not be like any war in history. A full-scale **nuclear** exchange, lasting less than 60 minutes, with the weapons now in existence, could wipe out

more than 300 million Americans, Europeans, and Russians, as well as untold numbers elsewhere. And the survivors, as Chairman Khrushchev warned the Communist Chinese, "the survivors would envy the dead." For they would inherit a world so devastated by explosions and poison and fire that today we cannot even conceive of its horrors. So let us try to turn the world away from war. Let us make the most of this opportunity, and every opportunity, to reduce tension, to slow down the perilous **nuclear** arms race, and to check the world's slide toward final annihilation.

Second, this treaty can be a step towards freeing the world from the fears and dangers of radioactive fallout. Our own atmospheric tests last year were conducted under conditions which restricted such fallout to an absolute minimum. But over the years the number and the yield of weapons tested have rapidly increased and so have the radioactive hazards from such testing. Continued unrestricted testing by the **nuclear powers**, joined in time by other nations which may be less adept in limiting pollution, will increasingly contaminate the air that all of us must breathe.

Even then, the number of children and grandchildren with cancer in their bones, with leukemia in their blood, or with poison in their lungs might seem statistically small to some, in comparison with natural health hazards. But this is not a natural health hazard--and it is not a statistical issue. The loss of even one human life, or the malformation of even one baby--who may be born long after we are gone--should be of concern to us all. Our children and grandchildren are not merely statistics toward which we can be indifferent.

Nor does this affect the **nuclear powers** alone. These tests befoul the air of all men and all nations, the committed and the uncommitted alike, without their knowledge and without their consent. That is why the continuation of atmospheric testing causes so many countries to regard all **nuclear powers** as equally evil; and we can hope that its prevention will enable those countries to see the world more clearly, while enabling all the world to breathe more easily.

Third, this treaty can be a step toward preventing the spread of **nuclear** weapons to nations not now possessing them. During the next several years, in addition to the four current **nuclear powers**, a small but significant number of nations will have the intellectual, physical, and financial resources to produce both **nuclear** weapons and the means of delivering them. In time, it is estimated, many other nations will have either this capacity or other ways of obtaining **nuclear** warheads, even as missiles can be commercially purchased today.

I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have **nuclear** weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be the increased chance of accidental war, and an increased necessity for the great **powers** to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts.

If only one thermonuclear bomb were to be dropped on any American, Russian, or any other city, whether it was launched by accident or design, by a madman or by an enemy, by a large nation or by a small, from any corner of the world, that one bomb could release more destructive **power** on the inhabitants of that one helpless city than all the bombs dropped in the Second World War.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union nor the United Kingdom nor France can look forward to that day with equanimity. We have a great obligation, all four **nuclear powers** have a great obligation, to use whatever time remains to prevent the spread of **nuclear** weapons, to persuade other countries not to test, transfer, acquire, possess, or produce such weapons.

This treaty can be the opening wedge in that campaign. It provides that none of the parties will assist other nations to test in the forbidden environments. It opens the door for further agreements on the control of **nuclear** weapons, and it is open for all nations to sign, for it is in the interest of all nations, and already we have heard from a number of countries who wish to join with us promptly.

Fourth and finally, this treaty can limit the **nuclear** arms race in ways which, on balance, will strengthen our Nation's security far more than the continuation of unrestricted testing. For in today's world, a nation's security does not always increase as its arms increase, when its adversary is doing the same, and unlimited competition in the testing and development of new types of destructive

nuclear weapons will not make the world safer for either side. Under this limited treaty, on the other hand, the testing of other nations could never be sufficient to offset the ability of our strategic forces to deter or survive a **nuclear** attack and to penetrate and destroy an aggressor's homeland.

We have, and under this treaty we will continue to have, the **nuclear** strength that we need. It is true that the Soviets have tested **nuclear** weapons of a yield higher than that which we thought to be necessary, but the hundred megaton bomb of which they spoke 2 years ago does not and will not change the balance of strategic **power**. The United States has chosen, deliberately, to concentrate on more mobile and more efficient weapons, with lower but entirely sufficient yield, and our security is, therefore, not impaired by the treaty I am discussing.

It is also true, as Mr. Khrushchev would agree, that nations cannot afford in these matters to rely simply on the good faith of their adversaries. We have not, therefore, overlooked the risk of secret violations. There is at present a possibility that deep in outer space, that hundreds and thousands and millions of miles away from the earth illegal tests might go undetected. But we already have the capability to construct a system of observation that would make such tests almost impossible to conceal, and we can decide at any time whether such a system is needed in the light of the limited risk to us and the limited reward to others of violations attempted at that range. For any tests which might be conducted so far out in space, which cannot be conducted more easily and efficiently and legally underground, would necessarily be of such a magnitude that they would be extremely difficult to conceal. We can also employ new devices to check on the testing of smaller weapons in the lower atmosphere. Any violations, moreover, involves, along with the risk of detection, the end of the treaty and the worldwide consequences for the violator.

Secret violations are possible and secret preparations for a sudden withdrawal are possible, and thus our own vigilance and strength must be maintained, as we remain ready to withdraw and to resume all forms of testing, if we must. But it would be a mistake to assume that this treaty will be quickly broken. The gains of illegal testing are obviously slight compared to their cost, and the hazard of discovery, and the nations which have initialed and will sign this treaty prefer it, in my judgment, to unrestricted testing as a matter of their own self-interests for these nations, too, and all nations, have a stake in limiting the arms race, in holding the spread of **nuclear** weapons, and in breathing air that is not radioactive. While it may be theoretically possible to demonstrate the risks inherent in any treaty, and such risks in this treaty are small, the far greater risks to our security are the risks of unrestricted testing, the risk of a **nuclear** arms race, the risk of new **nuclear powers**, **nuclear** pollution, and **nuclear** war.

This limited test ban, in our most careful judgment, is safer by far for the United States than an unlimited **nuclear** arms race. For all these reasons, I am hopeful that this Nation will promptly approve the limited test ban treaty. There will, of course, be debate in the country and in the Senate. The Constitution wisely requires the advice and consent of the Senate to all treaties, and that consultation has already begun. All this is as it should be. A document which may mark an historic and constructive opportunity for the world deserves an historic and constructive debate.

It is my hope that all of you will take part in that debate, for this treaty is for all of us. It is particularly for our children and our grandchildren, and they have no lobby here in Washington. This debate will involve military, scientific, and political experts, but it must be not left to them alone. The right and the responsibility are yours.

If we are to open new doorways to peace, if we are to seize this rare opportunity for progress, if we are to be as bold and farsighted in our control of weapons as we have been in their invention, then let us now show all the world on this side of the wall and the other that a strong America also stands for peace. There is no cause for complacency.

We have learned in times past that the spirit of one moment or place can be gone in the next. We have been disappointed more than once, and we have no illusions now that there are shortcuts on the road to peace. At many points around the globe the Communists are continuing their efforts to exploit weakness and poverty. Their concentration of **nuclear** and conventional arms must still be deterred.

The familiar contest between choice and coercion, the familiar places of danger and conflict, are all still there, in Cuba, in Southeast Asia, in Berlin, and all around the globe, still requiring all the strength and the vigilance that we can muster. Nothing could more greatly damage our cause than if we and our allies were to believe that peace has already been achieved, and that our strength and unity were no longer required.

But now, for the first time in many years, the path of peace may be open. No one can be certain what the future will bring. No one can say whether the time has come for an easing of the struggle. But history and our own conscience will judge us harsher if we do not now make every effort to test our hopes by action, and this is the place to begin. According to the ancient Chinese proverb, "A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step."

My fellow Americans, let us take that first step. Let us, if we can, step back from the shadows of war and seek out the way of peace. And if that journey is a thousand miles, or even more, let history record that we, in this land, at this time, took the first step.

Thank you and good night.

Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume XVII, Near East, 1961-1962

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 45-65

57. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

New York, May 30, 1961, 4:45-6 p.m.

/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.8411/5-3061. Secret. Drafted by Talbot and approved by the White House on June 29. The meeting was held in the President's suite at the Waldorf Astoria. The time is from the President's Appointment Books. (Kennedy Library)

SUBJECT

Conversation between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Ben Gurion/2/

/2/Additional documentation relating to Ben Gurion's visit is *ibid.*, National Security Files, Country Series, Israel, Subjects: Ben-Gurion Visit: 5/20/61-6/2/61. A copy of the briefing book prepared in the Department of State for the President is in Department of State, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 305, Ben-Gurion Visit 1961.

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Prime Minister Ben Gurion of Israel

Ambassador Avraham Harman of Israel

Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for NEA

Myer Feldman, Deputy Special Assistant to the President

After an exchange of amenities, in which each expressed his pleasure at meeting the other, the President and Prime Minister Ben Gurion plunged into a discussion of Israel's Dimona reactor. The President said he was glad that two American scientists had had an opportunity to visit the reactor and had given him a good report of it. Since some nations are disturbed at the prospect of the construction in Israel of a large reactor, with plutonium producing capability, the President suggested that--"on the theory that a woman should not only be virtuous but also have the appearance of virtue"--our problem is how to disseminate information about the nature of the reactor in such a way as to remove any doubts other nations might have as to Israel's peaceful purposes.

The Prime Minister said he wanted to talk about the reactor in the context of Israel's problems.

The greatest of these problems, and an almost insoluble one, he described as Israel's serious shortage of fresh water. Even when the Jordan River is effectively tapped there will not be enough fresh water for the southern part of Israel, he added. The only solution to this continuing shortage that Israel could discern is desalinization of sea water, a process that is technically possible but would be economically practicable only if very cheap power were available. Israel hopes that atomic power, which is now expensive, will become much cheaper and will make possible the economic desalinization of sea water. It had therefore consulted with Dr. Bhabha of India and with scientists from England and had followed the suggestion that Israel should gain the necessary scientific knowledge to take full advantage of the coming age of nuclear power. In building the Dimona reactor for this purpose the Prime Minister acknowledged that Israel had received assistance from France.

Israel's main--and for the time being, only--purpose is this, the Prime Minister said, adding that "we do not know what will happen in the future; in three or four years we might have need for a plant to process plutonium"./3/

/3/Presumably plutonium produced in the Dimona reactor could be processed in France, in the United States or in Israel. This multiplicity of processing opportunities would increase the difficulty of effective supervision. [Footnote in the source text.]

Commenting on the political and strategic implications of atomic power and weaponry, the Prime Minister said he does not believe that Russia wants to give atomic capacity to Egypt now but he does believe that "in ten or fifteen years the Egyptians presumably could achieve it themselves".

The President observed that while the Prime Minister's estimate might be correct, we do not want by our own actions to increase tensions in the Middle East. He explained that the United States is much involved with Israel in the Middle East and it is to our common interest that no country believe that Israel is contributing to the proliferation of atomic weapons. It is obvious, he added, that the UAR would not permit Israel to go ahead in this field without getting into it itself.

The President then asked again whether, as a matter of reassurance, the Arab states might be advised of findings of the American scientists who had viewed the Dimona reactor. In reply, the Prime Minister said, "You are absolutely free to do what you wish with the report. If you feel you should publish it, we have no objections."

The President expressed his appreciation of the Prime Minister's willingness to agree to this action. He added that of course the United States is sometimes suspect in matters dealing with Israel, "because we are close friends", and asked whether it would not be helpful to let neutral scientists also observe the reactor. Ben Gurion asked who are really neutrals these days? The President commented that although Khrushchev says that no man is neutral, there are, after all, such neutrals as the Scandinavians and the Swiss. The Prime Minister said he would have no objection to this. The President expressed his satisfaction at the Prime Minister's reply. He was pleased he could feel that Israel would agree to going ahead with this.

Prime Minister Ben Gurion then raised the question of Israel's security. The deficit is increasing in Israel's arms as compared to the UAR military equipment, he said; the UAR has more planes and tanks and now they have 200 Russian instructors. This means that while the gap in quantity is growing the gap in quality is being narrowed. Nasser's declared aim, the Prime Minister added, is to destroy not just to defeat Israel. "If they should defeat us they would do to the Jews what Hitler did". He asserted also that the Arabs do not value human life and that this makes the problem more difficult.

Prime Minister Ben Gurion referred to his visit last year with President Eisenhower.^{/4/} On that visit he had asked the United States for weapons--especially for defensive weapons, because the UAR has 26 air fields and Israel has only four. Before leaving Washington he had asked whether he could leave the United States with the assumption that he would get the weapons, and had been told "that is a fair assumption". (Presumably the Prime Minister was referring to Hawks.) He said he still does not see why Israel cannot get these weapons. He felt it is in the best interest of the United States for Israel to have defensive weapons.

^{/4/}Ben Gurion met with President Eisenhower on March 10, 1960, at the White House; see *Foreign Relations, 1958-1960*, vol. XIII, pp. 280-288.

The President commented that he had not found records which permit a firm conclusion about what had been committed by the previous Administration, but that the problem, as we see it, is that while the Hawk is a defensive weapon it is also a missile and should missiles come into the Middle Eastern area, military weaponry will escalate fast. This is a problem, he said, to which we will continue to address ourselves, because we do not want to see Israel at a disadvantage. But we are reluctant to introduce missiles into the Middle East; the other side might then introduce ground-to-ground missiles. He repeated that if Israel were faced with a critical break-through of weapons on the other side, we would have our views of what to do. But we will need a better understanding of the danger and we hesitate to be the ones to introduce missiles into the region.

The Prime Minister explained that he was not asking for these weapons on the basis of a commitment made by the previous Administration but on the merits of the case. Acknowledging this, the President observed again that what we are concerned about is introducing missiles into the region.

There followed a brief discussion of tanks and planes available to the UAR and to Israel, with figures taken from the briefing book that the President had at hand. The Prime Minister said that the UAR has 300 fighters, with 200 more they could call upon from other Arab nations. Israel has ordered 60 Mirages from the French. The first of these may be delivered by the end of this year but it will take more than 12 months for them to be delivered in full. Commenting on the performance capability of the MIG 19, the President observed that we cannot eliminate the hazard but we would not want Israel to get into such a position of inferiority that an attack on it would be encouraged. The Prime Minister again suggested that the Hawk, a defensive weapon, would be the best way to avoid this danger at the present time and that it could not threaten any other country.

Summing up this aspect of the conversation, the President said that the Hawk had been given to only a few other countries and that if it were introduced into Israel the next development on the other side might be an air-to-ground or ground-to-ground missile. He said we will watch this matter with care and added, "You don't feel that this is a satisfactory answer to your request, but you can be assured that we will continue to watch the situation."

Turning to another subject, Prime Minister Ben Gurion commented that now the President was going to see Premier Khrushchev.^{/5/} In 1956 Khrushchev and Bulganin and Prime Minister Eden had issued a declaration for the integrity and independence of all the states in the Middle East,^{/6/} and last year the French, on a visit in Moscow, had issued a similar declaration on May 19.^{/7/} If a joint declaration like those of 1956 and 1960 could be issued by the President and Premier Khrushchev the Prime Minister felt it would be helpful.

^{/5/}President Kennedy met with Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev at Vienna June 3-4.

^{/6/}The statement on the Near East was part of a broader U.K.-Soviet statement issued on April 26 regarding the discussions of Prime Minister Eden, Chairman Bulganin, and Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet Khrushchev in London between April 12 and 27, 1956. The U.K. Government printed it as Command Paper No. 9753.

^{/7/}Not identified.

The President asked what in the Prime Minister's judgment would be the response of Arab countries to such a declaration. To this the Prime Minister answered that several small countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq would accept the declaration gladly because they would feel it would protect them against Nasser. The President then asked whether Russia would be likely to do anything now to displease Nasser. Prime Minister Ben Gurion called this unlikely but added that if Khrushchev would be willing to do this it would help stabilize the situation in the Middle East. The President suggested that Nasser probably would object to this declaration, because he thinks that the present borders between Israel and the UAR are not fixed and he asked whether in this circumstance Khrushchev would be likely to accept such a declaration. The Prime Minister doubted that Khrushchev would do this but commented that it would be a test to see whether Khrushchev is really interested in relaxing world tensions. The President observed in this connection that he thinks Khrushchev is pushing hard on many issues.

The President expressed interest in the Prime Minister's views of Nasser's relations with Russia. These are very close, Ben Gurion answered. "Nasser is not a Communist, but he relies on Russia and gets Russian support to get into Africa. The African leaders are not Communists either--even Sekou Toure--but they are pro-Communist. Nasser is working very hard in these countries. His efforts help bring the Russians into them also."

On a broader front, the Prime Minister said he does not believe there will be a hot war. The American people don't want war, nor do the Russian people. Agreeing, the President observed that nevertheless the danger is there. The Soviet Union wants to push us out of Berlin. We cannot permit the USSR to destroy the Atlantic Alliance and we cannot permit ourselves to be forced out of Berlin, he said. If we should be forced out of Berlin Europe would no longer associate itself with us in NATO. And then, the Prime Minister added, you would be forced out of Europe. Yes, the President said, and then back to our own shores. But we don't intend that to happen.

Prime Minister Ben Gurion pointed out the United States accepted the status quo but the Russians do not. "The Russians think you are doomed, and they say so." The President responded that one can argue that systems in many countries may be doomed but not the people, adding, "I can say that doom would be hastened if we were to be run out of Berlin. What interest would you have in a guarantee from us if we let ourselves be pushed out of Berlin?" The Prime Minister responded again that a guarantee of Middle East borders would provide a test case of Soviet intentions. To this the President replied that he was not sure our security problems are not as great as Israel's. The Prime Minister saw in the two situations the difference that "we are the only remnants of a people that have been fighting for survival for the past 4000 years. If Nasser defeats us, we are destroyed."

The President asked the Prime Minister for his estimate of current tensions in the area of Israel. The Prime Minister responded that the borders are more or less quiet; there has been a little worry about Aqaba but the Secretary General has reassured him that everything was quiet there. Nevertheless the dangers remain in such places as Jordan and Iraq where regimes depend upon the life of a single man. They are much more worried than we are, the Prime Minister said, because Nasser can send someone to assassinate one man whereas in a democracy everybody would fight. Even Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey are afraid of what might happen. Such a

declaration as he had suggested would, in the Prime Minister's view, give more confidence to all the smaller Arab and other Middle East peoples.

The President asked the Prime Minister's views of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, explaining that as the Prime Minister knew, the PCC (of which the United States is a member) is obliged to make a report in the fall of 1961. The President expressed the hope that there may be an opportunity there and asked how the Prime Minister felt about it. The latter recalled that in 1953 President Eisenhower had sent a messenger named Anderson^{/8/} to make two exploratory trips in the Middle East. At first Nasser was agreeable to the suggestions that were evolved but the minute he discovered that Israel was serious about them he changed his mind. "All questions in the Middle East depend upon Nasser."

[/8/Reference is presumably to the Robert Anderson mission of 1955-1956.](#)

The President said he thought we have to assume that Nasser will make our lives as difficult as possible, and the Prime Minister agreed, unless some pressure is generated among his people for peace.

The Prime Minister said that all the people in the uncommitted world are watching the U.S. and other Western countries. For these people, freedom does not mean what it does to us. What makes an impression is better standards of living and health and education. It is not just money they want; they want to feel that they are treated as human beings. This is why Israel is working with Africans. "If you will succeed with the Peace Corps idea--with Americans going out not as superior human beings but to help others--this psychological factor will be more important than the large amounts of money you give away."

The Prime Minister then described how Israel has brought Asians and Africans into its population and has made its Army an educational institution, which is of great interest to other countries such as Ghana that are trying to develop themselves. He spoke of the Afro-Asian Institute in the University where Asians and Africans are taught cooperation and of other programs that attract many people to learn in Israel. Hundreds of Indians are also coming to Israel, he said, although Nehru will have no relations with Israel. He regretted Nehru's attitude on this point and said that his excuse is that he wants to make peace in the area. "It is not for me to judge him. He is a great man. I admire him. There is democracy in India; it is the only country in Asia which is democratic except Japan. If Nehru goes I am not sure what will happen; but now it has democracy."

Continuing his comments on the general world situation, the Prime Minister observed that the only imperialistic country that exists now is Russia, which keeps under its domination many Muslim countries in Asia, former parts of China and many countries in Europe. Yet in the war of propaganda they win because they go against the status quo in other countries. Unless the West can provide what other countries need, we will lose.

Returning to the subject of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, the President stated that its new efforts need a sympathetic hearing because if they fail we may get a "Troika" commission. The United Nations is trying to get a neutral representative who will in turn make the proposal which will involve the three alternatives of repatriation or compensation with resettlement in the Arab countries or elsewhere.

In response, the Prime Minister commented that any commission would be likely to fail in this effort. "They--the UAR and any Arabs--don't care what happens to people. They regard the refugees as the best weapon at hand. If they could get hundreds of thousands of Arabs into Israel we would have those and still be surrounded by many millions of other Arabs." He then recapitulated the events immediately following Israel's independence when after several quiet days the Arabs left Israel in large number and in succeeding months Israel had to accept many hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from other countries. He also stated that Israel has absorbed as many Jewish refugees from Arab countries as they have absorbed Arab refugees from Israel.

The President observed that maybe the Arabs would not agree to any realistic plan than the PCC might put forward but if so we would rather have the responsibility of disagreement on them. We are likely to have our troubles with our Congress if the US continues paying 70% of the UNRWA costs for caring for refugees. If it appears that Israel is constructive, it will make the problem easier.

"Yes, it is always worth trying", the Prime Minister responded. "But until there is peace between Israel and the Arabs I don't see much chance of success."

The President said that although we had been attacked by the press in the UAR on Cuba and other matters, we want to do our best to see if this PCC effort can succeed. The Prime Minister recalled the recent Bandung

Congress at which representatives of many states, including Communist China, attacked the U.S. He said that Israel had sent the U.S. information about this Congress about the way the people think and speak.

In summary, the President said that the conversation had covered several topics: on missiles, "I expressed a desire to continually review the missile situation. We are reluctant to give Israel missiles and you understand that, but we would be disturbed if Israel should get into a situation that would invite attack. We will keep the matter under continuing review in our Administration, I can assure you."

On the question of the security guaranty, "I'll see what the atmosphere is. We guess that Khrushchev will not wish to lessen the tension. We will have to feel our way through this. The problem probably will be that we won't get agreement on various issues. If we should, we might try to get an agreement limiting arms to all Africa also."

Before ending the conversation, the Prime Minister said he wished also to take note of the fact that Israel has good relations with Persia and Turkey. Turkey is the more stable and can take care of itself. In Persia there is a very difficult situation; while the people are monarchists, there is corruption and much difficulty. It would help if the U.S. could give them a little more help and encouragement. In response the President said that we and the previous administration have devoted more attention and effort to Iran than to almost any other country in that region. Iran has a large Army. During the recent riots some of our people had questioned whether the Army would support the Shah. There has been a good deal of corruption and there are even stories about the royal family. However, the President thought that this government represented the last best hope and we will do everything to support it. We are for this government and the new Prime Minister 100%. The Prime Minister said he was delighted to hear this.

In conclusion the President recalled his previous conversations with the Prime Minister. He wanted the Prime Minister to know that we wish relations between our two countries to be close and harmonious and that we want to be helpful in the Middle East. It was for this reason that he had recently written to Nasser.^{/9/} Responding, the Prime Minister assured the President that he does not hate Arabs, that he regards them as human beings and that "we want you to help them." The President expressed his feeling that we want to maintain some influence with them.

[/9/See Document 47.](#)

As the Prime Minister rose to leave he handed to the President, as a gift, a book written in Latin, published in 1680. This book, he said, was a record of a visit to the Holy Land by the author, Radziwili, who was a forebear of Prince Radziwill, the husband of President Kennedy's sister-in-law. Accepting the book with gratitude, the President said he was going to the christening of the Radziwills' child in London next week and, with the Prime Minister's permission, would present this book to the child.

The President and the Prime Minister parted with mutual expressions of respect.

Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962-1963

Released by the Office of the Historian
Documents 176-208 (199)

National Security Action Memorandum No. 231/1/

Washington, March 26, 1963.

1/Source: Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 231. Top Secret. On March 25, McCone met with President Kennedy. According to McCone's record of the meeting, he raised the "question of Israel acquiring nuclear capability" and gave the President Document 179. The President then instructed Bundy "to direct a letter to Secretary Rusk asking that he, in collaboration with DCI and Chairman, AEC, submit a proposal as to how some form of international or bilateral US safeguards could be instituted to protect against the contingency mentioned." (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80 D 01285A, DCI (McCone) Files, Memoranda for the Record)

TO
The Secretary of State

Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Middle Eastern Nuclear Capabilities

The President desires, as a **matter of urgency**, that we undertake every feasible measure to improve our intelligence on the Israeli nuclear program as well as other Israeli and UAR advanced weapon programs, and to arrive at a firmer evaluation of their import. In this connection he wishes the next informal inspection of the Israeli reactor complex to be undertaken promptly and to be as thorough as possible.

In view of his **great concern over the destabilizing impact** of any Israeli or UAR program looking toward the development of nuclear weapons, the President also wishes the Department of State to develop proposals for forestalling such programs; in particular we should develop plans for seeking clearer assurances from the governments concerned on this point, and means of impressing upon them how seriously such a development would be regarded in this country./2/

/2/On April 5, Brubeck sent Bundy a memorandum by Talbot dated April 3 describing the Department of State's immediate response to NSAM No. 231. The memorandum indicated that the Department had already formed a small working group under the chairmanship of NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary James Grant to pursue an arms limitation and control arrangement in the Near East. To meet the requirements of NSAM No. 231, the Department of State had requested Israel to allow semiannual visits to Dimona. The working group expected to have developed by early May a clear plan of action for securing Israeli-Egyptian agreement on nuclear and missile limitation. (Department of State, S/S - NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 231) Documentation relating to the NEA working group activities is *ibid.*, NEA/IAI Files: Lot 72 D 438, Authority to Consider Steps for NE Arms Limitation Probe, Spring - Summer 1963--NSAM 231. Additional documentation is *ibid.*, S/S Files: Lot 68 D 135, Chron Summary of the Arms Probe with Nasser and Related Events, 1963 - 1964; and NEA/IAI Files: Lot 80 D 102, McCloy Probe.

McGeorge Bundy

הנהלת הממשלה
משרד ראש הממשלה
7.7.63
103/271

COPY

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American Embassy,
Tel Aviv
July 5, 1963

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I enclose the text of a letter which I have been instructed
to deliver to you from President Kennedy.

Sincerely yours,

Walworth Barbour

Enclosure:
Letter from President Kennedy

His Excellency
Mr. Levi Eshkol,
Prime Minister of Israel.

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"Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

"It gives me great personal pleasure to extend congratulations as you assume your responsibilities as Prime Minister of Israel. You have our friendship and best wishes in your new tasks. It is on one of these that I am writing you at this time.

"You are aware, I am sure, of the exchanges which I had with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion concerning American visits to Israel's nuclear facility at Dimona. Most recently, the Prime Minister wrote to me on May 27. His words reflected a most intense personal consideration of a problem that I know is not easy for your Government, as it is not for mine. We welcomed the former Prime Minister's strong reaffirmation that Dimona will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes and the reaffirmation also of Israel's willingness to permit periodic visits to Dimona.

"I regret having to add to your burdens so soon after your assumption of office, but I feel the crucial importance of this problem necessitates my taking up with you at this early date certain further considerations, arising out of Mr. Ben-Gurion's May 27 letter, as to the nature and scheduling of such visits.

"I am

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"I am sure you will agree that these visits should be as nearly as possible in accord with international standards, thereby resolving all doubts as to the peaceful intent of the Dimona project. As I wrote Mr. Ben-Gurion, this Government's commitment to and support of Israel could be seriously jeopardized if it should be thought that we were unable to obtain reliable information on a subject as vital to peace as the question of Israel's effort in the nuclear field.

"Therefore, I asked our scientists to review the alternative schedules of visits we and you had proposed. If Israel's purposes are to be clear beyond reasonable doubt, I believe that the schedule which would best serve our common purposes would be a visit early this summer, another visit in June 1964, and thereafter at intervals of six months. I am sure that such a schedule should not cause you any more difficulty than that which Mr. Ben-Gurion proposed in his May 27 letter. It would be essential, and I understand that Mr. Ben-Gurion's letter was in accord with this, that our scientists have access to all areas of the Dimona site and to any related part of the complex, such as fuel fabrication facilities or plutonium separation plant, and that sufficient time be allotted for a thorough examination.

"Knowing that you fully appreciate the truly vital significance of this matter to the future well-being of
Israel

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Israel, to the United States, and internationally, I am sure our carefully considered request will have your most sympathetic attention.

"Sincerely,

JOHN F. KENNEDY

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General Assembly

A/RES/999 (ES-I)
4 November 1956

Resolution 999 (ES-I)

The General Assembly,

Noting with regret that not all the parties concerned have yet agreed to comply with the provisions of its resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956,

Noting the special priority given in that resolution to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, to the halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the area,

Noting further that the resolution urged the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolution 997 (ES-I), and once again calls upon the parties immediately to comply with the provisions of the said resolution;

2. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General immediately to arrange with the parties concerned for the implementation of the cease-fire and the halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the area, and requests him to report compliance forthwith and, in any case, not later than twelve hours from the time of adoption of the present resolution;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Chief of Staff and the members of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, to obtain compliance of the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines;

4. *Decides* to meet again immediately on receipt of the Secretary-General's report referred to in paragraph 2 of the present resolution.

Resolution 997 (ES-I) (2 novembre 1956)

The General Assembly,

Noting the disregard on many occasions by parties to the Israel-Arab armistice agreements of 1949 of the terms of such agreements, and that the armed forces of Israel have penetrated deeply into Egyptian territory in violation of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949, (1)/

Noting that armed forces of France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland are conducting military operations against Egyptian territory,

Noting that traffic through the Suez Canal is now interrupted to the serious prejudice of many nations,

Expressing its grave concern over these developments,

1. *Urges* as a matter of priority that all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and, as part thereof, halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area;

2. *Urges* the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to desist from raids across the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements;

3. *Recommends* that all Member States refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of the present resolution;

4. *Urges* that, upon the cease-fire being effective, steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to observe and report promptly on the compliance with the present resolution to the Security Council and to the General Assembly, for such further action as they may deem appropriate in accordance with the Charter;

6. *Decides* to remain in emergency session pending compliance with the present resolution.

1/ Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year,
Special Supplement No.3.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-9

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May 24, 1967

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Record of National Security Council Meeting held on May 24, 1967 at 12 noon -- Discussion of Middle East Crisis

Those Present: The President
 The Vice President
 Secretary Rusk
 Secretary McNamara
 Secretary Fowler
 General Wheeler
 Mr. Leonard Marks
 Under Secretary Eugene Rostow
 Assistant Secretary Lucius Battle
 Mr. Walt W. Rostow
 Mr. Farris Bryant
 Mr. George Christian
 Mr. Bromley Smith
 Mr. Francis Bator
 Mr. Harold Saunders

Secretary Rusk opened the meeting with a report on the current Arab-Israeli situation. He described it as serious but not yet desperate:

-- The U.N. Security Council is meeting, and it is important to have it in session on this issue. We do not yet have a full report from U Thant's talks in Cairo, but Bunche reports that the Egyptians have suggested a return to the General Armistice Agreements as they stood before the 1956 fighting. That might relieve the pressure in the Straits of Tiran, but the Israelis might not be in the mood to make that kind of concession.

-- We are in touch with the USSR. Privately we find the Russians playing a generally moderate game, but publicly they have taken a harsh view of the facts and have laid responsibility at Israel's door -- and by inference at ours. Syria and Cairo say publicly they have Soviet support; but our general impression is that this is somewhat less than complete.

-- Israeli Foreign Minister Eban will be here on May 25. We have insisted on consultation, and he is here to consult. The borders have been reasonably quiet, but the Straits to the Gulf of Aqaba are the main issue, both for Israel and for the major maritime nations. We are consulting with the British about this today.

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None attached

-- In a "thoughtful discussion" with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 23, he found unanimity that we should not act unilaterally, and that we should work through the UN and multilaterally.

In summary, he could not promise that this crisis would be over in 24 hours; but he had the impression that no government wants war.

Secretary Fowler asked to what extent we were looking into economic sanctions and to what extent we should be trying to influence the IMF and World Bank to operate in this situation. He had in mind economic sanctions that might be in the nature of a counter-blockade. We might hold the Israelis off if we could convince them we are hurting the UAR more than the blockade is hurting them. Secretary Rusk said that from the Fund's viewpoint, any agreement with the UAR consummated today would be reckless.

The President suggested that Eugene Rostow and Secretary Fowler look at all the cards we have had to play in this field. Secretary Fowler indicated that he was seeing Mr. Schweitzer of the IMF and private bankers from New York in the next couple of days, and we could begin laying any ground work necessary.

The President then said he would like to hear views on what we do if all these other measures fail. We should play out the UN and other multilateral efforts until they are exhausted. "I want to play every card in the UN, but I've never relied on it to save me when I'm going down for the third time. I want to see Wilson and De Gaulle out there with their ships all lined up too." But all of these things have a way of falling apart. He mentioned, for instance, early Congressional support for his actions in Vietnam. Therefore, we have to figure out what we can do if all these other courses fail.

In a parenthetical exchange, the President alluded to statements by Senators Symington and Fulbright to the effect that the U.S. could not manage two crises at once. They see it as a choice between Israel and Vietnam and believe we ought to withdraw from Vietnam. He told Secretary Rusk to let Senator Mansfield know that this kind of music in the Senate is just what Kosygin wants to hear.

Secretary Rusk before leaving the meeting commented that we were witnessing an interesting reversal of roles -- doves have become hawks, and vice versa.

The President then turned to Secretary McNamara for a military appraisal of the situation. The Secretary said in general that there is

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no substance to the Fulbright/Symington notion that the U. S. cannot manage both Vietnam and the Middle East crises at the same time. He then turned to General Wheeler for a detailed run down of our military posture in the Mediterranean and the current disposition of Arab and Israeli forces.

In addition to those facts widely current in our intelligence estimates today, General Wheeler indicated that it would be harder to open the Gulf of Aqaba than we had at first thought. Because of the two Egyptian submarines in the Red Sea, we would need a ASW unit, the nearest of which is now in Singapore -- two weeks away.

General Wheeler suggested that if Israel does try to open the Gulf, it will attack first by air, striking initially the UAR's naval forces in the Red Sea and the air bases in the Sinai. Only after establishing air superiority would the Israelis try to take out the battery at Sharm al-Sheikh. Therefore if the Israelis move, it might not be possible to localize a strike designed simply to open the Straits.

A brief discussion of possible presence of unconventional weapons followed. [REDACTED]

(3),
(5) [REDACTED] However, Mr. Helms was quite positive in stating there were no nuclear weapons in the area. General Wheeler said he was less well informed "but more skeptical."

In summary, General Wheeler noted that we have a powerful naval force in the Mediterranean; that our land forces are few, limited to about 1400 Marines now ashore at Naples, three days away; that our nearest ASW unit is two weeks away, since we cannot send one through the Suez Canal; that the UAR coastal battery and naval and air forces in the Red Sea will be the units employed to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba; that we will have trouble with overflight and staging rights in Turkey, Libya and Spain if we have to introduce our own ground forces; and that the Israelis can hold their own.


On the last point, the President asked for a new reading on Israeli capability. He said Ambassador Goldberg is less certain about Israeli superiority. Mr. Helms noted that he had sent a recent assessment to Ambassador Goldberg but had had no response yet. Both Mr. Helms and General Wheeler promised to review this estimate.

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The President came back to his initial question: "Suppose Gene doesn't deliver in the UN and suppose Bob is not as persuasive with Healy as he is with us, and suppose we have to have somebody carry a message to Garcia. What do we do?"

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(5)

The President then turned to Soviet motives and asked General Wheeler whether or not the Soviets had staged this Middle East crisis, the trouble in Hong Kong, and other such diversions simultaneously to force us to turn our attention from Vietnam. Neither General Wheeler nor Mr. Helms saw any sign of Soviet calculation behind these crises, though of course both admitted that the Soviets would view them as a godsend.

The President returned to the question of what we would do after relying on Israeli forces. General Wheeler noted that a long war would hurt the Israeli economy. At that point we would have to decide whether we were going to send in forces and confront Nasser directly.

(5)



Secretary McNamara saw the whole situation evolving somewhat differently. He thought the initial exchange would be a fierce air battle for air superiority which would deplete aircraft inventories on both sides. Then both the U. S. and the USSR would be faced with requests for air support. He felt that the USSR might supply Soviet-piloted aircraft.

The President returned to Soviet motives. Mr. Helms said that he felt the USSR likes the situation as it is now but is not ready to rush in. The Soviets would like to bring off a propaganda victory as in the 1950's with them as the peacemakers and saviors of the Arabs, while we end up fully blackballed in the Arab world as Israel's supporter.

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Mr. Helms said he was not as bearish as Secretary McNamara on Israeli air capability. He said the Israelis had taken the MIG that defected from Iraq last year through all kinds of maneuvers in Israel and had demonstrated in the 7 April air battle with Syria that they had learned their lessons well.

The President asked what is in Nasser's mind. Mr. Helms thought he had achieved his objective now. Secretary Fowler asked whether he might be looking for someone to hold him back. Mr. Eugene Rostow noted that he was looking for someone to hold the Israelis back.

The President asked about British Minister of State George Thomson and Israeli Foreign Minister Eban, and whether he should see either of them. Eugene Rostow said that Thomson had not raised the subject, but that Eban will definitely want to see the President. When the President asked whether this would be desirable, Mr. Rostow replied that he felt we had held the Israelis back from a strike yesterday and that the President would undoubtedly have to see Eban.

In conclusion, the President asked Mr. Battle for an assessment of what is in Nasser's mind. Mr. Battle said that, until Nasser threatened to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba, he would have agreed with Mr. Helms that all Nasser wanted was a limited propaganda victory. Now that he has gone as far as he has, Battle said he cannot help but wonder whether Nasser either has more Soviet support than we know about, or had gone slightly insane. He noted that it is most uncharacteristic for Nasser not to leave a door open behind him, and that is exactly what he appears to have done in this case.

Battle sketched Nasser's problems and motives on the broader front to include internal economic trouble and a tightening food supply, his drive to regain leadership in the Arab world, and his need to recoup his position on the world stage.

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**FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968, Volume XVIII
Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67**

**Department of State
Washington, DC**

293. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State/1/

Tel Aviv, May 24, 1966, 1137Z.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 UAR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Cairo, London, and Paris.

1229. Israeli strategic missiles. CA-11071, May 10, 66./2/

/2/Circular airgram CA-11071, May 10, instructed Barbour to renew the U.S.-Israeli missile discussions of April 1964 with Eshkol, in particular to try to halt any delivery to Israel of missiles falling under the initial French-Israel contract for 25 missiles mentioned to Feldman by Eshkol. (Ibid.) For Feldman's reports of his discussions of this subject with Eshkol, see Documents 36 and 37.

1. I had almost an hour with Eshkol morning 24th on missile question. I had given him prior knowledge of subject, and he was well prepared. Following is brief summary of highlights.

2. After I made pitch pursuant ref CA, and subsequent preliminary exchange, PM assured me a) there are no strategic missiles in Israel now; b) there will be no such missiles in Israel at least for two more years from now, perhaps three; c) he sincerely hopes within that period of time UAR will abandon its missile program, in which event Israel will do likewise. In any event Eshkol indicated that GOI not contemplating purchase of more than "two dozen, maybe one dozen more or less." He implied they were having development problems, and finding costs nearly prohibitive.

3. In view importance today's exchange and in order provide full flavor of Eshkol's sensible attitude towards missile question we preparing detailed memcon to be sent priority airgram./3/

/3/Barbour transmitted the memorandum of conversation with airgram A-1000, May 27. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 UAR)

4. PM gave me paper and map summarizing current Israeli appraisal UAR missile program. Paper states, inter alia, guidance problems apparently still not overcome, but if gyro on which Egyptians now working proves successful, UAR might have about 60 operational SSM's by middle or end of 1967. Israeli appraisal also being pouched.

5. *Comment:* Noteworthy that Eshkol did not take issue with my point that in present circumstances, presence of SSM's in Israel would constitute Israeli introduction of new weapons into area. PM impressed us as fervently desirous avoiding further qualitative escalation in area arms.

Barbour

**FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968, Volume XVIII
Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67**

**Department of State
Washington, DC**

294. Memorandum of Conversation/1/

Washington, May 26, 1966, 5 p.m.

/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 NEAR E. Confidential. Drafted by Thompson and approved in S on May 28. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office. The memorandum is Part III of VI.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Weapons in the Near East

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR

The Secretary

Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

The Secretary asked the Ambassador if he had any reaction in Moscow to the discussion they had had with respect to nuclear weapons in the Near East./2/ Dobrynin said he had understood the Secretary was not talking about a possible treaty, but rather the policy of our two countries.

/2/The subject was discussed briefly in the course of a wide-ranging discussion between Rusk and Dobrynin on March 18. According to a memorandum of the

conversation, Rusk indicated the United States would be interested in a nuclear free zone in the Near East, provided that Turkey and Greece could be excluded. Dobrynin expressed skepticism as to whether Israel and the UAR would be interested in such an arrangement. Rusk expressed the opinion that both would be. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 4443, 388.3, 1966)

The Secretary agreed that a formal treaty might not be practical since the Arabs would probably not sign a treaty with the Israelis. Dobrynin said that the Soviets were not going to furnish any nuclear weapons to these countries and he assumed that we were not and therefore he had not pursued the matter further in Moscow.

The Secretary pointed out that if all these countries would accept IAEA safeguards, this could be a good first step. He went on to explain, however, that what he had had in mind was the possibility that both the Soviet Union and the United States might get these countries to give separately private assurances to us and we could then each tell the governments on the other side. The Secretary asked if there had been any discussion of this subject with Cairo. Dobrynin replied that there was not, to his knowledge, but it was possible that this had come up during the recent visit of Mr. Kosygin to Cairo.

The Secretary said he could tell the Ambassador quite privately that we were convinced that the Israelis were not planning to make nuclear weapons.

Ambassador Dobrynin expressed some skepticism and wondered how an arrangement could be made. The Secretary said he thought that if these countries assured us that they would not go nuclear, they would not do so. He asked if it was the policy of the Soviet Government that there should be no nuclear weapons in this area.

The Ambassador replied that there should not be any anywhere!

The Secretary asked if the Ambassador had had any discussion in Moscow with respect to keeping sophisticated weapons out of the Middle East, such as missiles. Dobrynin, without directly relating his reply to any conversations he had had in Moscow, said that he did not see much possibility in this area until the Big Powers

took some steps toward disarmament and set an example. Otherwise, it was difficult to convince these countries not to acquire such weapons.

295. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/

No. 0830/66

Washington, May 28, 1966.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, United Arab Republic, Vol. IV. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Controlled Dissem/Background Use Only. A note in the source text states that the memorandum was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence in the CIA Directorate of Intelligence and coordinated with ORR and ONE.

EGYPTIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

Summary

Egypt and the USSR may be moving toward a period of closer cooperation in the pursuit of their common objectives in the Arab world. Nasir's reviving antagonism toward conservative and moderate Arab leaders, his concurrent tendency to try to unify "progressive and revolutionary" Arab forces, and his renewed hostility toward US and British policy in the Middle East have almost certainly increased his readiness to collaborate with Moscow. Moscow's present leadership will be cautiously receptive to opportunities Nasir may offer for extending Soviet influence in the area. They already appear to be preparing to work somewhat more closely with him than in the past in espousing his kind of Arab nationalism, socialism, and opposition to Western influence. There are, however, definite limitations on such cooperation well-recognized by both sides.

[Here follow 17 paragraphs of more detailed discussion.]

**FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
1964-1968, Volume XVIII
Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1964-67**

Department of State
Washington, DC

415. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 1, 1967.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret; Exdis. Filed as an attachment to Document 416. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, but another copy indicates that it was drafted by Sterner and cleared in draft by Rochlin, Deputy Assistant Director of ACDA for International Relations Culver Gleysteen, Raymond L. Garthoff of G/PM, Vladimir Toumanoff of SOV, Director of Atomic Energy Affairs in SCI Donovan Q. Zook, Edward A. Padelford of NEA/RA, Director of INR/RNA Granville S. Austin, Bergus, Battle, and Deputy Assistant Secretary in NEA Stuart W. Rockwell. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 ARAB-ISR) An undated memorandum from Battle, forwarding the memorandum for Katzenbach's signature, states that it was prepared at the request of the White House staff. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT

The Arab-Israel Arms Race and Status of U.S. Arms Control Efforts

Conventional Forces. Israel has a safe margin of superiority over any combination of Arab forces likely to attack it and can be expected to maintain that position for at least the next five years. Arab numerical force superiority is more than matched by Israel's superiority in training, leadership, military doctrine and maintenance of equipment. Moreover, the Arab states have made little progress in military coordination among themselves. Recent border clashes have demonstrated that

short of general hostilities, or Israeli occupation of Arab territory, the Arab states will not rush to one another's assistance. In practical terms, therefore, Israel's security must be measured by its ability to maintain military superiority over the UAR, the strongest single Arab state that can challenge Israel.

Nuclear Weapons. Concerned that over the long run the Arabs will achieve superiority in conventional forces, Israel is carefully preserving its option to acquire sophisticated weapons, including, we believe, nuclear weapons. We have no evidence that Israel is actually making a bomb, but we believe Israel intends to keep itself in a position to do so at reasonably short notice should the need arise. The Israeli reactor at Dimona is capable of producing enough plutonium to make one or two bombs a year, but thus far our periodic inspections of this facility (most recently on April 22, 1967) have uncovered no evidence of weapons activity. Our inspectors emphasize, however, that their visits cover only the Dimona site and there can be no assurance that the Israelis are not pursuing a clandestine weapons program elsewhere.^{/2/} Our suspicions that we do not know the full story have been heightened by the Israelis' unwillingness to tell us what happened to 80-100 tons of unsafeguarded uranium concentrate that they bought from Argentina 4 years ago. We have also had reports that Israel has acquired a nuclear chemical separation plant, which--if true--would be a significant step toward a weapons capability. These reports are being urgently investigated.

[/2/A "Preliminary Report of the Visit to Atomic Energy Sites in Israel, April 20 to April 24, 1967: Summary and Conclusions \(Only\)" is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Harold Saunders, Israel-Nuclear-Dimona-Desalting.](#)

On the Arab side, no state is anywhere near a nuclear weapons capability. The UAR has a small 2-megawatt research reactor which cannot produce significant amounts of plutonium.

Both Eshkol and Nasser are on record as saying that their countries will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area. Beyond this, however, neither the Egyptians nor the Israelis have accepted IAEA safeguards over their entire nuclear programs, in spite of our urging them to do so. The UAR's position is that so far they

have nothing that requires safeguarding whereas Israel does and should therefore be the one that takes the first step. Israel's position is more complex. Israelis have stressed to us their concern that information obtained by IAEA inspectors, which might be available to the UAR, could aid the latter in planning a military or sabotage operation against Dimona. In terms of their long-range security the Israelis may also have decided that they will not accept limitations upon their sophisticated weapon option in the absence of Arab arms control undertakings in the conventional field.

Ballistic Missiles. Israel has contracted with the French firm of Dassault to purchase an unknown quantity of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. These missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads and would not be militarily cost-effective unless so used. The missile (designated the MD-620) is now being flight-tested by the French. None have apparently been delivered to Israel as yet, but initial deliveries could take place sometime in 1968. Latest evidence indicates that, despite some difficulties with the guidance system, the MD-620 program is moving forward. Israel is also pursuing an indigenous SSM R&D program.

The UAR's SSM program, though widely advertised for many years, has reached a virtual standstill. Most of the West German scientists who were assisting this effort have departed. Flight testing of the UAR missiles has been suspended, and it is estimated that the missile program, at its present level of activity, could not be successfully completed within the next decade.

Soviet Policy. Although the Soviets have gained much from their large sales of conventional weapons to certain Arab countries, we believe it unlikely that they will help any Arab state toward a nuclear weapons capability. There is similarly no hard evidence of Soviet assistance on the UAR's missile program.

U.S. Initiatives. The coming months may well offer our best opportunity in years to press for our arms control objectives because of two possible forms of additional leverage--first, a non-proliferation treaty, and second, U.S. willingness to finance desalting plants in the area. We plan to pursue our objectives along the following lines.

1. *Safeguards and the NPT.* We hope the non-proliferation treaty will prove to be a vehicle to help us get both Israel and the UAR to accept safeguards over their nuclear programs. Much will depend on whether the treaty emerges with a strong safeguards clause. As soon as the U.S. is ready to table a draft treaty at the ENDC, we plan to discuss it with the Israelis and the UAR. We are also exploring ways of overcoming Israel's suspicions of the IAEA, including the possibility of getting Israel a seat on the IAEA Board of Governors.

2. *Ballistic Missiles.* In May last year we raised with Eshkol our concern over Israel's plans to acquire ballistic missiles. Eshkol said Israel would not acquire SSM's "for two, maybe three years." He indicated that if Nasser "abandoned" his missile program, Israel would do likewise. Since the UAR's program has remained inactive in the intervening year, we plan to raise this again with Eshkol in the near future. Our objective is to try to achieve a tacit understanding with the Israelis and Egyptians for mutual forbearance in the further development of their SSM programs. If Eshkol is receptive, we are prepared to approach Nasser.

3. *Talks with the Soviets.* Our probes of the Soviets concerning arms control in the Arab-Israel context have elicited little show of interest thus far. We do not expect that the Soviets will be receptive to an approach on controlling the supply of conventional weapons. However, depending on the course of U.S.-Soviet negotiations on the nonproliferation treaty, we may have a renewed opportunity to take up the problem of nuclear weapons and missiles in the Near East.

4. *Put More Punch Into Our Arms Control Discussions with the Israelis.* We are disappointed not only in the lack of progress of our arms control discussions with the Israelis but in the lack of Israeli candor that has characterized them. There is a large area of Israeli activity and planning that is a closed book to us. During the coming year we would like to see arms control results linked more directly to Israel's requests for military and economic aid.

Continuing Intelligence Surveillance. While our inspections of Dimona can reassure us concerning activities there, they leave open the possibility of Israeli weapons activity somewhere else in Israel. For this reason continuing surveillance of Israel by

every means at our disposal must remain a high priority intelligence requirement. We intend also to keep a watch on Israeli efforts to acquire in other countries equipment and technology related to nuclear weapon and missile programs.

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

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Department of State
Washington, DC

416. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/[1/](#)

Washington, May 8, 1967.

[/1/](#)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten "L" on the memorandum indicates that it was seen by the President.

SUBJECT

Israeli Aid Package

We now know enough informally about the AEC's inspection of Dimona to wrap up the Israeli aid package. Secretaries McNamara and Katzenbach have acquiesced (Tab A)/[2/](#) in most of Arthur Goldberg's proposals (Tab B)./[3/](#) I have outlined the resulting package on the attached chart./[4/](#) It gives the Israelis almost everything they want, except on APC's.

[/2/](#)Tab A is a May 5 memorandum from Katzenbach to the President.

[/3/](#)Document 414.

[/4/](#)The chart, entitled "Israeli Aid Package," dated May 8, not attached, listed the various elements of the package in three columns, headed "Israeli Request," "Katzenbach-McNamara-Goldberg Proposal," and "Your Decision." A copy is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel Aid, 5/67.

The one major difference between Arthur's recommendation and the Secretaries' indicates the Secretaries' continuing concern over providing APC's. They propose

only that we license sale of 100 APC's for cash, while Arthur recommends credit sale on no-concessional terms.

The main issue remains how closely we should identify ourselves with Israel in view of its unclear nuclear intentions and our interests in the Arab world. I understand--and share--your desire to do everything we can to help the Israelis. On the other hand, we know that every request they make is not only a request for help but part of an effort to maneuver us into closer and closer identification. They feel they've made a breakthrough in the tank and plane sales and are pushing hard to exploit it.

The AEC team found no evidence that Israel is using Dimona to produce material for use in nuclear weapons. While this conclusion is encouraging, it can't tell us one way or the other whether **Israel may be pressing a clandestine weapons program elsewhere.** Secretary Katzenbach concludes (Tab C)/5/ that Israel is carefully preserving its option to produce nuclear weapons on short notice if it needs to. Our intelligence proves nothing, but there are enough unanswered questions to make us want to avoid getting locked in too closely with Israel.

[/5/Document 415.](#)

In addition, State and Defense worry about our substantial interests in the Arab world. I know you are keenly aware of our oil interests (\$2.75 billion investment, \$750 million in yearly profits in production alone plus downstream operations) and of our obligations to our Arab friends. Our greatest single liability there--and one of the USSR's greatest assets--is the sincere Arab belief that the "Zionists exercise a veto on US policy."

These important concerns account for the rough passage this package has had. The alternative to selling APC's now would be to tell the Israelis that our agreement to their full requests for credit on military spares (\$14 million) is all we can do this year but that we'll consider the APC's along with other requests they've already made for the next generation of Israeli weapons. In fact, that \$14 million alone is a substantial concession--larger than the whole cost of the Jordan package (\$12 million) including airlift costs. If you approve APC's, we will need to control publicity.

I've set up the attached chart as your decision document.^{/6/} We might gain some points by giving the Israelis our decision before their Independence Day (15 May), especially if we don't go to their parade. Secretary Katzenbach will send a separate memo on desalting.^{/7/}

^{/6/}Handwritten notations on the chart cited in footnote 4 above indicate the President's decisions, which he made at a May 23 luncheon meeting with Rusk, McNamara, Rostow, Christian, and Helms. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) A list attached to a May 23 memorandum from Rostow to the President states that the President approved a cash sale of 100 APCs for \$3.7 million, preferably the sale of 100 Italian APCs with U.S. license, with a direct U.S. sale only if that arrangement was not workable, a \$2 million cash sale of tank spare parts, \$14 million military credit at 5 percent interest for Hawk and tank spare parts, sale of \$27.5 million in food at 2-1/2 percent interest, \$20 million in Export-Import Bank loans, \$5 million for special Africa assistance, agreement to establishment of facilities for Hawk missile maintenance, and agreement to offshore procurement for U.S. aid programs. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Israel, Israeli Aid, 5/67)

^{/7/}A May 10 memorandum from Katzenbach to the President recommended Jack Valenti as a possible Coordinator on Israeli and UAR desalting plants. (Ibid., Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 27)

Walt

Decisions

At its 1373rd meeting, on 9 November 1967, the Council decided to invite the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Israel and Jordan to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East: Letter dated 7 November 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8226)".¹¹

At its 1375th meeting, on 13 November 1967, the Council decided to invite the representative of Syria to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the question.

Resolution 242 (1967)

of 22 November 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area,

¹¹ *Ibid.*

Décisions

A sa 1373^e séance, le 9 novembre 1967, le Conseil a décidé d'inviter les représentants de la République arabe unie, d'Israël et de la Jordanie à participer, sans droit de vote, à la discussion de la question intitulée "La situation au Moyen-Orient : Lettre, en date du 7 novembre 1967, adressée au Président du Conseil de sécurité par le représentant permanent de la République arabe unie (S/8226)¹¹".

A sa 1375^e séance, le 13 novembre 1967, le Conseil a décidé d'inviter le représentant de la Syrie à participer, sans droit de vote, à la discussion de la question.

Résolution 242 (1967)

du 22 novembre 1967

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Exprimant l'inquiétude que continue de lui causer la grave situation au Moyen-Orient,

Soulignant l'inadmissibilité de l'acquisition de territoire par la guerre et la nécessité d'œuvrer pour une paix juste et durable permettant à chaque Etat de la région de vivre en sécurité,

Soulignant en outre que tous les Etats Membres, en acceptant la Charte des Nations Unies, ont contracté l'engagement d'agir conformément à l'Article 2 de la Charte,

1. *Affirme* que l'accomplissement des principes de la Charte exige l'instauration d'une paix juste et durable au Moyen-Orient qui devrait comprendre l'application des deux principes suivants :

- i) Retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit;
- ii) Cessation de toutes assertions de belligérance ou de tous états de belligérance et respect et reconnaissance de la souveraineté, de l'intégrité territoriale et de l'indépendance politique de chaque Etat de la région et de leur droit de vivre en paix à l'intérieur de frontières sûres et reconnues à l'abri de menaces ou d'actes de force;

2. *Affirme en outre* la nécessité

a) De garantir la liberté de navigation sur les voies d'eau internationales de la région;

b) De réaliser un juste règlement du problème des réfugiés;

c) De garantir l'inviolabilité territoriale et l'indépendance politique de chaque Etat de la région, par

¹¹ *Ibid.*

through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting.

Decision

On 8 December 1967, the following statement which reflected the view of the members of the Council was circulated by the President as a Security Council document (S/8289):¹²

"As regards document S/8053/Add.3,¹² brought to the attention of the Security Council, the members, recalling the consensus reached at its 1366th meeting on 9 July 1967, recognize the necessity of the enlargement by the Secretary-General of the number of observers in the Suez Canal zone and the provision of additional technical material and means of transportation."

des mesures comprenant la création de zones démilitarisées;

3. *Prie* le Secrétaire général de désigner un représentant spécial pour se rendre au Moyen-Orient afin d'y établir et d'y maintenir des rapports avec les Etats intéressés en vue de favoriser un accord et de seconder les efforts tendant à aboutir à un règlement pacifique et accepté, conformément aux dispositions et aux principes de la présente résolution;

4. *Prie* le Secrétaire général de présenter aussitôt que possible au Conseil de sécurité un rapport d'activité sur les efforts du représentant spécial.

Adoptée à l'unanimité à la 1382^e séance.

Décision

Le 8 décembre 1967, le Président a fait distribuer, en tant que document du Conseil (S/8289¹²), la déclaration ci-après qui reflétait l'avis des membres du Conseil :

"En ce qui concerne le document S/8053/Add.3¹², soumis à l'attention du Conseil de sécurité, les membres de celui-ci, rappelant le consensus intervenu à sa 1366^e séance, le 9 juillet 1967, reconnaissent la nécessité de l'accroissement, par le Secrétaire général, du nombre des observateurs dans le secteur du canal de Suez et de la mise à la disposition de ceux-ci de matériel technique et de moyens de transport supplémentaires."

THE CYPRUS QUESTION¹³

Decision

At its 1362nd meeting, on 19 June 1967, the Council decided to invite the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece to participate, without vote, in the discussion of the item entitled "Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488):¹⁴ report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus (S/7969)".¹⁵

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Resolutions or decisions on this question were also adopted in 1963, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

¹⁴ See *Official Records of the Security Council, Eighteenth Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1963*.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967*.

LA QUESTION DE CHYPRE¹³

Décision

A sa 1362^e séance, le 19 juin 1967, le Conseil a décidé d'inviter les représentants de Chypre, de la Turquie et de la Grèce à participer, sans droit de vote, à la discussion de la question intitulée "Lettre, en date du 26 décembre 1963, adressée au Président du Conseil de sécurité par le représentant permanent de Chypre (S/5488¹⁴) : rapport du Secrétaire général sur l'Opération des Nations Unies à Chypre (S/7969¹⁵)".

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Question ayant fait l'objet de résolutions ou décisions de la part du Conseil en 1963, 1964, 1965 et 1966.

¹⁴ Voir *Documents officiels du Conseil de sécurité, dix-huitième année, Supplément d'octobre, novembre et décembre 1963*.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, *vingt-deuxième année, Supplément d'avril, mai et juin 1967*.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES.
1964-1968, Volume XI
Arms Control and Disarmament

Department of State
Washington, DC

2. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/

Washington, January 14, 1964.

/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 306, 388.3, January 11-16, 1964. Secret. Attached to another copy of Bundy's memorandum is a January 15 memorandum from ACDA Director William C. Foster to the Committee of Principals, recommending that Bundy's memorandum serve as the agenda for their meeting on January 16 and transmitting a list of working papers for use as reference material. The list covers three areas: nuclear containment, immediate reductions or limitations of arms, and observation posts. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament--ACDA Publications, Vol. I, Box 11)

The January 16 meeting of the Committee of Principals was cancelled, and Foster and others instead worked on a paper that attempted to incorporate the President's general thoughts. (Seaborg, *Journal*, Vol. 7, p. 228) Regarding this paper, see footnote 3, Document 4.

Butch Fisher, Spurgeon Keeny and I have been working on the possible set of "new proposals" for the United States in Geneva, and from our point of view the following are desirable and practicable, subject to your advice. We have broken them down into two major fields--A. Nuclear Containment, and B. Immediate Reductions or Limitations of Arms (formerly called separable first stage).

The organizing principle of these proposals is that each separate numbered item should be something which we are prepared to negotiate on its own terms. The posture we seek to present is that of a nation which believes that the way to begin is to begin. We are offering a dozen or more ways to begin and are ready to start whenever others will meet us half way. While many of these proposals are not altogether new, the approach has some novelty and appears to us to match the President's temper and his general purpose.

A. Nuclear Containment

1. Non-dissemination. This is a familiar field and we would follow the general guidelines in the ACDA paper.^{/2/}

^{/2/}Reference presumably is to the January 14 ACDA paper, "Non-dissemination of Nuclear Weapons," which is cited in the list above under nuclear containment. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Disarmament--ACDA Publications, Vol., I, Box 11)

2. Non-reception of nuclear weapons. This is a partial element of non-dissemination and one which is worth encouragement, although probably not front-page leadership by the United States.

3. Non-dissemination to individual nations of strategic nuclear delivery systems. This is a separable element which might be accomplished by unilateral or bilateral agreement. This could be accomplished by the reciprocal destruction of B-47/Badger bombers so that they would not be available for possible dissemination to other countries. We also believe the United States could easily make a self-denying statement that its obsolete bombers, for example, will not be sold to those who might seek a nuclear capability of their own.

4. Reciprocal inspection of large peaceful nuclear reactors both here and abroad.

5. An agreed nuclear production cut-off with minimum inspection.

6. An offer to allow inspection to confirm our own projected close down of plutonium production reactors.

7. Improved proposals for the transfer of nuclear materials to peaceful purposes. These transfers need not be in the same amounts and will be under improved IAEA supervision.

8. Basic principles for nuclear-free zones.

9. Assertion of the possibility of nuclear-limited zones (such as a possible nuclear freeze in Europe).

10. Reassertion of the comprehensive test ban (in a low key with emphasis on seismic study if the subject is posed)./3/

/3/A handwritten question mark appears in the right margin next to this sentence.

B. Immediate Reductions or Limitations of Arms

11. An agreed reduction across the board.

12. An agreed reduction in strategic forces.

13. An agreed reduction in tactical forces.

14. A separate agreement on nondeployment of AICBMs (comparable to the nuclear weapons in space agreement).

15. An agreed freeze on the production of strategic delivery systems./4/

/4/The word "emphasis" has been inserted by hand in the left margin next to this sentence.

16. An agreed across-the-board stoppage of arms production./5/

/5/The word "No" is handwritten in the margin next to this sentence.

All of these separable measures are designed to be consistent with existing approaches to inspection with the possible exceptions of the reduction in strategic weapons and AICBM non-deployment, where our own means of surveillance may be satisfactory.

The President's set of proposals should also include:

--A general reaffirmation of our basic position.

--An assertion of our great interest in a plan for control posts, coupled with a statement that this is a matter which so closely engages the interest of some of our major allies that we will not make specific proposals until we have consulted further with them.

--A reaffirmation and resume of the proposed agreements on preventing the use of force set forth in the President's letter to Khrushchev, of which I attach the latest draft./6/

/6/Not printed. Text is identical to a letter President Johnson sent to Chairman Khrushchev on January 18. For text, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-64*, pp. 153-155.

Butch Fisher still wants to say something about budgets and will reluctantly settle for whatever small bone you wish to throw in his direction. He points out that this is a field of real promise and that in the fitness of things it should not be wholly neglected in a Presidential declaration at Geneva.

We recognize that not all of this may be negotiable in your terms in the few days that remain, but my own belief is that we ought to be able to get enough agreement on most of them to have them put forward as examples of the sort of things for which the Johnson Administration is ready, while detailed work proceeds, on specific ways and means.

McG. B.

3. Editorial Note

On January 16, 1964, President Johnson sent a letter to AEC Chairman Seaborg approving Niblick III, an AEC proposal for a total of 13 underground nuclear tests to

be conducted in the third quarter of FY 1964. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing--U.S. Testing Program, Volume II, Niblick Series--FY 1964, Box 27) Seaborg proposed this series in a December 21, 1963, letter to President Johnson. (Ibid.)

In a January 16 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Charles E. Johnson noted that the proposed test program had been circulated to all members of the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests on January 6 for comments and no negative comments or objections had been made. Thus, he and Spurgeon Keeny recommended that the President's previously signed letter of approval be dated and sent to Seaborg under cover of a transmittal memorandum from Bundy. (Ibid.) The Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests was established by President Kennedy in NSAM No. 269, October 31, 1963. For text, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961-1963, volume VII, Document 372.

Bundy's January 16 memorandum to Seaborg reads in part: "In making his approval, the President noted that your submittal was based on the understanding that there must be no untoward risk of violation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty limitations concerning delivery of radioactive debris beyond national boundaries, and your assurance to him that the test program proposed is consistent with such understanding." (Ibid.) The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed in Moscow on August 10, 1963, and entered into force on October 10, 1963. (14 UST 1313)

In a March 26 letter to President Johnson, Seaborg said that 10 shots were carried out under Niblick III, which had been completed, and he requested 14 weapons development tests and 2 Plowshare events for the Niblick IV series in the fourth quarter of FY 1964. "The Plowshare events," Seaborg wrote, "are directed toward the development of clean explosives and techniques for their employment in the excavation program." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Testing--U.S. Testing Program, Volume II, Niblick Series--FY 1964, Box 27)

In a memorandum to President Johnson, April 9, McGeorge Bundy wrote that the Review Committee on Underground Nuclear Tests and his office had reviewed the AEC request for the President's approval. The President initialed his approval of the

Niblick IV program on this memorandum. (Ibid.) Bundy conveyed the President's approval in an April 10 memorandum to Seaborg. (Ibid.)

Ultimately, the U.S. Government conducted 10 tests, including 1 Plowshare event, during the third quarter of FY 1964 and 13 shots, including 2 Plowshare events, in the fourth quarter. (*United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 Through September 1992*, pages 20-22)

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR XF IS US UR

SUBJECT: GOI CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN ATTACK TODAY

*Mrs. Meir's early meeting
 with Keating saying Israel
 expects attacks.*

1. AT PRIME MINISTER'S URGENT REQUEST, I MET WITH HER AT HER TEL AVIV OFFICE THIS MORNING AT 10:15. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DCM, AMB DJINITZ, MORDECHAI GAZIT OF PM'S OFFICE AND AVRAHAM KIDRON, DIRGEN MFA, ALSO PRESENT.

2- MRS MEIR INITIATED CONVERSATION BY NOTING "WE MAY BE IN TROUBLE". THEN GAVE ME A REVIEW OF THE SITUATION RE REPORTED SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN BUILD-UPS DURING THE PAST FEW WEEKS. I NOTED THAT WE HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH THE IDF ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AND WE WERE TOLD THE SITUATION WAS NOT DANGEROUS. MRS MEIR SAID THAT THIS WAS AN ACCURATE EVALUATION AT THE TIME, BUT THAT WITHIN THE LAST 12 HOURS THE SITUATION HAD BECOME VERY SERIOUS.

ISRAEL HAD INFO FROM A NUMBER OF TOTALLY RELIABLE SOURCES THAT SYRIA AND EGYPT WERE PLANNING A COORDINATED ATTACK AGAINST ISRAEL TODAY IN THE LATE AFTERNOON.

3. IN ADDITION TO INFO RE MILITARY SITUATION GOI HAD HARD INFO THAT SOVIET DEPENDENTS AND AT LEAST SOME ADVISORS WERE BEING EVACUATED FROM SYRIA AND AEGYPT. AT FIRST, SAID MRS MEIR, THE GOI THOUGHT THE SOVIET EVACUATION FROM SYRIA MIGHT MEAN A BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, BUT THIS NOW DOES NOT SEEM TO BE THE CASE SINCE A NUMBER OF SOVIET ADVISORS ARE STILL IN COUNTRY AND APPARENTLY PLANNING TO REMAIN. ALSO, GOI HAS INFO THAT SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS HAVE DEPARTED ALEXANDRIA. ISRAEL COULD ONLY SPECULATE ON REASON FOR SOVIET EXODUS, BUT ONE GOI SOURCE REPORTED THIS IS PART OF SOVIET NEGATIVE REACTION TO PLANNED EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN ATTACKS.

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4. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, SAID MRS. MEIR, ISRAEL WANTED THE URGENT HELP OF THE US IN TRYING TO HEAD OFF HOSTILITIES. SHE ASKED IF WE WOULD PASS ON TO THE SOVIETS AND EGYPTIANS THE FOLLOWING AS FAST AS POSSIBLE.

A. ISRAEL IS NOT PLANNING TO ATTACK SYRIA OR EGYPT. IT HAS DEPLOYED ITS FORCES TO PROTECT ITSELF IN CASE OF ATTACK AND, ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS, IS CALLING UP "SOME RESERVES". (SHE CONFIRMED THIS IS NOT GENERAL MOBILIZATION)

B. ISRAEL IS WELL AWARE OF THE MILITARY DISPOSITIONS OF EGYPT AND SYRIA. IF THEY ATTACK, THEY WILL LOSE AS SHE HAS BEEN ASSURED THIS AM BY DEFMIN DAYAN ALTHOUGH THE ATTACKERS CAN CAUSE DAMAGE AND INFLECT CAUSUALTIES WHICH ISRAEL WISHES TO AVOID.

5. IN ANSWER TO MY SPECIFIC QUESTION, MRS. MEIR REPLIED WITHOUT HESITATION THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT RPT NOT LAUNCH A PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK, NOTING THAT ISRAEL WOULD SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND ITSELF IF ATTACKED, BUT EMPHASIZING THAT THE GOI WISHES TO AVOID BLOODSHED.

6. DATT HAS BEEN BRIEFED BY IDF RE DETAILS OF MILITARY SITUATION IS REPORTING SEPARATELY BY IMMEDIATE CABLE.

7. PM'S OFFICE HAS JUST CALLED FOLLOWING CONTINGENCY PRESS GUIDANCE FOR IDF: IN ANSWER TO QUESTION IDF SPOKESMAN WILL SAY: "FOLLOWING CONCENTRATION OF SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN TROOPS THE IDF HAS TAKEN DEFENSIVE MEASURES INCLUDING A CALL UP OF SOME RESERVES."

8. AMB. DINITZ WILL LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON ON FIRST AVAILABLE PLANE. HE SHOULD BE THERE TOMORROW AT LATEST.
 COMMENT: I BELIEVE MRS MEIR SINCERELY WISHES TO AVOID USELESS BLOODSHED. I TRUST WE CAN AID IN THIS WORTHY ENDEAVOR. IF POSSIBLE, I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE SOME KIND OF REPLY TO PM WITHIN NEXT FEW HOURS.
 KEATING
 BT

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OF 02

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Authority EO 12958By PT NARA Date 8/24/03

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 6, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: WILLIAM QUANDT ^{w.B.2}
DONALD STUKEL ^{DS}

SUBJECT: WSAG Meeting--Middle East, Saturday,
October 6, 1973, 3:00 p.m.

The purpose of this meeting is to review the situation as it has developed since Arab-Israeli hostilities began this morning and to determine what actions the USG should take.

You will want to cover the following:

- A. Review the present situation. (CIA and JCS will be prepared to brief.)
- B. Measures to minimize threats to US interests
- C. Soviet moves
- D. Consequences of a major Arab defeat KK


Each of these topics is dealt with in Sections A through D. Talking points are provided.

The Tabs cover the following topics:

- Tab 1 - Evacuation
- Tab 2 - Oil
- Tab 3 - State Talking Points
- Tab 4 - Status of US Forces
- Tab 5 - Order of Battle
- Tab 6 - Relevant cables
- Tab 7 - SNIE 35/36-73 Arab-Israeli Hostilities and Their Implications

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October 6, 1973

A. Situation

--Ask Mr. Colby to brief on developments during the day. [Fighting broke out at about 2:00 p.m. local time, and the weight of evidence suggests that it resulted from a coordinated Egyptian-Syrian initiative. There is still some uncertainty on this score, however. Most of the fighting has been concentrated along the Suez and Golan fronts. The Israelis have not struck deep into either country or against air bases, but seem to have gained superiority in the air. The Egyptians have acknowledged the loss of ten aircraft. On the ground the Egyptians have managed to make a limited crossing of the Canal at several points, and will probably fight hard during the night to maintain their footholds. The Syrians have advanced, but have not passed the Israeli anti-tank defenses. The prospect is for continued fighting during the night as the Israelis try to oust the Egyptians from Sinai. If this is not successful, and if diplomatic efforts do not succeed in restoring the cease-fire, Israel will probably consider a large-scale air strike against Egyptian positions tomorrow morning.]

Talking Points

--If diplomatic efforts fail to restore the cease-fire on a status quo ante basis, the Israelis will probably hit hard tomorrow. Do we have an interest in trying to dissuade them?

--What position have the Soviets been taking during the crisis? How are they likely to come out of this in terms of their position in the Middle East?

--Are there any indications that Arab oil producers have threatened an embargo?

--Do we have any reports of hostility directed at US citizens in Arab countries, especially Libya, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon or Kuwait?

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
Authority EO 12958By PT NARA Date 8/24/03B. Measures to Minimize Threats to U.S. Interests

- Activate oil task force to evaluate contingency of Arab embargo.
Contact Shah of Iran about emergency oil arrangements.
- Alert U.S. forces for possible evacuation, with particular emphasis on contingency of Libyan Government actions against American citizens.
- Use UN machinery and bilateral consultations to bring about cease-fire on basis of status quo ante.
- Public posture of calling for ceasefire without taking sides.

Talking Points

- Could we consider contacting Bourguiba as a channel to Qadhafi if U.S. citizens seem to be endangered in Libya?
- If a ceasefire in place is accepted by the Arabs but refused by the Israelis, would we have an interest in trying to persuade the Israelis to reverse their decision?
- How long would an Arab oil embargo have to be in effect to hurt us or our allies? (See Tab 2 for more information on oil.)
- Are there any indications that we should evacuate U.S. citizens from any of the involved countries? (See Tab 1 for more information on evacuation.)

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C. Soviet Moves

--Yesterday the Soviets evacuated dependents from Egypt and Syria, suggesting that they saw war coming.

--Soviet media have carried Arab accusations of Israel attacking Syria and Egypt but have generally not gone beyond reporting the fighting from Arab sources.

--This morning only one Soviet naval ship (a destroyer in Alexandria) was in an Egyptian port and no ships were in Syrian ports.

--The Soviet surface forces are now beginning to concentrate in the Eastern Mediterranean, but most of the submarines are in the Western Mediterranean.

Talking Points

--If the Soviets knew that hostilities were imminent, did they take any steps to discourage their clients?

--Did Soviet rumors last week of an imminent attack contribute to hostilities, on the pattern of 1967?

--Will the Soviets be likely to conclude that they should cut their losses if the Arabs are defeated, or will they try to seize on the opportunity to rebuild their eroded positions in Egypt and Syria?

--How can we best take advantage of this crisis to reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East?

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D. Consequences of a Major Arab Defeat

- Setback for Soviet-Arab relations.
- Attacks on U.S. interests throughout the Arab world.
- Probable elimination of chances for negotiated Arab-Israeli settlement.
- Use of Arab oil as a weapon to reverse military defeat, especially by Libya.
- Intensification of pressures against moderate Arab regimes.

Talking Points

- Could we expect that a post-war atmosphere might be more, rather than less conducive to peace negotiations? If Arab loss of face could be minimized, would the chances for a peace settlement increase?
- How could we support moderate regimes against the pressure from radicals?
- What could we do to offset Arab efforts to use oil against us?

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Report	Intelligence Memorandum (5pp.)	10/6/73	A
2. Report	Intelligence Memorandum (3pp.)	10/6/73	A
3. Report	Situation Report (4pp.)	10/6/73	A
4. Telegram	Amemb Beirut to SecState (2pp.)	10/6/73	A
5. Telegram	To SecState (2pp.)	10/6/73	A
6. Telegram	King Faysal to HAK (1p.)	Undated	A
7. Report	Intelligence Memorandum (5pp.)	10/6/73	A
8. Report	Arab-Israeli Hostilities and Their Implications (16pp.)	10/6/73	A


FILE LOCATION

LS AP Meeting Middle East
 10/6/73 7:30 PM
 H Files Box H-94 Folder 1

RESTRICTION CODES

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
NA 14079 (1-68)



Mid East Maps, 1973 October War (Yom Kippur War) –Syrian Front.
<http://www.mideastweb.org/octoberwarmapsyria.htm>

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INDICATIONS OF ARAB INTENTIONS TO INITIATE
HOSTILITIES


This paper deals in the first instance with military moves made by Egypt and other Arab states during the past several weeks. Individually, these moves do not appear to have great significance. Taken collectively, however, they suggest a pattern of action that could be preparation for hostilities against Israel, but they are also part of an effort to arouse international concern and put psychological pressures on Israel and the US.

The balance of the paper is a discussion and assessment of the objectives of Egypt and the other Arab states and of the likelihood of hostilities in the near future. We conclude that whatever the Egyptian and Arab leaders intend at this stage, the pattern of their actions thus far does not provide the Arabs with a rational basis for an attack at an early date.

In recent weeks, the emphasis in Egyptian statements and activities has gradually shifted toward preparing for war. The most serious indicators to date are

- Movement of SA-6 surface-to-air missiles to firing sites within 20 miles of the Suez Canal; a program to convert SA-2 missile systems to more advanced models has also been reported.
- Transfer within the past month of about 30 Mirage V jet fighters, which have a ground attack capability, from Libya to Egypt. Flight operations by Egyptian pilots using these aircraft have begun. About 16 Hawker Hunter jet fighters also have arrived in Egypt from Iraq, with Iraqi pilots. About 10 Lightning jet fighters are expected from Saudi Arabia.
- Movement of TU-16 bombers from Aswan to the Cairo area in late March. These aircraft are equipped to carry air-to-surface missiles, but we have no evidence that the missiles themselves have been moved from Aswan.
- A high state of alert imposed on the Egyptian air force since 20 April; some air force reservists were recalled on 3 May.

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-- Relocation and reactivation of various Egyptian air squadrons. Some of the shuffling was to accommodate the aircraft from Libya and Iraq.

-- Evidence suggesting that additional commando units may have moved closer to the Suez Canal since mid-March.


-- A report that the Egyptian staff has been ordered to prepare a detailed plan for an attack across the Canal and to pick optimum dates; the staff is said to have chosen two full moon nights, 19 May and 16 June. We, however, do not believe that the plan described matches up with Sadat's objectives.

-- A high-ranking Jordanian military official's statement that the Arab chiefs of staff conference in Cairo, 21-25 April, was permeated with "despair and foreboding" due to Egyptian determination to go to war regardless of the consequences. King Husayn has passed his own concern about the seriousness of the situation to the Israelis.

-- Reliable reports that the Egyptians are trying to organize an oil boycott by the Arab oil producers against the US and Western Europe in the event of hostilities with Israel. This effort is having mixed results.

These are all actions that the Egyptians could be expected to take in the fairly early stages of preparing to fight; they are also actions that are necessary as psychological gambits. If Sadat intends a serious effort to take and hold, if only for a few days, territory in Sinai and thereby provoke outside intervention, we should see evidence of further preparation by his air forces. We are not likely to see further preparations by ground forces that might be used in a small-scale attack, because many units are already in place between Cairo and the Canal.

We judge that Sadat at this time has not made a decision to attack at a specific time and in a specific manner. Despite the gloomy prognoses being assiduously disseminated from Cairo, Sadat has not exhausted his diplomatic options. His economic situation is deteriorating, but we doubt that he is under significant domestic pressure to go to war. Both Sadat and his advisers are aware that their military prospects are poor at best; a fresh disaster might well sweep away Sadat's regime rather than rescue him from his dilemma.



3

We think that Sadat will wait at least until he sees the outcome of the UN session on the Middle East in late May before taking a new decision. Meanwhile, strengthening Egypt's military preparedness serves to create tensions that Sadat hopes will support the urgency of his diplomacy.

Recent military moves by other Arab governments, we believe, are primarily in harmony with this purpose, although each of these moves is also motivated by the narrower interests of the government making it. The moves include

-- Shipment of a Moroccan armored contingent to Syria. Some of this unit's equipment has already been delivered by Soviet LST's which picked it up in Algeria, and some of the troops may have arrived.


-- Transfer of two squadrons of Algerian MIG-21s (about 20 aircraft) with pilots to Libya, probably to bolster Libya's air defense. We have evidence that Algeria may also have sent Mig-15s and -17s to Syria.

-- An undertaking, still in the planning stage, to send a Sudanese ground force to Syria.

These moves are part of general Arab planning to increase the pressures on Israel. The transfers of men and equipment strengthen to some degree the armed forces of Syria and Egypt, but the main effect at this stage is psychological. The major gap in the Arab lineup is the refusal of the Jordanian government to place its forces at the disposal of the Egyptian-Syrian "eastern front."

Egyptian support of the anti-American campaign by the fedayeen is designed to step up pressure on the US, and through Washington, on Israel. The ruckus between the fedayeen and the Lebanese government is an embarrassment to Egypt and the other Arabs; it distracts attention from that aspect of the Arab-Israeli confrontation that Cairo wants to emphasize even though it also contributes to the sense of tension surrounding the area.

The suddenness of the flare-up in Lebanon illustrates the danger that in the next few months the various military moves may develop a momentum that Cairo will not be able to control. The events of 1967



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argue that most Arab governments are not able to resist giving the situation a shove once it has started rolling. Sadat has said so often that he is now dead serious that it will be progressively more difficult to find excuses for inaction, more especially when other Arab leaders have fulfilled their commitments to his cause.


The Soviet role in this situation is somewhat ambivalent. While they have an interest in sustaining a level of tension that underscores the seriousness of the problem and the need for US initiatives and Israeli concessions, the Soviet leaders are counseling the Arabs against precipitate military action. The Soviet position in the area would suffer if the Arabs, using Soviet weapons, were beaten again. Another war would risk an involvement that might endanger detente with the US--the centerpiece of Brezhnev's foreign policy.

Sadat's May Day speech indicated that he has felt pressure from the USSR to continue to pursue a "peaceful solution." There are also signs that Moscow is using third parties to warn Cairo of the dangers of new war.

-- "Confirmed information" from Jordan that the Soviet ambassador in Damascus had advised the Syrians "not to get involved in a war." Syrian President Asad frequently acts as a go-between with Cairo and Moscow.

-- Grechko last week asked the French chief of staff whether Paris could influence Egypt against starting a fight. The Soviets themselves no longer have a veto over Egypt's actions.

Overall, we do not believe that an outbreak of hostilities is likely before the next UN debate, and we doubt that Sadat will decide to try a major operation within the next six weeks.



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

5640

SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

October 9, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

WILLIAM H. QUANDT w.b.2.

SUBJECT:

Middle Eastern Issues

Today's developments suggest that our generally optimistic estimates of the outcome of the fighting could be wrong in several key areas. I mention these only because I sense that we have been caught by surprise too often in the last few days and we may now be at the point of having to face up to some difficult decisions.

The important facts that seem to emerge from today's fighting are the following:

--Israel, while generally regaining the initiative, is taking heavy losses and fighting seems likely to drag on for several more days.

--Threats to American citizens, which previously has not been noted in the Arab countries, have surfaced in Lebanon. If Israel bombs civilian areas in Damascus and Cairo, anti-American sentiment could flare up rapidly. [See Ambassador Buffum's cable at Tab A.]

--Oil from Iraq and Saudi Arabia that is normally shipped by pipeline across Lebanon and Syria is blocked. Kuwait is calling for the use of oil as part of the battle.


--Reports that Israeli bombing has caused Soviet casualties in Damascus raise the possibility that Soviet moderation could rapidly shift to a policy of military support via arms shipment to Syria and Egypt. [See Tab C.]

XGDS - 3

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

- 2 -

--Urgent Israeli arms requests raise an acute dilemma of acting either too soon or too late in terms of our later ability to deal with either Arabs or Israelis in any future peace settlement effort.

--Jordan seems to be drawing closer to possible involvement in the fighting, to judge from the highly emotional tone of King Hussein's reply to your message. [Tab B]

In light of these possible developments, the following decisions may have to be faced soon:

1. Evacuation of American citizens from Lebanon. This could probably still be done by commercial carriers in a relatively orderly manner. Timing is obviously of critical importance.

--On the one hand this would signal heightened US concern at a time when we may want to present a more confident image. If a ceasefire is achieved tomorrow, there may be no need for such a move.


--On the other hand, if the Arabs face an massive defeat in the next few days, it may be better to begin to get Americans out of Lebanon tomorrow, before attacks on them begin.

2. Ceasefire

--As fighting goes on indecisively, our own interests become increasingly exposed and Jordan runs the risk of being drawn in. Most of our Ambassadors in the Arab world seem to feel the best outcome we can hope for now is an immediate ceasefire.

--Until the Israelis have recovered lost territory, there may not be much we can do to stop them, even if we chose to do so. The balance of gains and losses on this issue is increasingly close. If we call for an immediate end to the fighting, we will irritate the Israelis, which may mean a loss of influence in future negotiations. If we do not manage to end the fighting soon, however, our relations with the Arabs and possibly even the Soviets could suffer.

SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)



- 3 -

SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)3. Israeli Arms Requests

--If we act too early or too visibly on this key issue, we will insure attacks on US citizens and an oil embargo in key Arab states.

--If we refrain from action at a time of genuine Israeli need, we cannot expect much Israeli confidence in us after the fighting is over.

4. The Soviet Role

If the Israelis inflict casualties on Soviet citizens in Syria or deal a devastating blow to the Arabs, the Soviets will be under strong pressure to react by resupplying arms to their clients and generally striking a more militant posture.

5. Oil

If oil exports to Western Europe from Arab countries are cut by 1.6 m.b.p.d. as reported, we must expect an announcement of export controls on oil products from Europe. This will create shortages in the US this winter. We should be prepared to issue a statement on rationing if necessary in the next few days.

The key problem that emerges from this analysis is whether we should consider altering our position on a ceasefire. In favor of doing so in the direction of simply stopping the fighting as soon as possible are the prospects for increasingly serious threats to US interests if the fighting is prolonged many more days. The price of pushing for a ceasefire in place would probably be an agreement with the Israelis on strong military and diplomatic support after the ceasefire, which may complicate later efforts at an overall settlement. On balance, however, this might be judged worth the cost, unless tomorrow the Israelis can recover lost territory. By Thursday, we may need to consider a shift in our policy on this key issue. As painful as it might be, the alternatives may not look all that attractive.

SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

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By PT NARA Date 8/20/03

VIA SPECIAL CHANNEL

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

DELIVER TO PETER HODMAN IN SEALED ENVELOPE

October 5, 1973

TO: Secretary Kissinger
FROM: Brent Scowcroft

Minister Shalev called on me at 5:30 p.m. and passed
the following informal communication from the Prime Minister:

QUOTE-----UNQUOTE
(See attached)

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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Authority EO 12958
By PTNARA Date 8/24/03

1. INFORMATION THAT HAS BEEN ACCUMULATING OBLIGES US TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE MILITARY PREPARATIONS IN SYRIA AND EGYPT, THE BATTLE DEPLOYMENT AND STATE OF ALERT OF THEIR ARMED FORCES, AND IN PARTICULAR THE INCREASED MILITARY CONCENTRATIONS AT THEIR FRONT LINES WITH US, MAY BE MOTIVATED BY ONE OF THE FOLLOWING TWO POSSIBILITIES:
 - A. A BONA FIDE ASSESSMENT BY BOTH OR ONE OF THESE COUNTRIES, FOR WHATEVER REASON, THAT ISRAEL INTENDS TO CARRY OUT AN OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST THEM OR AGAINST ONE OF THEM;
 - B. THE INTENTION ON THEIR PART - OR ON THE PART OF ONE OF THEM - TO INITIATE AN OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST ISRAEL.
2. IN CASE, HOWEVER, THIS DEVELOPMENT STEMS FROM THEIR APPREHENSIONS ABOUT AN OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATION FROM THE SIDE OF ISRAEL, SUCH APPREHENSIONS ARE COMPLETELY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. WE WISH TO ASSURE YOU PERSONALLY THAT ISRAEL HAS NO INTENTION WHATEVER TO INITIATE OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST SYRIA OR EGYPT. WE ARE, ON THE CONTRARY, MOST EAGER TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS AN EASING OF THE MILITARY TENSION IN THE AREA. ON THESE GROUNDS WE WISH, THROUGH YOUR GOOD OFFICE, TO INFORM THE ARABS AND THE SOVIETS OF OUR ATTITUDE, WITH THE VIEW OF ALLAYING THEIR SUSPICIONS AND THE AIM OF RESTORING CALM TO THE AREA.
3. SHOULD SYRIA OR EGYPT INTEND TO LAUNCH OFFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO THEM IN ADVANCE THAT ISRAEL WILL REACT MILITARILY, WITH FIRMNESS AND IN GREAT STRENGTH. WE WOULD LIKE YOU TO BRING THIS TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ARABS AND SOVIETS THROUGH THE CHANNELS AT YOUR DISPOSAL.

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority EO 12958
 By MB NARA Date 06/05/02

73 War

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TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN FLASH 4863
 AMEMBASSY JIDDA FLASH 2929

INFO USINT CAIRO NIACT IMMEDIATE 4596
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW NIACT IMMEDIATE 5487
 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 7938
 AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 1033
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3761

Secretary's
 message to
 Faisal & Hussein

T O P S E C R E T STATE 199583

TDSEC 141
 E.O. 11652: -XGDS
 SUBJ: MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO KING FAISAL AND KING
 HUSSEIN

1. PLEASE SEND FOLLOWING ORAL MESSAGE TO KING FAISAL
 AND KING HUSSEIN FROM SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER:
 QUOTE:

YOUR MAJESTY:

WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE REPORT FROM THE ISRAELIS THAT
 EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN FORCES ARE PLANNING A COORDINATED
 ATTACK WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL HOURS. WE HAVE URGED
 THE ISRAELIS NOT TO LAUNCH ANY PREEMPTIVE ATTACK. I
 HAVE SPOKEN WITH THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO URGE
 THAT HIS GOVERNMENT REFRAIN FROM LAUNCHING ANY ATTACK
 WHICH COULD LEAD TO SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. WE HAVE
 ALSO DISCUSSED THIS MATTER ON A MOST URGENT BASIS WITH
 THE SOVIETS.

I ASK YOU MAJESTY TO INTERVENE IMMEDIATELY WITH PRESIDENTS
 SADAT AND ASSAD AND URGE THAT NO SUCH ATTACK BE LAUNCHED
 ON THEIR PART. WE BELIEVE THIS IS A TIME FOR RESTRAINT,
 NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF THE OBVIOUS DANGERS THAT ARE IN-
 VOLVED BUT BECAUSE IT IS IMPORTANT TO MAINTAIN CONDITIONS
 WHICH WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE IN THE DAYS AHEAD TO
 PURSUE A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI
 CONFLICT. UNQUOTE. RUSH

BT

PSN:048637 RECALLED PAGE 01 OF 01 TOR:279/12:50Z DTG:061233Z OCT 73

UNITED NATIONS



Security Council

S/PV.1726, S/INF/29, 14 June 1973

At the close of the 1726th meeting, on 14 June 1973, the President read the following statement:

"Some tentative suggestions have been made to me concerning the desirability of suspending for a reasonably short period the formal Security Council meetings dealing with the examination of the situation in the Middle East. Among delegations which have informed me that they think such a suspension might be appropriate are those of Austria, France and the United Kingdom.

"The exchange of views on this matter with the members of the Security Council has revealed a common view that such a suspension would be useful. It can be used for further pondering on the results of the discussion of the question in the Security Council by both the members of the Council and the representatives of the States participating in the consideration of this question. In the light of the report of the Secretary-General on the efforts

Annexe 139

undertaken by his Special Representative and the statements made by all States participating in the present debate, the suspension could also be used for further unofficial consultations among the members of the Security Council as to the next steps of the Council.

"There is a general understanding that the Security Council would resume its examination of the situation in the Middle East, for which purpose a meeting of the Council will be convened in the middle of July on a date to be determined following consultations among the members of the Council."

UNITED NATIONS



Security Council

S/10974, 24 July 1973

Distr. GENERAL, S/10974 24 July 1973 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Guinea, India, Indonesia, Panama, Peru, Sudan,
Yugoslavia:draft resolution

The Security Council

Having examined comprehensively the current situation in the Middle East,

Having heard in this context the statements of the participants in this debate, including the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Algeria, Chad, Guinea, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania,

Emphasizing its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Emphasizing further that all Members of the United Nations are committed to respect the resolutions of the Security Council in accordance with the provision of the Charter,

Reaffirming resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967,

Conscious that the rights of the Palestinians have to be safeguarded,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/10929) which includes an account of the objective and determined efforts of his Special Representative since 1967,

1. Deeply regrets that the Secretary-General was unable to report any significant progress by him or by his Special Representative in carrying out the terms of resolution 242(1967), and that nearly six years after its adoption a just and lasting peace in the Middle East has still not been achieved;

2. Strongly deplores Israel's continuing occupation of the territories occupied as a result of the 1967 conflict, contrary to the principles of the Charter;

3. Expresses serious concern at Israel's lack of co-operation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

4. Supports the initiatives of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General taken in conformity with his mandate and contained in his aid-mémoire of 8 February 1971;

5. Expresses its conviction that a just and peaceful solution of the problem of the Middle East can be achieved only on the basis of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, the rights of all States in the area and for the rights and legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians;

6. Declares that in the occupied territories no changes which may obstruct a peaceful and final settlement or which may adversely affect the political and other fundamental rights of all the inhabitants in these territories should be introduced or recognized;

7. Requests the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to resume and to pursue their efforts to promote a just and peaceful solution of the Middle East problem;

8. Decides to afford the Secretary-General and his Special Representative all support and assistance for the discharge of their responsibilities;

9. Calls upon all parties concerned to extend full co-operation to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative;

10. Decides to remain seized of the problem and to meet again urgently whenever it becomes necessary.

The Security Council on 26 July 1973 voted on the draft resolution as follows:

In favour: Australia, Austria, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Annexe 140

Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia.

Against: United States of America.

By 221 NARA Date 11-3-00

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 DE WTE #0002 2791255
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 Z 061250Z OCT 73
 FM NEW YORK
 TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
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 T O P S E C R E T

T O P S E C R E T/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVE EYES ONLY

FLASH

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING TO THE PRESIDENT FOR DELIVERY AT
 9:00 A.M., WITH INFORMATION COPY TO GENERAL HAIG.

BEGIN TEXT.

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

AT 6:00 A.M. THIS MORNING, I WAS NOTIFIED THAT THE
 ISRAELIS HAVE WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE HARD INFORMATION
 THAT EGYPTIANS AND SYRIANS WERE PLANNING TO LAUNCH A
 COORDINATED ATTACK WITHIN SIX HOURS.

I IMMEDIATELY CALLED DOBRYNIN AND TOLD HIM OF THE
 ISRAELI DEMARCHE. I EMPHASIZED TO HIM THAT:


-- THE U.S. AND THE USSR HAVE A SPECIAL
 RESPONSIBILITY TO RESTRAIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
 FRIENDS.

-- WE ARE URGENTLY COMMUNICATING WITH THE
 ISRAELIS, WARNING THEM AGAINST ANY PREEMPTIVE
 ATTACK.

-- THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR OUR OWN RELATIONSHIP
 THAT THIS CRISIS NOT DEGENERATE INTO ARMED CONFLICT.

I ASKED DOBRYNIN TO CALL MOSCOW IMMEDIATELY TO REPORT
 THIS INFORMATION AND TO ASK HIS GOVERNMENT TO RESTRAIN
 SYRIA AND EGYPT. HE PROMISED TO DO SO AND HAS DONE SO.
 (IN ORDER TO EXPEDITE THE ABOVE, WE HAD DOBRYNIN USE OUR
 COMMUNICATIONS.)

I THEN CALLED ISRAELI CHARGE SHALEV AND TOLD HIM
 THAT I HAD TALKED TO DOBRYNIN. I EMPHASIZED TO HIM
 THE ESSENTIALITY OF RESTRAINT ON THE ISRAELI PART, AND
 SAID THERE MUST BE NO PREEMPTIVE STRIKE.



2.

SHALEV CALLED BACK SHORTLY THEREAFTER AND SAID HIS GOVERNMENT ASSURED US THERE WOULD BE NO PREEMPTIVE ACTION. SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER MEIR CONFIRMING THIS.

NEXT, I CALLED THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ZAYYAT. I TOLD HIM OF REPORTS WE HAD OF POSSIBLE EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL AND URGED THAT NO ATTACK BE LAUNCHED AND THAT THERE BE RESTRAINT BY HIS GOVERNMENT AND SYRIA. HE REPLIED THAT HE SUSPECTED ISRAELI PROVOCATION BUT WOULD COMMUNICATE WITH CAIRO IMMEDIATELY.

I HAVE SENT PERSONAL MESSAGES TO KING HUSSEIN AND KING FAISAL URGING THEM TO INTERVENE WITH PRESIDENTS SADAT AND ASSAD.

I HAVE ASCERTAINED THE LOCATION OF THE SIXTH FLEET, BUT HAVE TAKEN NO ACTION IN REGARD TO THAT FOR THE TIME BEING.

AFTER RECEIVING THE ISRAELI ASSURANCES THAT NO PREEMPTIVE STRIKE WOULD BE LAUNCHED I PASSED THIS ON TO BOTH ZAYYAT AND DOBRYNIN. I TOLD THEM THAT SINCE THIS MESSAGE WAS PASSED TO US, WE WOULD OPPOSE ANY PREEMPTIVE STRIKES.

3.

By 24 NARA Date 11-3-80

3.

I HAVE SENT A BRIEF ALERT MESSAGE TO VARIOUS OF OUR POSTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST JUST SO QUIET PRECAUTIONS COULD BE TAKEN.

I AM MAKING DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HERE IN NEW YORK AND HAVE ASKED DOBRYNIN TO DO THE SAME.

I WILL BE CALLING SYG WALDHEIM TO GIVE HIM A GENERAL PICTURE OF THE SITUATION SO THAT "THE U.N. WILL BE INFORMED", BUT THERE SEEMS TO BE NO NEED AT THE MOMENT FOR CONSIDERING SECURITY COUNCIL RECOURSE. I WILL STRESS THAT THE REPORT IS FOR INFORMATION AND THAT WE ARE NOT ASKING FOR ANY ACTION BY THE U.N. AT THIS TIME.

I HAVE DIRECTED BRENT SCOWCROFT TO CALL A 9:00 A.M. WSAG MEETING. WE HAVE REQUESTED AN URGENT INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FROM THE CIA, AND WE WILL HAVE FURTHER INFORMATION AT THAT TIME REGARDING SIXTH FELLETT DISPOSITIONS.

IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO GIVE YOU AT BEST WHAT CAN BE A PRELIMINARY JUDGMENT. ON THE BASIS OF THE INFORMATION WE HAVE, I BELIEVE THE ISRAELI FEARS OF A POSSIBLE ATTACK ARE JUSTIFIED. HOPEFULLY, WE WILL BE ABLE TO GENERATE SUFFICIENT PRESSURE SO THAT COOLER HEADS WILL PREVAIL.

I SHALL KEEP YOU FULLY INFORMED AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS.

HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

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DECLASSIFIED
 Authority E.O. 12958
 By NARA Date 8/26/03

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SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
 Situation Report #8 (corrected first page)

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Situation in the Middle East, as of 2300 Hours. (EDT, Oct. 7, 1973)

Military Situation

1. Summary. It is becoming clear that October 7 was a day of heavy fighting with major losses on both sides. The Israelis, still not fully mobilized, concentrated on containing the Egyptian and Syrian thrusts; however, they admit to losing some ground in both sectors.
2. At midnight local time the Israeli radio reported that the Egyptian bridgeheads established on the east bank of the Canal were being subjected to intense Israeli air force, armored and artillery attack.
3. USDAO/Tel Aviv was briefed by Israelis on events of October 7. General impression was one of a "miserably tough day" with implied heavy casualties and losses of equipment. IDF admitted to losing some ground on the Golan Heights and also on the Egyptian front. Estimate was that 400 Egyptian tanks have crossed Canal over eleven bridges in central and southern sectors, and another 100 in the northern sector. Israelis claim to have knocked out nine of these bridges. IAF flew SAM suppression raids in both Syria and Egypt and attacked 8 Egyptian airfields. IAF admits high aircraft losses, all but one or two to SAMs and AAA (one report says 37 aircraft on October 7 alone; another says 35 since hostilities began). On the Golan sector, the Israelis say the Syrians have massed 1000 tanks and 600 artillery pieces but believe their forces are now exhausted. The Israelis are massing their armor for counterattack, which may come Oct 8 or 9.
4. IDF claims to have a radio transcript of Soviets speaking at Syrian brigade and battalion command level, including one instance of Soviet assuming de facto control of a battalion and giving orders.
5. The United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization said that the Egyptians have requested the evacuation by UNTSO of its observation posts along the Suez Canal. In the Syrian sector, several UNTSO observation posts have been overrun by Syrian forces, but so far UNTSO has not taken any casualties on either sector.

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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SECRET2. Situation Report continued
October 7

6. Israelis expect the Egyptians to blockade the Red Sea and possibly to try to sink Israel-bound ships.

7. Radio Algiers announced that Algerian Air Force had arrived on the Egyptian front. The Israelis believe that some Iraqi aircraft may have arrived in Syria.

Diplomatic

The White House announced that it was instructing Secretary Kissinger to request a Security Council meeting. It is also expected that several speeches on Middle East hostilities will be made October 8 in the General Assembly.

American Communities

The situation in the Arab capitals remains calm, with no reports of imminent danger to American citizens.

APPROVED BY:

E. F. M.

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By AB NARA Date 8/26/03

73 wae

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations CenterMIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #8 (corrected first page)/S (3)
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SECRET2. Situation Report continued
October 7

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APPROVED BY: *[Signature]*

DEMOZ DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
By AB NARA Date 9/4/00

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


October 8, 1973

Dear Mr. Foreign Minister:

Attached is the message sent this morning to Mr. Hafiz Ismail, which I told you I would forward to you.

I would like also to take this opportunity to express how much I appreciate my contacts with you over these past days. I value the relationship which has developed and look forward to our continued association.


Warm regards,



Henry A. Kissinger

Attachment

His Excellency
Muhammad Hasan al-Zayyat
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Suite 37-F
Waldorf Towers
New York, New York



Oct. 8, 1973

Message for Mr. Hafiz Ismail from Dr. Kissinger

I very much appreciate your taking the time amidst your present heavy preoccupations to share with me your thinking concerning developments in the Middle East.

Even before the outbreak of the current hostilities, I had told Foreign Minister Zayat that I was prepared to explore seriously and intensely with all parties, and especially with Egypt, what the United States might be able to do to assist the parties in bringing peace to the Middle East. This offer still stands.

Obviously, such an effort can best succeed in the calmest possible atmosphere. It is for this reason that the United States has attempted to bring about a ceasefire without at the same time taking a position which might produce a confrontation with the Egyptian side.


With respect to the specifics in your note of October 7, there are two questions. First, the U.S. side is not clear as to whether the first point in the position of the Egyptian side, that Israel has to withdraw from all occupied territories, must be implemented before a conference can take place or whether agreement in principle to such a condition is what is anticipated. Secondly, the U.S. side has received the following message from its Ambassador in Tehran:

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Authority E.O. 12958
By AB NARA Date 9/4/00

-2-

"Prime Minister Hoveyda, at Shah's instruction, summoned me at 2315 local to read me cable to Shah from President Sadat transmitted via Iranian Ambassador to Cairo who saw Sadat early afternoon Egyptian time October 7. To summarize, cable gives optimistic description of Egyptian military position on East Bank of Suez Canal and of Egyptian prowess in crossing Canal and establishing bridgehead there. Then cable requests Shah to inform President Nixon that Egypt until now, in order to avoid fighting, has been ready to accept peace under certain conditions. However, Egypt has now been obliged to fight and to take casualties. It still wants peace, a lasting peace in the area. Sadat wants President Nixon to know that if Israel will evacuate all the territories occupied since June 5, 1967, Egypt will be ready to negotiate sincerely to place these territories under the control of the United Nations, or under the control of the four big powers, or under some other international control to be agreed. As for Sharm Ash Sheikh, Egypt is prepared to accept international supervision of freedom of navigation through Gulf of Agaba after Israeli withdrawal. Sadat wants Shah to explain foregoing to President Nixon so that casualties may be stopped as soon as possible."

The U.S. side would greatly appreciate clarification of the position on withdrawal and of the differences between the positions of the Egyptian side contained in your note and as passed to our Ambassador. In particular, did our Ambassador convey accurately the position of President Sadat



-3-

regarding evacuation of territories and the placing of them under international control?

I would like to reiterate that the United States will do everything possible to assist the contending parties to bring the fighting to a halt. The United States, and I personally, will also actively participate in assisting the parties to reach a just resolution of the problems which have for so long plagued the Middle East.

Warm personal regards.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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DECLASSIFIED BY FRANK WISNER
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Simcha Dinitz of Israel
Military Attache General Mordechai Gur
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *WR*

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, October 9, 1973
8:20 - 8:40 a.m.

PLACE: The Map Room
The White House

Secretary Kissinger: I need an accurate account of what the military situation is.

Ambassador Dinitz: I brought the General to do that. Let me say something and then we can have a few words alone.

Secretary Kissinger: All right.

Dinitz: We got a message which sums up our losses until 9 a.m. Israeli time. In planes, 14 Phantoms, 28 Skyhawks, 3 Mirages, 4 Supermysteres -- a total of 49 planes. Tanks -- we lost something like 500 tanks. Some were lost on the way.

Secretary Kissinger: 500 tanks! How many do you have? [to Scowcroft:] We should get Haig here. Well, we can give him the figures.

Ambassador Dinitz: This includes those that were put out of commission for a week or more.

Secretary Kissinger: How many do you have?

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

CLASSIFIED BY FRANK A. ROSSINGER

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
by NND 009029
NARA Date 10/30/00

-2-

Gur: 1800.

Dinitz: We lost 100 in the north and 400 in the south.

Kissinger: How did it happen?

Dinitz: It will become clear from the military situation.

Kissinger: So that's why the Egyptians are so cocky. Can I use these figures?

Dinitz: With the President.

Kissinger: Anyone else?

Dinitz: They were given to me for you.

Kissinger: How many have the Egyptians lost?

Gur: 4-500 in the Sinai, and the Syrians 400.

Kissinger: It is still about one-to-one with the Egyptians.

Gur: Yes.

Dinitz: Replacements to Syria are coming from Iraq. So far there are 16 Mig 21's and 32 Sukhoi-7's, all with pilots. As of yesterday, we observed an Iraqi armored division coming into Syria. There is also a request from Syria to Iraq for tanks. We have indications that they are on the way.

Egypt has received 18 Mig-21's from Algeria. There are also preparations for additional ones. Libya is giving hundreds of Strela missiles and a French anti-aircraft missile. Also there is an unknown number of planes. Another squadron of Hunters are coming from Iraq, and Me-6 helicopters. From the Sudan, an infantry brigade is expected.

Kissinger: Explain to me, how could 400 tanks be lost to the Egyptians?

Gur: We were in a very big hurry to bring them to the front line. That's why we say some were lost on the way to the battle.

Dinitz: Some got out of commission because of moving so fast.

Scowcroft: Do you know how many were battle losses?

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 009029
NARA Date 10/30/08

Gur: Some were hit by artillery fire on the Suez Canal. They have heavy artillery fire. We don't know the exact numbers. I assume the biggest number were put completely out of action. [General Gur then pulls out a map and sits beside Kissinger.]

Let me show you the situation. They crossed the Canal all along here from Qantara to the Suez. Now they have a line 6 to 8 miles from the Canal.

Kissinger: Miles or kilometers?

Gur: Miles. They crossed with five infantry divisions. In each division they have tanks, a total of 6 - 700. So they have a narrow strip all along with their backs to the water. On the main axis, they have armored divisions that are ready to exploit if the infantry divisions can open the road to the east.

We have blocked the road. We have not allowed them through to exploit. We succeeded in this yesterday and it is the same today.

Kissinger: How many Syrian tanks have been lost?

Gur: 400, and we 100. On the Golan Heights, in most of the line they are now out, and we are back to the situation they were in before the war. But one armored brigade is still inside.

Dinitz: Encircled.

Gur: They still have a passage out.

Kissinger: But they have not broken inside. The army is intact, not running.

Gur: Many big units are very severely harmed.

Dinitz: They have brought up their last armored division from the Damascus area.

Gur: They wanted to assure we won't cross into Syria.

Kissinger: Will you?

Gur: That we will have to see. The Iraqi armored division may come. It will take 2 to 3 days for their tanks to come.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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 ID# NND 009029
 NARA Date 10/30/02

-4-

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
 EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

Kissinger: They won't be able to fight right away.

Gur: It depends on our air operations. On the Golan Heights, we're holding the same line, and will be able to straighten the line here without a big effort. And put them in the position where they will not be able to launch a big attack. This will help us concentrate on the south.

Kissinger: But when? That's the question.

Dinitz: I asked and have not received an answer.

Kissinger: On Saturday, you said Tuesday or Wednesday.

Dinitz: Yes, two days from Monday noon. Obviously something went wrong. It comes down to their ability to cross the Canal with armor, and the success of their anti-aircraft missiles which weakened our air effort.

Gur: We have two possibilities. One is to concentrate to drive their forces to pieces by an offensive, would be very costly because of the anti-aircraft missiles. The other possibility is to straighten the lines and make an effort a little bit inside, without air support.

Kissinger: They won't move.

Gur: They might. We have information they may go to the Mitla.

Kissinger: I think there will be a ceasefire call tonight.

Dinitz: Based on a return to ceasefire lines?

Kissinger: No. If you ask me. I have no evidence.

Yesterday I thought we had it won -- politically. Now with your bombing Damascus all hell will break loose in the UN. But that's water over the dam. I don't know what the local situation is.

OK. Now what can we do?

Dinitz: The decision last night was to get all equipment and planes by air that we can.

[A call comes in for the Ambassador. He takes it and Gur continues the briefing.]

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Gur: And we have mobilized all our El Al planes from here.

Kissinger: Where are you going to get it?

Gur: From here. All the equipment we asked for.

There was a problem with El Al markings flying in, and for security reasons.

Kissinger: That's a bigger problem now than we thought. I must tell you, don't go running around Defense. Scowcroft will handle it.

You can't get tanks from here.

Gur: We could get them from Europe and take them by ship. This will be helpful even if it is two to three weeks. We have crews ready for the planes and tanks. It's important; it's urgent. Your Air Force used to deliver it in civilian planes. Our pilots can get them.

Kissinger: But not in the middle of a war. [to Scowcroft:] See what we can do.

Gur: Planes we need.

Kissinger: You have to realize that to take planes from combat units will be in every newspaper in the world.

Gur: But we face fire.

Kissinger: I understand your problem.

I don't understand how it could happen. Our strategy was to give you until Wednesday evening, by which time I thought the whole Egyptian army would be wrecked.

Gur: We were in the same position. We didn't know how many would cross. Another thing. We need general information. I asked for information about Iraqi forces moving.

Kissinger: [to Scowcroft:] Call Colby and tell him to give them every bit of intelligence we have.

Gur: Thank you.

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Kissinger: We face massive problems. We expected a quick victory. Our whole strategy was to delay until Wednesday.

Dinitz: [Returning to discussion after finishing the call:] We now have another cable in. They say that 7 - 800 tanks are across the Canal of which 150 are in fighting condition.

We are concentrating now on a fast Syrian victory. With the Egyptians it will take longer.

The Soviets made a supreme effort of supply in the last minute before the war -- we have caught FROG missiles that were sealed with the date April 1973.

They have anti-tank missiles operating in the Canal.

There are 30 SA-6 batteries in both fronts. We pushed [back] two armored divisions of Syrians this morning, with heavy casualties [inflicted]. It looks promising.


On the Egyptian front, we have deployed defensive positions to contain the pressure for advance.

Kissinger: Good. Can I talk to you alone?

[Kissinger and Dinitz confer alone from 8:43 to 8:48 a.m.]

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
 WASHINGTON

October 6, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
 FROM: WILLIAM B. QUANDT
 SUBJECT: Arab-Israel Tensions

Ambassador Keating met with Prime Minister Meir this morning and was informed that Israel had received information from totally reliable sources that Syria and Egypt are planning a coordinated attack against Israel today in the late afternoon. In addition, she confirmed that Soviet dependents and some advisers are being evacuated from Egypt and Syria. She has asked that we inform the Soviets and the Egyptians that:

- Israel is not planning to attack Syria or Egypt. It has called up "some reserves" on a contingency basis, but has not declared a general mobilization.
- Israel is aware of military dispositions in Egypt and Syria and knows that in any war they will lose, even if Israel will suffer some casualties.

Mrs. Meir assured Ambassador Keating that Israel does not intend to launch a preemptive attack and is genuinely interested in avoiding war.

Other information of note is that Cairo appears normal this morning, with no sign of special military precautions. We do, however, have confirmation that as many as 1,000 Soviet dependents have left Egypt. Some reduction in the number of Soviet advisers in Syria is also apparently underway. In addition, we know that the Egyptian forces, as part of their current fall maneuvers, are on a high state of alert and that Syrian forces have been repositioned along the Golan Heights cease-fire lines.

Wor
 7:00 AM

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Several possible interpretations of the evidence can be made:

1. Egypt and Syria, despite the military odds against success, do intend to initiate hostilities as a way of forcing international attention to the Middle East and activating the use of oil as a political weapon against the United States. The Soviets have gotten wind of this and are evacuating dependents and some advisers. In so far as Soviet advisers are included in the evacuation, the effectiveness of an Arab attack is likely to be somewhat degraded and the risks of Soviet involvement will lessen.

2. A major crisis is under way in Arab-Soviet relations, and under the cover of a war scare, Soviet advisers are being expelled from both Egypt and Syria. There have been numerous strains in Arab-Soviet relations recently, and King Faisal has been pressing hard to convince Sadat and Asad to cut their ties to Moscow.

Our intelligence services have continued to downplay the likelihood of an Arab attack on Israel and still have no signs that such action is imminent. They appear to favor the alternative explanation of a crisis in Arab-Soviet relations.

If hostilities are imminent, we should immediately consider the following actions:

- Demarche to the Soviets and Egyptians to convey Prime Minister Meir's message and to add our own statement about the need to avoid hostilities.
- Activate first steps for possible evacuation of U.S. citizens from key Arab countries (Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia)
- Convene oil task force to prepare on a contingency basis for cutoff of Arab oil.
- Consult with Israelis and Jordanians on steps to be taken in the event of hostilities. In particular, we want to make sure that Jordan does not get drawn in.
- Ask the Shah of Iran to use his influence with President Sadat to discourage a resort to force.
- Alert U.S. forces in the Mediterranean and Europe for possible action in the Middle East.

Briefing d'Henri Kissinger le 23 octobre. Compte rendu sur les attaques préventives et le rôle de Kissinger dans la crise (25 pages).

Source : National Security Archive Transcript,
"Secretary's Staff Meeting," 23 October 1973, 4:35 P.M.
Source: Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Staff Meetings, 1973-1977. Box 1

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SECRETARY'S STAFF MEETING

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1973 - 4:35 P.M.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I thought I would bring you up to date briefly on what has happened -- because the Middle East crisis is something in which the Department played a principal role and in which its members acquitted themselves extraordinarily well.

So I wanted to talk to you about the strategy, what has happened and where we now stand.

When the war broke out, the first time I heard about the imminence of the war was when Joe Sisco woke me up at six o'clock on Saturday morning, October 6, and told us that the Israelis believed that a war might be imminent and to use our influence to get it stopped.

I mention this because there have been many stories that we prevented a pre-emptive attack by the Israelis and that their setbacks are due to our urging them not to engage in a pre-emptive attack. This is ^{NOT NOT TRUE} ~~total nonsense~~. We did not urge them not to engage in a pre-emptive attack because we didn't believe that a war was coming. And we had no reason to tell them this. In fact, we can make a case for the proposition that we were more concerned about war than the Israelis were.

On the Sunday before the war started, I had ^{THE ISRAELI AMBASSADOR} Dinitz in here. (And that was at a time when the Department

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was not yet equipped for weekend work.] [But I had Dinitz in here] and I asked him what he thought. He assured me that there was no possibility of an attack. And I was sufficiently uneasy about it to ask for intelligence estimates, producing a massive row between CIA and INR as to who was entitled to produce intelligence estimates for the Secretary.] [We got one estimate for the Secretary and another one for the Assistant to the President.] Both ~~responsible~~ [Of which, however,] agreed on the proposition that an Arab attack was highly improbable. These intelligence reports were confirmed during the week. And indeed the morning of the attack, the President's daily brief, intelligence brief, still pointed out that there was no possibility of an attack.

For all these reasons, we had no incentive in the world to tell anyone not to engage in a pre-emptive attack.

When I saw Eban on Thursday afternoon, ^{that week} he explained to me at great length that there was no real need for a peace initiative, which I had urged on him, because the military situation was absolutely stable and could not be changed, and politically there was nothing to be gained by a peace offensive.

I don't want to go into great detail, except to

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point out that the only reason I mention this is because as the myth develops, it would be that our influence prevented the Israelis from forestalling the attack by a pre-emptive move. Secondly, the most important thing to remember is that whatever we had advised them, and even if they had made a pre-emptive attack, it would not have changed the outcome in any sense. And this is what the Israelis have to understand in the diplomacy after this war. It would not have changed the outcome, because a new element in the situation has been the combination -- I think it is safe to say that the Arabs have learned more from the war in '67 than the Israelis did.

The Israelis continue to adopt their tactics of '67. The Arabs developed tactics to thwart the tactics of '67. And there are three new elements in the Arab strategy.

One -- the heavy reliance on SAM's which negated to a considerable extent the Israeli air force. The heavy reliance on anti-tank weapons, which exacted an exorbitant toll of Israeli tanks. And the better leadership and morale of the Arab forces, in which they would not surrender once they were surrounded. In fact, the Arabs used the same tactics which were eventually used

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to thwart the German thrusts in World War II, and the Israelis used exactly the same strategy as the Germans used, which is to use airplanes as artillery, to demoralize the enemy by lightening thrusts, which works beautifully as long as a surrounded enemy surrenders; it does not work well when the surrounded enemy does not surrender, and therefore exposes the fact that you are really operating with rather tenuous lines of communication and not very strong forces.

Therefore, even if the Israelis had launched a pre-emptive attack, the outcome of the initial battles would have been substantially the same.

For the first few days, the Israeli effort had to be expended on the SAM sites, and until the SAM's were suppressed, their classic pre-emptive weapon, the airplane, suffered losses that were exorbitant in relation to the objectives that could be achieved in any one day. This was the massive change in the situation, and a change which will affect in my view the entire post-war period.

[Now, we had here a little crisis group, composed of Ken Rush, Joe Sisco, David Popper, ^{Tom}~~Don~~ Pickering and ^{for}~~for~~ Terry Eagleberger, with others brought in from time to time. In addition, we had daily meetings on an interdepartmental

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basis with Bob McCloskey as part of this group -- with WASAG.]

From the beginning, our problem was this.

We could not tolerate an Israeli defeat. Apart from any sentimental attachment that may have existed to Israel and apart from any historic ties, the judgment was that if another American-armed country were defeated by Soviet-armed countries, the inevitable lessons that anybody around the world would have to draw is to rely increasingly on the Soviet Union. Secondly, it would undermine the position in the Middle East, even in countries that formerly were not ^{ally} formerly opposing us, such as ^{Arabia} the Saudis and Jordan, if the radical Arab states supported by the Soviet Union scored a great victory over the Israelis.

On the other hand, we could not make our policy hostage to the Israelis, because our interests, while parallel in respect to that I have outlined, are not identical in the overall term. From an Israeli point of view, it is no disaster to have the whole Arab world radicalized and anti-American, because this guarantees our continued support. From an American point of view, it is a disaster. And therefore throughout we went to extreme lengths to stay in close touch with all the key Arab participants and

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exchanged, in the totality, as many messages with the Arabs as we did with the Israelis, and on the whole ^{we} kept the anti-Americanism in the Arab world, even though this war lasted much longer than the war in 1967, to a much lesser proportion than was the case in 1967.

And third was our relationship with the Soviet Union, and other great powers; the Europeans, Chinese.

But of the great powers, the key one was the Soviet Union.

The Europeans behaved ^{badly} [like jackals.] Their behavior was a [total] disgrace. They did everything to egg on the Arabs. They gave us no support when we needed it. They proclaimed loudly that the Russians had double-crossed us in the declarations of principals we had signed -- forgetting that the declarations of principals we had signed followed similar declarations of principals each one of them had signed with the Soviet Union. And none of them seemed prepared to invoke their own declarations of principal. They were ready enough for us to give up detente on the grounds of what had been done to us by the Russians. [Nor were] ^{more not} they willing to have any joint moves in the United Nations. And when this is over, as it will be in a few days, it is absolutely imperative for us [-- George and Win --] to assess just where we are going in our relationship

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with the European allies -- what exactly it means to talk about the indissolubility of our interests with respect to defense and the total (in)divisibility of our interests in every other respect that may come up.

I don't want to prejudge it, but I think it is an issue that can no longer be evaded.

The Chinese, I think, had only one interest in the situation, which was that the Soviets (^{lose,} get creamed) both militarily and politically. And while they made minimum noises of support for the Arabs, they certainly did not object to any of the military moves they made.

So that leaves us with the Soviets.

Now, it has been a moving experience to see ^{commentators} [Joe Kraft] realize the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union, which had been neglected by this Administration, considering that for years we had been castigated by many of those who wanted to end detente for conducting the cold war beyond all reason. And we had many volunteers who wanted us to end detente and proclaim that the Soviet Union had started this.

Our judgment is -- I don't know whether Ray Cline will disagree with this -- that the Soviets did not start it, but they became aware -- they started it in the sense perhaps of having given equipment. But they must have

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shared our judgment that the Israelis were so militarily preponderant, that no amount of equipment they could give to the Arabs would do more than enable them to give a slightly better account of themselves.

But I have never seen a military estimate by anybody, prior to the war, which indicated that the Arabs had any chance whatever of defeating the Israelis or of even staving off their own defeat for anything longer than six days.

There is no reason to believe that the Soviets made a different estimate.

Our estimate is that the Soviets became aware of it around October 3--maybe a little earlier. But it gave them a massive problem, because if they told us and the Israelis, ^{then} pre-empted, [then] they would not only have prevented the war, but they would have brought about the defeat of their friends. They evacuated some of their personnel, most of their personnel^x from Egypt. And they played militarily a rather neutral role until they started the airlift.

Now, then, what about the behavior during military operations?

First, they stayed conspicuously remote from any attack on the United States. Neither the Soviet

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press nor their UN behavior was in any way directed against the United States. And they could have made life extremely -- certainly much more difficult had they gone into an all-out onslaught.

Secondly, their military units did not maneuver as provocatively as they did in 1967. ^P Thirdly, they did engage in a massive airlift into the Middle East.

For this you can have two explanations. Either that they expected their clients to lose and didn't want to be blamed for the loss, and poured in equipment which they thought probably didn't make any difference; or that they wanted to keep the war going. You can choose your own interpretation. The first is as logical as the second -- that they thought their clients were going to lose, but that they did not want to be blamed for the defeat, and that they wanted to salvage what they could from the wreckage by having proved themselves loyal as allies, not only to the Arabs, but to other countries that relied on them.

I think of some of the considerations that we went through when we thought Israel was on the downgrade.

This is not implausible.

Anyway, no matter what is said in the press, we did not fail to do anything that we should have done or

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that we wanted to do because of detente.

What we wanted to do was use the detente as a means of using super-power influence to calm the situation. To some extent it was achieved even during the first week at the United Nations. During the first week, we engaged in a complex maneuver to try to get a cease-fire at the end of the first week. It is true that the Soviet eagerness to bring about a cease-fire was not as intense when they thought their side was winning ^{or} (than) ^{by the} it grew ^{later}.

We pursued this until Saturday of the first week -- that is to say until October 13. On October 13 it was clear that the Soviets could not deliver the Egyptians to what was in effect a cease-fire in place, and to which we had obtained Israeli acquiescence, more or less. When that occurred we felt we had no choice except to go another route, namely to prove to the Soviets that we could match strategically anything they could put in the Middle East, and that we could put it into more capable hands. And that therefore the longer the war would go on, the more likely would be a situation in which they would have to ask for a cease-fire rather than we. And this is ^{the} reason why we started the airlift on Saturday. ^{It} is the principal reason why we started the airlift on October 13.

Having failed to bring the war to a conclusion by

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diplomatic methods, we concluded that the only way to end the war would be to demonstrate to the Soviets and to the Arabs that the war could not be won by military methods.

Our calculation was that whatever price we would pay with the Arabs would be increased if the war went on for an appreciable length of time. Since we could not permit Israel to lose, which is the only thing that would satisfy the Arabs, it was best to move massively and rapidly.

And this is what we did.


All during this period -- I won't go into the details of diplomatic exchanges, but we were literally in daily touch with the principal Arab countries, except Syria; in frequent touch with the Soviet Union; in touch enough with the Chinese so that they knew what was going on. I suspect we were the ^{PRC's} only source of information. And in sporadic touch with the Europeans to beat off occasional [jackal] forays, to see whether they could pick up any loose pieces that might be lying around, which were never pressed very energetically.

The diplomacy began to -- well, it never really ended, because on Monday night the Soviets tried out a proposal on us -- Sunday night, Monday morning.

MR. SISCO: You called me midnight Sunday.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Sunday night they tried out

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a proposal on us which created a tentative link between the political and military provisions. And we continued this during the rest of the week.

Thursday night the Soviets put this into specific form. Friday they asked me to go to Moscow. And we felt that since the military situation had turned drastically, and since we also believed that the Russians were on the verge of having to make the same fundamental decision we thought we might have to make the week before -- what to do in the face of a complete collapse of their clients -- we thought this was the strategic moment for moving fast. Until then, we had moved, shall we say, deliberately, and not speeded up any diplomatic exchange.

We have just come back from two days in the Soviet Union, and you have all seen the UN resolution.

Now, let me say a word about the UN resolution.

First of all, it was significant that it was introduced by the United States and the Soviet Union jointly, so that by not ripping our relationship with the Soviet Union we could, when the strategic moment arose, move very rapidly to a conclusion.

We have never maintained -- this Administration least of all -- that we relied on good personal relations

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with the Soviet leaders. We have never believed that we could substitute charm for reality. All we have said is that we could add into the calculations of reality, as the Soviet leaders saw it, an element of their relationship with the United States to be used when objective conditions permitted it. And objective conditions permitted it on Saturday and Sunday.

And I believe we have established a relationship which enabled us to move faster and at a higher level than would have otherwise been the case.

Now, what is the essence of the resolution?

It establishes a cease-fire in place. The cease-fire in place means in effect, simply looked at strategically, that the Israelis will wind up with more territory than they possessed at the beginning of the war, and that the Arabs, who were not our principal antagonists ^{with less} -- but the Soviets made no strategic gain, because with the Israelis now on both sides of the Canal, it is still impossible to open ^{it} [the Canal.]

Secondly, we affirmed Security Council Resolution 242 which has been on the books since 1967 -- and while it asks for the immediate implementation, this is impossible even with good will, since no one knows, except Joe Sisco, what 242 means. (Laughter)

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[MR. SISCO: And I won't tell. (Laughter)]

SECRETARY KISSINGER:] That is like what Palmerson said about the Schleswig-Holstein question -- that only three people ever understood it, and one was dead, the other was in an insane asylum, and he was the third, and he had forgotten. [it.]

And the third, which is the most significant, is that for twenty-five years the Middle East issue has been hung up on the problem that the Arabs would not negotiate with the Israelis. Here we have a Security Council resolution asking for direct negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis under appropriate auspices. The auspices, as we interpret it, and as we have agreed with the Soviets, will almost certainly be U.S.-Soviet, assuming this is acceptable to the other parties -- though we do not want this generally put out until it emerges from the diplomacy that will develop.

Now, the essence of a good settlement is that everybody can feel he has gained something. And you cannot conduct a permanent relationship on the basis of unconditional surrender.

What the Arabs gained out of this is respectability. They did not surrender. They fought effectively. And while they were defeated, they were not crushed.

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What the Arabs further gained out of it is undoubtedly ^{that} they will interpret the Security Council Resolution 242 to mean that Israel has to return to its '67 boundaries. But they have claimed that ever since 1967. So this is not new.

But what they certainly should gain out of it is a realization on the part of the Israelis that this cockiness of supremacy is no longer possible; that like other countries in history, they now have to depend on a combination of security and diplomacy to achieve their security.

What Israel gained out of it is first that they avoided, literally avoided the precipice. And secondly that they won another war, though at heavy cost. That they gained recognition by the Arabs of direct negotiations. And that our support was validated.

What the Soviet Union gained out of it is largely negative. The Soviet Union cut its losses. I think basically what happened with the Soviet Union is that for the third time since 1953 they have lost much of the equipment they put into the Arab world. They were once again defeated. And their major contribution to their allies cause was to cut the extent of the disaster, but not really to gain them anything very positive.

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So that puts us into a position where if we behave wisely and with discipline in the months ahead, we are really in a central position.

The Israelis have learned that their original idea -- that they could use the stockpiled equipment that they had from us to score a big victory over the Arabs if we pressed them too hard is no longer possible. If they get into another war, they must do it with our enthusiastic backing or they are lost. And [therefore] the Israelis, ^{until now to} [after they] recover from the enormous shock of the tremendous casualties they have suffered -- their total casualties are around 6,000, with about 2,000 dead, which if you adjust it to the American scale is something like 600,000 casualties in two weeks -- that is World War I type casualties. So it will take them a couple or three weeks to absorb the impact of what has happened to them.

As far as Israel is concerned, we have to be taken even more seriously than we have been in the past. And our insistence on a more politically oriented policy cannot go unheeded.

As far as the Arabs are concerned, the situation seems to me reasonably simple. We are besieged now with oil company executives who tell us that we have

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thrown away everything in the Arab world. [They will probably manage to do it. But if they don't succeed in throwing everything away -- the fact of] the matter is that ^{what} any rational Arab leader now has to (do) know (that) whether he hates us, loves us, despises us, ¹⁵ there is no way around us. If they want a settlement in the Middle East, it has to come through us. And that incidentally is the theme that I want us to adopt in a very friendly and conciliatory fashion; that it does not pay to antagonize us, that we cannot be pressured into doing things we do not want to do. So they better get us to want to do them.

And we absolutely will not apologize for our actions. We will tell them that we are prepared to make a major contribution to remove the conditions that produced this war; that we do not maintain that the conditions that produced this war are tolerable for the Arabs. But we will do it as an act of policy and not because somebody is blackmailing us. And this is how we handled at least the serious ones of them during this whole period, and why Egypt never launched a propaganda campaign during this whole period -- because we told them the basic fact of the matter is that they would need us in the post-war diplomacy, and we would not play if they

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behaved in such a way.

So I think we now have a good opportunity to try to move towards a fundamental settlement. We have the forum which was established by the Security Council resolution. We have the reality which was established by the war. And I hope we can now in this building develop a policy, as I am sure we can -- because I want to repeat again what I said at the beginning; that the behavior of the people, the performance of the people who worked on this was superlative.

When our first plan went awry, the group stayed up all night, from the 13th to the 14th, and wrote out a new strategy, which we then literally followed the rest of the way. It was one of the situations where for good or ill we can claim what we designed more or less came to pass.

(October 23)
Today [^] there is a little flap because -- who knows who started it, but the Israelis grabbed another -- obviously they grabbed some more territory, because it is the Arabs and the Soviets who are ^{pushing} ~~screaming~~ for another Security Council resolution. The Security Council is meeting now. And there will be another joint U.S.-Soviet resolution calling for ^{one} an immediate cease-fire, ^{two} a return to the positions which existed when the cease-fire went into

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effect. And thirdly, the establishment of UN observers. We have no excessive expectation that it is possible to determine where the lines were when the cease-fire went into effect. So that one and three are the most important ones.

But the major thing to remember is that (I think) the events of the last two weeks have been on the whole a major success for the United States. And not only a success for the United States. They were a success for the policy that had preceded it, because without the close relationship with the Soviet Union, this thing could have easily escalated. Not that I am saying the Soviet Union behaved in a friendly fashion, but that there was enough in that relationship to moderate them at critical points. Paradoxically, we are in a better long-term position in the Arab world than we had been before this started. And finally, we have a better position to bring about a permanent settlement than before.

And I think it also shows what we can do here if we think conceptually and lay out where we want to go, and then get all the resources that exist here all working together, as I believe was essentially done, in this crisis.

Joe, do you want to add anything?

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MR. SISCO: Just a very short postscript, Mr. Secretary. I had only been to the Soviet Union once before. That was in 1969. And after sitting there with Brezhnev for eight or nine hours, whatever it was we had, I carried away one impression very, very strongly. I knew that the Soviets attached importance to detente, but I think in these meetings that we had, the strength of that view even surprised me. It just comes out in every possible way.

[SECRETARY KISSINGER: And he didn't even kiss me on the mouth as he did in Camp David. You didn't see it in full flight. (Laughter)]

[MR. SISCO: Well, I just want to say the leadership that you have given to this is very impressive indeed, Mr. Secretary, and I think I am in a very good position to say this.]

[SECRETARY KISSINGER: Any questions? I know, Ken, you don't talk in my presence. (Laughter) You run your own meetings.]

MR. RUSH: I would like to say that while on the one hand this does show what the State Department can do, the other side of the coin is it shows also what can be done when you and the State Department work

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very closely together. I should like to express my very high degree of satisfaction at the results that were achieved under your leadership in this very important situation.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Also the interdepartmental process [after a week of sabotage by some of the departments] worked extremely well.

Are there any questions?

Ray, what is your assessment?

MR. CLINE: The same as yours, Mr. Secretary.

But since --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You will go far. (Laughter)

MR. CLINE: Since you commented on the intelligence support you got, I would like to make one observation about the intelligence. Our difficulty was partly that we were brainwashed by the Israelis, who brainwashed themselves, I think, in the same way. But much more important, we really did not have an adequate intelligence base to work on, as to what was going on day by day in the Middle East. I think our strategic framework was all right. But we did not have very good intelligence, and we didn't have nearly as much as the Russians had. And I think that is a very serious thing for the future. They had a great deal more to go on than we did.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have asked everyone who was on the Middle East Task Force --we never called it that-- people who met twice a day in my office, and I will ask anybody else who did something, who saw enough of the operation to have an opinion about it, to write a critique of, first, what was done well, and second, what was done badly; and thirdly, apart from whether what was done well or badly, what lessons we can learn from it to improve the operations of the Department as well as the operations of the government.

And finally, I would appreciate people's judgment if they think we got everything out of that crisis that we should have, and if in a few more days we could have come out even better.

MR. CLINE: There is no substitute for good information, as you know.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And the trick is to end these things in time, before one of the great powers feels it has to push in another batch of chips.

George.

MR. ALDRICH: Mr. Secretary, I was curious as to what is really the forum for the follow-on negotiations. Is it the UN, or U.S.-Soviet?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Probably U.S.-Soviet.

The UN is not a good forum for us, nor for the Israelis.

But not even for us.

MR. NEWSOM: Mr. Secretary, do you have any thoughts at the moment on what we do about the Arab oil boycott? My own feeling is that here is a very good chance to show them that there is a common interest --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We will break it. We will not provide auspices for the negotiations until they end it.

MR. NEWSOM: I think the question of their reliability as suppliers can also be emphasized to them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We will not participate in any joint auspices until the oil boycott ends.

MR. NEWSOM: Is this being made clear?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It will be. It has not been made clear yet. We want to get the war ended first. I don't think they will go through with it, not under these conditions. It may come back next year. And also we will start an emergency oil program in this country, [which is more symbolic than substantive.

Any other questions?

Good. Thank you.]

(Whereupon at 5:00 p.m. the meeting was ended.)

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We spent today in the following operations: we knocked down nine out of the ten or eleven bridgeheads established on the Canal.

Kissinger: Let me know if we are doing enough.

Dinitz: We took out nine out of the ten to eleven bridges. Secondly we have bombed nine Egyptian airfields. The third operation is bombing Egyptian armor on our side of the Canal. We estimate there are close to 400 tanks on the eastern side. The cable to us said there were "good results" in all these targets, and heavy casualties inflicted.

Today we had to move aircraft to the northern front because it was more difficult there. We are feeling more optimistic on the Egyptian front, where there will be a counterattack on a large scale.

On the northern front, it was less pleasant; the Syrians succeeded in moving between our positions in several places, including Quenitra. At 10:00 p.m. local time, we were holding. There was very heavy fighting.

Mordechai, why don't you call the Embassy and let them know about the equipment?

[Shalev goes out to call his attaché about the equipment, and then comes back.]

Shalev: He says we asked for 200 Sidewinders. He's happy to get the 80 tonight, but hopes for the rest tomorrow.

Dinitz: Can you do it?

Kissinger: Probably.

Dinitz: On the Golan Heights, let me read from the cable. Mordechai, you have it.

Shalev: [reads cable] "We caused heavy damage to the Syrians in the land battles and air battles. On both fronts, our forces are increasing in strength. After a day of heavy tank-to-tank battles, the Egyptian army concentrated several hundred tanks east of the Canal and established main bridgeheads

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on the central and southern portions of the Canal. Our forces created defense lines opposite these bridgeheads. Our aircraft attacks have continued since then..."

Dinitz: In other words, over night.

Shalev: [continues reading:] "...and we destroyed nine bridgeheads. Egyptian armor suffered very heavy damage from our air force and tanks. Our forces are becoming stronger and stronger in the Sinai, including units called up in the last twenty-four hours."

[Shalev is called out to take a phone call from the Israeli attache.]

Dinitz: [Continues reading:] "Our air force has concentrated on four missions: on hitting the airfields in the depth of Egypt; the ground-to-air missiles in Syria; the bridgeheads on the Canal; and air support to the attacking ground forces. In all these, our people report "good results.""

By tomorrow noon, we will be at our full striking capacity; we need two to three good fighting days.

Kissinger: You've seen what we have done.

[Shalev comes back.]

Shalev: There was a mistake. We only asked for 100, so 80 is good. If we can get more, fine.

Kissinger: My advice is to get what you can out of the country tonight.

Dinitz: The Prime Minister called me when I was in London on the way back to tell you she appreciated what you've been doing. On the military list, she says top priority is on the planes.

Kissinger: While the fighting is going on, it will be difficult.

Dinitz: If it is possible to fly them part way, for example to one of your bases in Italy, our people can pick them up. If you don't want to fly into the war zone.

Kissinger: Let me see. It will be difficult.

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Dinitz: The other items of importance are ordnance, ammunition, and accessories for aircraft. This is old stuff. If you are having difficulty, you can point out this is different from new stuff we never had before. But these are extremely important. We also need ammunition against tanks. We are fighting against several thousand tanks now -- actually in the fighting, not counting ones in reserve.

Kissinger: I do want to know what you need as priority items.

Dinitz: Yes. Then electronic equipment.

Kissinger: I'll see whether I can get it tomorrow.

Dinitz: Then on the political side. The Prime Minister says she appreciates what you have done.

Kissinger: Let me tell you where things stand on the UN. I spoke to the Secretary General. The meeting is scheduled for 3:30 tomorrow afternoon. I'm counting on Eban to talk for six hours.

Dinitz: I told him thirteen hours!

Kissinger: I told the British they should be in favor of delay. They favor a ceasefire; we favor also a return to the lines. I told them we shouldn't let this disagreement hold us up. I think we'll get through tomorrow before a vote, which will give us Tuesday also. I understand your strategy. You should move as fast as possible.

Dinitz: Let me tell you about our Cabinet meeting on Saturday morning, which I attended. Before it the Cabinet meeting, I was in a meeting alone with the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister. We had a briefing by the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff said there was every indication that the Arabs would strike at 6:00 a.m. He asked permission to strike first, because they were sitting like eggs. She said, "No, I don't want to have a preemptive strike and then have to spend the rest of my life explaining why we struck first." She asked Dayan for his view. He said he was schizophrenic. As a general he felt they should strike, but as a member of the Cabinet he knew that they should not. Then at 10:30 she saw Keating. I didn't know what she would say to him because the Cabinet hadn't met yet. But she said straight out, "We will not strike first." Then afterward she told me, "What did I say?" I said, "You can defend it to the Cabinet." She said, "Yes, but it is a terrible responsibility." Then

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at the Cabinet, she started the discussion by saying straight out that she had told the American Ambassador there would be no first strike. There was a silence. Then a somewhat dovish member said, "There are lives at stake; that may not be the right decision." She got angry. She said, "You shouldn't talk in those terms. We fight for our freedom and our independence, but this means not only border fighting, but standing by our friends" -- meaning one friend.

I left immediately afterward to the Lydda airport because the airports would be closed later.

Kissinger: Because of Yom Kippur.

Dinitz: Yes. Even though I felt bad about leaving in the middle of that situation. On the way to the airport, I saw young boys taken from the synagogues. Right out of the synagogues. They were folding their tallises, and getting their revolvers. It was very dramatic sight. I heard sirens at two o'clock. Real sirens.

Kissinger: You've had a rough week. [Reference to the fact that Ambassador Dinitz had flown back to Israel on October 2 because of the death of his father.]

Dinitz: Yes. In every sense. It was a hard decision.

Kissinger: But it was right. You would have been killed if you had struck first. It's hard enough as it is.


Dinitz: I told her after Keating left, "Dr. Kissinger had always told me, whatever happens, don't be the one that strikes first. He told this to Rabin too." She said, "You think I forgot?"

Kissinger: Through tomorrow it's easy, because everyone will delay. Scali has been instructed to talk long. We won't table anything. We'll talk about returning to the status quo ante. If someone tables a resolution, we will table a resolution.

Dinitz: What about the General Assembly?

Kissinger: On the General Assembly I spoke to the Secretary General. El-Zayyat, Eban, and the Syrian will give informative reports, and Waldheim

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has agreed that there will be no other speakers. We agreed to the General Assembly because the need for the key people to speak there will delay the Security Council until the afternoon.

I am assuming that by Wednesday night you will be in good shape.

Dinitz: We will be. On Yom Kippur we mobilized 100,000 alone.

Shalev: I have three members of my family -- two sons and a son-in-law -- in the field. They are in armor.

Kissinger: This is only for the Prime Minister. I have had a message from Ismail. They say they did it -- they didn't even claim you started it -- they say they did it only to prevent further provocation. They say they will not deepen their bridgeheads beyond where they are.

Dinitz: They can't!

Kissinger: Second, if you agree to withdrawal from the territory, they will agree to negotiate under the auspices of the Security Council or the Permanent Members of the Security Council, and to internationalization of the waterways.

The second, I have a message from the Russians -- that they pulled out all their advisers without consulting the host country.


Dinitz: That we observed on Thursday.

Kissinger: We tried to get them to cosponsor a resolution for a return to the ceasefire lines. There was no way they could agree to that, even with good will.

Dinitz: You think they knew in advance? And tried to prevent it?

Kissinger: I really think they tried to prevent it. In all their communications with us, they were very mild. They moved their fleets away from the coast. Really, they are playing your game. They haven't proposed any resolutions. If they were playing the Egyptian game they'd be proposing a ceasefire.

[Kissinger and Dinitz conferred alone in the Secretary's inner office until from 8:10 to 8:20 p.m.]



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Ambassador Simcha Dinitz of Israel
Minister Mordechai Shalev of Israel

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME:

Tuesday, October 9, 1973
6:10 - 6:35 p.m.

PLACE:

The Map Room
The White House

Secretary Kissinger: On your special requests, the President has approved the entire list of consumables, that is, ordnance, electronic equipment -- everything on the list except laser bombs. The President has agreed -- and let me repeat this formally -- that all your aircraft and tank losses will be replaced. Of the tanks you will be getting, a substantial number will be M-60's, our newest. As for the planes, for immediate delivery; you will be getting 5 F-4's, 2 plus 3. For the rest, you will work out a schedule.

Ambassador Dinitz: It's a question of days, Dr. Kissinger.


Secretary Kissinger: It will be a matter of days. On the anti-tank ammunition and anti-tank weapons, Schlesinger is all set. You know whom to get in touch with at Defense. If there is any trouble, contact Scowcroft. This is everything else on the list, except the laser bombs and aircraft. On tanks, you will have to work out a schedule.

At the end of the week we can see what is urgent.

Ambassador Dinitz: We will take it all by plane.

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Secretary Kissinger: That's agreed. But you have to paint El Al out. This is for maximum security.

Ambassador Dinitz: Our people who I just spoke to said General Sumner said you wouldn't accept our planes even with El Al painted out.

Secretary Kissinger: Oh baloney. You will see a rapid change.

If the need is acute, you'll see a speedup of tanks.

Dinitz: Can you get some through from Europe?

Secretary Kissinger: There is some possibility. We have some at Leghorn. At the end of the week we can see where we stand. The problem of tanks isn't what you need in this battle, but the situation after this battle. You have assurances that you will have replacements. You have the additional assurance that if it should go very badly and there is an emergency, we will get the tanks in even if we have to do it with American planes.

It is absolutely essential also that Senators and Congressmen don't go around attacking the President. Ribicoff called me to say there is a story going around that I kept you from preempting.

Ambassador Dinitz: That's ridiculous.

Secretary Kissinger: That is the story that is going around. They say I kept you from preempting.


Ambassador Dinitz: I know the source. I'll handle it.

Secretary Kissinger: You don't need to say that something is going on -- we don't need that -- but just keep people from going around attacking us.

Now what is the military situation?

Ambassador Dinitz: The military situation is more encouraging. On the Golan Heights, we have pushed the Syrian forces almost off all the Heights, except at the very edge of the ceasefire line. There are some forces that are not destroyed. Today we destroyed hundreds of Syrian tanks. The missile setup of the Syrians was quiet today, most probably a result of air-strikes yesterday. Also it is possible that they don't want to reveal themselves.

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Secretary Kissinger: From the strike on Damascus?

Ambassador Dinitz: That was strategically important because of direct hits on the targets I listed to you. About the other casualties, I don't know.

On the Suez front, we are at five to eight kilometers all along the Canal. Compared to yesterday, this is two to three kilometers nearer.

Today we operated carefully and contact was limited. We took out the tanks but suffered hits.

In the afternoon, 50 Egyptian tanks began to move south to Abu Rudeis. Our Air Force liquidated thirty and the rest were finished off by our armor.

So this is encouraging news, and with the new equipment we'll be able to strike.

Secretary Kissinger: OK. You get in touch with our military people. They shouldn't talk all over the Pentagon.

Ambassador Dinitz: We'll deal with General Sumner, not Noyes.

Secretary Kissinger: Scowcroft is here in my office to coordinate.

Ambassador Dinitz: He was very helpful to us last night.

Secretary Kissinger: I'm glad he's helpful to somebody! [Laughter]

Ambassador Dinitz: I shouldn't tell tales out of school but I tell people that you only yell at people you trust.

Secretary Kissinger: Only at people I know can do better work. I never yell at Scowcroft. [Laughter]

OK, can I speak to you alone for five minutes?

[Secretary Kissinger and Ambassador Dinitz spoke alone from 6:25 to 6:35 p.m.]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
 Situation Report #18

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Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1800 EDT, Oct. 10, 1973

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October 10 was a day of sparring and regrouping on the ground, with most of the action in the air. On the Golan Heights, Israeli forces consolidated positions on the 1967 cease-fire line. Israel claimed that al-Quneitra had been at least turned into a no-man's land. The Syrian air force, perhaps including Iraqi planes, was unusually active. According to Israel, the Syrians lost 19 aircraft fighting IDF forces along the border with a loss of only one Israeli aircraft. The IAF attacked Damascus International Airport and conducted repeated attacks against the power station in northern Syria as well as the refinery at Homs. The German, Swedish and Dutch Embassies at Damascus were reported to be evacuating dependents.

The Egyptian air force was inactive. At the end of the day, Egyptian ground forces were positioned on a line 6 kilometers east of the Canal, in some places bulging to 10 kilometers. According to Israeli sources the IDF repulsed Egyptian forces attempting to turn south below Suez. Israeli aircraft hit Port Said defenses again heavily, as well as targets elsewhere in Egypt.

Greek, Israeli and our intelligence all reported an airlift of AN-12's to Aleppo (the Israelis claim 16 flights). The Israelis speculate the main cargo is missiles. There were also press reports that a Boeing 707 with Israeli markings was loaded with missiles and bombs in Norfolk October 10.

Jordan announced mobilization, but the King told us this was a psychological act. Ambassador Brown delivered a copy of Allon's warning re Jordanian involvement to the King and Prime Minister. At 11:00 P.M. Jordanian time * the Prime Minister phoned to say the situation was increasingly critical. He is still trying to resist the demands of the Egyptians and Syrians that Jordan enter the battle immediately, but thinks the King is weakening.

(* 5:00 p.m. EDT)

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He is reportedly finding it particularly difficult to turn down an urgent Syrian request for tank transporters, needed to transport the Iraqi armored division to the Syrian front. The Prime Minister asked that the U.S. do everything possible in the next few hours to calm the situation in the Middle East.

Saudi Minister of Petroleum Yamani has reportedly told the oil companies that if the U.S. makes a misstep during the present hostilities--i.e., such as resupplying Israel--Saudi Arabia will immediately reduce oil production from 9 to 7.5 million barrels per day, and a further 5% over specific intervals until U.S. policy changes.


DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OPERATIONS CENTER

APPROVED BY:

Roderick M. Wright

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

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


Message from Brezhnev to Secretary Kissinger as read by Minister Vorontsov to the Secretary on the telephone on October 23, 1973 at 10:40 a.m.

President Sadat has informed us that in the morning on the 23 of October Israeli forces in violation of the decision of the Security Council renewed firing on the West Coast of the Suez Canal and are moving into the southern direction. We would like to underline that Moscow has its own reliable information which proves that this is the fact and that the Israelis apparently decided to widen their bridgehead on the West Coast of the Canal. Thus Israel once again challenges the decision of the Security Council. This is absolutely unacceptable. All this looks like as a flagrant deceit on the part of the Israelis. We will express the confidence that the United States will use all the possibilities they have and its authority to bring the Israelis to order. It goes without saying that Israeli forces in this case should be withdrawn to the positions where they stayed during the acceptance of the ceasefire decision.

President Sadat suggests that the Soviet Union and the United States agree among themselves about measures which would insure physical parting of Egyptian and Israeli forces with the help of the observers of the United Nations.

Sadat suggests in particular immediate use of the United Nations observers and first of all the personnel of the United Nations which was placed previously along side the Suez Canal and which is now in Cairo. That is our point of view, Brezhnev says, that it would be really wise to do so since the personnel of the United Nations, which is in Cairo now, need only appropriate orders and they could be immediately dispatched to the place of conflict.



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- 2 -

We suggest that the Soviet Union and the United States urgently submit to the Security Council a draft of appropriate resolution to this effect. If the side United States/agrees to that the draft could look like that and follows the text of the draft:

The Security Council referring to its resolution 338 of October 22, 1973,

(1) Confirms to its decision about immediate cessation of all fire and all military activity and demands that the forces of the sides should be withdrawn to the position where they were at the moment of the adoption of the decision on ceasefire.

(2) Suggest to the Secretary General of the United Nations to immediately take steps for immediate dispatch of the UN observers to supervise the observation of ceasefire between the forces of Israel and Egypt, using for that purpose first of all the personnel of the United Nations which is at present in Cairo.

Mr. Brezhnev would like to underline to Secretary Kissinger the urgency of these matters.

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NODIS/CHEROKEE

DELIVER IMMEDIATELY TO GENERAL SCOWCROFT WHITE HOUSE
 FROM THE SECRETARY EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

HAKTO 14/SECTO 18

1. PLEASE URGENTLY CALL IN DINITZ AND EXTEND MY PROFOUNDTEST APOLOGIES FOR FOUR HOUR COMMUNICATIONS BREAKDOWN WHICH RESULTED IN TELESCOPING OF ADVANCE NOTICE ISRAELIS GOT OF SECURITY COUNCIL INITIATIVE. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES WE WOULD UNDERSTAND IF ISRAELIS FELT THEY REQUIRED SOME ADDITIONAL TIME FOR MILITARY DISPOSITIONS BEFORE CEASE-FIRE TACES EFFECT. WE STILL WANT TO SHOOT FOR TARGET OF 12 HOURS TIME SPAN BETWEEN SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION AND BEGINNING OF CEASE FIRE BUT COULD ACCEPT ISRAELI'S TAKING SLIGHTLY LONGER FOR REASONS STATED ABOVE. THIS COMMUNICATION FOR OBVIOUS REASONS REQUIRES TOTAL DISCRETION.

2. FOR OC/T. PLEASE KEEP ALL REPEAT ALL COPIES OF THIS MESSAGE UNTIL MR. EAGLEBURGER'S RETURN AT WHICH TIME THEY SHOULD BE DELIVERED PERSONALLY RPT PERSONALLY TO HIM.

KISSINGER

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012958By ARO NARA Date 9/9/03SECRET/EXDISDEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations CenterMIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report # 57

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1200 EDT, 10/23/73

Egypt has called for a Security Council meeting, claiming the Israelis have violated the ceasefire and are seeking to enlarge their bridgehead on the west bank of the Canal. The meeting, scheduled for 1200 EDT, has been delayed to give time for missions to receive their instructions.

Military Situation

Fighting has resumed along the Israeli bulge in the west bank of the Suez Canal although there are conflicting reports as to the level. According to an IDF spokesman, the Egyptians advanced eastward in the northern sector although there were no reports of firing. The central sector was reported quiet. In the southern sector, an Egyptian artillery barrage was followed by an armor attack on Israeli positions from the west and south. In earlier reports, IDF spokesman claimed there was artillery fire along the entire front.

According to Egyptian sources, Israel pushed enormous quantities of equipment across the Canal during the night near Ismailia and the Great Bitter Lake and succeeded in considerably strengthening its position on the west bank. Egypt claims Israeli planes bombed Egyptian positions west of the Suez Canal in violation of the ceasefire.

On the Syrian front there was heavy fighting in the area of Mt. Hermon. Numerous Syrian troops have reportedly entered Lebanon to avoid capture. A large air battle took place near Damascus in the morning of October 23. Syria claims 60 Israeli aircraft were involved of which 11 were

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DOD (LDX)
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By

ARDA Date 9/9/03

SECRET/EXDIS

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shot down. The IDF said 10 Syrian planes were downed.

Soviet Resupply

Approximately 60 Soviet missions were flown October 22 raising the level of resupply missions to 800 since the Soviet airlift began on October 10. Approximately 10,000 short tons of materiel have been airlifted to the Arabs since the conflict began. On October 20 a Yugoslav ship reportedly unloaded over 800 tons of military equipment at the port of Tripoli, Lebanon, including an unknown number of tanks.

Estimated Casualties

DIA estimates casualties are as follows through October 22:

	<u>Arabs</u>	<u>Israel</u>
Personnel (KIA/WIA)	15,700	4,150
Tanks	1,950	875
Aircraft	412	119
Ships	30	1

During briefing for the Secretary when in Tel Aviv, the Chief of the IAF listed Israel's aircraft losses at 104. The most critical factor at this time is not aircraft but aircrews. The Israelis now have only 69-70 F-4 crews.

Ethiopia Cuts Diplomatic Relations with Israel

Ethiopia announced today that it is severing relations with Israel. Ethiopia's announcement is in accordance with Boumedienne's call to all African states to break relations with Israel.

Reaction to UNSC Ceasefire Resolution 338

On the front, Egyptian troops at all levels reportedly were bitter at Sadat's decision to conclude a ceasefire. Newsweek editor de Borchgrave reports having witnessed a mutiny among Egyptian troops in Kantara lasting 45 minutes in protest at Sadat's decision to conclude a ceasefire.

In Cairo Al Ahram reports that when Sadat received the U.S./Soviet draft and accepted the ceasefire, it was

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based on "full Israeli withdrawal from all occupied lands" and safeguarding of legitimate Palestinian rights. Al Ahram commented favorably that the undertaking by the superpowers of a special commitment to implement a ceasefire is a stand which neither the U.S. nor Israel had ever before accepted.


In Israel, the rightwing Likud opposition alliance has issued a declaration stating that the implementation of the UNSC resolution will not lead to peace but will endanger Israel's security. At the Knesset session scheduled to begin 10:00 a.m. EDT today, a vote may be taken on the GOI decision to accept the ceasefire resolution. Embassy Tel Aviv estimates the GOI will win the Knesset vote by only a small margin and the labor alignment will be in for some rough sledding in the weeks ahead.

In accordance with Libya's refusal to accept the ceasefire resolution, about 1,250 students picketed our Embassy in Tripoli in protest of the resolution.

APPROVED BY:

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SECRET/EXDIS



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October 24, 1973

Dear Henry,

I am sending you herewith the
message I have told you about this
morning over the telephone.

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'J. Edgar Hoover'. Below the signature, the name 'J. Edgar Hoover' is printed in a small, sans-serif font.

The Secretary of State
Dr. Henry KISSINGER,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Authority E.O. 12958
 By TJ NARA Date 12/24/01

*Delivered from Bureau
 Encl. 2 copies to the President
 Oct. 24, 1973*

October 24, 1973


Dear Mr. President,

We have hard information that the Israeli forces are now fiercely attacking by tanks and naval crafts the Egyptian port of Adabel on the Western bank of the Suez Canal with obvious intention to capture this port in gross violation of also a new cease-fire decision of the Security Council.

At the same time the Israeli armed forces are fiercely fighting Egyptian forces on the Eastern bank of the Southern Suez Canal.

These defiant actions have been taken by the presumptuous leaders of Israel only several hours after the last confirmation by the Security Council of its decision about an immediate cease-fire and after your firm statement that the United States takes full responsibility for implementation by Israel of a complete termination of hostilities.

So what is happening - hardly have we reached an understanding and received from you very solemn assurances concerning its implementation, when gross defiance occurs of both



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this understanding of ours and of decisions of the Security Council.

We, naturally, have questions as to what is behind all this. I wish to say it frankly, Mr. President, that we are confident that you have possibilities to influence Israel with the aim of putting an end to such a provocative behaviour of Tel Aviv.

We would like to hope that we both will be true to our word and to the understanding we have reached.

I will appreciate information on your steps towards Israel's strict and immediate compliance with the decisions of the Security Council of this October 22 and 23.

Respectfully,

L. Brezhnev

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12958By 12 NARA Date 11/24/01*Final Translation*
Rec'd 5:00 PM
10/29/73

THE JOINT STAFF

NMCC

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

TRANSLATION OF USSR 01, 231600Z October 1973.

01
USA/USSR
231600R**TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE**

WASHINGTON. THE WHITE HOUSE.

SPEC CAT**"EYES ONLY"**

ESTEEMED MR. PRESIDENT:

ISRAEL HAS FLAGRANTLY VIOLATED THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION ON THE CEASE FIRE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE IN MOSCOW ARE SHOCKED THAT THE UNDERSTANDING WHICH WAS REACHED ONLY TWO DAYS AGO HAS IN FACT BEEN RUPTURED BY THIS ACTION BY THE ISRAELI LEADERS. WHY THIS TREACHERY WAS ALLOWED BY ISRAEL IS MORE OBVIOUS TO YOU.

WE SEE ONE POSSIBILITY FOR CORRECTING THE SITUATION AND FULFILLING THE UNDERSTANDING...IN FORCING ISRAEL TO IMMEDIATELY OBEY THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION. WE VOUCH FOR THE ARABS, SINCE THE LEADERS OF EGYPT AND SYRIA HAVE STATED THAT THEY WILL IMPLICITLY FULFILL THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION.

WE PLEDGED WITH YOU, JOINTLY AS GUARANTOR-COUNTRIES, TO ENSURE THE FULFILLMENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE PROPOSE THAT THE MOST DECISIVE MEASURES BE TAKEN WITHOUT DELAY BY THE SOVIET UNION AND

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Authority E.O. 12958By TD NARA Date 1/24/01

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE**SPEC CAT****"EYES ONLY"**

TRANSLATION OF USSR 01, 231600Z October 1973 [continued].


THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO STOP THE VIOLATIONS OF THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED AND OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION BASED ON [THIS UNDERSTANDING]. WE WOULD LIKE TO BELIEVE THAT ON YOUR PART, ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, EVERYTHING WILL BE DONE IN ORDER THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION AND OUR UNDERSTANDING WITH YOU WILL BE IMPLEMENTED. TOO MUCH IS AT STAKE, NOT ONLY AS CONCERNS THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT IN OUR RELATIONS AS WELL.

WE WILL BE GRATEFUL FOR A SPEEDY RESPONSE.

RESPECTFULLY,

L. BREZHNEV

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SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)Ismail to Kissinger--2215 (EDT) October 20, 1973.

"... The Egyptian Government sets out the following stand with respect to the present conflict:

- (A) A ceasefire on the present lines,
- (B) convening a peace conference with the object of reaching a fundamental settlement,
- (C) a guarantee by the United States and the Soviet Union of the ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli troops.

"Mr. Ismail believes that the presence of Dr. Kissinger in Moscow now will be helpful in reaching an agreement on the above mentioned lines. "

Kissinger to Ismail--October 21, 1973.

"I deeply appreciate your message of October 20.... We have reached agreement with General Secretary Brezhnev that our Governments will introduce a joint Security Council resolution.... On this basis, I believe we can look toward a settlement satisfactory to all parties. To this end, we have agreed with the Soviet Government that the US together with the USSR will be prepared to use their good offices and participate as required to facilitate a fundamental settlement.... I can assure you that as the fighting ceases, the US will use its influence to secure a lasting peace in the Middle East on a basis just for all parties. "

Ismail to Kissinger--October 23, 1973.

"Very urgent. We have very strongly drawn your attention to the dangers of a ceasefire and therefore have demanded guarantees for the fulfillment by both parties of their obligations once they accept the ceasefire.

"It is our understanding according to reports received from the Soviet Union that the US Government have accepted to guarantee the ceasefire which will create the conditions necessary for the commencement of peace talks.... "


XGDS - 1 and 3

DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.

BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

- 2 -

Sadat to Nixon--2115 Cairo time, October 23, 1973

"... I am formally asking you to intervene effectively even if that necessitates the use of forces in order to guarantee the full implementation of the ceasefire resolution in accordance with the joint US-USSR agreement.

"We were asked to comply with the ceasefire resolution with the full understanding of the effectiveness of the joint guarantees.... The Egyptian Government will consider the U.S. Government fully responsible for what is happening at present, in spite of your guarantees and of the Security Council Resolution co-sponsored by the USA and the USSR, as well as of our acceptance of the Resolution on that basis.

"... What is happening now, in the light of your guarantees, does not induce confidence in any other future guarantees."

Nixon to Sadat--October 23, 1973

"I appreciate your recent message and the frankness with which you spoke. Let me be equally frank. All we guaranteed--no matter what you may have been told from other sources--was to engage fully and constructively in promoting a political process designed to make possible a political settlement.

"Nevertheless, as evidence of our earnest desire to promote a lasting settlement... I have instructed Secretary Kissinger to make urgent representations to the Government of Israel requesting its full compliance with Security Council Resolution 338...."

Sadat to Nixon--1400 EDT, October 26, 1973

"... The two superpowers bear a major responsibility in seeing that the Security Council resolutions are being fully and promptly implemented...."

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THE JOINT STAFF

N M C C

THE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By 12 NARA Date 1/24/01

Final Translation

Rec'd 5:00 pm
12/29/73

TRANSLATION OF USSR 02, 231807Z October 1973.

02
USA/USSR
231807R

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

ESTEEMED MR. PRESIDENT:

SPEC CAT "EYES ONLY"

I AM NOTIFYING YOU THAT THE EGYPTIAN SIDE IS READY TO CEASE
FIRE IMMEDIATELY IF THE ISRAELI ARMED FORCES WILL CEASE FIRE.
YOU CAN CATEGORICALLY NOTIFY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OF THIS.

WE HOPE THAT THE UNDERSTANDING DISPLAYED BY YOU OF THE URGENCY
AND ACUTENESS OF THE TASK TO IMMEDIATELY CEASE FIRE WILL BE
GIVEN TO THE ISRAELIS IN THE MOST EXPLICIT FORM.

WE PROPOSE THAT THE CEASE FIRE BE IMPLEMENTED IMMEDIATELY.

WE ALSO PROPOSE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL BE CONVENED MOST
URGENTLY. WE ARE GIVING OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN THE COUNCIL
CORRESPONDING INSTRUCTIONS.

WE WILL BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WILL URGENTLY INSTRUCT YOUR
REPRESENTATIVE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN SUCH A WAY THAT
OUR AND YOUR REPRESENTATIVES ACT CONCERTEDLY ON THE BASIS
OF THE PLAN WHICH WAS THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE
USSR CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AND MR. KISSINGER.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

RESPECTFULLY,

L. BREZHNEV

SPEC CAT "EYES ONLY"

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
By 72 NARA Date 4/24/01

Sent via hotline o/a 1:10 p.m.,
Tuesday, October 23, 1973.

Dear Mr. General Secretary:


I have just received your message regarding violations of the Security Council decision on the ceasefire in the Middle East.

I want to assure you that we assume full responsibility to bring about a complete end of hostilities on the part of Israel. Our own information would indicate that the responsibility for the violation of the ceasefire belongs to the Egyptian side, but this is not the time to debate that particular issue. We have insisted with Israel that they take immediate steps to cease hostilities, and I urge that you take similar measures with respect to the Egyptian side.

You and I have achieved an historic settlement over this past weekend and we will not permit it to be destroyed.

Sincerely,


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Mr. General-Secretary:

You will have received word that we and you will once again be joining together in a proposal to the Security Council designed to make the cease-fire effective. We did so even though we had reservations regarding one part of the resolution. We felt that it was in our overall interests to maintain unity on this matter involving the first test of making the cease-fire effective. In this connection, I urge you to continue to press Syria to accept the cease-fire so that there will be greater assurance on both fronts that the shooting will in fact stop, and we can begin to move towards the next stage of our joint efforts toward a fundamental settlement.

You know, Mr. General-Secretary, that our principal reservation regarding today's resolution was that the parties were being asked to withdraw to the positions they occupied at the moment they accepted the cease-fire. Our difficulty with this is that the positions actually occupied by both sides at that time are unclear. As I said to Mr. Vorontsov, and as he confirmed, our willingness to accept the principle of your Security Council proposal was made possible when your government assured me that it will show moderation when differences ensue between the parties, as



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SECRET

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to the positions in dispute. Once the observers are in place, of course, this difficulty will be eliminated. Thus the most immediate goal must be to speed the work of the observers.


Secondly, we agreed to proceed together because of the understanding we have that you will press for the immediate release of prisoners of war. I cannot underscore enough how helpful an immediate exchange of prisoners would be to assure an effective cease-fire and to move rapidly to joint auspices for subsequent negotiations. I continue to believe that you and we have done a distinct service to the cause of peace.

Warm regards,



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520



25 Oct. '73

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONPARTICIPANTS:

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State

Joseph J. Sisco
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs

Arthur W. Hummel
Acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs

Winston Lord
Director of Planning and Coordination

Ambassador Huang Chen
Chief of PRC Liaison Office

Han Hsu
PRC Liaison Office

Chi Chao Chu
Interpreter, PRC Liaison Office


DATE AND TIME: Thursday, October 25, 1973
4:45 p.m.-5:25 p.m.

Amb Huang: You were up all night.

Secretary: Your allies tried to throw their weight around last night. I thought I would bring you up to date on what has been happening for the benefit of the Prime Minister.

First, let me tell you about the situation last night and today, and then I'll go back to the Moscow trip. First, Mr. Ambassador, our policy has been what I told you the first night. We

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

2

have one principal objective, to keep the Soviet military presence out of the Middle East and to reduce the Soviet political influence as much as possible. I know you are going to disagree with these objectives violently. (Laughter)

Amb Huang: Not necessarily.

Secretary: But we will pursue them regardless of your recommendations.

Amb Huang: I watched your entire TV press conference today.

Secretary: (To Mr. Sisco) The Prime Minister says I am the only man who can speak a half an hour without saying anything.


I was not offended by what he said, simply that he gave away my secret.

Amb Huang: You are very much interested in these words of the Prime Minister, and Chiao Kuan-kwa also told you how the Prime Minister explained them.

Secretary: Let's go through yesterday. We received in the morning some Soviet complaints that the ceasefire was being violated. We believed them and, therefore, we brought very great pressure on Israel to stop what they were doing. But then we found out that Israel was not doing anything. We also found out that the Egyptians were not doing anything, that it was a rather quiet day. All day long the complaints were getting louder and louder in a way that we couldn't do anything about.

At four o'clock I saw Dobrynin, and he discussed with me only the question of how we get the political negotiations started. At the end, we discussed what would happen at the Security Council, and he said the only instructions to their representatives were to vote for the resolution about the ceasefire. At 7:30, Dobrynin called me and said they had changed instructions now and would vote for the resolution introduced by somebody

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
else that the Soviet and American forces be introduced into the Middle East. We told them we would veto such a resolution. You remember we called you and recommended that you might consider vetoing, too.

At 10:15 we received a message from the Soviet Union which was very brutal in language and which, in effect, said that we should immediately agree to send a joint force with them into the Middle East, and if we didn't agree to send a joint force with them, they would send Soviet forces alone. We were not prepared to send a joint force with the Soviet Union because of the impression of condominium, because our objectives were not the same as theirs, and because we did not want to establish the principle that Soviet combat forces could be transported over long distances into foreign countries.

So I called the Soviet Ambassador and told him he would get an answer later, and I called a meeting of the National Security Council. That is when we put our military forces on the alert. We moved our fleet to the eastern part of the Mediterranean and put another aircraft carrier into the western part of the Mediterranean. And only after we were sure that the Soviets would have picked up all these movements did we send them a reply, in which we said we were prepared to send individual observers, but not combat personnel, only as part of the UN observer force. But if the Soviet Union would act unilaterally, it would have the gravest consequences and would violate the principles we signed and violate Article II of the Treaty for the Prevention of Nuclear War. I know you won't like me to invoke that treaty. So we used the treaty as I told the Prime Minister we would use it. And we also told the Soviet Ambassador that we would not receive any other communication until we had replied to this one.

So at the United Nations today you know what happened. We refused to join any resolution unless it excluded permanent members from any force. So now the Soviet Union is excluded from sending a force except as part of the United

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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Nations. About one and one-half hours ago we received a reply from the Soviets that they were sending 70 individual observers and no military contingents.

Amb Huang: That would mean that you will also send individual observers?

Secretary: Maybe, but we haven't decided yet. Our major concern was that they had alerted 7 of their 8 airborne divisions. (To Sisco) Was it 7 out of 8 or 6 out of 7?

Mr. Sisco: I think it was 7 out of 8 but I'm not sure.

Secretary: They had assembled all their air transportation to move them. We are not concerned with individual personnel in Egypt -- they have been there before -- but we were determined to resist introduction of combat units.


Now about our strategy. As far as the discussions in Moscow were concerned, they dealt only with the Middle East and only with the Security Council resolution. There was no other subject. I don't think their affection for you has increased in recent months, but it was not a subject they pursued. Our major concern was that, since they were defeated, not to push matters to the point where it would produce a military confrontation.

Amb Huang: Who was defeated?

Secretary: Basically, the Egyptians were defeated and, therefore, so were the Russians. We weren't asking for a ceasefire. We will now pursue the policy I discussed with the Vice Foreign Minister of strengthening our relations with Arab countries. I am considering stopping in a few Arab countries, specifically including Cairo, on the way to Peking. And I wanted to ask you whether it might be possible for you if we entered China the way I did on my first trip through Pakistan. I thought I would go from Cairo to Teheran to Rawalpindi to see President Bhutto and go up to Peking from there. (There was some discussion among the Chinese.) You will have to ask your government. Or maybe we could come around that area and go to Shanghai.

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



Amb Huang: We will report this to our government and tell you very quickly.

Secretary: Of course. We think this is an opportune moment to visit those countries and it fits in with the general views expressed by Chiao Kuan-hua when I last saw him. And it will be in the spirit that we discussed that I would be making those stops.

This is what I wanted to inform you of and, of course, answer any questions you might have.

Amb Huang: Thank you for the information about this. We will report this immediately to Prime Minister Chou En-lai. I would like to ask from your point of view what you estimate the developing situation in the Middle East to be.

Secretary: My honest view is that the Soviet Union has suffered a major strategic defeat, and that's why they tried to bluff us last night. For the third time now its friends have lost most of the equipment the Soviet Union gave them. Even the Arab leaders have had to learn that they can get military equipment from the Soviet Union, but if they want to make diplomatic progress, they have to deal with us. And since we are not anti-Arab we will help them now make diplomatic progress. So we now have a very good position to reduce the Soviet political influence.


This is our assessment of the outcome. They will bluff us from time to time and make some threatening noises, but their nerves are not as good as their bluffs.

Amb Huang: What are the United States and the Soviet Union planning to do in the future?

Secretary: There will be formal cooperation between the Soviet Union and us to encourage negotiations. The Soviet Union will try to create the impression that they pushed us into it. But since the Soviet Union can deliver nothing, we will have our bilateral discussions with the Arabs as well. You must distinguish appearance from reality. There may be some face-saving things, but we will determine

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



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for ourselves what will be done. You know the Western concern with face.

Amb Huang: The Orientals are very much concerned with face, with self-respect.

Very honestly speaking, I would like to say that the practice of the United States and the Soviet Union that they were doing during the Security Council meetings of the 22nd and 23rd, of putting in a resolution agreed upon by themselves, but not letting other countries consult or receive instructions from their governments, is a practice we find intolerable. And Vice Minister Chiao Kuan-hua made that quite clear in the Security Council. At the Security Council meeting, others didn't even want him to finish his speech.

Secretary: I hope our representative didn't bring any pressure on you.

Amb Huang: But practically both the U.S. and the Soviet Union pushed the resolution in the Security Council without giving time to the other members to consult or to ask instructions from their governments.

Secretary: I agree with you. This was an exceptional circumstance in which the Egyptian forces would have been completely wiped out if the war continued another 24 hours.


Amb Huang: I don't agree with that estimate. From the very beginning our views were different on this point. The U.S. said at the very beginning that in 72 to 96 hours the Arabs would be defeated.

Secretary: I underestimated.

Amb Huang: It went on for 16 or 17 days, and as Chiao Kuan-hua has made very clear, it was a big victory for the Arabs. It was not the six-day war of 1967. On this point we differ. I do not wish to go further.

Secretary: We have different public assessments, but we still have to have realistic private assessments. I underestimated the length of time, but I did not underestimate the outcome.

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
Amb Huang: But there is a fundamental difference of assessments here. We look at the perspective of which side is just and which side is not just. Also, we consider that, while weapons are important, people who use the weapons are even more important.

You can see that the Arab peoples have, during the past several decades, suffered humiliations, ever since the British trusteeship of Palestine in 1947. And in the creation of Israel there were two states -- one in Palestine and one in Israel -- with the support of the big powers on the 5th of June 1948. On the second day, Israel launched attacks on the Arab states and the Arabs in the Palestinian area, about one million, were driven out homeless. And for these several decades the Palestinians and Arabs are without their homes and have to live in refugee camps. After the war in 1967, our Arab friends felt humiliated. That was why the Arab people suffered so much in the 1967 war. The Soviet Union gave them weapons, but they did not let them use them. The purpose was to control them. Under the circumstances, of course, the Arab people could not have their concerns met. Under the provocation of Israel, the Arabs fight back, as the Vice Minister made clear in his speech at the Security Council. He pointed out that the Arabs fought very heroically, and they victoriously hoisted the Egyptian flag east of the Suez. And on the Golan Heights it was not so easy for Israel; the Syrians put up a very firm struggle. Mr. Dayan claimed that the Israeli forces would take Damascus, but they did not. And the Palestinian Arabs, too, put up a heroic struggle. Other Arab countries and peoples participated in the battle. And the unity and strength of the people have increased. I'm not very clear on the present situation.

There is strength in the situation of the Arab people. At this or that time, there may be military setbacks, but I do not share your assessment that they have been defeated. We are firmly convinced that the side of justice will finish with victory. So long as territories are not restored and so long as the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arabs have not been

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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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resolved, there cannot be peace. Regarding what the U.S. and the Soviet Union did, I am frankly expressing my views. In the end, the Arabs will certainly be victorious.

Secretary: We are not anti-Arab. Our principal objective is to prevent Soviet influence, as I told you on the first day. We take very seriously what the Vice Minister said in New York. You will see that we will pursue a very active policy toward the Arabs. I agree with you that they have wiped out the humiliation of the past years, and they fought very heroically.

Amb Huang: I just wanted to say these things, and then I won't go on any longer. We are old friends. We have differences of view, but we are old friends. And you do know that we do sympathize with the just cause of the Arab people.

Secretary: We are not asking you to abandon this.


Amb Huang: And as we said in the past, we are not against the Jewish people; we are opposed to Zionism and Zionist aggression. That's what the Arabs say, too.

And what is more, I myself being a soldier, I don't believe the theory that weapons decide everything. Because if the weapons were more decisive, then the Chinese revolution would never have been victorious. And George Washington would never have been victorious. And many others, too.

Secretary: And Winston Lord would be deprived of all hope of taking over the State Department.

Mr. Ambassador, our present plan is to leave here on the 5th or 6th of November and then go to Cairo and then into China. If you could let us know at your convenience whether we can come in via Pakistan, it would be a sentimental journey.
(Laughter)

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

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Amb Huang: I will immediately report this.

Secretary: Of course, I will be happy to go into greater detail with the Prime Minister when I am there.

(As the Chinese were moving toward the door)
You will not disagree with what we did last night,
Mr. Ambassador. (Laughter) I don't want you to get
too nervous.

Amb Huang: We will report this immediately. I personally think that this (travel to Arab countries) would be a good idea.

(The Secretary then went over parts of the itinerary, adding Saudi Arabia as an example of another country that he might visit.)

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority 84969032
 By [signature] NARA Date 11-7-00

CONFIDENTIAL

October 24, 1973

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 Secretary Kissinger requests that Mr. Ismail pass the following urgent communication from President Nixon to President Sadat:

"I have just learned that a resolution may be introduced into the Security Council this evening urging that outside military forces -- including those of the US and the USSR -- be sent to the Middle East to enforce the ceasefire. I must tell you that if such a resolution is introduced into the Security Council it will be vetoed by the United States for the following reasons:

--It would be impossible to assemble sufficient outside military power to represent an effective counterweight to the indigenous forces now engaged in combat in the Middle East.

--Should the two great nuclear powers be called upon to provide forces, it would introduce an extremely dangerous potential for direct great power rivalry in the area.

"It is our view that an effective implementation of the ceasefire already called for by the Security Council would be by the rapid introduction of United Nations observer personnel. We strongly support such a move.

CLASSIFIED BY FRANK WISNER
 SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO-
 YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON
 OCTOBER 31, 2000

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POL 27-14 ARAB-ISR
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"Mr. President, the United States stands ready to move rapidly toward a political solution to the tragic problems that have made peace in the Middle East such a tenuous thing.

But we are equally intent upon avoiding an unnecessary confrontation which would but make more difficult and dangerous an already extremely complex situation."

a resolution is introduced which would authorize the President

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DATE 11-7-00

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11-7-00

*Read at State Dept.
10 PM 10/24/73*

Mr. President:

I have received your letter in which you inform me that Israel ceased fighting. The facts, however, testify that Israel continues drastically to ignore the ceasefire decision of the Security Council. Thus, it is brazenly challenging both the Soviet Union and the United States since it is our agreement with you which constitutes the basis of the Security Council decision. In short, Israel simply embarked on the road to defeat.

It continues to seize new and new territory. As you know, the Israeli forces have already fought their way into Suez. It is impossible to allow such to continue. Let us together, the Soviet Union and the United States urgently dispatch to Egypt Soviet and American military contingents, with their mission the implementation of the decision of the Security Council of August 22 and 23 concerning the cessation of fire and of all military activities and also of the understanding with you on the guarantee of the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council

It is necessary to adhere ^{out}with/delay. I will say it straight that if you find it impossible to act jointly with us in this matter, we should be faced with the necessity urgently

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to consider the question of taking appropriate steps unilaterally.

We cannot allow arbitrariness on the part of Israel. "

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We have an understanding with you which we value highly--that is to act jointly. Let us implement this understanding on a concrete case in this complex situation. It will be a good example of our agreed actions in the interest of peace. We have no doubt that all those who are in favor of detente, of peace, of good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States will only welcome such joint action of ours. I will appreciate immediate and clear reply from you.

Respectively,

L. Brezhnev

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Authority E.O. 12958


By AB NARA Date 9/4/03

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We have an understanding with you which we value highly--that is to act jointly. Let us implement this understanding on a concrete case in this complex situation. It will be a good example of our agreed actions in the interest of peace. We have no doubt that all those who are in favor of detente, of peace, of good relations between the Soviet Union and the United States will only welcome such joint action of ours. I will appreciate immediate and clear reply from you.

Respectively,

L. Brezhnev



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October 25, 1973

Mr. General Secretary:

I have carefully studied your important message of this evening. I agree with you that our understanding to act jointly for peace is of the highest value and that we should implement that understanding in this complex situation.


I must tell you, however, that your proposal for a particular kind of joint action, that of sending Soviet and American military contingents to Egypt is not appropriate in the present circumstances.

We have no information which would indicate that the ceasefire is now being violated on any significant scale. Such violations as are taking place can be dealt with most effectively by increased numbers of observer teams to inform the Security Council of the true responsibility for violations.

We are prepared to take every effective step to guarantee the implementation of the ceasefire and are already in close touch with the Government of Israel to ensure that it abides fully by the terms of the Security Council decisions. I assume that you are taking similar steps with Egypt.

In these circumstances, we must view your suggestion of unilateral action as a matter of the gravest concern involving incalculable consequences.

It is clear that the forces necessary to impose the ceasefire terms on the two sides would be massive and would require closest coordination



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
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so as to avoid bloodshed. This is not only clearly infeasible but is not appropriate to the situation. In this situation the Security Council requires accurate information about what is occurring so that it as well as each of us can exert maximum influence in Cairo and Tel-Aviv, respectively, to ensure compliance with the terms of the ceasefire.

To this end, I am prepared to join with you at once to augment the present truce supervisory force by additional men and equipment. I would be prepared to see included in such augmented truce supervisory units a number of American and Soviet personnel, though not combat forces. It would be understood that this is an extraordinary and temporary step, solely for the purpose of providing adequate information concerning compliance by both sides with the terms of the ceasefire. If this is what you mean by contingents, we will consider it.

Mr. General Secretary, in the spirit of our agreements this is the time for acting not unilaterally but in harmony and with cool heads. I believe my proposal is consonant with the letter and spirit of our understandings and would ensure a prompt implementation of the ceasefire. This would establish a base from which we could move into the negotiations foreseen by Security Council Resolution 338 which we shall jointly sponsor.

I will await a prompt and positive reply from you on these proposals. Meanwhile, I will order the necessary preparations for the steps I have outlined. Upon receipt of your agreement, I will immediately designate



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representatives to work out the modalities with your representatives.

You must know, however, that we could in no event accept unilateral action. This would be in violation of our understandings, of the agreed Principles we signed in Moscow in 1972 and of Article II of the Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War. As I stated above, such action would produce incalculable consequences which would be in the interest of neither of our countries and which would end all we have striven so hard to achieve.

Traprock Peace Center

**Interview with Mordechai Vanunu (via telephone)
August 13, 2004**

Miller: My name is Sunny Miller. I'm the director of the Traprock Peace Center in Deerfield, Massachusetts, and we're privileged to have on the phone with us Mr. Mordechai Vanunu, the Israeli who spoke the truth about nuclear weapons and spent 18 years in prison for doing that, 11 and a half years I understand was in a very small cell. Mr. Vanunu, can you tell us about your situation now in Israel?

Vanunu: The situation now is that I was released from prison on April 21st and since then I have my place in St. George Cathedral in East Jerusalem, an Anglican church. I'm staying here because the Israeli government imposed on me a restriction not to speak to foreigners for six months and not to go freely for 6 months ... and for one year I'm not allowed to leave the country. We appealed to the Supreme Court in Israel, and the Supreme Court left this restriction as it was, so the situation now is that I am staying at St. George, and I'm not allowed to leave the country, but I'm meeting and speaking to foreigners who come to the church because I'm a Christian and this is a bad situation and I am trying to do all that I can to receive my human rights. The basis of a democracy system is to have freedom of speech, freedom of movement. I'll be very glad to leave as soon as possible.

Miller: I hope that you will be able to enjoy freedom soon. Can you tell us about the threat that you feel is posed by the nuclear reactors in Israel at this time?

Vanunu: My information was about nuclear weapons secrets in Israel. That's why we revealed in 1986 to the newspaper in London, the Sunday Times. I've come out with new details, most interesting revelation about how many nuclear weapons has Israel developed in that time up to 1986. It was about 100 to 200 nuclear weapons. I also revealed Israel producing new atomic bombs like hydrogen bomb and neutron bomb. Hydrogen bomb has no justification, nor any real excuse for Israel's defense. It's a real holocaust weapon, a hydrogen bomb, and it only can be used against civilians in cities, so I revealed this information to prevent and to bring the attention of the world to what Israel is doing. And also the situation of the reactor working for forty years without any inspections from abroad, from international people or even from the Israel government, Israel

parliament, even in the media - no one discussing what was going there, so all those subjects were raised by my revelation.

Miller: Thank you very much. We, too, here suffer the fear of living with a government who has hydrogen bombs. Can you tell about the environmental concern? I understand that you feel Jordan may be particularly threatened by the emissions from the Dimona nuclear reactor.

Vanuau: About the environmental dangers..., it's easy to tell that the Dimona reactor also has sent into the Earth some radioactive production as a result of the nuclear radioactive activity in Dimona. Because the Dimona reactor was built in the Negev, near the Jordan border, about five to ten miles from the Jordan border. It's very close, so anything that can be (emitted) to the air can flow back to Jordan. And, also, they used to produce Plutonium to dissolve the Uranium only when the air flew toward Jordan. That was one of the conditions. When I was working there, we should asked the control room to give us permission to start dissolving uranium only when it was clear that the air flew toward Jordan's border. That was the situation. And when we dissolved the uranium after every nuclear s... now there are dissolving... materials that can also out-gas and can go to the air, and they can flow to the borders and environment around the Dimona reactor. So the radioactive materials were going outside from Dimona and also include the production of other radioactive materials. Dimona reactor sending with water that is going to the underground. They are sending water ... from the reactor that can be contaminated with radioactive materials.

Miller: So both air and groundwater, you fear, are contaminated downwind and down river from the Dimona reactor.

Vanunu: Yes.

Miller: I commend you for incredible strength and perseverance all these years, still having a desire to speak the truth. I wonder how do you keep your strength, and how incredible it was that you maintain this commitment to the truth even after solitary confinement. Can you speak about that?

Vanunu: Yes, it started by the urgent demand from my conscience to go and reveal the nuclear secrets about all the nuclear weapons that Israel produced. That's (how) my story began, to reveal the nuclear weapons secrets. Then all what happened later, the kidnapping, the isolation, the injustice by Israel's Supreme Court and obviously their justice system that gave me 18 years; they sentenced me as a traitor and spy, and all the treatment, cruelty, barbaric treatment, by ... Mossad in prison, made me much more determined and firm and bold to continue to speak the truth. And, also, the Israel situation that continued to silence anyone and treating any state, all of this makes it very sure

that I should continue to speak and repeat and bring the news to all the world's attention. So I suffered and paid 18 years, and, yet, I could be also arrested again or questioned, but I think I'm doing the right thing. I'm very sure that I'm doing the best thing for all the human rights, for peace and for world peace and for the Middle East peace. That was sending me to speak very clear and bold.

Miller: The question of your capture, that itself was a kidnapping in Italy. Can you speak about that incident?

Vanunu: Yes, after the explanation to the Sunday Times in 1986, the Mossad and other spy organizations in not only Israel but foreign states too, who were helping Israel nuclear weapons for many years, those states also helped them to try to silence me, to try to kidnap me, and they succeeded and brought me to Rome by an American young woman. And then the Rome was waiting for me, the Mossad and other spy organizations like Italy, French, and England. And then they took me to a boat, a yacht in the sea, and in the sea I asked them you are you who would kidnap me. They said we are here French, England, and Israel. It was a cartel of foreign spy ... who were behind the nuclear proliferation during the cold war to Israel and South Africa and other states, and my revelation damage all their work during the cold war. So they decided to try to sentence me and to kidnap me. And they succeeded ... for 18 years to gain from that kidnapping and sentence me for 18 years.

Miller: Yes. I understand that you wish to travel and particularly that you have friends; is it Minnesota?

Vanunu: Yes, adoptive parents in Minnesota.

Miller: And I understand that you would like to leave as soon as possible and be a free man.

Vanunu: Yes. I absolutely was working for this for 18 years. To feel free is to be out of Israel. In Israel I certainly cannot feel free, especially a man like me who is now called a traitor, and regarded as an enemy of Israel. And also, as a Christian who was baptized to Christianity in Australia in 1986, but here in Israel they regard my baptism to Christianity as also another kind of betrayal. So ... I cannot feel free. I cannot feel safe. There are some threats to my life. But I'm not enjoy to go on the street and walk with people as I want. So all the time I was waiting, but I will not be free. I will go straight to the airport and fly away to the free world: Europe and the United States. That's what I want to do.

Miller: I hope that when you are here we will still have some freedoms left in the United States in spite of our government and its criminal record regarding nuclear weapons and experiments on our own people. I thank you for your time, and I understand next you're going for a long swim. Is that right?

Vanunu: Since I'm staying in St. George, and they don't have sea here, so I'm going to swim in a swimming pool, in a hotel swimming pool. I love to swim. I love the water. That is very good – what do you call it -- rehabilitation for all my body and my spirit, to swim. I'm swimming about one hour every day I'm going to swim. It's good exercise.

Miller: Wonderful. I hope that we will welcome you to the waters here in the United States soon.

Vanunu: Yes. I hope to come swim to the United States and meet lots and lots of friends from all the United States, including from Massachusetts, Boston, I received many, many letters during the 18 years in support, encouragement -- from the people but not from the government and not from the media. The people of the United States are beautiful and wonderful sending their message of support for many, many years.

Miller: Thank you. We will welcome you heartily. Thank you so much for your courage.

Vanunu: The media there has not enough courage just to speak against Israel and also the Washington governments still are not able to speak clear and loud against Israel's nuclear policy or even to demand my human rights, my basic human rights. Imagine if one man like me was in an Arab state what the United States was doing, or in other states, but, because I am in Israel, the United States government are silent. So I hope this will change. I hope I'll be free and come to the United States and speak, and maybe I will bring back the message of that freedom that they lost in the last two years after September 11.

Miller: Thank you very much, Mr. Vanunu. Mordechai Vanunu speaking to us from the cathedral, St. George Cathedral in is it Jerusalem there?

Vanunu: East Jerusalem, yes.

Miller: Thank you so much. Best wishes to you.

Vanunu: Thank you, too, for bringing my voice to those in the United States. I hope to meet you and continue to work together in others to bring good news to the U.S. citizens.

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ority *AND 969032*By *W* NARA Date *5/24/97*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S *MSO*~~SECRET~~ *4/26/99*

TO : The Secretary

FROM: INR - Ray S. Cline *RC**10/24/73* OCT 24 1973

Dist to:

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INR

PM

EXDIS File *processors.*

(1eb)

Cease-fire Problems

Even if the major combatants stop shooting, this cease-fire appears much more precarious than its predecessors.

Difficult Geography. With two Egyptian salients east of the Canal and one Israeli salient west of the Canal, in addition to possible Egyptian enclaves inside the Israeli salient, the cease-fire on the Suez front will be extremely difficult to police. Israeli violations of the October 23 cease-fire -- and possibly the October 24 cease-fire -- appear to have reflected an effort definitively to isolate the Egyptians' southern salient. With their forces on the east bank reportedly running short of supplies, the Egyptians will be under acute pressure to reopen their two main supply lines from the Nile Delta region to Suez and Isma'iliyyah through Israeli lines.

Insufficient Observers. To police the chaotic situation on the Suez and Golan fronts, UNTSO can muster about 200 observers. This force will have great difficulty in preventing a breakdown of the cease-fire unless all parties act in good faith. Given the political pressures in Cairo and Tel Aviv, efforts to encroach at strategic points may well continue.

Differing Motivations for Accepting the Cease-fire. The cease-fire intervened just as Israel appeared to be well on the way to fragmenting the Egyptian forces on the west bank and isolating those on the east bank. Apparently, Israel halted its victory drive only out of deference to Washington and has no real interest in letting Cairo get off "so lightly." With his army on the ropes, Sadat seems to have grasped at the cease-fire as a chance

~~SECRET~~ *MS*GDS -- Declassified
December 31, 1981 BY S/S-I

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Priority **100 969032**By **W** NARA Date **6/24/97**SECRET/EXDIS

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for his forces to catch their breath, to reorganize, and to integrate the materiel delivered by the Soviet re-supply effort, so that he will be in better shape for the next round.

The Syrians did not seem so eager for the truce, probably because Sadat acted without consulting them and because they enjoy a stronger defensive position than the Egyptians. However, the Syrian leadership is going along, even though a special problem is posed by its Iraqi "allies." Although the Iraqis performed poorly in the fighting, they have political designs on Syria, and their home territory is far enough from Israel so that they may toy with the idea of trying to embarrass Asad by sabotaging the cease-fire. Sabotage is certainly to be expected from the Palestinian fedayeen, who have nothing to gain from an end to the fighting.

Contradictory Interpretations of the Cease-fire.

Having turned the tide of battle, Israel seems determined to hold its present positions until all prisoners are exchanged, and until the Arabs have embarked on direct negotiations. Meanwhile, Sadat is telling his allies and his own people that he has Soviet assurances that the cease-fire is tied to early Israeli moves toward total withdrawal, prior to any diplomatic negotiations. Although his propaganda has concealed the magnitude of Israel's recent military successes, his armed forces already know the truth of the military situation, and reports suggest that they suspect the real nature of the cease-fire. The Arab world will soon realize that there will be no automatic Israeli withdrawal, and that Sadat's and Asad's glorious reassertion of Arab dignity has suddenly turned into another crushing defeat. Iraq, the fedayeen, and probably Qadhafi will not be shy about driving this message home.

At this point, Sadat at least will be in a very difficult political position. His alternatives may be reduced to resuming hostilities or stepping down, although he might have a way out if he can argue credibly that the imposition of irresistible pressure by the two super-powers produced the new situation.


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Drafted: INR/RNA:CFJones

x21056: 10/24/73

Concurrence: INR - Mr. Mark

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INDICATIONS OF ARAB INTENTIONS TO INITIATE
HOSTILITIES


This paper deals in the first instance with military moves made by Egypt and other Arab states during the past several weeks. Individually, these moves do not appear to have great significance. Taken collectively, however, they suggest a pattern of action that could be preparation for hostilities against Israel, but they are also part of an effort to arouse international concern and put psychological pressures on Israel and the US.

The balance of the paper is a discussion and assessment of the objectives of Egypt and the other Arab states and of the likelihood of hostilities in the near future. We conclude that whatever the Egyptian and Arab leaders intend at this stage, the pattern of their actions thus far does not provide the Arabs with a rational basis for an attack at an early date.

In recent weeks, the emphasis in Egyptian statements and activities has gradually shifted toward preparing for war. The most serious indicators to date are

- Movement of SA-6 surface-to-air missiles to firing sites within 20 miles of the Suez Canal; a program to convert SA-2 missile systems to more advanced models has also been reported.
- Transfer within the past month of about 30 Mirage V jet fighters, which have a ground attack capability, from Libya to Egypt. Flight operations by Egyptian pilots using these aircraft have begun. About 16 Hawker Hunter jet fighters also have arrived in Egypt from Iraq, with Iraqi pilots. About 10 Lightning jet fighters are expected from Saudi Arabia.
- Movement of TU-16 bombers from Aswan to the Cairo area in late March. These aircraft are equipped to carry air-to-surface missiles, but we have no evidence that the missiles themselves have been moved from Aswan.
- A high state of alert imposed on the Egyptian air force since 20 April; some air force reservists were recalled on 3 May.

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-- Relocation and reactivation of various Egyptian air squadrons. Some of the shuffling was to accommodate the aircraft from Libya and Iraq.

-- Evidence suggesting that additional commando units may have moved closer to the Suez Canal since mid-March.


-- A report that the Egyptian staff has been ordered to prepare a detailed plan for an attack across the Canal and to pick optimum dates; the staff is said to have chosen two full moon nights, 19 May and 16 June. We, however, do not believe that the plan described matches up with Sadat's objectives.

-- A high-ranking Jordanian military official's statement that the Arab chiefs of staff conference in Cairo, 21-25 April, was permeated with "despair and foreboding" due to Egyptian determination to go to war regardless of the consequences. King Husayn has passed his own concern about the seriousness of the situation to the Israelis.

-- Reliable reports that the Egyptians are trying to organize an oil boycott by the Arab oil producers against the US and Western Europe in the event of hostilities with Israel. This effort is having mixed results.

These are all actions that the Egyptians could be expected to take in the fairly early stages of preparing to fight; they are also actions that are necessary as psychological gambits. If Sadat intends a serious effort to take and hold, if only for a few days, territory in Sinai and thereby provoke outside intervention, we should see evidence of further preparation by his air forces. We are not likely to see further preparations by ground forces that might be used in a small-scale attack, because many units are already in place between Cairo and the Canal.

We judge that Sadat at this time has not made a decision to attack at a specific time and in a specific manner. Despite the gloomy prognoses being assiduously disseminated from Cairo, Sadat has not exhausted his diplomatic options. His economic situation is deteriorating, but we doubt that he is under significant domestic pressure to go to war. Both Sadat and his advisers are aware that their military prospects are poor at best; a fresh disaster might well sweep away Sadat's regime rather than rescue him from his dilemma.



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We think that Sadat will wait at least until he sees the outcome of the UN session on the Middle East in late May before taking a new decision. Meanwhile, strengthening Egypt's military preparedness serves to create tensions that Sadat hopes will support the urgency of his diplomacy.

Recent military moves by other Arab governments, we believe, are primarily in harmony with this purpose, although each of these moves is also motivated by the narrower interests of the government making it. The moves include

-- Shipment of a Moroccan armored contingent to Syria. Some of this unit's equipment has already been delivered by Soviet LST's which picked it up in Algeria, and some of the troops may have arrived.


-- Transfer of two squadrons of Algerian MIG-21s (about 20 aircraft) with pilots to Libya, probably to bolster Libya's air defense. We have evidence that Algeria may also have sent Mig-15s and -17s to Syria.

-- An undertaking, still in the planning stage, to send a Sudanese ground force to Syria.

These moves are part of general Arab planning to increase the pressures on Israel. The transfers of men and equipment strengthen to some degree the armed forces of Syria and Egypt, but the main effect at this stage is psychological. The major gap in the Arab lineup is the refusal of the Jordanian government to place its forces at the disposal of the Egyptian-Syrian "eastern front."

Egyptian support of the anti-American campaign by the fedayeen is designed to step up pressure on the US, and through Washington, on Israel. The ruckus between the fedayeen and the Lebanese government is an embarrassment to Egypt and the other Arabs; it distracts attention from that aspect of the Arab-Israeli confrontation that Cairo wants to emphasize even though it also contributes to the sense of tension surrounding the area.

The suddenness of the flare-up in Lebanon illustrates the danger that in the next few months the various military moves may develop a momentum that Cairo will not be able to control. The events of 1967



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argue that most Arab governments are not able to resist giving the situation a shove once it has started rolling. Sadat has said so often that he is now dead serious that it will be progressively more difficult to find excuses for inaction, more especially when other Arab leaders have fulfilled their commitments to his cause.

The Soviet role in this situation is somewhat ambivalent. While they have an interest in sustaining a level of tension that underscores the seriousness of the problem and the need for US initiatives and Israeli concessions, the Soviet leaders are counseling the Arabs against precipitate military action. The Soviet position in the area would suffer if the Arabs, using Soviet weapons, were beaten again. Another war would risk an involvement that might endanger detente with the US--the centerpiece of Brezhnev's foreign policy.

Sadat's May Day speech indicated that he has felt pressure from the USSR to continue to pursue a "peaceful solution." There are also signs that Moscow is using third parties to warn Cairo of the dangers of new war.

-- "Confirmed information" from Jordan that the Soviet ambassador in Damascus had advised the Syrians "not to get involved in a war." Syrian President Asad frequently acts as a go-between with Cairo and Moscow.

-- Grechko last week asked the French chief of staff whether Paris could influence Egypt against starting a fight. The Soviets themselves no longer have a veto over Egypt's actions.

Overall, we do not believe that an outbreak of hostilities is likely before the next UN debate, and we doubt that Sadat will decide to try a major operation within the next six weeks.

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Authority EO 12958By PTNARA Date 8/24/03

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USMISSION USUN

S E C R E T CAIRO 3243

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MOPS EG ISSUBJECT: SOVIET VIEW ON CAUSES AND TIMING OF EGYPTIAN
DECISION TO RESUME HOSTILITIES

1. DEPUTY TASS DIRECTOR LEO YEDRASHNIKOV, A SUSPECTED RIS
OFFICER, HAS TOLD US THAT SADAT MADE DECISION TO OPEN
HOSTILITIES WITH ISRAEL IN EARLY AUGUST. YEDRASHNIKOV
SAID SOVIETS HAD VERY CAREFULLY CHECKED THEIR OWN RECORDS
TO DETERMINE ACTUAL DATE OF DECISION. HE SAID THAT SOVIET
EMBASSY IN CAIRO HAD RECEIVED SOME INDICATIONS IN AUGUST
AND SEPTEMBER THAT SADAT WAS PREPARING FOR ANOTHER FIGHT,
BUT WERE NOT ABLE TO DRAW THESE TOGETHER INTO
COHERENT PICTURE UNTIL THE END OF SEPTEMBER. MOREOVER,
SOVIET EMBASSY HAD NOT BELIEVED THAT RESUMPTION OF FIGHTING
WAS AT ALL LIKELY.

2. YEDRASHNIKOV SAID THAT, USING 20/20 HINDSIGHT, SOVIETS
HAD PUT TOGETHER PICTURE OF WHO HAD BEEN INFORMED OF GOE
DECISION TO RESUME WARFARE. HE STATED THAT FEISAL WAS

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KEMMER _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEGN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SANDERS _____
SONNENFELDT _____
V.I.G. _____
WALSH _____

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 CAIRO 03243 261529Z

INFORMED OF PLAN RELATIVELY EARLY IN THE GAME. SADAT HAD DISCUSSED PLAN WITH HIM DURING HIS VISIT TO JIDDA ON AUGUST 23, AND HAD IN FACT BEEN ENCOURAGED BY SAUDI MONARCH. HUSSEIN WAS GENERALLY AWARE THAT EGYPT WAS PREPARING FOR WAR, BUT WAS NOT INFORMED OF WHEN IT WOULD OCCUR. HE DISCUSSED DECISION WITH SADAT DURING TRIPARTITE MEETINGS IN CAIRO ON SEPTEMBER 10-12 AND WAS ENJOINED TO SILENCE. HVEDRASHNIKOV SAID THAT HUSSEIN WAS TAKEN BY SURPRISE ON DAY WAR BROKE OUT, SINCE HE BELIEVED IT WOULD TAKE PLACE LATER.

3. WITHIN THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT, SECRET WAS HELD VERY TIGHTLY AMONG SMALL GROUP OF ADVISORS SURROUNDING SADAT. THESE WERE WAR MINISTER AHMED ISMAIL, INTERIOR MINISTER SALEM AND ASU FIRST SECRETARY HAFEZ GHANEM. HEYKAL WAS BROUGHT INTO IT AFTER HE RETURNED TO SADAT'S GRACES AT THE END OF AUGUST. YEDRASHNIKOV SAID THAT HAFEZ ISMAIL WAS OPPOSED TO WAR FROM START; HE WAS STRONGLY PRO-AMERICAN AND BELIEVED THAT POLICY OF RAPPROCHEMENT WITH WEST WAS WORKING IN EGYPT'S FAVOR. X

4. ON OCTOBER 5, SADAT HELD FULL CABINET MEETING TO REVEAL THAT ON FOLLOWING DAY EGYPT WOULD GO TO WAR. DURING DISCUSSION WHICH TOOK PLACE, MOST OF THOSE PRESENT APPROVED. VICE-PRESIDENT SHAFFI AND HAFEZ ISMAIL WERE OPPOSED. VICE-PRESIDENT FAWZI CONTRIBUTED LITTLE TO THE DISCUSSION.

5. YEDRASHNIKOV CONCLUDED THAT SOVIETS THEMSELVES WERE NOT AWARE OF DANGER OF SITUATION UNTIL END OF SEPTEMBER, AND DID NOT KNOW DEFINITELY THAT SADAT WAS ABOUT TO RESUME WAR UNTIL OCTOBER 3, WHEN VINOGRADOV SAW SADAT.

6. REGARDING CAUSES OF WAR, YEDRASHNIKOV SAID SOVIETS BELIEVED IT TO HAVE BEEN FORCED ON SADAT BY INTERNAL PRESSURES. AMONG THESE WERE WIDESPREAD RESENTMENT AT SHORTAGES AND PRICE INCREASES OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS, FEARS IN GOE OF CONTINUED STUDENT DISTURBANCES WHEN UNIVERSITIES, AND GENERAL MALAISE ABOUT POLITICAL SITUATION. YEDRASHNIKOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THESE REASONS SEEMED INSUBSTANTIAL ALMOST TO THE POINT OF WHIMSY, BUT ADDED THERE SEEMED NO OTHER PROXIMATE CAUSE.

SMITH

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Mr. Muhammad Hafez Ismail, Egyptian
Presidential Adviser for National Security
Affairs
Ambassador Jamal-al-din Barakat, Presi-
dential Office
Dr. Abd-al-Hadi Makhluf, Mr. Ismail's Chef
de Cabinet
Mr. Ahmad Mahir al Sayyid, Mr. Ismail's
Staff
Mr. Ihab Said Wahba, Mr. Ismail's Staff

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Alfred L. (Roy) Atherton, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs
Mr. Harold H. Saunders, NSC Senior Staff
Mr. Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Miss Irene G. Derus, Notetaker

PLACE:

Moulin St. Fargeau
Rocheport, France

DATE AND TIME:


Sunday, May 20, 1973
10:15 a.m. - 3:20 p.m.

[The group first gathered in the living room of the house for coffee and light conversation. They adjourned to the meeting room about 10:35 a.m. and the meeting began.]

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know who is technically the host at this meeting.

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Mr. Ismail: I probably am. So I wish to welcome you again on the second round of talks. I think you know everybody around the table here on our part.

And I would like to say how much impressed I was during our last meeting, the very good spirit that you have shown, and the frankness with which we exchanged ideas. I would like to also confirm our position with respect to the secrecy of our meetings, of what goes on during our contacts, in spite of the fact that more and more people are becoming a party of these discussions.

We believe that this second meeting of ours confirms that both parties are interested in continuing these contacts and these discussions. We feel at least on our side that they are very useful. I have told the Soviets about this meeting, and I have told Mr. Pompidou, and I think, if I understand him well, I believe he would like to know something about the outcome of this meeting. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain told me also about his preparedness to put us in contact as much as we want.

I think it would be useful, if you agree, that before we start our series of talks that we go through very quickly what we have achieved before, our evaluation of positions, so that we know exactly where we are and probably to find a way to proceed from that point onwards. I am sure that this meeting also will be conducted in the same relaxed and frank and sincere way, with the same objective of seeing how we can reach a solution of the armed conflict in the Middle East.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Ismail, first let me say what a personal pleasure it is for me to see you again. I also enjoyed our talks last time. I think we both recognize that we have an extremely difficult problem. We wouldn't be here if the problems weren't extremely difficult. And since they haven't found a solution for 25 years they aren't going to yield very readily.

On the other hand, we established this contact because I think there is a sincere desire on both sides to make a serious effort to see what could be done. I thought in our talks last time we spoke openly and with the attitude, on both sides, that there is no point promising something that could not be delivered, but what is promised must be done. This has been the context from which we have approached it.

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I agree that it may be useful to summarize where we are, how we evaluated work since then.

If I may make one observation. It isn't directly relevant to the subject of our discussion but has something to do with the mood. I have noticed from the comments from the Egyptian side saying that the seeming coincidence of the announcement of alleged decisions to give planes to Israel and your visit was psychologically very unfortunate. I must say I understand your attitude in this respect. First I would like to make clear to you that there was no American governmental announcement to that effect. What happened was that some officials leaked what they thought were decisions to the newspapers, which then made a sensation out of it, which then when read in Cairo had to make the impression that shortly after your visit a formal announcement was made, and this had complicating aspects for you. I want you to understand how this came about.

Now then about the decision such as it was. You know we have a military relationship with Israel; that was clear when you saw us. Unfortunately we have always put it in the context of a very definite time period, with the result that every two years there was a Wagnerian confrontation which then leads to a great announcement, where if it was just continued in the normal way no one would pay any attention to it. The numbers talked about now are less than the rate at which it has been supplied in the past. Our belief has been we should make our influence felt with respect to those aspects of our relationship only if there is something concrete to talk about rather than in the abstract. I want to assure you in the context of these talks there is no attempt to exert pressure on Egypt. If we wanted to exert pressure on Egypt we wouldn't conduct these talks. I was sorry there was these newspaper stories. We cannot control what our press is doing, as recent events have clearly proved.

I think we should also talk at some point about not only what we will say to the French to whom we owe some brief summary because we are meeting on their ground -- I think we can agree on that -- but also what we say to other countries, just as we did at our last meeting. And thirdly, we should say a word about how to maintain the secrecy of these talks. Because, as I told you, it is sometimes difficult if some of our people hear things from others they haven't heard from us. Our representative in Cairo gets morally extremely outraged, but we will discuss that before we break up.

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The major thing to say now is that we recognize that we are dealing with an extremely difficult problem. We are here with the intention of exploring with you as candidly as we can what possibilities either side sees, what either side can do, and to continue our discussions in the same spirit as last time.

Ismail: If you would allow me to say a few words about our last meeting. First I would like to say a few words about our last meeting. First I would like to say that we went to the United States from a position of independence and a nationalist pace. Egypt is not tied by any commitment to any foreign powers. Egypt wanted sincerely to explore how to achieve peace in the Middle East, within the general context of an Arab settlement, hoping that during 1973 we might be able to really do some serious work and see major development and progress.

On the other hand we approach the U.S. as a superpower, responsible for peace in general, a power having immense interests in the Middle East and very special and very strong ties with a number of countries in that area. We believe that when we met last time there were circumstances, international and regional, which to a great extent encouraged us to hope for a breakthrough in the Middle East crisis, and circumstances which would allow the U.S. to play, not a role but a very big role in bringing about that peace. Because we believe that the U.S. is an important factor, if not a decisive one, in the handling of this Middle East crisis.

I have spoken to the President of the United States and I have spoken to you and we have conducted very long discussions. I have spoken to the Secretary of State. I came out with the impression that the President is intent on a settlement but he sees a very long way to accomplish that dream. He affirms Egyptian sovereignty, and this is a very positive, very constructive approach to the Egyptian problem. Of course on the other hand, he sees the needs and the concerns of the Israeli security. He wants the United States to contribute towards the solution of the problem. However, he has said also in his report to Congress, he doesn't know exactly what useful role the United States can play. During my discussions with you, Dr. Kissinger, I came out with the impression that Egypt was required to make a new approach to the problem, to present something that will help the United States to go to Israel and say "Look here, you have got to move." In spite of the fact that, on several times and on several occasions, you have made the reservation that even with such a new Egyptian position you are not sure about the acceptance of Israel to withdraw to Egyptian international frontiers, not only that but to start moving even from the east side of the Suez Canal.

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I have found during our talks and later in the messages exchanged between us, a hesitancy with respect to the role to be played by the White House, if any. You were not still decided whether you would take over that problem or leave it to the State Department to handle it. That is to say that the White House has not yet decided to put its weight behind the development of the peace efforts.

While Mrs. Meir was in Washington after my visit, and we don't know exactly what went on, I understand again from the messages exchanged between us that you had been in contact with the other parties. You had been discussing. But of course we have no exact information about the contents of these discussions and the results. Therefore we have tried to read through certain declarations and statements made by Israeli officials, Israeli leaders, and I must say that there was big disappointment on the part of Egypt. Even the last statement made by General Dayan a few days ago -- we thought he might be a hope -- but he is a member of government, a responsible leader, and his words are usually well read and understood and immediately followed in the Israeli circles. We saw a roundtable discussion in which a few generals, chiefs of staff took part, in them; they spoke about peace and they spoke about the future, and we have come with the impression that Israel is not interested in peace, is not interested in solving the present armed conflict with the Arabs. There was nothing in the declarations and statements to say whether they are prepared to make a major move this year or not, whether they find any encouragement or whether they have different ideas from what we have expressed to you last time about how to handle the whole thing -- an Egyptian settlement within that general context, approached with an open face.

Therefore one would think it fair enough to stand here and to see, is the Israeli attitude positive or negative? Because if it is negative, then our course will be different. If it is positive then we can start talking.

I don't know about your impressions, Dr. Kissinger. I remember I sent to you saying that if we are talking about our second round, I am under the impression that -- first the White House is determined how to take over this problem.

Kissinger: You are going to shake my friend Mr. Atherton to the very core. He will never be the same after this.

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make such a statement, and that it does not reflect agreement between the U.S. and Israel. It does not necessarily reflect disagreement. But you cannot necessarily draw the conclusion.

In fact, I would say that to the extent the Israelis know you are so sensitive to what they say and to the extent they believe you blame us for their statement, you will give them incentive to make intransigent statements. I told you last time and I shall always maintain, there is no position better for the Israelis than the one they now have, in their conception; therefore the incentive to move from the east bank of the Canal is not overwhelming, and therefore if they know that you will blame us for every statement they make, and to the extent that they are afraid you and we will have general talks, you will, with all candor, really support their strategy if you react against us for their statements.

Now I know that there was an attitude in Egypt that after Mrs. Meir was in Washington this was followed by one intransigent Israeli statement, and therefore this meant the Americans are not honest with you. But I tell you also the opposite might be true. These statements were as much directed at us as at you, and they were a warning to us not to go too far; and if there was the by-product that they would also infuriate you, so much the better. Now therefore what I tell you here our policy is, that you should assume is our policy. If now two weeks after we leave here you hear something contrary from Jerusalem, that is between you and Israel, not between you and I. And I think we ought to understand that clearly.

Now what has been our general attitude in our talks with Israel? Last time you told me it was up to me how to conduct talks with the Israelis. You did not see how to make a judgment, how to handle that correctly. I have followed that guidance, and I have therefore kept the Israelis informed in a general way of the fact of the conversation but not in great detail. The reason I am not giving them any great detail was there isn't a great deal to give them, and because of something that I tried to point out to you last time and I would like to do today. From a psychological point of view it is easy to make general statements -- not easy, but possible to make general statements -- but I believe that one of the reasons there has not been more progress... There are many reasons, but one of them is that there has been too much of a tendency to make general statements that were then unrelated to any action that might be taken. I have tried to avoid a theoretical debate with the Israelis. I have tried to avoid a situation where this whole set of pressures which can be generated begins to move in a

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context in which nothing concrete can be achieved.

I cannot at this point tell you precisely what is the Israelis' attitude toward peace. I will give you my assessment. My assessment is first that they have an election this year, which is an overwhelming fact of life. You mentioned Dayan. My impression is that the Israeli Cabinet is composed of members half of whom think they ought to be Prime Minister and some of whom are engaged in a struggle for succession. Not one, but the five or six possible candidates for succession are consistently shifting positions. Sometime they move to the right of Mrs. Meir, sometime to the left; sometimes I am told by my friends in the State Department Dayan is the hope for peace; sometimes he makes the most intransigent statements. But I think many of the things are seen in terms of the election campaign. Secondly, it is not inconceivable to me that the Israelis won't say anything concrete because no one wants to take the responsibility of saying anything concrete until the process of negotiation is advanced.

So their attitude towards me has been a theoretical willingness to have negotiations, but I cannot say in good conscience that they have said yes, they are willing to make peace with the Egyptian conception of peace.

But I also believe that perhaps one shouldn't put it in this way. Because the question is whether enough points of convergence can be discovered or developed which will enable some movement to start, and it may be much easier for outside countries to make their influence felt in the context of a movement that is going on than in the context of an abstract discussion of nature of security and so forth. I believe that Israel will not be able to refuse, and in fact will not refuse, some significant steps in the direction that we discussed last time. I do not have the impression that Israel will agree in advance of negotiations to the whole program that you outlined last time. You asked me about my impression of the Israeli attitude. But I must also tell you in all candor that I would not put the whole details to them because I did not want to start an enormous debate until our discussions had advanced further.

So whether the Israelis' attitude is positive or negative it is hard to say in the abstract. I think with some influence it can be made positive. But then the question is, in what context and towards what direction?

Now we have also had some talks with the Soviets; so have you. But they have been confined mostly to generalities up to now.

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Ismail: And secondly I felt to have the impression that there was an encouragement on the part of the reactions of the Israeli side to our talks, and therefore you saw fit that we might be able to get together and continue our dialogue. I would like to say here before I continue that it has taken us a few months, and a number of years probably, to link up with the White House. We believe this is a major step, and we would keep that line of contact in any circumstances, not only through messages exchanged but even through personal contacts and things like that.

So how do you see, Dr. Kissinger, Israeli attitudes? Are they interested in peace? And if so, are they interested to make some move this year? Are they aware of our discussions, some of the outline of what we have been talking about? Are they interested to go along those lines? Well, I will be very much obliged to...

Kissinger: Let me make a general observation on the problem and first on our relations since our meeting, and then specifically on the questions which you raise, and then also on what may be meant by White House role in it.

I think we both of us agreed last time that we had had unusually frank and open discussions and we established a relationship of some confidence in each other's bonafide approaches, and I think the exchanges we have had since then have been business-like. I have one concern, which I want to put to your mind openly and I have put it also in a message to you. With the growing talk of the imminence of some military action.

One can only look at these talks between us from two points of view -- one as a means of making some progress and the other as finding some villain for the breakdown of the talks. And as I told you in a message, I have no excessive desire to be used as the scapegoat for Egyptian frustrations. And it is conceivable that at some point you may decide, because we are not making any progress, you assume no progress is possible at all. If a military action took place after our meeting, in this context, or any other context, that of course would inspire a certain caution, quite honestly in this matter. So I would like to have some understanding with you what it is all about here. Because it is, after all, possible that with the best intentions we can't make the progress we want. I want to say if we can insulate this channel from whatever other measure you may plan to take... That is one concern.

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And some of the reports I've heard which your Arab friends, especially the Saudis, tell of the accounts that were given from the Egyptian side of our meetings, seem to me to create an attitude of confrontation which we frankly did not feel at our last meeting. So this has been one concern.

Secondly, as I told you last time, when you say White House role, what exactly does that mean? In a sense every major diplomatic move is approved by the White House. But there are different levels at which it can be exercised: There are some matters that we have not only approved personally but conducted personally such as the Vietnam negotiations, Chinese negotiations and more or less most of the Soviet negotiations. That is one level of the White House -- personal negotiations by me. Another level of the White House is that the negotiations are conducted by someone else but under generally close White House supervision and Presidential supervision. And I told you last time, between these two it is very difficult to choose, because of the availability of time. Or a combination of both, that is to say, you and I could meet, set the main lines and then have somebody else negotiate the details so they would work. The third could be to just adopt a general supervisory role without very active participation.

As the President has pointed out, we are very seriously interested in a Middle East settlement and, therefore, there will be a major White House interest in one of the first two means I have mentioned -- either a personal interest, or partly involved, or through a combination of both; that is, where you and I would meet to establish guidelines, then they would be channeled into the talks.

Then the question is, what do we mean by an American role and what can we do? I have the impression that on your side you have an exaggerated idea of the degree of influence in the short term that we can have with Israel and the degree to which American policies and Israeli policies are synchronized. You spoke about public statements of the Israeli leaders following our talks. I have not followed these statements in any great detail, to be honest, because I think life is too short to follow them in that much detail. They were certainly not based on any discussions they had with us or on any discussions Mrs. Meir had in Washington.

I have not yet read the Dayan speech to which you referred. I finally did read the Eban speech which was mentioned in some public declarations. I don't want really to comment on individual Israeli statements, except that it is really important for you to understand that we do not synchronize our public positions, that we have no advance information when the Israelis

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Ismail: I would like first to say that we are not in search of a scapegoat; or that we have a predetermined plan or that our meetings do represent a part of that plan, or that we are trapping the White House or the United States. That would be too subtle for us. But I would like on the other hand to give you our general evaluation. We see the situation first that the Israelis are not willing to make any move towards peace, whether it is on account of the coming elections or whether it is a long-term policy. This has got still to be seen. The general impression in Cairo is that we tend to consider the second line of that thought as part of Israel the more dominant. The U.S. we still see hesitant. Of course it could not escape our notice the certain developments which took place during March and April and the early days or few weeks of May.

Kissinger: Which?

Ismail: Political and military. You mentioned -- you spoke about the deliveries. We see the deliveries extending through '74, '75 very revealing. We see the technological assistance to be given by the U.S. to the military industry of Israel a very dangerous policy. Because it means that maybe in a couple of years' time the U.S. can restrict its deliveries but Israel at that time will be able to maintain its balance of force and then the U.S. will come and say we cannot influence Israeli policy.

We say how much pressure has been brought to bear on the Soviet Union. I'm not defending the Soviet Union. I am not speaking in their name. But such pressure ... although you will say, of course, this is the Congress. I accept that. But you see the difficulty of the U.S. playing a big role, I mean to the extent that the immediate interests of the U.S. are subjected to Israeli policy. But on the other hand U.S. also is responsible as an Administration if under pressure of Congress you ask the Soviets to facilitate the emigration, whatever that emigration might be in numbers or quality, but to finance on the part of the U.S. -- to finance to about \$50 million this emigration -- is a very dangerous policy. That is \$1,000 a head, over \$1,300, \$1,400 per head, to finance the settlement of the immigrants not inside what might be called Israel but inside Arab territory at the expense of the U.S. To go directly to the Security Council because Israel raided Beirut, one of the most outrageous raids in the civilized world, and for the U.S. to stand up and almost threaten everybody by using a veto if there is any condemnation of that act. We have expressed sorrow about the Khartoum business for example. If the U.S. wants to condemn the Palestinians for their acts, this can be done on the spur of the moment, but to balance Israeli acts with Palestinian acts is a most unfair line of policy on the part of the US.

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Where does Egypt stand? As we tried to explain last time we have given everything we can within the text and the spirit of the Security Council's Resolution -- which we do not consider as a joke and cannot consider as a joke. We never considered this a joke. Within Security Council Resolution 242, we have gone to accept to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. This is the first time in almost a quarter of a century that an Arab Head of State takes a decision to be prepared to enter into a peace agreement with Israel.

How do we see the situation? In order to reach a solution to the problem, Egypt has one of two alternatives leading to the same result -- either to accept an interim agreement, which will most certainly become a final one because Egypt will not have any factors that could be employed to keep up the momentum of the whole business. Or to accept what we are talking about, some kind of a final solution but with enormous concessions on the part of Egypt.

Egypt has no declared policy and undeclared policy; Egypt has always had one kind of policy. It is not in the intention of Egypt and of the leadership of Egypt to accept something and to present it to its people as an achievement. If it is sovereignty it has got to be full sovereignty; if it is half sovereignty, we shall tell our people it is half sovereignty. But we cannot get half sovereignty and tell our people it is full sovereignty. We have no intention to play that game with our people, or with our Arab neighbors and friends and allies. Because for a very long time Egypt has always been on the side of these peoples, and has fought with them, and has contributed to the fight for their independence at the expense of its own, and has always helped towards their social and economic development at the expense of its own resources.

So if this is not the solution that Egypt wants, what is left for her? To accept status quo? Or to go to war? I don't call it war; it is not war. We have been in a state of war for 25 years. As I said to you in Washington the ceasefire is a burden to everybody, even to the Israelis themselves. There will come a point when we say that whatever positions we have offered are in the past tense, and have no meaning. If every time we step forward -- I think we should follow the Vietnamese example -- every time we think this is going to be the last step, and we take it and find that we are still in the middle of that morass, it is very frustrating.

Kissinger: You are too human to be able to follow the Vietnamese example. Would you like to take a few minutes break? Or, were you finished?

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Ismail: Yes. Well, it is about an hour since we started. What time do you want to have lunch? I think Mrs. Trone would be interested to know because they bring in the lunch from the village.

Kissinger: Let us say at 1:30 because I should leave around 3:00. Are you finished? Let me make an observation. Then perhaps we should take a five minute break and resume.

First, I really understand what you are saying. I don't say this to be polite. You face a really difficult dilemma -- that negotiations as you have conceived them do not seem to be progressing, and the prospects of war have their own, or resumption of hostilities, have their own complexities. And I really understand the dilemma in which you find yourself.

Now you keep mentioning the Vietnam situation, but it is different to some extent, at least as far as the U.S. is concerned. In Vietnam we were engaged with our own military forces, and while I like you more than my Vietnamese counterparts I was in a better position vis-a-vis my Vietnamese counterparts because I could deliver on any promise I would make. It probably is much more frustrating for you because I have to be more tentative. We don't have our own forces there.

And you have pointed out our domestic situation. We are subjected now with a Congressional situation regarding relations with the Soviet Union -- leaving you aside -- that is totally against the policy of the Administration. I you see my press conference statements in the last weeks, I have consistently pointed out that the pressure from these groups runs contrary to American foreign policy. The MFN for the Soviet Union is part of the context of U.S.-Soviet relations; it has to be seen in the whole context of the policy and one cannot pick it out and make it subject to additional conditions. I have said this publicly on three occasions in the last three weeks. I pointed this out to you because this is not directed to the Middle East; this has been an important part of our whole policy to the Soviet Union. I can say absolutely you are totally wrong. It cannot be in our interest six weeks before Brezhnev comes to the United States to have the Congress generate pressures on what has to be clearly Soviet domestic legislation; it is very tough to accept for a major country.

I point this out so that you don't think, when we discuss these Congressional and public pressures to which we are exposed, that we are inventing these obstacles. They exist quite apart from the Arab-Israeli issue. But to pretend these didn't exist might be good in this room but would lead to a totally useless result.

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Now as far as our immediate case is concerned, I agree with you that there are two possible approaches: that is, one is the interim approach and the general. The difficulty with the interim approach, as you correctly point out, is the danger from your point of view that it might lead to a permanent de facto settlement. The danger of a general approach is that it could become so protracted and lead to so many deadlocks that it could be used to sanctify the present status quo. The point must be reached, if the status quo along the Canal is protracted indefinitely... A point will be reached where that will develop its own -- it will simply become a part of the international landscape to which people have become accustomed. So that is the argument for getting some movement, because wherever the new movement will be, the advantage is that it will at least be new.

Now on this issue I have talked to the Israelis, and I have made clear to them that in any interim solution -- I know you don't like the word, but let me use our ritualistic term...

Ismail: We hope you will discuss it in your talks between Mr. Rogers or Mr. Sisco.

Kissinger: [to Atherton]: You can take that back to the State Department. [to Mr. Ismail]: Mr. Atherton and I have an understanding that for these purposes he is on my staff and he does not do any reporting that I don't do.

Now we will certainly make it very clear, and make it publicly clear, and we have told the Israelis we would make it publicly clear, that as part of say a Suez settlement the U.S. would not consider that in any sense a final settlement; that it is not intended in any way as a new de facto boundary but rather as a step towards a final peace settlement on other boundaries. And we would be prepared publicly to ask the government of Israel to make a similar declaration. Now this may not meet your basic concern, but I want you to know that it at least is an attempt to indicate that we have understood this problem. And probably we could get such a declaration from the government of Israel in that context. And we could insist, and I think we could succeed, in getting such a declaration made publicly, regardless of whether the entire agreement is public or confidential.

Now with respect to the general settlement, as I said to you last time, we recognize that the overwhelming concern of Egypt has to be in a general settlement and that any other solution from an Egyptian point of view has to be a stage, at best, towards a general settlement. And the question is how do we get to the general settlement.

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I was much impressed by the basic conception which Mr. Ismail advanced last time of general "heads of agreement" which could then be followed immediately by a discussion on an interim settlement and a discussion leading to a general settlement. I don't exclude this at all. The question is, how would we approach the heads of agreement and what content would they have? That would really be the key to this approach.

Let me give you my frank opinion; then perhaps we should take a break. If the heads of agreement are extremely specific, that will lead to an immediate deadlock. If the heads of agreement are phrased like Security Council Resolution 242, that is, consistent with the basic position of the parties but leaving some room for interpretation, then I think they might contain a fruitful approach. I don't want to mislead you. The fruitfulness of the approach consists of the fact that both parties will probably interpret them somewhat differently. There is no sense deluding ourselves on this. But they would then get a process started which would enable other countries to inject themselves in the process. And I would have thought, quite honestly, that from your point of view it was in your interest to get movement started backward from the Suez Canal in the context of, first, this public U.S. declaration which I mentioned, with a similar Israeli declaration, and in connection with some principles that are consistent with your position. There is no line as natural as that of the Suez Canal, and it would seem to me that once the movement started it would be easier to keep it going, contrary to what you have described.

Now I have some questions I want to ask you about the Palestinian part of your presentation last time, and the content of peace. But I wanted to make this general observation in response to your statements and to show you that we have done something about our discussions last time. If you think we should take a break now -- or would you like to respond?

Ismail: Yes, we take a break.

Kissinger: Good.

Ismail: You are accustomed to much longer sessions. I must say but when you have the translation you can sort of wander.

Kissinger: You see if you make a big effort I will make a big effort!

Ismail: We are asking you for a big effort, and I stop there.

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[The meeting broke at 11:50 a.m. and resumed at 12:13 p.m.]

Ismael: You said you had some questions about the Palestinians, or shall we put them aside?

Kissinger: Let us put that aside and see whether we can continue.

Ismael: Well, Dr. Kissinger, you have spoken about what we decided to call the interim agreement and your thinking about the linkage between such an agreement and the final one, and the need to have heads of agreement as flexible to permit a certain range of discussion and interpretation. I would say that such flexible wording of heads of agreement can land us in exactly the same grounds as 242 -- the difference of interpretation, and five years of continuous effort to interpret it. It does not go even as far as the one Mr. Rusk and Mr. Rogers had back in '68 or '69. I know it is more than three of four years later, but I don't see why more specific heads of agreement cannot be reached. And, therefore, the general wording of a declaration made by the U.S., with all due respect to the integrity and the determination of the U.S., cannot be satisfactory to the Government of Egypt.

Kissinger: Even if it were adopted by the Israelis also?

Ismael: Well, it does not differ much from what is being said at the present time. But then I must say that we are still determined to see if there is a way out of the dilemma. We do not accept this as a stalemate or as a final word, as a "goodbye and see you next year."

Kissinger: No, no, nor do we.

Ismael: Of course, probably that might have been in the back of our minds when we thought that maybe the Security Council can help us -- help us and help you too, if the U.S. wanted helping. That is why we talk about asking the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to prepare their report about what has been going on in the past few years and let the Security Council discuss the whole problem again. You know well that the Middle East question has always been a problem unique in its belonging to the UN. It started in the UN and still is. We did not take that decision on the spur of the moment because of the Lebanese situation, but back in February when I went round to Moscow, and when I came to New York, I saw both representatives in the UN, the Secretary-General and his Special Representative. I told them about our round of talks with the Soviet Union and with the U.S. and I said we had our eye on the Security Council if our efforts did not materialize. It is a step that we are taking in earnest to seek a way towards

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a solution of the problem. We are not going there to put anybody -- to corner anybody, or to embarrass anybody. We are not going there to quarrel with anybody, or to embarrass anybody. We are not going there to quarrel with anybody, but just to discuss in the most objective and constructive way how to proceed.

So the problem has always been to find an interpretation as a basis for a start, an interpretation of 242. Of course we understand that the U.S., being the most important factor in the Security Council, and outside it also, is determined as far as the development of the discussion will proceed.... Therefore, we are asking the U.S. to be forthcoming in the next discussions. If we concede on this point, that the U.S. is in search of, as you said once I think last time, of a moral basis to approach the Israelis and tell them "Well, now you have got to make some serious thinking" -- if U.S. cannot do that by itself, can the Security Council, if it reaches some resolution -- not instead of 242 but interpreting 242 -- can this help in facilitating the task of U.S. in approaching Israel?

There are two possibilities. Maybe the Israelis would say, "It is all right. In the Security Council now things are becoming difficult. Let us work along those lines, those directives." On the other hand, they might start to be more difficult. Then comes a second step by the U.S., because we think that the Security Council and any Security Council resolution is only half the way, takes us half the way. We believe that it will be up to the U.S. then to carry on for the next half; that is to say, to deliver Israel.

One would say that the most important factor encouraging Israel to stay put is the interpretation and execution and implementation of the U.S. policy of balance of power in the area. We consider this as the most important stumbling block in front of reaching a solution. As long as Israel feels itself capable of maintaining its positions along the present lines, we honestly do not believe that it will withdraw. I can only quote Mr. Sisco here when he says "I think one thing that you ought to find reassuring is that our assessment in terms of the balance and the Israeli assessment in terms of the balance is agreed in one important respect, namely that the balance is being maintained, which means that Israeli security is not in jeopardy, that the Arabs are in no position to dislodge the Israelis from leaving the occupied territory; therefore we are satisfied the balance is being maintained."

Kissinger: Where did he say this? In what context?

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Ismail: In his speech in Baltimore.

Kissinger: That is why I never make public speeches.

Ismail: It makes life easier. You see, so the U.S. is at the present time committed to defending Israeli conquests until such a time that the Arabs concede to the Israelis' demands. Therefore as you said, there is nothing to force the Israelis to take any step towards any move or any move towards a peaceful solution, a reasonable and balanced solution that takes care of the reasonable interests of everybody. So as I said, it is not only a question of a provision of the most complicated, most sophisticated armament which some people say that even American allies don't get; it is also that question of industrial capacity, and our concern that in a couple of years Israel will defy any approach towards peace. On top of that, one does not exclude the fact that enormous data about political and technical aspects of the employment of atomic weapons are being forwarded to Israel.

Kissinger: From where?

Ismail: From the United States.

Kissinger: Seriously, do you mean officially or from private sources? No, seriously, what do you think?

Ismail: I don't know. I don't know. People in the State Department some-time say that even Israel has not been encouraged to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Atomic Weapons. I think it came even from the Rand studies in California. I don't want to go into different aspects of the alliance between the United States and Israel concerning the intelligence, political and military. But you see unless -- as I said last time -- unless there is a kind of a parity, from our point of view there would be no possible acceptable solution. We thought that after July '72 with the withdrawal of the Soviet military elements from Egypt, to correspond with and to respond to such a move the United States might start a new approach to this question of balance of power not desirable up to now.

So, to summarize this point, I am saying that yet we are interested, very interested in a political solution or a peaceful solution to the problem. We see the Israelis blocking the road towards such a solution. Therefore we think that if in the Security Council some resolution is passed that takes care of the differences of opinion between the two countries with respect to the interpretation of 242; secondly, if the U.S. is prepared to introduce a major shift in its policy of balance of power in the area, in this way we may

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be able to get along and see some positive results. I would like to listen to your comments on how you see the interpretation of the situation, Dr. Kissinger.

Kissinger: As I said before, I understand the problem which you face. What I am not sure about is your approach to solving it, to be quite candid.

First, let us talk about the issue of resumption of hostilities. Now I have read a great deal of speculation that you should do what the Vietnamese did, and get military action started to create a condition that will force negotiation. First, I don't think the desert lends itself to the kind of warfare that the Vietnamese fought. All of military history indicates that battles in the desert are short and decisive, more like naval battles than land battles, while the Vietnamese strategy is a protracted sort of a war in which no decisive battles were fought. So there is one objective difference, in the sense that from World War II on every battle in your area was short, and that is likely to be the outcome of a resumption of hostilities again. Second, the Vietnamese did not really get what they wanted in these negotiations. For three and a half years, they were telling us that the people we were supporting in the South had to be overthrown and they would discuss nothing until they were overthrown; then they had to settle for keeping them in office. So there the outcome was a sort of compromise. We let them keep their troops there, but they had to keep our friends there. Perhaps in two or three years it will start again, but that is a different issue.

So I would think the Vietnamese analogy is not a happy one for Egypt.

Second, in the diplomacy that is now going on, it is getting extremely confused. There is a Security Council meeting; there is U.S. - Soviet talks where the Soviets are talking to us about the Middle East, and our bilateral talks, all going on more or less simultaneously and without any overriding design. Now the Security Council is handled by us right now in a normal bureaucratic way, in which I assume any resolution that deviates in any way from 242 will be vetoed. That is my assessment of the situation. I have not even addressed the situation in any great detail.

The U.S. - Soviet talks.... I have been frankly waiting for our talks. So that essentially, if we agree with you we have no particular reason to make a separate arrangement with the Soviets. If we disagree with you we won't make an arrangement with the Soviets on the issues where we don't agree with you. There is no chance. The only interest we would have in a

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separate Soviet arrangement is one in which we separate ourselves to some extent from the Israelis and the Soviets separate themselves to some extent from you. There is no interest for us to make a deal with the Soviets. I said to Gromyko when I was in Moscow, "If the Soviets have exactly the same position Egypt has, then either we agree with both or neither." If the Soviet Union has a different position than Egypt, that is then between you and the Soviet Union and then the position becomes complicated. So this is how I assess where we now stand.

In terms of our dealings with the Israelis, there is no nuclear cooperation going on between us and the Israelis of any kind, and if you have any information of anything going on let us know and we will stop it immediately, and if you have concrete information of something illegal going on. I don't know what information you have. We have urged them to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty, on many occasions and officially.

Now on the question of the degree of our cooperation with Israel: We do not agree that Israel should stay in occupation of Arab territory, but we do believe that the final borders should emerge from a negotiation, direct or indirect, between Arabs and Israelis rather than have us write out the whole details of the settlement. For many years, going back to Vietnam, people said to me, "Are we totally supporting the South Vietnamese?" I said, "As soon as we have a proposition we could support we will press it, and you will see that we will separate ourselves if necessary." And last year when we finally had a proposition that we felt we could support, we very strongly urged it on the South Vietnamese. The situation isn't exactly the same in Israel but it has many similar aspects. So we are not committed. I don't know what Mr. Sisco had in mind with his speech. It was probably to some Jewish group and it was probably stated in an ambiguous way designed to appeal to that particular group. It was not a fundamental statement of U.S. policy.

That is, in fact, one respect in which I really believe the Arab attitude has helped Israel and the perpetuation of the situation. It is a lot easier for the U.S. to bring pressure in terms of an ongoing negotiation and on specific issues going on than in the context of abstract issues and formulations -- which in our view play into the hands of the perpetuation of the status quo. So it is really a misconception of our policy to believe that we want to bring about the psychological defeat of the Arabs and that we want the Arabs to yield to Israeli demands. But given the complexities of our situation we would like to get into this issue by stages.

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I frankly don't see much good that can come out of the Security Council.
Do you, Roy?

Mr. Atherton: No.

Kissinger: I think little good and a lot of confusion. But I may be wrong and I don't have any sense from talking to other nations that they have a clear idea of what could come out of it. Do you? You have talked to others.

You spoke before of very major Egyptian efforts, or concessions, as part of a general settlement. What did you have in mind?

Ismail: Generally speaking, the move from a state of war to a state of peace.

When we speak about the Security Council we believe that the big powers have done a lot of work in the past during the Four-Party talks, that Dr. Jarring has come up with a memorandum acceptable to the big powers, that the General Assembly has endorsed the ideas of the Special Representative; that even in May the U.S. and the Soviet Union have agreed upon the Jarring mission. Of course they don't agree to the man as a likeable gentleman; they must have had in the back of their mind what he has been doing. He has not gone beyond his mandate when he proposed his memorandum. And therefore when we talk here about heads of agreement or about a declaration by the U.S. which does not go even as far as policy statements made in speeches by Secretary Rogers or in official documents presented to us and to other parties, we feel that we are being asked for a new position. If we, at the present time, have different opinions about the interpretation of the ambiguities of the Security Council Resolution, accepting the statement as suggested by Dr. Kissinger would be fixing Egyptian positions very much and making it much harder to reach what President Nixon spoke about; that is Egyptian sovereignty.

Kissinger: We stick to what President Nixon spoke about. There has been no change in our position with respect to that.

Ismail: You put it in the paper, in the declaration, that they support Egyptian sovereignty.

Kissinger: What paper are we talking about?

Ismail: You were suggesting something about an American declaration. Your draft declaration.

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Kissinger: Oh yes.

Ismail: Of course I am not discussing at the present time in detail.

Kissinger: No, I agree with it.

Ismail: I am giving very general remarks.

Kissinger: Of course.

Ismail: But this is a most important question as far as Egypt is concerned, within the context of the Egyptian settlement. Of course, if what you have proposed is subjected to our more experienced and better qualified technical assistants, they might find new elements which would have to be introduced to be a more acceptable declaration.

Kissinger: What I have proposed with respect to an interim settlement, to what an American declaration might be -- what I have said is that this is not the final border.

Ismail: Right, both as far as its linkage with the total Arab-Israeli settlement -- when I say Arab I mean the Syrian and Jordanian positions -- and secondly, when it comes to particularly Egyptian sovereignty. Egyptian international frontiers have got to be settled once and for all. Maybe it is a very complicating process -- this Security Council thing, Soviet-American discussions, Egyptian-American discussions. Of course, we do not accept an American-Soviet agreement if that agreement is not to our liking.

Kissinger: That puts us in the happy position that we may find ourselves with an agreement that both sides will reject!

Ismail: Maybe you talk about global questions. We are talking about purely Egyptian, Arab general interests and positions. We honestly believe that if the U.S. is -- possibly it is too much to ask from the U.S. -- cooperative in the Security Council, then something might be achieved. I beg to differ with you, Mr. Atherton. You see it is six years, the occupation, and we are not in Europe where things can get frozen for the next twenty-five years and to accept the Oder-Neisse or the division of Berlin.

Kissinger: The Russians think the Oder-Neisse is permanent, not just for twenty-five years.

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Ismail: No, I mean it took twenty-five years for the Germans to accept it. Maybe Herr Brandt is a much more pragmatic leader who thinks there are no final solutions.

Of course, we do not succumb to the aspirations of Israel. And we don't know honestly really why the U.S. firmly, tangibly stand beside Israel to maintain its positions in the occupied territories.

Kissinger: But that is really a misconception. We don't stand behind Israel to maintain its position in the occupied territory.

Ismail: Until there is a solution. Convinced of the right of Israel to maintain its positions and to impose new frontiers. Is it only the Israeli interest that you....

Kissinger: I think, Mr. Ismail, you would find that in an actual negotiation the American support for frontier changes would be very minimal, and that the American practical support for your conceptions, especially on the Egyptian side, would be very considerable.

Ismail: You support changes on the grounds of security arrangements?

Kissinger: I tried to explain to you last time what I thought -- our recognition of Egyptian sovereignty -- and I assured you that Israel would violently, totally oppose this part. We are not here presenting an Israeli position; we are here presenting a position that the Israelis could be forced to accept only under enormous pressure. What we tried to present to you was a recognition of Egyptian sovereignty coupled with some transitory Israeli security arrangement. You are quite right in pointing out that this might not be full sovereignty; this may not be the exercise of full sovereignty immediately. On the other hand the principle of legal sovereignty would be established immediately; there then there can be some kind of security arrangement.

In the Soviet Union the Foreign Minister asked me if we agree to one hundred percent security for Israel, would you to one hundred percent withdrawal from Egyptian territories? I could say "yes." But quite honestly, I said, "what countries in the world have one hundred percent security? We don't, the Soviet Union doesn't. But if you can do it, of course we would agree to it. If somebody can establish one hundred percent security we would agree to it. But I don't think it would advance matters because total security for one country would be total insecurity for every other country. But if it helps to think in these terms, of course..."

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What I told you last time is what I think a realistic process could involve. What we ought to find is the difference between you and us. I think it is important that we have a correct assessment of each other's position. You could say we are wrong or crazy in our assessment: that is possible. But if you assess our position to be that we want to preserve Israel's occupation of Sinai, then that is wrong. That is not our policy. Our policy is to get a process started by which the withdrawal begins and possibilities exist for using our influence on a continuation of the withdrawal. We honestly believe that the present stalemate will lead to a perpetuation of the status quo. We honestly believe that a military action will make that situation worse because our assessment is that this will not bring about a change of physical control, so at the end of that military action, which will be short, we will be back to where we are now, even under more adverse circumstances. That is our assessment.

So the difference between you and us is not that we want the Israeli position but to begin that process of withdrawal and to what extent the American role can be exercised on the negotiation. You want us to commit ourselves to your total program, publicly, immediately, in a short period of time. If I were you this is a natural, rational policy: it is not immoral or unjust or anything of the kind. We, faced with the practicalities of the situation, will try to start a process going.

Even on a Suez settlement, any frontier through Sinai is less natural, less plausible, than the Suez Canal. But even then we are prepared to say that we do not consider it the final frontier.

Now you say the objective consequences of this is to support the Israelis' desire to exact from you a change of frontier. Our evaluation is different. We have no American interest in bringing about a change of frontier. Our evaluation is that in the process of such a negotiation we would certainly meet many times and it would have a natural evolution. It is not our intention to be here -- as we said once in an exchange -- as the lawyers for any other country, any more than you are here as the satellite of any other country.

Ismail: Well, I don't think the U.S. is interested in changing frontiers if it is meaningless work. But indirectly, through what you call the practicalities of the problem, we are being led to that. What is the interest of the U.S.? I read what was included in the President's report to Congress.

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Dr. Kissinger: That wasn't characterized by great precision.

Mr. Ismail: I was fascinated by the way you projected the long-term American view of the area. I differed with you when we were speaking downstairs, when we were talking about Iran and Iraq not being part of the complex. I said I think they are a part of the game: our view is not limited by the Suez Canal. We are thinking also in terms of the whole area. We think this is the way of the American approach to the problems in the area. It is not a point of how far the Israelis will go, what kind of presence they will maintain in Sinai. Those are probably purely Israeli, as you call them, concerns. In the area, you have of course your problems in the area. Maybe the biggest problem is the Soviet Union? But you have already come to agreement with the Russians on confrontation in the area, about respect of each other's interests. Is it the direct American interest in the Gulf area? I am not taking you too far away from the Suez Canal line. But you say there is a new front being developed in the Middle East.

Such statements could not escape our attention. When some professor -- I am sorry I don't have the names and the dates -- is speaking about the Arab cartel, OPEC, the oil organization, thinking that it has got to be broken up, at the time when everybody is considering that the Arab credits in banks will be causing immense problems for the monetary system in Europe. But the most interesting was that statement made by Deputy to the Director of Emergency Preparedness Department when he spoke about the two options in front of the United States -- either to give up its dependence on Arab oil or go and occupy the area. [Kissinger laughs] He said so, didn't he?

Dr. Kissinger [to Atherton]: Who the hell is that?

Mr. Ismail: It is very unfortunate that he didn't bring in a third option of peace in that area. Because what is causing the American concern around that part of the world is not the reluctance or the acceptance of the Arabs to sell or produce oil; I think the origin of the concern is lying in our area, in the western part of the Middle East. As long as there is no peace in that area, there will continue that situation of tension there. You mentioned once to Ghorbal that the U.S. can tolerate a state of tension in the area and can take care of itself.

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Dr. Kissinger: To whom did I say that?

Mr. Ismail: Dr. Ghorbal, you remember?

Dr. Kissinger: I remember him very well but I don't remember in what context I said that.

Mr. Ismail: Anyhow probably you have in mind that Egypt for a very long time has been, in your evaluation, a stimulus driving the area against American interests. But we are not against anybody's interests in the area if they are based on voluntary cooperation. And we think that the best conditions for our Middle East will be a genuine peaceful settlement of that armed conflict, in which the U.S. participates strongly and even-handedly. We see, secondly, that this area is in need of social and economic development and that it has got the credits, it has got the possibilities for development and for progress. It does not need to depend on anybody or to be a burden to anybody, with the exception of provision of technical knowhow and the sale of capital goods. Thirdly, to limit to the greatest extent superpower or big-power, shall I call, competition around the area. Otherwise we shall live in a nightmare in that part of the world, instead of developing its possibilities of a good partnership and a healthy one.

I would like to tell you that Egypt, if frustrated through lack of peaceful solution or if defeated through military action, may fall and disintegrate. But a lot of people also will fall with it, because a lot of people around the area are so much attached, dependent on Egypt.

We believe that the U.S. carries a big responsibility -- not for the past; I mean for the future -- and will have to exert a much bigger effort. I am not quoting the Vietnamese, but you have got to exert a much bigger effort, to really lead that area towards a more prosperous future. You have more friends than enemies in that area, if there are enemies. We are not interested in standing up against the U.S., or harming it, but having the normal exchange of everything and of having as good relations as one can expect, political and economic.

We hope you can make a decision on that. Of course we expect it to be a decision on the highest level. I am telling you the honest and sincere understanding of Egypt on the present situation and of the future.

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Dr. Kissinger: And I appreciate this very much. Let me say, first of all, we don't consider Egypt an enemy or even an opponent. When one looks at the relations in the area one would have to say, in any sense of the word, Egypt would have to be a friend. We have no conflicting interests in this area. We want Egypt to be independent and strong so that it can play its normal role in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. And nothing in its exercise of that role is inconsistent with American purposes. I think in the disposition of the oil resources of the Middle East, military occupation is such an absurd idea it shouldn't even be discussed. It has to be done on some kind of a cooperative basis between the producing nations and the consuming nations in which both parties are satisfied. In that respect Egypt, not being a major producing country, is not the country with which we have any direct difficulties anyway. So that is not at all the problem and we are prepared to make major efforts to improve our relationship with Egypt. The only issue between us right now is what can be done concretely in given time periods.

Now about our intention as far as the great power conflict in the Middle East is concerned, we are trying to reduce this to a minimum, and I think in our relations with the Soviet Union we are trying to reduce this to a point where neither side makes a major challenge to the other where both sides have an interest. We have had an arrangement, you and I, that we would keep the Soviet Union informed of the major lines of our meeting and the major developments.

We want to proceed. We come back to the basic problems. We want to improve relations with Egypt. We have made that decision. The decision we have to make now is what can we do to advance matters and in what manner? That is the only decision that needs to be made, and that is what we are here to explore with you. Even if we don't come to a full agreement right away, it would be a very unfortunate event if we started engaging in public confrontation or controversies, because I think we can narrow the distance between us consistently. And that is certainly our intention. We want to be helpful but we also want to be realistic.

I notice that lunch hour is approaching. Should we meet tomorrow, or what is your view?

Mr. Ismail: Can we meet for a quarter of an hour after lunch or half an hour?

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Dr. Kissinger: Sure. I have to leave here no later than three.

Mr. Ismail: OK. Unless Mrs. Trong has prepared for us a banquet.

Mr. Atherton: An Egyptian banquet.

Mr. Ismail: Well, I find our French meals are a banquet.

Dr. Kissinger: Why don't we resume at 2:30? I have to leave about three because I have to make a big effort this afternoon.

Mr. Ismail: I am sure that we are squeezing you in between your Vietnamese friends.

Dr. Kissinger: No, I am squeezing them in between you.

[The group broke for lunch at 1:30 p.m.]

[After luncheon Mr. Ismail and Dr. Kissinger had an extensive private conversation while walking in the garden. Dr. Kissinger's account of the private conversation follows:]

SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CONVERSATION

The following are points summarized by Dr. Kissinger as having been discussed between him and Hafiz Ismail in a private talk following lunch at their session on May 20, 1973:

1. Dr. Kissinger thought, "paradoxically," that more progress had been made in the private talks this time than in the talks on February 25-26. Last time, he felt that Ismail had listened with an open mind and had agreed to consider new ideas that Dr. Kissinger had advanced, but he did not appear to have realized fully the implications of what Dr. Kissinger was proposing. This time, Ismail seemed to "take aboard" more of the implications of the approach that Dr. Kissinger was discussing. Particularly, he seemed to have greater understanding of the step-by-step approach to an Egypt-Israel agreement -- the political

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reasons for it on the U.S. side and the pace at which it might proceed. Ismail even said that he surmised from Dr. Kissinger's comments that there might not be an interim agreement until 1974 and little progress on an overall agreement before 1975. Dr. Kissinger said that he felt there had been little point at this meeting in getting into the details of a possible agreement between Egypt and Israel before there was full understanding on the theory of how the U.S. and Egyptian sides were going to proceed.

2. In response to a question from Mr. Saunders, Dr. Kissinger acknowledged that Ismail must have understood the official USG rationale for an interim settlement before, but maybe he needed to hear directly from the White House an assurance that the White House would stick with the process after an interim agreement and not walk away from it, leaving the interim agreement as a final one.

3. Mr. Ismail had asked Dr. Kissinger what he thought was the most Egypt could get from Israel. Dr. Kissinger had said that he thought the most that he could foresee now Israel's giving was nominal Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai with Israeli security positions at key points.

4. Ismail said that he could not give any commitments now; he would have to talk to Sadat. He would send word back to Dr. Kissinger within the next ten days or so, in time for the US-USSR summit. Dr. Kissinger after the meeting with Ismail acknowledged that the principal problem is with President Sadat; he may very well decide that he does not wish to engage in this process and send word that such is the case.

5. Mr. Ismail got a clearer understanding of the inter-relationship among the various diplomatic problems the U.S. faces -- particularly right now the inter-relationship between the US-USSR summit and the UN Security Council debate scheduled to begin June 4. Mr. Ismail promised that, if the debate at the UNSC went on for a couple of weeks, Egypt would be prepared to accept a proposal for adjournment before the

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US-USSR summit begins on June 18. Egypt did not want to make too much trouble for the U.S. in the Security Council. Mr. Ismail seemed to grasp better than before the complexities of the U.S. domestic situation in dealing with this problem -- one of the reasons why a step-by-step approach seems more feasible to the U.S. than a single jump to a final settlement.

6. Mr. Ismail said that Egypt would be willing to sign an agreement with Israel before Jordan or Syria. Dr. Kissinger, commenting afterward, said he was doubtful that they would make full peace effective before those other agreements were signed, however.

[The formal meeting then resumed at 3:10 p.m.]

Mr. Ismail: I think I will give you the word, Mr. Kissinger.

Dr. Kissinger: We reviewed where we stand, and Mr. Ismail and I have had an opportunity for a very frank private talk and what we are concerned about. I want to make clear that our position on the Arab-Israeli dispute is not influenced by an attempt to realize global objectives by means of local rivalries and local differences in the Middle East. If we have any bilateral problems with Egypt we will raise them with Egypt directly and not via a third country. This is important to understand what we may or may not be able to do in given circumstances.

But we remain prepared to work with you in bringing about a just solution of the Middle East difficulties, especially of the Egypt-Israeli part of them. I think Mr. Ismail and I have agreed to stay in touch with each other and to perhaps arrange another meeting, particularly after the summit, if conditions at that time are favorable. We shall certainly make every effort to do it. From our side we will try to conduct our other policies consistent with achieving the objectives we have set ourselves. And I want to express my appreciation to all our Egyptian friends, especially Mr. Ismail and the way we have been able to talk to each other.

Mr. Ismail: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. And I would like to say that irrespective of the fact that we have not started to discuss the suggestions that we agreed to discuss, however, we had a most important and most

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useful exchange of views. And I believe that our positions, ours to you and yours to us have been clarified. You have told us about your possibilities, the extent to which you can go at the present time under present circumstances, the effort that you will have to put in and the limitations to which you can go. I have found that explanation most illuminating. And we have also expressed to you that Egypt is interested in a global solution -- a solution that includes within its framework an Egyptian settlement, that recognizes fully Egyptian sovereignty and Egyptian interests. I would like to report whatever discussions we have had to my President.

I have understood well the complexities of the situation from your point of view with respect to coming events, diplomatic and political events. As I said to you, we have no bad intentions. We would respect a meeting between President Nixon and Comrade Brezhnev, and we are prepared to take that into consideration.

As to other questions, respecting both your conducting your discussions with the Russians with respect to the Middle East and the question of the Security Council, I hope I will be able to let you know our standpoint much clearer way within the span of a week or so. I will also convey to the President our tentative agreement about a future meeting towards the end of June or beginning of July. We have agreed upon what to tell the French side. I have noted what you told me about Israeli military provocations in the area.

And I wish to thank you again for, as you said, the way we have discussed this intricate problem, and to thank you especially for the time you have given us while you are squeezing the Vietnamese! I have valued very highly our personal contacts, our personal talks, and I am sure that what we have exchanged will be of extreme importance to our President. Thank you very much.

Dr. Kissinger: I look forward very much to seeing you and your colleagues again. And you can be certain that we will remain in the spirit of seeking a solution and working within the framework of what is attainable.

Mr. Ismail: What is attainable with maximum American effort!

Dr. Kissinger: He is worse than Le Duc Tho!

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Mr. Ismail: Well, I am getting educated.

Dr. Kissinger: Your demands are worse but you are humanly easier.
Thank you very much.

[The meeting ended at 3:20 p.m.]

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 By AB NARA Date 9/4/0
 E.O. 12958

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 2, 1973

INFORMATION
 (outside system)
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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
 FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*
 SUBJECT: Meeting with Hafiz Ismail on May 20

In short, Ismail came to this meeting to probe White House intentions further--not to discuss concrete elements of a possible Egypt-Israel agreement. The result was that the formal talks were less useful than last time, but I felt that more progress was made than last time in bringing Ismail to understand the reasoning and the domestic political realities behind our proposal to move toward a settlement in a step-by-step approach. Last time he had listened well, but only in this second talk did I feel that he fully understood the implications of the step-by-step approach we are proposing.

I explained to him concretely in private talks that it is essential for us, if we are to be influential with the Israelis, to be dealing with proposals which represent politically manageable steps rather than tackling the issue of total withdrawal all at once. It remains very much an open question how Sadat will respond; he has rejected this approach before and may do so again. The issue on Sadat's mind is whether the White House will remain engaged beyond the first stage. It may be that he needed to hear this directly from us.

The issue I posed, which the Egyptians are now considering, is whether a general statement of principles like that in Resolution 242 could be used to get talks started on the first phase of an agreement provided the US and Israel stated publicly that this first step would not become the final settlement. Ismail promised to let me know before your meetings with Brezhnev. If the Egyptians are agreeable, some progress in working out a set of principles might be made during the summit meetings here.

XGDS - 1 and 3
 DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
 BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

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By AB NARA Date 9/4/00

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- 2 -

Background

These talks took place against the background of an agenda of specific issues left from the February meeting which Ismail had promised to consider. These included:

- As full and concrete a statement as possible of the obligations Egypt and Israel would accept toward each other in a state of peace.
- The relationship of an Egypt-Israel agreement to other aspects of a Palestine settlement. For example: Could a state of peace become effective between Egypt and Israel before Syrian and Jordanian settlements with Israel or a refugee settlement are achieved?
- Concrete ways for assuring Israeli security in the Sinai while restoring Egyptian sovereignty there.


Ismail's Position This Time

It quickly became apparent that Ismail was not prepared this time to discuss those issues left from our first meeting. He wanted to discuss US intentions. These were the main points in his presentation:

- The Egyptian side had the impression from the last talks that Egypt was being asked to come up with a new position that would enable the US to try to move Israel.
- Even with a new Egyptian position, however, the US seemed uncertain whether Israel would withdraw. In the Egyptian view, Israel has shown no sign that it is interested in peace.
- Ismail had found continued hesitancy about the role, if any, to be played by the White House. It is not clear that the White House has decided to put its weight behind an effort to achieve a peace settlement.
- The events of March, April and early May had raised further questions in Egyptian minds about US intentions:

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- 3 -

--The decision to continue aircraft deliveries to Israel through 1974-75 was "very revealing."

--The decision to provide technological assistance to Israeli military industry was "dangerous" because it would free Israel of US influence.

--US financing (\$50 million) for the settlement in Israel of Jewish emigres from the USSR further supports Israel's growth.

--The US equating of the acts of the radical Palestinians with Israel's raid in Beirut was "most unfair."

--Egypt had observed how pressure from the US Congress had forced the Administration against its will to put pressure on the USSR for the emigration of Soviet Jews. This caused Egypt to wonder whether the US could freely play a role in the Middle East.

--It cannot even be excluded that there is US nuclear cooperation with Israel.

--Egypt feels that the most important factor encouraging Israel to stand fast is the fact that the US is committed to defend Israel's conquests until the Arabs concede to Israel's demands. Unless there is a more balanced US approach, it is difficult to see how there can be progress. If the US is prepared to shift its "balance of power" approach of assuring overwhelming Israeli predominance, there could be some positive results.

--Egypt is, therefore, faced with two choices:


--It can accept an "interim agreement" which will "almost certainly" become a final one.

--Or it can move toward a final agreement which would require "enormous concessions" by Egypt.

--If neither approach is acceptable, what is left to Egypt except military action? [Ismail in private conversation said he felt military action would be "too adventurous" now, so he was apparently thinking of the longer term future.]

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My Response

Given Ismail's unreadiness to talk about the concrete elements of a settlement, it seemed to me most useful to concentrate my discussion with him on the general theory of how we should proceed. I had a long private talk with him in which I made these points:

--The US is not trying to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict to achieve some global objective. The US remains prepared to work with Egypt for a just solution.

--The most the US can now foresee persuading Israel to accept is restoration of nominal Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai with a transitional Israeli security presence at key positions. This might not be the full exercise of sovereignty but it would establish the principle of legal sovereignty.

--It might be 1974 before real progress on an interim agreement could be made and a year after that before there could be progress on an overall agreement.


--On the other hand, it is not the US strategy to keep the Israelis in the Sinai. It is the US policy to try to get a process going in which the US could exercise its influence.

--The US has no interest in bringing about a change in Egypt-Israel frontiers. The longer the present situation continues, the greater the danger that it will become permanent. Any line through the Sinai would be less natural than the Suez Canal, so there is advantage simply in beginning Israeli movement back. If a negotiating process could be started, the US would stick with it beyond the first-stage agreement for withdrawal from the Suez Canal. We would make this clear publicly and elicit a comparable public commitment from Israel. It is not excluded that negotiations on a Canal agreement and on an overall agreement could be carried on simultaneously.

--The US view is that an effort should be made soon to work out general principles of agreement that could get talks started. The US needs to avoid the kind of concrete detail that would trigger sharp

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domestic and Israeli pressures on us at the outset and limit the usefulness of our involvement before we have even begun. The potential of these public pressures is great. It might be useful to work toward such principles with the USSR during the summit.

--Debate in the UN Security Council (beginning June 4) could complicate the process of arriving at some useful understanding with the USSR, if the Egyptians thought some such understanding would be helpful. Ismail said that, if the Security Council debate dragged on to the eve of the US-USSR summit, Egypt would be receptive to a proposal for adjournment.

Where the Matter Stands

The issue now is whether Sadat can accept the step-by-step approach with assurance of persistent White House involvement. Ismail frankly said he could not commit himself; he would have to talk with Sadat. There is a good chance that Sadat will not feel able to go along. Ismail said he would send word of Sadat's reaction in the next couple of weeks.

If Sadat were prepared to engage on the basis I outlined, then it might be possible to make some progress on a statement of principles during the US-Soviet summit. We would try to keep these general, and this would be one reason for Egyptian hesitancy. If we were to proceed, we would want to discuss this approach further with the Israelis.

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UNITED NATIONS



Security Council

S/10974, 24 July 1973

Distr. GENERAL, S/10974 24 July 1973 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Guinea, India, Indonesia, Panama, Peru, Sudan,

Yugoslavia:

draft resolution

The Security Council

Having examined comprehensively the current situation in the Middle East,

Having heard in this context the statements of the participants in this debate, including the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Algeria, Chad, Guinea, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania,

Emphasizing its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Emphasizing further that all Members of the United Nations are committed to respect the resolutions of the Security Council in accordance with the provision of the Charter,

Reaffirming resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967,

Conscious that the rights of the Palestinians have to be

safeguarded,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/10929) which includes an account of the objective and determined efforts of his Special Representative since 1967,

1. Deeply regrets that the Secretary-General was unable to report any significant progress by him or by his Special Representative in carrying out the terms of resolution 242(1967), and that nearly six years after its adoption a just and lasting peace in the Middle East has still not been achieved;

2. Strongly deplores Israel's continuing occupation of the territories occupied as a result of the 1967 conflict, contrary to the principles of the Charter;

3. Expresses serious concern at Israel's lack of co-operation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

4. Supports the initiatives of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General taken in conformity with his mandate and contained in his aid-mémoire of 8 February 1971;

5. Expresses its conviction that a just and peaceful solution of the problem of the Middle East can be achieved only on the basis of respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, the rights of all States in the area and for the rights and legitimate

aspirations of the Palestinians;

6. Declares that in the occupied territories no changes which may obstruct a peaceful and final settlement or which may adversely affect the political and other fundamental rights of all the inhabitants in these territories should be introduced or recognized;

7. Requests the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to resume and to pursue their efforts to promote a just and peaceful solution of the Middle East problem;

8. Decides to afford the Secretary-General and his Special Representative all support and assistance for the discharge of their responsibilities;

9. Calls upon all parties concerned to extend full co-operation to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative;

10. Decides to remain seized of the problem and to meet again urgently whenever it becomes necessary.

The Security Council on 26 July 1973 voted on the draft resolution as follows:

In favour: Australia, Austria, France, Guinea, India,

Annexe 170

Indonesia, Kenya, Panama, Peru, Sudan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia.

Against: United States of America.

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14 000692640

8 September 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Special Projects

SUBJECT : Briefing to General Maxwell Taylor on
Photographic Satellite Support to
Middle East Crisis, 31 August 1967

1. As a result of a presentation given to the PFIAB, by the DCI in early July, General Taylor forwarded to the Agency a series of questions concerning intelligence collection capabilities in the context of the Middle East crisis. One of these questions had to do with utilization of photographic satellites to support decision making in the crisis situation.

2. In response to this query, I spent approximately 25 minutes discussing current satellite capabilities including the CORONA R -1 problem in the context of crisis situations. I also presented briefly the satellite coverage actually obtained in the Middle East from 23 May to the present time. I particularly emphasized the problems associated with using recovery film type systems in a crisis situation. I stated that the CORONA system did have a capability to stand by for 30 days at R -1 but this capability was not currently being utilized. I also said that there was no technical problem in the way of providing the R -1 on a continuous basis, but the cost of such an operation could be quite high. I further raised the question of the utilization in such situations of the CORONA ten-foot ground resolution. I also talked about the [REDACTED] system and the fact that it did not have a stand-by capability of any appreciable magnitude and that further, although the resolution of the system was considerably higher than CORONA, its coverage, particularly in situations such as the Middle East, was very limited.

3. General Taylor was clearly very interested in this problem area and very concerned about our ability to collect hard, timely

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SUBJECT: Briefing to General Maxwell Taylor on Photographic
Satellite Support to the Middle East Crisis, 31 August 1967

intelligence in such situations as the Middle East crisis. He took the point of view that high resolution is not a terribly important factor when really many of the most interesting and important questions revolved around allocation of forces, troop movements and bomb damage assessment. I had mentioned that a CORONA launch costs approximately [REDACTED] but did not give him any estimates of the annual cost of providing a CORONA stand-by capability. [REDACTED] dollars did not seem to impress him as being a large number and he requested that we examine the question of the costs associated with providing a continuous stand-by vehicle. [REDACTED] staff, who was present, noted General Taylor's request and presumably will initiate action in this regard.

4. I mentioned briefly the work we were doing on the [REDACTED] Program and how this might be of possible interest to General Taylor. He asked a few questions, but did not request any further information in this regard.

5. I came away with a very clear impression that General Taylor felt strongly that policy making during the Middle East crisis was not adequately supported by intelligence data. Furthermore, he seemed to view this as an important problem and potentially worth the investment of substantial dollars.

[REDACTED]

Chief, Design and Analysis Division

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[Leslie Dirks], Chief Design and Analysis Division, Memorandum for: Director of Special Projects, Subject: Briefing to General Maxwell Taylor on Photographic Satellite Support to Middle East Crisis, 31 August 1967, September 8, 1967, Top Secret, 2 pp.

Source: NRO CORONA-ARGON-LANYARD Collection


The Six Day War of June 1967 had demonstrated the limitations of U.S. photographic reconnaissance satellite systems – which at the time included the CORONA system with ten-foot resolution and the GAMBIT system with 18-inch resolution. Although both types of satellites were in orbit during the crisis, neither was able to provide sufficiently timely, clear images to aid decision-makers.

This briefing by Leslie Dirks, chief of design and analysis in the DS&T's Office of Special Projects, to the chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board focused on problems with maintaining a standby capability (since at the time the U.S. did not continually have a reconnaissance satellite in space), and CORONA's limited resolution. The inevitable lag between acquisition of an image and its return to earth and transformation into intelligence was undoubtedly apparent to Taylor.

The need for a better means of obtaining satellite images in the case of crisis had been apparent to Dirks for many years. It would be another decade before the U.S. would have a satellite system capable of providing real-time imagery – an event that would occur during Dirks' tenure as Deputy Director for Science and Technology.

National Air Intelligence Center translation of Chinese magazine article, 1996

Source : <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/index.html>



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
NAIC-ID(RS)T-0568-96

Date 18 December 1996

0568-96

Hangtian (Aerospace), Number 2, 1996

Page 15



Key: (1). Xu Yansong Liu Wei [Authors]. (2) The Shavit [Comet] rocket (left) and Chetz [Arrow] missile (right).

Israel's Satellites and Missiles

On April 5, 1995, Israel launched its first space-based missile early warning system satellite, the Ofteq [Horizon] 3. The satellite weighs 225 kilograms and can transmit 1–2 meter

resolution imagery. Offeq 1, launched in September 1988, and Offeq 2, launched in April 1990, were two experimental models.

Offeq 3, which was launched from a launch site south of Tel Aviv, is in an east-west retrograde orbit at an altitude of 500 kilometers and revolves around the earth once every 90 minutes, covering Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Western intelligence bureaus have revealed that Offeq 3 carries an experimental navigation system and a three-dimensional stabilization unit, as well as optical sensors and other payloads. Although technical problems caused launch delays, the satellite is now operating well. If the satellite can remain in good working order for its nominal one-year life span, it will speed up Israel's development of the most advanced defensive system in this region and greatly increase Israel's ability to identify nuclear missiles in real time.

Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) has been engaged in development of reconnaissance satellites for at least eight years. At the same time, other companies have taken charge of developing optical and data transmission systems. Shortly after the Gulf War, then-defense minister Moshe Arens emphatically pointed out that wars and conflicts, especially Iraq's launching of missiles against Israel, proved the urgency of Israel's need for reconnaissance satellites.

Israel plans to spend US \$3000¹ in 1996 to launch the Amos 1 communications satellite using France's Ariane rocket at the Kourou, French Guiana launch site. This satellite will probably be positioned in a geostationary orbit over Zaire, its working life span will be ten to eleven years, and it will be controlled by Israel's ground station. US \$300 million has already been spent on this program. The satellite weighs 961 kilograms. Although it has an array of commercial applications, it is commonly believed that one of its main functions will be to monitor the communications networks of [Saudi] Arabia and Iran. Two high-ranking public figures participating in this project are former Director of Military Intelligence Mei'er Amite [Chinese romanization] and former Air Force Commander Amos Lapiduote [Chinese romanization]. Amos 1 was originally scheduled to appear publicly in 1989 and be launched in 1994. The satellite was jointly produced by Israel's SpaceCom Satellite Communication Services, German Aerospace, and France's Alcatel company. Its development cost was US \$350 million.

¹ Figure probably too low. Character (wan⁴, ten thousand) may be missing. Actual amount may be US \$30 million.

At the beginning of April, 1995, Russia used a modified SS-25 missile as a rocket to launch the experimental scientific research satellite Gurwin 1 from the Plesetsk launch site. Because of a malfunction at an altitude of 670 kilometers, it was locked inside the rocket.

During the past several years, missiles have spread into the hands of nations considered hostile to Israel. The nucleus of Israel's response measures is the Arrow [Chetz] anti-missile program. This project is an important sign of the strategic relationship between Israel and the United States. The Clinton Administration had promised to help Israel maintain its scientific and technical advantage. Arrow and its subordinate projects give Israel a small-scale American-style air defense system, but may become an obstacle to the United States' efforts to promote peace in this region.

Despite internal opposition by Israel's military organizations, Israel is now still intensifying development of the two-stage solid rocket propellant Arrow 2, which is the actual combat model of the Arrow 1.

Arrow missiles will be kept on call to counter nations seeking to employ ballistic missiles.

In the near future, Israel will be seeking a dual defense system against tactical missiles. The long-range Arrow missile is the first line of defense, and the shorter-range American Patriot missile is the inner second line of defense. Wuzi Lubin [Chinese romanization, probably for "Uz Rubin"], director of the Israeli General Office of Missile Defense, declared that six live ammunition tests using the Arrow 2 missile would be carried out in the next 18 months. The first flight test of this 6.3-meter-long missile is scheduled for the middle of the year. The target for the first launch will be set at an altitude of 50 kilometers, and the target for the second launch will be set at an altitude of 8 to 10 kilometers. Afterwards, live ammunition tests will be carried out, lastly using two launch units with four rounds each. According to an official statement, this arrangement can ensure the security of 85 percent of the population of Israel. Each unit will be equipped with combat management and control departments, as well as

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combined phased array detection and fire control radar developed especially for this system. According to an estimate, the first launch units will be fully equipped in 1997. They will be set up near Tel Aviv and south of Haifa.

The Arrow missile has entered the most critical second stage [of testing]. On June 12, 1994, in a live ammunition flight test in the sky above the Mediterranean Sea, the Arrow 1 successfully intercepted and destroyed a target missile carrying a simulated chemical warhead. This launch was carried out on a modified offshore oil platform. This was the ninth test launch of the Arrow missile, and was the third launch using live ammunition against a target missile. The Arrow missile was launched four minutes after the target missile attained its ballistic acme. Its warhead detonated 40 kilometers away from the target missile at an altitude of 22 kilometers.

Development of the Arrow missile began in July 1988 as a joint effort between Israel's Ministry of Defense and the United States' Strategic Defense Initiative. The United States invested US \$158 million in initial development work. At present, close to US \$500 million has been spent on this project, three-quarters of which was invested by the United States. The first test took place on August 9, 1990. Iraq's launching of 49 Scud missiles into Israeli territory during the Gulf War strengthened [Israel's] determination to develop the Arrow missile.

The speed of the Arrow missile is Mach 9, three times that of the Patriot missile, and its interception radius is 100 kilometers, while that of the Patriot is only 18 kilometers. According to estimates, it would take 1200 missiles to protect all of Israel, and this project would cost approximately US \$1 billion. In addition, US \$1.25 billion would be required for a radar network and a command and control system. The first fire control radar was developed successfully by Israel's Elta Electronics Industries at the end of 1994, and was considered the most advanced radar system ever developed by Israel. At this rate of progress, it will be impossible for Arrow missiles to arrive at their positions before the year 2000.

Israel is attempting to develop a booster stage missile defense system which can strike enemy missiles at their weakest point, within one minute of being launched. This ensures that the missiles' debris falls outside [Israeli] territory. This defensive system involves tactical heat-sensitive seeker missiles which can be launched by cruising F-15 jet fighters or long-distance unmanned air vehicles. Israel has been in a leading position in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles, and has many products, such as the "Searcher," which can loiter in the air up to 24 hours and be fitted with sensors for reconnaissance of missile launches. The "Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Hunter-Killer Project" is being developed together with the Arrow missile program. This project has been praised by the Israeli Air Force, which has always opposed the Arrow missile program. The Israeli Air Force believes that the substantial funds used for developing the Arrow missile could better be spent on other, more effective projects. The Israeli Air Force has insisted

on launching anti-missile missiles from the air.

Other Israeli missile programs include the Jericho II medium-range missile, which was developed in secret jointly with South Africa in 1987 and is capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Jericho II is a modified military version of the Shavit rocket. It can send the Ofeq 3 into orbit and has a launch range of 1500 kilometers and a payload of 500 kilograms.

0371 ISR /AFP-CD78

Nucléaire: Israël distribue des pilules anti-radiations près des réacteurs
JERUSALEM, 8 août (AFP) - Israël a commencé à distribuer dimanche des pilules d'iode aux personnes vivant près de ses deux réacteurs nucléaires pour prévenir le risque de radiations en cas de dommages aux installations nucléaires, a indiqué dans un communiqué le porte-parole de l'armée.

"Les tablettes de +Lugul+ à l'iode fournissent une protection contre la radio-activité en cas de risque majeur de dommage à un centre de recherches" nucléaires, a indiqué ce communiqué.

Il a précisé que des soldats apporteront ces tablettes au domicile des personnes concernées et qu'un centre de distribution sera en outre ouvert sous le contrôle de spécialistes.

Les premières localités concernées par cette décision sont les suivantes: Yéroham, Dimona, Aruar, Ksaifa, Idan, Ein-Hazeva, Néot Hakikar, Ein Tamar, Névé-Zohar et Hezva, auxquelles s'ajoutent divers secteurs ruraux habités par des Bédouins nomades.

En juin dernier, un porte-parole du ministère de la Défense à Tel-Aviv avait annoncé cette décision à l'AFP en précisant qu'elle avait été prise en concertation avec les experts de la Commission israélienne à l'énergie nucléaire et du ministère de la Santé.

"Des pilules de +Lugul+ contenant de l'iode sont stockées depuis une vingtaine d'années au ministère de la Santé et doivent être distribuées progressivement d'ici deux mois à titre préventif", avait déclaré ce porte-parole.

"Nous avons pris cette décision parce que des rapports ont prouvé que ces pilules sont efficaces et devraient être ingérées au plus vite en cas d'augmentation des radiations autour des réacteurs de Dimona et Nahal Sorek", avait-il ajouté.

Israël dispose d'une centrale de recherches nucléaires à Nahal Sorek, au sud de Tel-Aviv, et d'un réacteur de Dimona, créé dans le désert du Néguev (sud) à la fin des années 1950 avec l'aide de la France.

Certains experts s'inquiètent du caractère obsolète de ces installations.

Israël refuse toujours de reconnaître qu'il détient des armes nucléaires, mais les experts militaires étrangers lui attribuent un arsenal de 100 à 200 ogives nucléaires.

ChW/tj tf.moa
AFP 080650 AOU 04

0235 QAT /AFP-XX66

Iran-USA-Israël-nucléaire LEAD

"Les frappes préventives ne sont pas un monopole américain", prévient l'Iran

DOHA, 18 août (AFP) - Le ministre iranien de la Défense, Ali Chamkhani, a laissé planer la menace d'une offensive pour empêcher une attaque contre les installations nucléaires de son pays, affirmant mercredi (18 08 04) à la chaîne Al-Jazira que "les frappes préventives ne sont pas un monopole américain".

"Nous ne resterons pas les bras croisés en attendant que les autres fassent de nous ce qu'ils veulent. Certains dirigeants militaires en Iran sont convaincus que les frappes préventives dont parlent les Américains ne sont pas un monopole américain", a déclaré le ministre, interrogé sur la possibilité d'une frappe préventive israélienne ou américaine sur les équipements nucléaires iraniens.

"La présence militaire américaine (au Moyen-Orient) ne sera pas un élément de supériorité à nos dépens, au contraire, car leurs forces deviendraient otages auprès de nous", a ajouté M. Chamkhani, dont les propos en persan étaient traduits en arabe par un interprète.

Il faisait ainsi allusion à la présence de dizaines de milliers de soldats américains en Irak et en Afghanistan, deux pays voisins de l'Iran.

"En tous cas, nous traiterons toute frappe contre nos installations nucléaires comme une frappe contre l'Iran tout entier, et nous y répondrons avec toute notre force", a-t-il affirmé.

lr/tq
AFP 182055 AOU 04

0681 IRN /AFP-TM87

Iran-Israël-nucléaire PREV

L'Iran frappera un réacteur israélien s'il est attaqué, prévient un commandant

(PAPIER GENERAL)

Par Laurent LOZANO

TEHERAN, 18 août (AFP) - L'Iran frappera le réacteur nucléaire israélien de Dimona si l'Etat hébreu s'avise de lancer une attaque contre la centrale iranienne de Bouchehr, a prévenu un commandant des Gardiens de la Révolution, fer de lance du régime islamique.

"Qu'Israël tire un seul missile contre la centrale nucléaire de Bouchehr, et il peut oublier à jamais le centre nucléaire de Dimona, où il produit et garde ses armes atomiques, et c'est Israël qui sera responsable des conséquences

terrifiantes de tels actes", a mis en garde le général Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, un des chefs de l'armée idéologique du régime iranien, cité mercredi (18 08 04) dans la presse.

Ces déclarations s'ajoutent aux menaces qu'Iraniens et Israéliens échangent actuellement.

Devant la suspicion persistante sur la nature purement civile du programme nucléaire iranien et la détermination affichée par Téhéran à mener à bien ce programme, les conjectures vont à nouveau bon train sur une attaque préventive israélienne, sur le modèle de celle conduite le 7 juin 1981 par des chasseurs bombardiers sur les installations nucléaires irakiennes d'Osirak.

L'Iran construit actuellement à Bouchehr (sud) sa première centrale nucléaire. Israël et les Etats-Unis sont persuadés que, sous couvert de produire de l'électricité, la République islamique met secrètement au point la bombe atomique.

L'Iran se défend contre ces accusations et renvoie à l'arsenal nucléaire qu'Israël ne dément ni ne confirme détenir de longue date. Dimona servirait à la production de plutonium pour les armes nucléaires israéliennes.

Le commandant des Gardiens de la Révolution, Yadollah Javani, a déjà prévenu

dimanche que "le territoire sioniste dans son entier, y compris les établissements militaires et les stocks nucléaires, est à présent à portée des missiles iraniens de technologie avancée".

Quelques jours auparavant, la République islamique avait procédé "avec succès" à l'essai d'une version optimisée du missile Chahab-3, qui met Israël à

portée de tir et dont les premiers exemplaires ont été livrés en 2003 aux Gardiens de la Révolution.

Le général Zolqadr a cependant estimé qu'étant donné "les dissensions internes au régime sioniste et sa vulnérabilité militaire, stratégique et géographique, Israël n'est pas capable d'attaquer l'Iran et ses menaces sont de

la pure propagande".

Celle-ci est destinée, selon lui, à priver la République islamique de son "droit indiscutable" à la technologie nucléaire "à des fins pacifiques".

Les Israéliens s'alarment qu'il ne soit trop tard et que les Iraniens ne disposent déjà de l'arme nucléaire lorsque les voies diplomatiques auront été explorées. Les renseignements israéliens estiment que l'Iran pourrait posséder la bombe d'ici à 2007.

L'un des pourfendeurs du nucléaire iranien dans l'administration américaine,

le sous-secrétaire d'Etat chargé du contrôle des armements, John Bolton, a estimé mardi que l'envoi du dossier iranien au Conseil de sécurité de l'Onu n'avait "que trop tardé".

"Nous ne pouvons pas laisser l'Iran, un des principaux soutiens du terrorisme international, acquérir des armes nucléaires et les moyens de les lancer sur l'Europe, l'Asie centrale et le Moyen-Orient", a-t-il dit.

Israël a procédé, le 28 juillet, à l'essai de son système anti-missiles amélioré Arrow II, mis au point avec l'aide américaine et expressément destiné

à
contrer une attaque iranienne.

Des experts israéliens émettent en revanche des doutes sur une répétition du
précédent d'Osirak. Ils invoquent la dispersion des sites iraniens ainsi que
les
difficultés de l'allié américain en Irak.

Le général Zolqadr a de nouveau désigné Israël et les Etats-Unis comme les
"ennemis" de l'Iran. Mais "les Etats-Unis ne sont pas seulement les ennemis de
l'Iran (...) Seize mois après le début de l'occupation de l'Irak, les
Américains
continuent à tuer tous les jours des innocents irakiens".

lal/feb
AFP 180909 AOU 04

0672 IRN /AFP-AD14

Iran-Israël-nucléaire-USA-Irak PREV

L'Iran menace à présent de devancer l'attaque (PAPIER D'ANGLE)

Par Laurent LOZANO

TEHERAN, 19 août (AFP) - L'Iran est lancé dans une surenchère verbale contre

les Etats-Unis et Israël, prévenus désormais que la République islamique pourrait prendre les devants et atteindre ses "ennemis", où que ce soit.

"Nous ne resterons pas les bras croisés en attendant que les autres fassent de nous ce qu'ils veulent. Certains dirigeants militaires en Iran sont convaincus que les frappes préventives dont parlent les Américains ne sont pas un monopole américain", a prévenu mercredi (18 08 04) le ministre de la Défense, l'amiral Ali Chamkhani, sur la chaîne Al-Jazira.

C'est la première fois depuis longtemps que l'Iran évoque publiquement la possibilité de devancer ses adversaires. Il était plutôt question depuis plusieurs semaines de l'éventualité qu'Israël, fidèle à une tactique militaire qui a fait ses preuves dans le passé, lance des raids prophylactiques contre les

sites nucléaires iraniens, avec ou sans le soutien des Etats-Unis.

Les chasseurs bombardiers de l'Etat hébreu ont déjà procédé de la sorte le 7

juin 1981 contre les installations nucléaires irakiennes d'Osirak. Les Etats-Unis avaient alors condamné.

Un commandant des Gardiens de la Révolution, fer de lance du régime islamique, a déjà commencé cette semaine à détailler ce que pourrait être la riposte iranienne: "Qu'Israël tire un seul missile contre la centrale nucléaire

de Bouchehr, et il peut oublier à jamais le centre nucléaire de Dimona, où il produit et garde ses armes atomiques", a averti le général Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr.

Dimona servirait à la production de plutonium pour les armes nucléaires qu'Israël ne dément ni ne confirme posséder.

L'amiral Chamkhani a à son tour signifié plus explicitement qu'à l'accoutumée ce à quoi l'adversaire s'exposait.

"Les Américains ne sont pas la seule force présente dans la région car nous sommes aussi présents, de Khost à Kandahar en Afghanistan et nous sommes également capables d'être présents en Irak", a-t-il dit. Les troupes américaines

déployées au Proche-Orient pourraient ainsi devenir les "otages" des Iraniens, a-t-il envisagé.

Si le ministre insiste sur les risques encourus par les Américains, c'est que, pour les militaires iraniens comme pour les analystes, les Israéliens peuvent difficilement agir seuls, pour des raisons opérationnelles autant que politiques. Israël est "incapable de mener une opération militaire sans un feu vert américain", a assuré l'amiral Chamkhani.

La dispersion des sites iraniens hypothèque à elle seule une répétition d'Osirak.

Par ailleurs, si certains "faucons" dans l'administration Bush estimaient, avant l'offensive en Irak, que le plus grand danger était iranien, le précédent

irakien leur en a fait rabattre. Ainsi la diplomatie américaine continue à s'en remettre à l'Onu.

Les Israéliens s'alarment qu'il ne soit trop tard et que les Iraniens ne disposent déjà de l'arme nucléaire lorsque les voies diplomatiques auront été explorées. Les renseignements israéliens estiment que l'Iran pourrait posséder la bombe d'ici à 2007.

Israël a procédé, le 28 juillet, à l'essai de son système anti-missiles amélioré Arrow II, mis au point avec l'aide américaine et expressément destiné à contrer une attaque iranienne.

La semaine passée, la République islamique, qui a fait un dogme de la non-reconnaissance d'Israël et soutient le Hezbollah libanais et des groupes palestiniens, a testé "avec succès" une version optimisée du missile Chahab-3, qui met Israël à portée de tir.

L'Iran se défend opiniâtrement de vouloir la bombe et assure que son programme nucléaire servira uniquement à produire de l'électricité.

Mais il a durci depuis juin son attitude vis-à-vis de l'agence de l'Onu qui enquête sur ses activités depuis 2003.

"Difficile de dire si ces échanges verbaux sont de pure rhétorique", observe

un analyste, "le fait est que chacun alimente l'inquiétude de l'autre".

lal/feb

AFP 191143 AOU 04

0400 IRN /AFP-AB64

Iran-Israël-USA-nucléaire

Les "opérations tactiques" d'Israël "n'intimident pas l'Iran" (Téhéran)

TEHERAN, 30 juil (AFP) - Le ministre de la Défense iranien, Ali Chamkhani, affirme dans un entretien publié vendredi (30 juillet, jour de test de Hetz – voir plus loin) que les "opérations tactiques"

d'Israël "n'intimident pas l'Iran", alors que des responsables israéliens ont menacé que leur pays frapperait les installations nucléaires iraniennes.

"Les opérations tactiques du régime sioniste n'intimident pas l'Iran", déclare M. Chamkhani dans cet entretien accordé à l'agence estudiantine Isna.

"Nous sommes prêts à la contre-attaque. Leurs casernes sont pleines de poudre et totalement vulnérables", dit M. Chamkhani.

Les Israéliens "paieront cher s'ils mettent leurs menaces à exécution", ajoute le ministre, estimant néanmoins que ceux-ci "ne prennent pas leurs propres menaces au sérieux, car ils menacent uniquement parce qu'ils ont le soutien des Etats-Unis".

Cité lundi par Isna, le commandant Seyyed Massoud Jazayeri, chef du département des relations publiques des Gardiens de la révolution (Pasdaran), la

puissante armée idéologique du régime islamique, avait déclaré que l'Iran effacerait Israël "de la carte du monde" si celui-ci ose attaquer ses installations nucléaires.

Depuis quelques semaines, les responsables iraniens ont multiplié les avertissements à l'égard des "ennemis" de la République islamique (terme qui regroupe Israël et les Etats-Unis), alors que l'Etat juif s'inquiète de l'avancement du programme nucléaire iranien.

Plusieurs responsables israéliens ont laissé entendre récemment que l'Etat juif pourrait détruire les installations nucléaires iraniennes, comme il avait détruit le réacteur atomique irakien Osirak en 1981.

L'Iran est actuellement engagé dans une épreuve de force avec la communauté internationale, qui le soupçonne de vouloir acquérir la bombe atomique sous le couvert de son programme nucléaire civil, ce que Téhéran dément.

Les services secrets israéliens ont indiqué récemment que, selon leurs estimations, l'Iran aura l'arme nucléaire d'ici à 2007.

Israël a annoncé jeudi avoir réussi un nouveau tir d'essai du missile antimissile Hetz-Arrow, qu'il met au point avec les Etats-Unis. La presse israélienne estimait vendredi que le Hetz est "un moyen de dissuasion de premier ordre" vis-à-vis des missiles iraniens à longue portée (1.300 km) Chahab-3.

fpn/mj/hj

AFP 301606 JUL 04

0611 ISR /AFP-YU83

PO-Israël-défense PREV

Le missile antimissile Arrow, un nouvel atout stratégique pour Israël (PAPIER D'ANGLE)

par Jacques PINTO

JERUSALEM, 30 juil (AFP) - Le missile antimissile israélien Hetz (Arrow), qui a réussi le test d'interception jeudi (29 juillet) d'un missile sol-sol Scud au large

des

côtes ouest américaines, est un nouvel atout stratégique pour l'Etat hébreu.

"Il a fait mouche", titrent en Une vendredi 30 juillet) les deux grands quotidiens israéliens Yediot Aharonot et Maariv, soulignant que lors de ce septième essai réussi, c'est un véritable missile Scud qui a été intercepté et non un missile "Black Sparrow" (Moineau Noir) simulant un missile Scud, comme ce fut le cas lors des précédents essais.

Quelque six minutes après son lancement au large des côtes de **Californie**, le

Scud, onze mètres de long, sept tonnes, a été intercepté et détruit à plusieurs

dizaines de kilomètres d'altitude par le Hetz, filant vers sa cible à neuf fois

la vitesse du son, rapportent les journaux israéliens.

"Nous vivons dans une ère d'incertitude. Les pays du troisième cercle (concept géostratégique qui fait allusion notamment à l'Iran) poursuivent leurs

efforts pour obtenir des capacités non conventionnelles couplées à des moyens de

lancement à longue portée", a déclaré le ministre israélien de la Défense Shaoul

Mofaz, dans un communiqué publié par son bureau après la réussite du test du Hetz.

"Le Hetz renforce l'effet de dissuasion de l'Etat d'Israël", a-t-il souligné.

Arié Herzog, directeur du projet de défense antimissile "Homa" (Rempart) au ministère de la Défense, a été plus explicite.

"L'Iran développe aujourd'hui des missiles plus perfectionnés et de plus grande portée et nous veillerons à ce que, lorsqu'ils seront opérationnels, nous

ayons la réponse adéquate à leur apporter", a-t-il déclaré à la radio militaire.

La semaine dernière, les responsables de l'ensemble des services de renseignement d'Israël avaient estimé, lors d'une intervention devant le cabinet

sécuritaire, que l'Iran aura une capacité nucléaire d'ici 2007, avait rapporté la radio publique.

En novembre 2003, Meir Dagan, le patron du Mossad (services secrets) avait déjà tiré la sonnette d'alarme en affirmant lors d'une rare intervention devant

une commission du Parlement que le programme nucléaire iranien, couplé aux missiles sol-sol à longue portée Shahab-3 (1.300 km), représentait "la plus grande menace pour l'existence d'Israël depuis sa création" en 1948.

Dans ce contexte, écrit le Yédiot Aharonot dans un éditorial, "d'un système de défense, le Hetz devient un moyen de dissuasion de premier ordre".

"La brèche dans le système de défense d'Israël que représentait le danger d'une frappe des populations civiles par des missiles à longue portée a été comblée", estime de son côté, dans le Maariv, le général de réserve Yitzhak Ben

Israël, directeur du département des études de Défense de l'université de

Tel-Aviv.

La mise au point du Hetz a été accélérée avant le déclenchement de la guerre

d'Irak en mars 2003, Israël craignant d'être frappé comme lors de la guerre du Golfe en 1991 par des missiles sol-sol irakiens.

L'Irak avait alors tiré 39 missiles Scud sur Israël, qui avaient fait deux morts et de nombreux blessés ainsi que des dégâts importants.

Le projet Hetz a été lancé en 1988, sur l'initiative des Etats-Unis, dans le

cadre du projet de la "Guerre des étoiles" du président Ronald Reagan, abandonné

officiellement en 1993.

Les Etats-Unis ont assuré le financement de la première génération du Hetz à

hauteur de 80%. Depuis 1991, son développement est financé à part égale par les

Américains et l'Etat hébreu.

jp/jb

AFP 301127 JUL 04

Juillet 2004

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ISRAEL-VANUNU (VERSION COMPLETEE *)

La Haute Cour refuse d'autoriser Vanunu à quitter Israël *
(complété deux derniers paragraphes *)

JERUSALEM, 26 juillet (Reuters) - La Haute Cour israélienne a refusé d'autoriser Mordechaï Vanunu, le technicien qui a révélé au monde dans les années 1980 l'étendue du programme atomique militaire israélien, à quitter le pays, a annoncé lundi un responsable de la plus haute juridiction du pays.

Le gouvernement israélien considère que Vanunu, qui a été libéré en avril après 18 ans d'emprisonnement, représente un risque pour la sécurité d'Israël parce qu'il pourrait, selon les autorités, révéler d'autres secrets.

Craignant de nouvelles divulgations de secrets d'Etat, les autorités lui ont interdit de quitter son pays pendant au moins un an et ont limité ses contacts avec les étrangers.

Vanunu a quant à lui saisi la Haute Cour en affirmant que cette restriction de déplacement portait atteinte à ses droits élémentaires.

"C'est un jour très triste et honteux", a dit Vanunu après l'annonce de la décision de la Haute Cour.

Vanunu, un ancien juif marocain qui avait été condamné pour trahison après avoir été piégé par une espionne et enlevé par le Mossad à Rome, s'est converti en prison au christianisme. Depuis son élargissement, le 21 avril, il vit dans une église de Jérusalem et souhaite émigrer aux Etats-Unis ou en Europe.

"Je veux aller à l'étranger et commencer ma vie d'homme libre. Si Israël est une démocratie, il devrait m'y autoriser".

* Le ministre israélien de la Justice, Yosef Lapid, a menacé de le renvoyer derrière les barreaux s'il ne respecte pas les restrictions qui pèsent sur lui, à commencer par l'interdiction d'accorder des interviews aux médias étrangers.

* "Il est évident que lorsqu'une personne enfreint sciemment la loi elle s'expose à de nouveaux déboires", a déclaré pour sa part le procureur de l'Etat d'Israël, Shaïd Nitzan. Vanunu a notamment accordé fin mai une interview au Sunday Times de Londres. /JCL/MD

0266 ISR /AFP-GW15

Israël-Vanunu-nucléaire-justice 2ELED

La Cour suprême d'Israël rejette l'appel de Mordechaï Vanunu
JERUSALEM, 26 juil (AFP) - La Cour suprême d'Israël a rejeté lundi un recours présenté par le technicien nucléaire Mordechaï Vanunu, libéré en avril après 18 ans d'incarcération, contre les sévères restrictions qui continuent à lui être imposées.

M. Vanunu avait été condamné en 1986 à 18 ans de prison pour "trahison" et "espionnage" après avoir transmis au Sunday Times des informations sur la centrale nucléaire de Dimona (sud), où il avait été employé.

Après sa libération en avril, il lui a été interdit de parler à des médias étrangers, de sortir du pays, et il doit avertir à l'avance la police de ses déplacements.

M. Vanunu et l'association des droits civiques en Israël avaient présenté un appel contre ces restrictions, mais la Cour s'est rangée à l'avis du ministère public selon lequel M. Vanunu dispose encore d'informations dont la divulgation pourrait nuire à la sécurité de l'Etat.

"Le monde entier peut voir le vrai visage de la démocratie israélienne. La Cour a donné son blanc-seing à un gouvernement qui ne respecte pas les droits de l'Homme, la liberté de parole et de mouvement", a-t-il déclaré aux journalistes

après l'arrêt.

"Je n'ai aucun secret à révéler, je ne détiens plus aucun secret" a-t-il réaffirmé.

L'Etat hébreu n'a jamais reconnu détenir l'arme atomique, mais un certain nombre d'experts militaires étrangers lui prêtent un arsenal de 100 à 200 ogives nucléaires sur la foi, notamment, des informations transmises par M. Vanunu.

ms/mj

AFP 260937 JUL 04

0584 ISR /AFP-HM94

Israël-Vanunu-nucléaire-justice PREV

Le technicien nucléaire Vanunu restera privé de sa liberté de mouvement (PAPIER GENERAL)

par Majeda EL-BATSH

= (PHOTO) =

JERUSALEM, 26 juil (AFP) - L'homme qui avait révélé les secrets nucléaires d'Israël, Mordechaï Vanunu, libéré en avril après 18 ans de prison, restera privé de liberté de mouvement et soumis à une série de restrictions, selon une décision lundi de la Cour suprême d'Israël.

La Cour s'est rangée à l'avis du ministère public et a rejeté le recours de

M. Vanunu, qui constitue toujours, selon l'Etat hébreu, une "menace pour la

sécurité".

" Il y a de bonnes raisons de craindre que si Vanunu sort d'Israël, il va publier des informations secrètes en sa possession, ce qui risque de porter atteinte à la sécurité de l'Etat" a affirmé la Cour, dans ses attendus.

"Il ne fait aucun doute que Vanunu veut publier ces informations", affirment

les trois juges, qui s'appuient notamment sur des écrits personnels de M. Vanunu

découverts en prison.

"Le monde entier peut ainsi voir le vrai visage de la démocratie israélienne", a ironisé en réponse M. Vanunu, s'adressant aux journalistes.

Il a accusé le tribunal d'avoir "donné son blanc-seing à un gouvernement qui

ne respecte pas les droits de l'Homme, la liberté de parole et de mouvement".

"Je n'ai aucun secret à révéler. Je ne détiens plus aucun secret, c'est Israël qui en détient", a-t-il affirmé.

"Mon pays n'est pas Israël. Israël ne m'a pas respecté en me traitant d'espion et de traître durant dix-huit ans. Je veux vivre libre et partir !" s'est-il exclamé.

M. Vanunu avait été condamné en 1986 à 18 ans de prison pour "trahison" et "espionnage" après avoir transmis au journal londonien Sunday Times des informations sur la centrale nucléaire de Dimona (sud), où il avait été employé.

Après sa libération en avril, il lui a été interdit de parler à des médias étrangers, de sortir du pays pour au moins un an et il doit avertir à l'avance la police de ses déplacements.

L'avocat Dan Yakir, de l'association des droits civiques en Israël, qui s'est associée à l'appel, a estimé que la décision de la cour "violait les droits de l'Homme" en imposant une punition supplémentaire à un homme qui a déjà

purgé dix-huit années de prison, dont onze à l'isolement.

En revanche, le procureur Shaï Nitzan s'est félicité de la décision et a accusé l'ancien prisonnier de n'avoir pas respecté les conditions de sa libération, ce qui pourrait lui valoir des poursuites judiciaires.

Il fait allusion aux déclarations de M. Vanunu au quotidien arabe Al-Hayat dans lesquelles il mettait en garde contre le risque d'un "deuxième Tchernobyl"

au Proche-Orient en raison de l'état vétuste de la centrale nucléaire de Dimona.

M. Vanunu a en outre affirmé au journal que ses révélations sur le potentiel

nucléaire israélien "sont suffisantes pour considérer Israël comme un danger réel qui menace l'ensemble du Moyen-Orient".

Il a en outre critiqué la visite début juillet du chef de l'Agence internationale pour l'énergie atomique (AIEA) Mohamed ElBaradei en Israël. "Il aurait dû refusé de visiter Israël (dès lors) qu'il n'était pas autorisé à inspecter le réacteur nucléaire" de Dimona, a dit l'ancien détenu.

L'Etat hébreu n'a jamais reconnu détenir l'arme atomique, mais un certain nombre d'experts militaires étrangers lui prêtent un arsenal de 100 à 200 ogives

nucléaires sur la foi, notamment, des informations transmises par M. Vanunu.
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 AFP 261234 JUL 04

0496 ARE /AFP-EP68

Israël-Vanunu-nucléaire-USA

Vanunu met en garde contre un risque d'un "Tchernobyl" au Proche-Orient
 DUBAI, 25 juil (AFP) - L'ancien technicien nucléaire israélien Mordechaï Vanunu a mis en garde contre le risque d'un "deuxième Tchernobyl" au Proche-Orient en raison de l'état vétuste de la centrale nucléaire israélienne de Dimona, dans des propos publiés dimanche par le quotidien arabe Al-Hayat.

M. Vanunu, l'homme qui a révélé les secrets nucléaires de l'Etat hébreu, soutient en outre qu'Israël serait impliqué dans l'assassinat du président américain John F. Kennedy.

L'ancien employé de Dimona, libéré de prison en avril après 18 ans d'incarcération, s'inquiète que la centrale nucléaire construite dans le sud d'Israël il y a 40 ans, devienne en cas d'accident "un deuxième Tchernobyl" par

"l'infiltration de radiations nucléaires qui menacent des millions de personnes

dans les pays voisins".

Il se réfère à la catastrophe provoquée par l'explosion en 1986 à la centrale nucléaire de Tchernobyl, en Ukraine, qui avait fait plus de trois millions de victimes selon les autorités de ce pays.

"La Jordanie doit soumettre ses habitants dans les régions frontalières avec

Israël à des examens médicaux pour s'assurer de leur éventuelle irradiation et leur administrer les médicaments nécessaires", ajoute-t-il.

Les autorités israéliennes ont interdit à M. Vanunu de parler à des médias étrangers, de sortir du pays et il doit avertir à l'avance la police de ses déplacements, depuis sa sortie de prison.

Dans ses propos publiés par al-Hayat, extraits d'une interview à paraître lundi dans le supplément hebdomadaire de ce journal, M. Vanunu évoque en outre une possible implication de l'Etat hébreu dans l'assassinat de Kennedy en 1963,

mais sans fournir la moindre précision.

Selon des "indications quasi-sûres", Kennedy a été assassiné "en raison de pressions qu'il a exercées sur le chef du gouvernement israélien de l'époque, David Ben Gourion, pour qu'il fasse la lumière sur le réacteur nucléaire de Dimona", dit-il.

M. Vanunu a en outre affirmé que ses révélations sur le potentiel nucléaire israélien "sont suffisantes pour considérer Israël comme un danger réel qui menace l'ensemble du Moyen-Orient".

Il a en outre critiqué la visite début juillet du chef de l'Agence internationale pour l'énergie atomique (AIEA) Mohamed ElBaradei en Israël. "Il aurait dû refusé de visiter Israël (dès lors) qu'il n'était pas autorisé à

inspecter le réacteur nucléaire" de Dimona, a dit l'ancien détenu.

M. Vanunu avait été condamné en 1986 à 18 ans de prison pour "trahison" et "espionnage" après avoir transmis au Sunday Times britannique des informations sur la centrale nucléaire de Dimona.

L'Etat hébreu n'a jamais reconnu détenir l'arme atomique, mais un certain nombre d'experts militaires étrangers lui prêtent un arsenal de 100 à 200 ogives

nucléaires sur la foi, notamment, des informations transmises par M. Vanunu.

tm/ms/mj

AFP 251022 JUL 04

0457 JOR /AFP-IB95

Jordanie-Israël-Vanunu-nucléaire

Nucléaire: Amman dit n'avoir enregistré aucune radiation venant d'Israël

AMMAN, 26 juil (AFP) - La Jordanie n'a pas enregistré de radiations nucléaires provenant de la centrale atomique israélienne de Dimona, a indiqué lundi le gouvernement, après qu'un ancien employé de cette centrale eut estimé que celle-ci faisait courir au Proche-Orient le risque d'un nouveau Tchernobyl.

"A ce jour nous n'avons pas enregistré de radiations", provenant de la centrale de Dimona installée dans le désert du Néguev (sud d'Israël), a déclaré

la porte-parole du gouvernement jordanien, Asma Khodr, lors d'un point de presse.

Mme Khodr réagissait aux propos de l'ancien technicien nucléaire israélien Mordechaï Vanunu, qui, dans des propos publiés dimanche par le quotidien arabe Al-Hayat, a mis en garde contre le risque d'un "deuxième Tchernobyl" au Proche-Orient, en raison de l'état vétuste des installations de Dimona.

"La Jordanie doit soumettre ses habitants dans les régions frontalières avec

Israël à des examens médicaux pour s'assurer de leur éventuelle irradiation et leur administrer les médicaments nécessaires", a dit dans cet entretien cet ancien employé de Dimona.

"Notre inquiétude se concentre sur les risques d'éventuelles radiations nucléaires en cas d'explosion ou de problèmes techniques dans cette centrale",

a

dit Mme Khodr.

Selon elle, ces éventualités font l'objet "d'une attention permanente des parties concernées dans le royaume". "Nous soutenons les efforts arabes et internationaux pour faire de cette zone une région libre d'activités nucléaires

et pour que des contrôles internationaux soient imposés", a-t-elle ajouté.

Le directeur de l'Agence jordanienne de l'énergie Atomique, Ziad Qoudah a de

son côté affirmé que les trois centres de contrôle nucléaire dans le royaume "prélèvent quotidiennement des échantillons d'air et de terre pour les analyser".

Dans des déclarations à la presse il a indiqué que la Jordanie disposait "de stations d'alerte qui se déclenchent en cas d'accident nucléaire".

Il a reconnu que la centrale nucléaire de Dimona construite dans le sud d'Israël il y a 40 ans, a "dépassé l'âge acceptable", mais a-t-il ajouté, il s'agit d'études "sur des hypothèses qui ne sont pas soutenues par des faits précis, cette centrale étant une zone fermée à tout visiteur".

M. Vanunu a été libéré de prison en avril après 18 ans d'incarcération, pour avoir révélé les secrets nucléaires de l'Etat hébreu.

Israël n'a jamais reconnu détenir l'arme atomique, mais un certain nombre d'experts militaires étrangers lui prêtent un arsenal de 100 à 200 ogives nucléaires sur la foi, notamment, des informations transmises par M. Vanunu.

fi-rh/mj

AFP 261446 JUL 04

0673 IRN /AFP-NT41

Iran-missiles-Israël PREV

L'Iran augmente à 2.000 km la portée de ses missiles (PAPIER GENERAL)
par Siavosh GHAZI

TEHERAN, 5 oct (AFP) - L'Iran a fourni mardi un motif supplémentaire d'inquiétude à la communauté internationale et à Israël en annonçant avoir augmenté à 2.000 km la portée de ses missiles conventionnels.

"Nous avons aujourd'hui la puissance de lancer nos missiles jusqu'à 2.000 km

et les experts savent qu'une fois qu'un pays a franchi cette étape, toutes les suivantes sont accessibles", a déclaré l'ancien président Akbar Hachemi Rafsandjani, cité par l'agence officielle Irna lors d'une conférence sur le thème "espace et sécurité nationale".

"Nous possédons aujourd'hui la technologie balistique et si on n'entravait pas nos progrès, nous serions encore plus avancés", a affirmé M. Rafsandjani, qui est resté l'un des hommes forts du régime islamique et dont le nom est cité

avec insistance comme candidat à la présidentielle de 2005 huit ans après la fin

de son deuxième mandat.

L'Iran a testé le 11 août une version optimisée de son missile conventionnel

Chahab-3. Sa portée était jusqu'alors chiffrée entre 1.300 et 1.700 km selon les

sources iraniennes. Mais, après le 11 août, des sources israéliennes ont avancé

que le Chahab pouvait désormais atteindre jusqu'à 2.000 km.

Un missile qualifié de "stratégique" ou "de longue portée" a été mis à l'épreuve un mois plus tard lors de manoeuvres de l'armée idéologique (NDLR les

gardiens de la Révolution) dans l'ouest du pays. Les responsables iraniens n'ont

jamais dit s'il s'agissait du Chahab-3. Mais l'Iran a fait savoir le 25 septembre que l'opération avait été couronnée de succès et que l'engin avait été

livré aux forces armées.

Le Chahab-3, dérivé d'un missile nord-coréen, met Israël, régulièrement présenté comme la première cible potentielle, à portée de frappe. Mais les responsables israéliens mettent en garde les Européens contre la menace que font

peser, aussi sur eux, les engins iraniens.

Les progrès proclamés par la République islamique concernant son programme balistique ajoutent aux préoccupations internationales face aux activités nucléaires iraniennes.

L'Iran est sous la menace de se retrouver devant le Conseil de sécurité de l'Onu s'il ne satisfait pas à certaines exigences de l'Agence internationale de

l'énergie atomique d'ici au 25 novembre. Téhéran n'a pour l'instant manifesté aucune intention de suspendre toutes ses activités d'enrichissement d'uranium. Et, en pleine période de tensions, la glorification de la force de frappe

nationale par les dirigeants iraniens est jugée "provocante" par les Occidentaux.

L'Iran assure que ses activités nucléaires sont purement civiles. Il affirme que le Chahab-3 est une arme purement défensive et dissuasive. Mais Israël et les Etats-Unis en particulier, ennemis déclarés de la République islamique, sont convaincus du contraire et s'alarment que les missiles iraniens pourraient servir de vecteurs à des charges nucléaires.

Les renseignements israéliens estiment que l'Iran pourrait posséder la bombe atomique d'ici à 2007.

Ces assertions nourrissent les spéculations sur d'éventuelles frappes "préventives", américaines ou israéliennes, contre les installations nucléaires iraniennes.

"Les Etats-Unis et le régime sioniste sont nos ennemis (...) mais, avec leurs expériences passées, les Etats-Unis savent qu'ils ne doivent pas s'engager dans un conflit dangereux avec nous", a dit M. Rafsandjani.

L'actuel chef du Conseil de discernement, institution clé du régime, a aussi insisté sur la volonté de l'Iran d'être présent dans l'espace.

"Avec cette puissance balistique, nous pouvons aujourd'hui parler d'un satellite indépendant et nous devons chercher à avoir la technologie pour construire nos propres satellites", a-t-il dit.

"Nous sommes à la porte du club des pays possédant la technologie satellitaire", a-t-il ajouté.

L'Iran entend lancer en 2005 son premier satellite propre de télécommunications.

sgh-lal/feb/nou eaf
AFP 051511 OCT 04

. 0243 USA /AFP-AR34

Le renseignement américain juge des frappes contre l'Iran inopérantes
WASHINGTON, 19 sept (AFP) - Les services secrets américains ont pratiqué des

simulations d'attaques préventives contre des sites nucléaires iraniens, mais
en

ont conclu qu'elles ne résoudraient pas la crise sur ce dossier, affirme le
magazine Newsweek à paraître lundi. 20 09 2004

"Les simulations de guerre n'ont pas permis d'éviter que le conflit ne
s'intensifie", a déclaré un responsable anonyme des forces aériennes
américaines, cité dans la dernière livraison de l'hebdomadaire américain.

Ces simulations et leurs résultats potentiels ont été réalisées par la CIA
(centrale de renseignements) et le DIA (renseignement militaire), selon
l'hebdomadaire.

Newsweek ajoute que les "faucons" de l'administration du président George W.

Bush avaient prôné une politique de "changement de régime" en Iran, impliquant
si nécessaire des opérations secrètes.

Mais avec une situation en Irak qui se dégrade, personne parmi les membres
du cabinet de M. Bush et dans la haute hiérarchie militaire n'a pris le risque
d'endosser une telle politique, ajoute le magazine.

Les Etats-Unis accusent l'Iran de chercher à se doter de l'arme atomique
sous couvert d'un programme civil, ce que Téhéran dément. Les Etats-Unis font
pression pour que ce dossier remonte devant le Conseil de sécurité de l'Onu en
vue de sanctions contre la république islamique.

gs/cr/im ef/tmf

AFP 192213 SEP 04

0686 USA /AFP-AS56

USA-Iran-nucléaire-AIEA PREV

Le nucléaire iranien, dossier à hauts risques pour Washington (PAPIER
D'ANGLE ACTUALISE)

par Christophe de ROQUEFEUIL

ATTENTION - Actualise avec article Newsweek sur attaques préventives ///

WASHINGTON, 19 sept (AFP) - Les Etats-Unis veulent garder une ligne dure sur

le programme nucléaire iranien, mais ce dossier reste parsemé de
chausse-trappes

pour une administration américaine déjà confrontée à une situation difficile en

Irak, et en pleine campagne électorale.

Un Iran accédant à l'arme atomique serait un camouflet cinglant pour
Washington, qui a mis en tête de ses priorités le combat pour empêcher les
"Etats voyous" d'acquérir des armes de destruction massive.

Mais Washington court aussi le risque, entre autres, d'aggraver les
tensions avec un pays voisin de l'Irak, au moment où les responsables
américains

accusent Téhéran de soutenir une rébellion de plus en plus active.

L'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA) a adopté samedi 18 09 2004 à Vienne une résolution exigeant de l'Iran qu'il clarifie "impérativement" la nature de ses activités nucléaire avant la prochaine réunion de cette instance le 25 novembre.

Bien que cette résolution permette de maintenir une forte pression sur l'Iran, Washington a dû battre en retraite sur son objectif affiché d'envoyer le dossier iranien dès à présent devant le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU.

Ce texte permet de préserver le front entre Américains et Européens, et permet surtout à Washington de remettre des décisions susceptibles de provoquer

de fortes tensions internationales à après l'élection présidentielle américaine

du 2 novembre.

Les Etats-Unis sont confrontés à des choix difficiles depuis des mois sur le dossier de l'Iran, un pays classé dans un "axe du mal" par le président George W. Bush. Washington accuse Téhéran d'être en train de se doter de l'arme atomique sous couvert d'un programme civil.

Mais Washington ne peut ignorer non plus la capacité des Iraniens de répondre à une forte pression sur le dossier nucléaire par des actions de déstabilisation en Irak.

Le secrétaire d'Etat Colin Powell a reconnu, dans un entretien au Washington Times de vendredi, "qu'il n'y avait aucun doute sur le fait que les Iraniens étaient impliqués et apportaient un soutien" à l'insurrection irakienne, tout en estimant difficile d'évaluer l'ampleur et l'effet réel de cet appui.

Selon l'hebdomadaire Newsweek, à paraître lundi, les services secrets américains ont pratiqué des simulations d'attaques préventives contre des sites

nucléaires iraniens, mais en ont conclu qu'elles risquaient en fait d'aggraver la situation.

Les "faucons" de l'administration ont prôné une politique de "changement de régime" en Iran, impliquant si nécessaire des opérations secrètes, mais personne

parmi les membres du cabinet de M. Bush n'a visiblement endossé une telle stratégie qui "horrifie" la hiérarchie militaire, ajoute l'hebdomadaire.

L'administration Bush hésite aussi manifestement à provoquer à ce stade une crise majeure avec les trois pays européens -Grande-Bretagne, France, Allemagne-, en pointe dans la recherche d'une solution diplomatique avec l'Iran.

Une telle crise ne manquerait pas d'alimenter les accusations de l'adversaire démocrate de M. Bush dans la course à la Maison Blanche, John Kerry, sur l'incapacité de l'administration actuelle à maintenir des alliances internationales solides.

Washington peine également à trouver le "smoking gun", la preuve irréfutable permettant de dire avec certitude, au delà des forts soupçons, que Téhéran est

en train de se doter de la bombe atomique, dans un climat déjà marqué par l'échec américain à trouver des armes de destruction massive (ADM) en Irak.

Le directeur de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique, Mohamed ElBaradei, a estimé dimanche que Téhéran devait absolument prendre des mesures pour restaurer la "confiance", mais a estimé que son programme ne présentait pas

en l'état de "menace imminente".

Les plans iraniens sont "vraiment une question d'intention", a-t-il ajouté.

cr/im ef/tmf

AFP 192242 SEP 04

0323 USA /AFP-OW17

USA-Iran-nucléaire-AIEA

Des photos d'un site iranien supposé nucléaire présenté par des experts

WASHINGTON, 15 sept (AFP) - Des experts américains ont rendu publiques mercredi soir à Washington sept photographies satellitaires d'un site militaire

industriel iranien, susceptible, selon eux, de procéder à des tests sur la bombe

atomique et de fabriquer des armes nucléaires.

Les photos présentées par l'Institut pour la science et la sécurité internationale montrent un grand complexe industriel avec plusieurs installations disséminées, situé dans une zone montagneuse dans le nord de l'Iran.

Les experts estiment que ce centre industriel de Parchine, situé à 30 km au sud-est de Téhéran, qui est censé fabriquer des armes conventionnelles, pourrait être utilisé comme usine d'armes nucléaires.

"Ce site semble bien adapté pour être un lieu de fabrication d'armes nucléaires surtout pour la recherche et le développement sur des composants explosifs", ont souligné les experts en commentant les photos.

Ils ont notamment montré un bunker qui pourrait servir "à réaliser une simulation d'explosion nucléaire en utilisant de l'uranium ou de l'uranium appauvri, à la place d'uranium fortement enrichi," ont-ils dit.

La publication de ces photos intervient alors que les Etats-Unis font actuellement pression sur leurs partenaires européens au sein de l'AIEA (Agence

internationale de l'énergie atomique) pour qu'un ultimatum soit lancé à Téhéran

sur son programme nucléaire avec une date butoir en novembre.

Les Etats-Unis accusent les Iraniens de vouloir se doter de la bombe atomique, sous couvert d'un programme d'énergie civil.

Jeudi depuis Vienne (Autriche) siège de l'AIEA un responsable iranien a

démenti toute activité nucléaire sur le site militaire de Parchine.

La CIA et le Département d'Etat ont refusé de commenter ces photos qui sont consultables sur un site internet www.isis-online.org.

mk/vk

AFP 161457 SEP 04

0686 AUT /AFP-OX25

AIEA-Iran-nucléaire-USA-UE PREV

Iran: les Américains demandent des explications sur un site militaire (PAPIER GENERAL)

Par Jean-Michel STOULLIG

VIENNE, 16 sept (AFP) - Les Etats-Unis ont relancé jeudi leurs accusations contre l'Iran au sujet de possibles expériences nucléaires militaires alors que

des progrès étaient enregistrés avec les Européens, mais sans accord, pour une résolution de l'AIEA sur le programme nucléaire de Téhéran.

Les tractations entre les Américains --qui veulent une saisie du Conseil de sécurité de l'Onu en vue de sanctions internationales-- et l'Union européenne (UE) --qui refuse tout ultimatum explicite-- pourraient, selon des diplomates, se poursuivre jusqu'au week-end à Vienne, siège de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA).

La délégation américaine à Vienne a demandé à l'AIEA de s'expliquer sur le fait que l'agence onusienne de sûreté nucléaire n'ait pas encore visité le site

militaire iranien de Parchine, près de Téhéran.

Des photos satellites du complexe ont été publiées mercredi soir par un organisme proche des services de renseignements américains, l'Institute for Science and International Security, et par la chaîne de télévision ABC News.

"Pour nous cela démontre des intentions militaires", a déclaré une source américaine.

"Nous démentons catégoriquement qu'il y ait des activités liées au nucléaire

à Parchine", a rétorqué Hossein Moussavian, porte-parole de la délégation iranienne auprès de l'AIEA.

Des sources diplomatiques avaient indiqué à l'AFP vendredi dernier que l'AIEA avait fait une demande pour visiter le site, sans avoir reçu d'accord à ce stade, mais que l'agence onusienne n'a pas fait mention de Parchine dans son

dernier rapport sur le programme iranien, début septembre.

M. Moussavian a démenti que la république islamique ait reçu une demande en ce sens: "Ils n'ont pas demandé d'y aller. S'ils le font, nous accepterons", a-t-il dit.

Un porte-parole de l'AIEA s'est refusé à tout commentaire mais son directeur-général, Mohamed ElBaradei, pourrait s'expliquer à ce sujet devant la

presse.

Une visite à Parchine s'inscrirait dans les inspections que mène l'AIEA

depuis 2003 pour s'assurer que le programme nucléaire iranien est bien pacifique comme l'affirme la république islamique et non pas militaire, comme le disent les Américains.

Le complexe militaire de Parchine, à 30 km au sud-ouest de la Téhéran, n'a rien de secret. Il abrite une série de projets de défense iraniens, notamment d'explosifs chimiques.

La crainte existe, selon des sources américaines, que les Iraniens mènent également à Parchine des expériences sur "des charges fortement explosives avec

un coeur d'uranium appauvri" pour tester "à blanc" une réaction fissile militaire.

Un diplomate à Vienne n'a pas exclu cependant que l'affaire soit montée en épingle au moment où Washington fait pression pour obtenir des 35 gouverneurs de l'AIEA le texte le plus dur possible contre l'Iran .

De rudes négociations se déroulaient à ce sujet entre les délégations en marge de la réunion plénière du conseil des gouverneurs, qui a été ajourné depuis mardi soir à Vienne.

"Les différences se réduisent. On progresse, mais rien ne dit qu'on arrivera

à un accord d'ici jeudi soir comme c'est l'objectif", ni même avant le week-end, a estimé un diplomate européen auprès.

L'UE, a-t-il dit, "reste ferme" pour refuser que l'AIEA impose un ultimatum à l'Iran impliquant automatiquement l'envoi en novembre du dossier au Conseil de sécurité.

Les Etats-Unis jugent "essentiel et urgent" que les Iraniens prennent des "actions nécessaires" avant le 31 octobre, notamment sur la nature de leurs projets d'enrichissement et de conversion d'uranium et veulent des explications

complètes pour "vraiment comprendre" leurs activités nucléaires passées.

"Nous faisons des progrès" et "les capitales en ont été saisies", a déclaré un responsable américain. Les trois grands Européens, Allemagne, Grande-Bretagne et France, "préfèrent une menace implicite" à Téhéran mais sans rupture du dialogue.

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AFP 161504 SEP 04

0361 RUS /AFP-SM40

Russie-Iran-nucléaire-AIEA-ONU LEAD

La Russie contre le projet de transférer le dossier nucléaire iranien à l'ONU

MOSCOU, 17 sept (AFP) - La Russie "ne considère pas comme utile de transférer le dossier nucléaire iranien au Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU", a déclaré vendredi le vice-ministre des Affaires étrangères Iouri Fedotov.

"A l'heure actuelle, cette question est examinée par le Conseil de l'AIEA

(Agence internationale pour l'énergie atomique) et la transférer au Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU est une étape injustifiée", a affirmé M. Fedotov, cité par les agences russes.

"Nous considérons comme indispensable d'utiliser complètement le potentiel de l'AIEA dans la résolution de ces questions", a-t-il ajouté.

Les Etats-Unis et trois grands pays européens sont parvenus jeudi, après trois jours de discussions, à un accord à Vienne sur un projet de résolution à l'ONU sur le supposé programme iranien d'armements nucléaires.

Les Etats-Unis, qui accusent l'Iran de développer en secret des armes nucléaires, voudraient que le conseil de l'AIEA juge l'Iran coupable de ne pas se conformer aux exigences du Traité de non-prolifération nucléaire et traduise

Téhéran devant le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies pour y recevoir d'éventuelles sanctions.

L'Iran souligne que son programme nucléaire est destiné à fabriquer de l'électricité et qu'il revêt un caractère civil et pacifique.

Ces déclarations surviennent alors que la construction de la centrale nucléaire de Bouchehr, la première à être construite dans un Etat islamique, a subi d'importants retards dont les causes n'ont pas été énoncées publiquement.

Fin août, l'Organisation iranienne de l'énergie atomique avait reconnu que la première centrale avait pris plusieurs mois de retard et qu'aucun accord n'était encore trouvé avec la Russie sur la livraison de combustible nucléaire.

Selon un nouveau calendrier divulgué à Téhéran, les Russes auxquels a été attribué le contrat de 800 millions de dollars ne remettront qu'en octobre 2006

les clés de la centrale de Bouchehr aux Iraniens. La mise en service était initialement prévue en été ou fin 2005.

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AFP 171122 SEP 04

0442 AUT /AFP-UT33

AIEA-Iran-nucléaire 2ELED

Pas d'activités nucléaires sur site militaire iranien: AIEA

VIENNE, 17 sept (AFP) - Il n'y a "aucune indication d'activités liées au nucléaire" sur le complexe de Parchine, près de Téhéran, a affirmé vendredi le directeur-général de l'agence Mohamed ElBaradei, en réponse aux soupçons américains d'expériences nucléaires de nature militaire.

"Nous n'avons aucune indication d'activités liées au nucléaire", a-t-il dit,

en soulignant cependant que, les inspecteurs de l'agence suivaient toutes les révélations sérieuses qui leur sont signalées.

"Les rapports de l'AIEA sont basés sur des faits", a-t-il déclaré, en soulignant que rien n'avait été omis dans le rapport du 1er septembre sur l'Iran.

Il a ajouté manifestement agacé: "nous n'avons pas besoin des suppositions de tierces parties", ni de "délocalisation" des inspections dans d'autres pays.

La délégation américaine à Vienne avait demandé jeudi à l'AIEA de

s'expliquer sur le fait que l'agence onusienne de sûreté nucléaire n'ait pas encore effectué de visite au site militaire iranien de Parchine, près de Téhéran.

Des photos satellites de ce site ont été publiées mercredi soir par un organisme proche des services de renseignements américains, l'Institute for Science and International Security, et par la chaîne de télévision ABC News.

"Pour nous, cela démontre des intentions militaires", selon une source américaine jeudi.

"Nous démentons catégoriquement qu'il y ait des activités liées au nucléaire à Parchine", a alors rétorqué Hossein Moussavian, porte-parole de la délégation iranienne auprès de l'AIEA. M. Moussavian a démenti que la République islamique ait reçu une demande en ce sens: "Ils n'ont pas demandé d'y aller. S'ils le font, nous accepterons", a-t-il dit.

Des sources diplomatiques avaient déclaré à l'AFP que l'AIEA avait demandé à visiter le site, sans avoir reçu d'accord à ce stade, mais que l'agence onusienne n'avait pas fait mention de Parchine dans son dernier rapport début septembre.

L'AIEA mène depuis 2003 des inspections pour s'assurer que le programme nucléaire iranien est bien destiné à un usage pacifique comme l'affirme la république islamique et non pas militaire comme le disent les Américains.

Le complexe militaire de Parchine, à 30 km au sud-est de Téhéran, abrite une série de projets de défense, notamment d'explosifs chimiques.

La crainte existe, selon des sources américaines, que les Iraniens y mènent également en bunkers des expériences sur "des charges fortement explosives avec

un coeur d'uranium appauvri" pour tester "à froid" une réaction fissile militaire.

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AFP 171827 SEP 04

0697 IRN /AFP-WX32

Iran-missiles-nucléaire PREV

L'Iran montre ses missiles en action malgré le soupçon nucléaire (PAPIER GENERAL ACTUALISE)

par Laurent LOZANO

= (PHOTOS) =

TEHERAN, 18 sept (AFP) - L'armée iranienne a exhibé samedi une partie de son

arsenal balistique en pleine action, malgré les soupçons d'un programme secret pour disposer de la bombe atomique à laquelle ces missiles pourraient servir de

vecteurs.

L'armée idéologique du régime islamique, les Gardiens de la Révolution, a procédé à des tirs d'entraînement lors de grandes manoeuvres dans l'ouest du pays et en présence du Guide suprême, l'ayatollah Ali Khamenei, selon les images de la télévision d'Etat.

Cette dernière a montré en particulier deux missiles s'élevant à la verticale au milieu des "ya Hussein" d'acclamation lancés au poste de commandement, mais sans préciser s'il s'agissait ou non des engins de "longue portée" qu'elle avait annoncés auparavant.

La télévision avait dit plus tôt que les Gardiens de la Révolution tireraient dans la journée un missile "de longue portée sur les positions d'un ennemi factice". Elle parlait aussi de "missile stratégique".

Mais elle ne disait pas si elle évoquait une nouvelle arme ou bien le Chahab-3, missile conventionnel qui met Israël, régulièrement présenté comme la

première cible potentielle, à portée de frappe.

S'il s'agissait du Chahab-3, ces tirs seraient a priori les premiers dont le

régime ferait état en situation opérationnelle depuis qu'une version optimisée en a été mise à l'épreuve le 11 août.

Le pouvoir avait alors annoncé que les tests avaient été couronnés de succès. Et le ministre de la Défense Ali Chamkhani avait dit le 7 septembre que

son pays était prêt à mener des tests sous le regard d'observateurs pour faire mentir certaines informations selon lesquelles les essais du 11 août avaient été un échec

Les premières informations rapportées dans l'après-midi après la visite du Guide ne permettaient toutefois pas d'en savoir plus.

Selon la télévision, le Guide, qui s'est rendu sur l'un des terrains de manoeuvres dans la province de Zanzan et a suivi "de près toutes les étapes", a

notamment visionné des tirs de missiles sol-sol et sol-air sur écran au commandement central de l'exercice.

Le développement des activités balistiques iraniennes ajoute aux inquiétudes

de la communauté internationale devant le programme nucléaire de la République islamique.

Ce dernier est purement civil, proclame Téhéran. Mais Israël et les Etats-Unis en particulier, ennemis déclarés de la République islamique, sont convaincus du contraire et s'alarment que les missiles iraniens pourraient servir de vecteurs à des charges nucléaires.

Le régime glorifie actuellement dans les médias officiels les capacités balistiques du pays, au moment même où l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA) examine à nouveau le dossier nucléaire iranien.

Les médias officiels rendent compte abondamment des grandes manoeuvres auxquelles procèdent depuis quelques jours les Gardiens de la Révolution et dont

l'objectif annoncé est d'"essayer et d'évaluer de nouveaux équipements", de mettre à l'épreuve des "tactiques modernes" et de "maintenir l'esprit du jihad

(guerre sainte) et de la défense" des troupes.

Ces exercices (Achoura 5, du nom du jour de la mort de l'imam Hussein, l'un des deux imams les plus révéérés par les chiites) coïncident avec les commémorations de la "défense sacrée", appellation officielle de la guerre contre l'Irak (1980-1988).

Ils donnent lieu à un vaste battage de la télévision montrant, sur fond de musique nationaliste ou traditionnelle, des mouvements de troupes, d'avions, d'hélicoptères, de blindés, des soldats en ligne tirant sur l'ennemi ou sautant

en parachute comme à la parade.

Mais la télévision s'est repue des images de fusées. "Les forces aériennes des Pasdaran ont tiré hier (vendredi) des missiles de courte et moyenne portées

sur des positions ennemies fictives", a-t-elle dit.

L'Iran affirme que le Chahab-3 est une arme purement défensive et dissuasive. Les renseignements israéliens estiment que l'Iran pourrait posséder

la bombe atomique d'ici à 2007.

lal/tp

AFP 181409 SEP 04

Press Conference by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan- 6 October 1973 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Relations, Historical Documents, Vol. 1-2. 1947-1974.

3. Press Conference by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, 6 October 1973.

At 2030 hours, the Minister of Defence held a press conference which was televised. Following is Mr. Dayan's opening statement:

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I want to make a brief opening statement and then to answer as many questions as I have information to provide you with.

I suppose everyone knows by this time that the Syrian and Egyptian attack started today, at ten minutes to 2 this afternoon. We had information and we suspected that such an attack would take place, so we were faced with the dilemma of whether to open fire first and, of course, thereby to obtain a very important advantage, or not to do so and lose this military advantage, but make sure that the picture will be clear, the true one - that the Egyptians and the Syrians started the war - and this is the start of an all-out war again.

We decided to take the second course, taking into account the military outcome of that course, and only this morning we started mobilizing our reserves. Before that we informed other governments of what we thought was going to happen, that is to say, of the Egyptian and Syrian attack.

I want to explain one thing about our general attitude or specific approach to the question. We face a great number of forces on both fronts, Egyptian and Syrian. Now and again they reinforce their forces along the line, sometimes they are more reluctant. But if we want to maintain normal life in this country we have to take the risk of not holding the line, especially the Egyptian line, with many forces, because when we say forces that means the young people of Israel, and if we do that with a great number for many years, in this case for six years, then we cannot have normal life in the country. So, the way we do it is to take the risk of something similar to what happened today, that we would have to follow up later, after the start of the war, with small forces on the spot at the start, and mobilize our reserves and eventually reach a sufficient number of forces - and I believe we shall have enough. We do not have enough men today, at the beginning - that is, enough forces to meet the enemy and to control the area there. That is one problem we have to face, and this is the answer.

The second one I already referred to, namely, whether to start or not to start a preventive war. In this case we considered it and it was a decision of the Government not to strike first, even though we were sure that they would strike - in order to have that political, or whatever you would call it, advantage at the expense of the military

advantage. I think it was the right decision. I think both of them are correct decisions. The first, not to keep many forces there for too long a time, and the second, in this case today, unlike six years ago, not to strike first, not to start with the preventive strike, because we are not in the position that we were in before. Had it been the lines we had before - Latrun, 10 or 15 miles from Lydda, 25 kms. from the sea, and a divided Jerusalem and so on - we could not have taken such risks. But, after all, Sinai is far away and we can allow ourselves such a tactic or strategy: to say "Never mind, we can fight and even if at the beginning the Egyptians manage to cross the Canal and some of them did manage to cross the Canal - and even if we shall have to evacuate or lose some positions, it is far away and it is a big desert, and in order to defend it you have to keep a lot of forces or to start a war again and again, which we do not want." This is the second course, the philosophy.

What happened today on both fronts is that in the North I think we lost a position. We did have some casualties, not significant ones. That is to say, after the first day of fighting I think our position there is well established. None of the settlements suffered in a significant way. All the women and children were evacuated. We have some forces there and eventually we shall have the mobilized reserve forces. The Syrians lost much more heavily than we did and I feel sure that their plan, their objective - to kick us out of the Golan Heights - will fail.

But, as in Sinai, there, too, we have the two stages. The first when the war starts and the second when we have the complete number of our forces after bringing over the mobilized reserves, which takes time - days or hours depending on where it is. Then we can conduct the war the way we like, and I believe we can get to that point eventually. Not today. The half day today was their beginning, their initiative. They started, they had the initiative. We had to stop them and mobilize the reserves, bring them over, which takes time. I believe we shall manage to do it. And the sum of the first day is that they have not had any real gains in the Golan Heights.

Now, the situation in Sinai. Objectively, to begin with, it is much different. It is a much bigger scale, a big, big desert with the long line of the Suez Canal, and there are a lot of places where people can cross. It is not a continuous line that you are holding, even with numerous forces, and certainly not with small forces, so I would have been surprised if they had not managed to cross in some places or to establish bridges.

They have crossed in a few places and we have lost a few positions, and we had casualties there. I suppose during the night they will have more forces crossing and tomorrow morning we shall see more Egyptians on our side of the Suez Canal. We shall not sit quietly either and when we pass this stage, between the start of the war and the full reinforcement of our forces, with the armour and other forces that should be mobilized and supported over there, then we can start the real war the way we see it and not only try and stop them.

As I said, this is our answer to the problem of a small country, with three million people, that have to live under such conditions and at the same time want to have a normal life here. That is our answer. I believe in this, and I suppose that when the end of this battle or war comes we shall be proved right.

UNSC Resolution 339

23 October 1973

The Security Council,

Referring to its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973,

1. Confirms its decision on an immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all military action, and urges that the forces of the two sides be returned to the positions they occupied at the moment the cease-fire became effective.
 2. Requests the Secretary-General to take measures for immediate dispatch of United Nations observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between the forces of Israel and the Arab republic of Egypt, using for this purpose the personnel of the United Nations now in the Middle East and first of all the personnel now in Cairo.
-

Adopted at the 1748th meeting by 14 votes to none.

Israel Special Weapons News 1998

Peres Admits Israeli Nuclear Capability.

(IsraelWire-7/14) Tuesday, July 14, 1998 8:13

In an unprecedented statement, former prime minister Shimon Peres stated yesterday that **Israel "built a nuclear option, not in order to have a Hiroshima but an Oslo."** To date, no Israeli leader has made any public statements admitting to Israeli nuclear capabilities, prior to Peres' statement yesterday.

Peres added, "we thought the reason that Israel was attacked 5 times was because some of our neighbors thought they can overcome us." He concluded that he believes if not for it [the nuclear option], we would not have Oslo. The former prime minister made the statements during a press conference in Jordan, following his meeting with King Hussein.

**Debate in the Knesset on Nuclear Weapons and Mordechai Vanunu Proposal
Tabled by Knesset Member Issam Makhoul, February 2, 2000**

The following is the English version of the speech made today, February 2, 2000, by Knesset Member Issam Makhoul, in the historic debate in the Knesset on Israel's nuclear policy.

Mr. Chairman, Honorable Knesset,

This is a historic day. For the first time since the establishment of the State of Israel, the Knesset is holding a debate on the issue of nuclear weapons in Israel, so this debate is being held 40 years late. This is also a sad day, because it reminds us, that the Knesset shirked its responsibility in an area that threatens us with the next holocaust, if we do not come to our senses, pause and stop in our tracks before the disaster. I hope that today's debate will symbolize the breaking of the wall of silence and the beginning of an intensive debate in the Knesset and among the public on this subject.

Allow me to welcome our guests, Dr. Ray Kidder, one of the leading nuclear scientists in the United States, a man who has won numerous awards, who worked for decades at the U.S. government's National Nuclear Laboratory of Lawrence-Livermore, California, and who came to Israel especially to be present at this debate; the members of the Israeli Committee for Mordechai Vanunu and for a Middle East Free of Atomic, Biological and Chemical Weapons; representatives of the World Committee of Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War; the representatives of the embassies of Egypt and Russia; and the many public figures, from the fields of academia, culture and the media, who are committed to breaking through the longstanding conspiracy of silence on the nuclear issue, who are here today for this debate.

Members of the Knesset, I will begin with a quotation from the joint manifesto of Albert Einstein and philosopher Bertrand Russell, of July 9, 1955: "We are speaking on this occasion, not as members of this or that nation, continent, or creed, but as human beings, members of the species Man, whose continued existence is in doubt... The problem... stark and dreadful, and inescapable [is]: Shall we put an end to the human race, or shall mankind renounce war?"

Shortly after Albert Einstein issued that call for the elimination of nuclear weapons, he was approached by Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and asked to serve as the president of the State of Israel. Ben-Gurion was already involved in the efforts to develop nuclear weapons in Israel, but he did not disclose that fact to Einstein. The eminent scientist turned down the offer. Einstein, a rare combination of a scientific genius and a humanist, already then believed that no message of justice and peace for humanity was forthcoming from Israel. How right he was.

For the past 40 years, the policy of the Israeli governments on the nuclear issue has been characterized by fraud, lies and deceit. I strongly recommend to all Knesset Members to read the book "Vanunu and the Bomb", that was published last year by

the Israeli Committee for Mordechai Vanunu and for a Middle East Free of Atomic, Biological and Chemical Weapons. It is important for the Knesset Members to be exposed to alternative information on a subject concerning which the government, the media and academia have collaborated to brainwash and drug the public. In one of the chapters in the book, entitled "The Israeli Government Declares", by journalist Gideon Spiro, the writer recalls that the deceit began 39 years ago, when on this very podium, **on December 20, 1960, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion announced the construction of "a research reactor in Dimona, that is designed entirely for peaceful purposes, and that when it is completed, it will be open to researchers from other countries."** When he made that statement, Ben-Gurion knew that the reactor was not built for "peaceful purposes" and that there was no intention to open it to "researchers from around the world." Rather, we were presented with an Israeli atomic bomb factory, the work of which would be concealed from the citizens of Israel and from the citizens of the world.

When the London weekly *The Sunday Times* published Mordechai Vanunu's revelations in October 1986, an alarming picture was revealed, showing that Israel already had more than 100 atomic bombs. Since then, the number of bombs, according to experts' estimates, is thought to have increased to the insane amount of 200-300.

That is what we must discuss today, Mr. Chairman. The problem is not the messenger Vanunu, but the policy of all Israeli governments, which has turned this small piece of land into a poisonous and poisoning nuclear waste bin, which could blow us all to heaven in a nuclear mushroom. The crime of manufacturing nuclear weapons in Israel was combined with another crime, the collaboration between Israel and the neo-Nazi apartheid regime in South Africa.

I do not have the time to enter into the historic debate about whether the establishment of the reactor was a strategic blessing for Israel. Is the doomsday weapon a deterrent that guarantees Israel's existence? I believe not. However, even those people who do believe that this is the case, cannot ignore the fact that what once appeared to them to be a blessing (a view which I do not share), is now a curse.

Nuclear ambiguity is nothing but self-delusion, and has long ago ceased to be effective. The entire world now knows that Israel has a huge stockpile of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and that it serves as the cornerstone for the nuclear arms race in the Middle East. In Israel there is frequent mention of the "Iranian and Iraqi danger", while ignoring the fact that it was Israel that introduced nuclear weapons to the Middle East in the first place, and created the legitimacy for other states in the region to obtain nuclear weapons.

One obvious proof that the ambiguity and deterrence which formed the basis for Israel's nuclear policy have become redundant, is Israel's acquisition of the German submarines that have recently arrived in this country and which, according to the media, will be equipped with nuclear missiles. The purpose of these submarines is to cruise deep in the sea and constitute the "second strike" force, in the event that Israel is attacked with nuclear weapons. That means, that not only do the hundreds of nuclear bombs that Israel possesses not pose a defense - they actually caused the military establishment to fear a nuclear early strike, which escalates the spiral of the non-conventional arms race further and further, at the cost of billions of dollars.

Today the so-called ambiguity applies only to the citizens of Israel. They are unable to act as democratic critics of their government because the latter conceals from them the truth about an issue on which their lives depend. We have no

information about the people who have their fingers on the nuclear button, what is their chain of command, or what is our defense if a nuclear Barukh Goldstein should infiltrate the system, and equipped with a religious sanction from some rabbi, launch a nuclear Armageddon.

Mr. Chairman, the dangers to the citizens of Israel and to our neighbors exist not only in the event of a nuclear war. Even without a war, we face the constant danger of the eruption of the nuclear volcano that we have built on our own doorstep.

In the 40 years of the reactor's operation, a huge amount of nuclear waste has accumulated. This waste, if it leaks, could contaminate the land and water for centuries and millennia. I do not have to explain the significance of such a scenario in a country like ours, that needs every drop of water it can get. How is the waste stored? There are different methods, some safer, some less, none perfectly safe. It is all a matter of financial investment.

Since everything in this area is cloaked in secrecy, extra-parliamentary ecological monitoring groups cannot supervise the government's actions. "Trust Big Bother," the government tells us. But we know from our experience, and from experience that has accumulated worldwide, that we must not rely on the government, and in the absence of supervision by non-governmental and independent organizations, the danger of negligence lurks at our doorstep. The reactor is old, the safety measures are kept secret from us. A mini-Chernobyl disaster as the result of human error or material stress would make this country unfit for human habitation.

Last year a story appeared in the media, according to which Israel exports part of its nuclear waste to be buried in Mauritania, in Africa. I ask the Prime Minister: Is this true? Has Israel adopted the criminal colonialist practice of polluting the Third World, which European countries abandoned some years ago following the struggle of the green organizations?

I ask the Prime Minister: What is the condition of Israel's nuclear missile sites near Kfar Zechariah on the outskirts of Jerusalem, and near Yodfat in the Galilee? Are there additional sites? Of course, these sites must be shut down, but until common sense prevails, they must be available to monitoring by parliamentary and extra-parliamentary ecological organizations from Israel and abroad.

I ask the Prime Minister: How is it that plants in which the missiles are manufactured and atom bombs are made are located in the most densely populated areas in Israel, in the center and in Haifa? I ask the Prime Minister: Do you not understand that the Biological Institute in Nes Tsiona, which is where Israel manufactures its biological warfare, is set in a residential area, which is a crime against the residents of Israel and the neighboring countries?

And what about the risk of an earthquake? **The reactor in Dimona is located over the Syrian-African Rift. An earthquake similar to the one that occurred in Turkey last year would crack the reactor, and Israel would be covered with a radioactive dust.** If that happens, there would be nothing left but say goodbye, and die a terrible death.

I refer you to the article by Professors Barukh Kimmerling and Kalman Altman, who wrote: "The public is unaware of the dangers that they face from the enormous amounts of plutonium in the area and from the difficulty in storing the nuclear waste. The 'nuclear option' was intended to be a response to security threats, but perhaps it should be examined whether the medicine is not more deadly than the disease." (Ha'aretz, 5.11.99).

The international community has recognized that the nuclear issue is not an internal affair of any state, but has implications that reach beyond national and geographic borders and require international attention.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and other treaties relating to this issue are the sum total of worldwide human wisdom mobilized to defend us from nuclear holocaust.

Israel has chosen to remain outside the realm of human wisdom. That was a dangerous choice. The mentality of 'a nation unto its own' entails, in the context of the issue at hand, the syndrome of national suicide. Our lives and our security will not be guaranteed by the reactor in Dimona, nor by the hundreds of atomic bombs, nor by the millions of biological warfare germs that are produced at the Biological Institute in Nes Tsiona, nor by the chemical weapons that Israel is developing. Rather, our security would come from an inspired initiative to make the Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction.

Israel is the party that started the race and it bears the responsibility for changing that course. I call on the government of Israel to open all doors and windows and air the information. A certain change in the right direction took place in November 1999, when parts of the transcripts of the trial of Mordechai Vanunu were released. Naturally, that is not enough. The Dimona reactor must be opened to international inspection; a moratorium must be declared on the production of all weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, biological and chemical; all information must be released about the amount of bombs that Israel possesses. Israel must announce, as a confidence-building measure, its willingness to begin unilateral nuclear disarmament, to be completed in the framework of a general Middle East treaty.

In fact, there is no need for nuclear weapons. Paul Nitze, who was the chief U.S. representative to the arms control negotiations on behalf of the Reagan administration, not exactly a dangerous Leftist, wrote in the New York Times: "The truth is that I see no reason not to unilaterally eliminate the nuclear weapons that we possess. Keeping them is a costly matter, which adds nothing to our security. I cannot think of any circumstances in which it would be wise for the U.S.A. to use nuclear weapons, even in retaliation for the use of such weapons against us. What would be our targets in such an event? It is impossible to think of a target that could be hit without the strike entailing the mass killing of innocent people... The very existence of nuclear weapons endangers our existence." (Published in *Ha'aretz*, 1.11.99).

We need to extend our hand to Egypt in its efforts to bring all countries in the Middle East into the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We must respond to the Syrian demand that the peace negotiations include the dismantling of weapons of mass destruction. The Dimona reactor must become a burial site, and that burial site should serve as a reminder to future generations of the foolishness of humankind on one hand, and also of its recognition of that foolishness before it was too late.

Mordechai Vanunu, who was kidnapped in Italy in an act of terrorism on the part of the State of Israel, and who was later tried in a secret and unfair trial, is a prisoner of conscience who sacrificed himself on the altar of the struggle for a nuclear-free world. A person who hands over to the free press information about the negligence and crimes of his government, as Mordechai Vanunu did when he exposed the information about what was being done behind the walls of the Dimona reactor, was neither a traitor nor a spy. Rather, he performed the role of a whistleblower and carried the democratic principle of the public's right to know. It was no accident that Mordechai Vanunu received the Right Livelihood Award and the Danish Peace Prize,

and that every year he is a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize. The world recognizes people who work to save humanity from a nuclear holocaust.

From this podium I call on the government of Israel and on the President to listen to the voices coming from all corners of the globe, the voices of politicians, scientists, Nobel Peace Prize laureates, artists and authors, to release Mordechai Vanunu after 13 years in prison, more than 11 of which he spent in cruel solitary confinement. Even President Clinton has recently called for Vanunu's release. He has served two-thirds of his sentence and he is entitled to parole. It is time to end the vindictiveness.

With your permission, Members of the Knesset, I wish to appeal from this podium to Regional Cooperation Minister Shimon Peres. History, I believe, will judge you harshly for two things: your major role in establishing the Dimona reactor, and for the order that you gave, when you served as Prime Minister, to commit the act of terrorism of abducting Mordechai Vanunu, from London via Italy, in September 1986.

I doubt whether you would have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, if the members of the Nobel committee had been aware of your immense contribution to the production of Israel's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. Now, as you approach the last stretch of your political career, I ask you to right both wrongs: to begin the process of Israel's disarmament of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as part of making our region free of weapons of mass destruction, and to release Mordechai Vanunu.

The International Court in The Hague has ruled that nuclear weapons are illegal. I propose to the government of Israel and to the Knesset to make an effort, however difficult, to join the ranks of the enlightened international community.

In summing up, I wish to quote again from the manifesto of Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell, in which they called for the elimination of nuclear weapons: "We appeal, as human beings, to human beings: Remember your humanity and forget the rest. If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death."

The Auschwitz survivor, the author Yehiel Dinur, whose books were published under the name Ka. Tzetnik, called the outcome of nuclear weapons a nuclear Auschwitz. A few days ago, on January 27, the anniversary was celebrated of the liberation of Auschwitz by the Red Army. Note the historic irony and absurdity: Israel has become a haven for the creators of a new holocaust, the nuclear Auschwitz. Mordechai Vanunu learned the major lesson of the Holocaust, but the State of Israel has yet to learn.

If he were still alive today, Albert Einstein would have considered Mordechai Vanunu to be a man after his own heart, a culture hero, a courageous man of conscience with a humanist vision who sacrificed his freedom for the noble ideal of eliminating nuclear weapons and preventing a nuclear Auschwitz. He would certainly have joined the ranks of those who protest Vanunu's abduction and demand his release.

0394 ISR /AFP-PH15

Israël-Sharon-armée-histoire

Ariel Sharon a songé en 1967 à un coup de force militaire

JERUSALEM, 16 nov (AFP) - Le Premier ministre Ariel Sharon a songé de son propre aveu à un coup de force militaire en 1967, alors qu'il était général, pour contraindre le gouvernement à déclencher la guerre, selon son témoignage publié cette semaine dans une revue.

M. Sharon a confié avoir envisagé à l'époque que "l'armée prenne le pouvoir pour contraindre le gouvernement à se décider" à lancer une attaque préventive contre l'Egypte.

On savait que l'armée avait exercé une très forte pression sur le gouvernement mais qu'Ariel Sharon ou d'autres généraux aient songé à une espèce

de putsch constitue une révélation.

"Pour la première fois, j'ai eu alors le sentiment qu'une telle chose pouvait se produire en Israël et serait bien accueillie" par la population, a confié M. Sharon au service historique de l'armée, dans un témoignage publié par la revue Maarakhhot du ministère de la Défense.

"Il ne s'agissait pas pour l'armée de prendre le pouvoir et diriger le pays mais de décider", à la place du pouvoir civil ajoute M. Sharon qui faisait partie à l'époque de l'état-major et commandait une division blindée dans le sud d'Israël.

Il souligne qu'aucune mesure concrète n'avait été prise en vue d'exécuter un

tel plan et qu'il en avait parlé avec le chef d'état-major et futur Premier ministre Yitzhak Rabin, qui affirme-t-il, n'aurait pas totalement écarté une telle option.

La tension entre armée et pouvoir civil avait atteint son point culminant lors d'une entrevue extrêmement orageuse le 28 mai 1967 au QG, entre l'état-major israélien et le Premier ministre travailliste de l'époque Lévy Eshkol.

Lors de cette rencontre, que les historiens ont appelée la "révolte des généraux", le général Sharon et d'autres officiers supérieurs ont exigé qu'Israël déclenche une guerre contre l'Egypte.

Ils affirmaient qu'Israël devait absolument frapper le premier alors que l'Egypte avait concentré des forces dans le Sinaï et fermé le détroit de Tiran,

sur le Mer Rouge, sachant qu'Israël considérait ces actions comme un "casus belli".

Eshkol avait résisté un temps en espérant une intervention internationale qui ne vint pas. Finalement, il devait donner le feu vert à l'attaque le 5 juin

1967, début de la Guerre des Six jours.

ms/hj

AFP 161146 NOV 04

0668 CHL /AFP-XR55

USA-Iran-nucléaire-APEC PREV

Powell: L'Iran veut adapter ses missiles à des charges nucléaires (PAPIER D'ANGLE)

Par Christophe de ROQUEFEUIL

SANTIAGO, 18 nov (AFP) - Le secrétaire d'Etat américain Colin Powell a assuré mercredi que l'Iran, accusé de vouloir se doter secrètement de l'arme atomique, pourrait d'ores et déjà chercher à adapter ses missiles pour qu'ils puissent recevoir une éventuelle charge nucléaire.

"J'ai vu certaines informations suggérant qu'ils (les Iraniens) travaillent activement sur des systèmes de lancement" qui pourraient emporter de possibles charges nucléaires, a-t-il déclaré à des journalistes l'accompagnant avant son arrivée à Santiago (Chili) pour le Forum économique Asie Pacifique (APEC).

"Il ne fait aucun doute, dans mon esprit, qu'ils sont intéressés par une arme nucléaire qui ait une utilité, c'est à dire une arme qu'ils soient capables

de lancer, pas une qui reste là", a-t-il dit.

"Ces informations dont je parle suggèrent qu'ils travaillent dur sur la manière de mettre les deux ensemble", le vecteur et une ogive, a-t-il ajouté.

Un membre de sa délégation a précisé que M. Powell parlait bien de missiles,

et de charges nucléaires potentielles.

Ces informations montrent la détermination de l'Iran à disposer d'une arme nucléaire opérationnelle, mais ne signifient toutefois pas qu'il la possède, a déclaré M. Powell. "Je ne parle pas d'uranium, de matériaux fissiles ou d'une ogive", a-t-il dit.

Le ministre de la Défense iranien, Ali Chamkhani, a déclaré la semaine dernière que l'Iran était capable de "produire en masse" son missile chahab-3, d'une portée annoncée de 2.000 km, capable d'atteindre Israël notamment.

Interrogé sur des informations émanant des Moudjahidine du Peuple, un mouvement d'opposition iranien en exil, affirmant que l'Iran poursuit des activités de nature militaire, y compris de l'enrichissement d'uranium, sur un site secret à Téhéran, M. Powell a affirmé "avoir vu des renseignements qui pourraient corroborer ce que dit ce groupe, et cela devrait préoccuper tout le monde".

M. Powell n'a pas donné plus de détails sur ces efforts iraniens, ni précisé

d'où pourrait provenir la technologie employée.

Washington accuse l'Iran de chercher à se doter de l'arme atomique sous couvert d'un programme civil, ce que dément Téhéran.

L'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA) a annoncé lundi que l'Iran s'engageait à suspendre toutes ses activités d'enrichissement d'uranium à

partir du 22 novembre, en échange de promesses de coopération de trois pays de l'Union européenne (Allemagne, France, Grande-Bretagne), juste trois jours avant

une importante réunion des Etats-membres de l'AIEA à Vienne.

M. Powell a réaffirmé l'approche prudente de Washington face à cet accord.

"Des progrès sont faits, mais ils sont lents. Nous devons rester prudents" sur la bonne application de cet accord, a-t-il dit.

Ce dossier pourrait être évoqué en marge de la conférence internationale sur l'Irak prévue les 22 et 23 novembre à Charm el-Cheikh (Egypte), à laquelle M. Powell doit se rendre après le sommet de l'APEC.

Cette conférence doit réunir l'Irak et les pays voisins, dont l'Iran, les pays membres du G8 (dont les Etats-Unis et les trois pays européens négociant avec Téhéran) ainsi que plusieurs organisations internationales.

M. Powell a indiqué qu'Iraniens et Américains participeraient ensemble aux réunions plénières, comme cela s'est déjà fait par le passé, et n'a pas voulu se prononcer sur un éventuel contact bilatéral, sans l'exclure absolument. "C'est à voir, nous n'avons pas pris de décision", a-t-il dit.

M. Powell a une nouvelle fois demandé à l'Iran qu'il ne cherche pas à s'ingérer dans les affaires irakiennes.

Il a salué l'attitude "un peu plus coopérative" de la Syrie pour empêcher les infiltrations de combattants en Irak au travers de sa frontière, mais a déclaré que "les choses sont moins claires avec l'Iran quant à ce qui peut passer par la frontière".

cr/bm

AFP 180902 NOV 04

0296 IRN /AFP-XO11

Iran-nucléaire-espionnage

Quatre espions nucléaires actuellement jugés en Iran (responsable)

TEHERAN, 18 nov (AFP) - Quatre espions nucléaires sont actuellement jugés par le tribunal révolutionnaire de Téhéran, a annoncé Ali Mobacheri, chef des tribunaux révolutionnaires, cité jeudi par le quotidien gouvernemental Iran.

"Ces individus qui s'étaient infiltrés dans les centres nucléaires et avaient réussi à obtenir la confiance des responsables, espionnaient pour les pays étrangers", a affirmé M. Mobacheri, sans donner plus de détails.

"Ils sont actuellement en prison et leur procès est en cours", a-t-il dit.

Il n'a donné aucune indication sur l'identité des personnes arrêtées ni la date de leur arrestation.

Selon le quotidien Iran, "par le passé, ces individus avaient également fait

de l'espionnage au profit de l'Irak".

En août dernier, le ministre iranien des Renseignements, Ali Younessi, avait

annoncé l'arrestation d'un "certain nombre d'espions qui transmettaient à l'étranger des informations sur le programme nucléaire iranien".

Il avait ajouté que "les +hypocrites+ (l'appellation donnée aux Moudjahidine

du Peuple par les responsables iraniens, ndlr) ont pris la plus grande part au transfert des informations. Par le passé, ils se sont même glorifiés d'avoir fait de l'espionnage contre l'Iran et, lors d'une conférence de presse aux Etats-Unis, ils se sont vantés d'avoir fourni des renseignements aux Américains

et à d'autres".

Les Moudjahidine du Peuple, à travers leur vitrine politique, le Conseil national de la résistance iranienne (CNRI), avaient été les premiers à révéler publiquement, lors d'une conférence de presse à Washington le 14 août 2002, l'existence des sites nucléaires d'Arak et Natanz (centre).

sgh/vl

AFP 180812 NOV 04

0558 AUT /AFP-VV60

Iran-nucléaire-opposition-AIEA-Pakistan 2ELEAD

Khan a fourni de l'uranium enrichi à l'Iran en 2001, selon l'opposition

ATTENTION - Avec changement de lead ///

VIENNE, 17 nov (AFP) - L'Iran dispose à Téhéran d'une usine secrète d'enrichissement d'uranium et a pour objectif d'avoir la bombe atomique l'an prochain, a affirmé mercredi à Vienne l'opposition iranienne en exil.

Les militaires iraniens disposent au nord-est de Téhéran d'un site d'enrichissement "dirigé par Mohsen Fakhri-Zadeh, l'un des plus éminents savants

nucléaires du régime", a déclaré Farid Soleimani, haut responsable du Conseil national de la résistance en Iran (CNRI, Moudjahidine du Peuple).

"Le site est dénommé +Centre pour le développement de la technologie de défense avancée+", a précisé M. Soleimani.

Selon lui, Abdul Qadeer Khan, le père de la bombe atomique pakistanaise, a fourni en 2001 de l'uranium hautement enrichi de qualité militaire à l'Iran, qui

cherche à avoir l'arme nucléaire en 2005. "Khan a fourni une certaine quantité d'UHE à l'Iran en 2001", a-t-il affirmé.

Les militaires iraniens mènent des programmes secrets indépendamment des civils en Iran et se sont fixé 2005 "comme date cible pour avoir la bombe", a-t-il encore dit.

Ces accusations ont été lancées par le CNRI alors que l'Iran vient de s'engager à suspendre toutes ses activités d'enrichissement d'uranium à partir du 22 novembre en échange de promesses de coopération de trois pays de l'Union européenne (Allemagne, France, Grande-Bretagne).

Le 25 novembre, l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA) doit une nouvelle fois examiner la nature du nucléaire iranien, les Etats-Unis accusant Téhéran de vouloir mettre au point l'arme atomique sous couvert d'un programme civil.

Il y a deux ans, le CNRI avait révélé l'existence du site de Natanz situé à 250 km au sud de Téhéran et où 164 centrifugeuses sophistiquées pour l'enrichissement d'uranium ont été découvertes. Le site, entré en opération à la

fin de l'été, a depuis été inspecté par l'AIEA.

Contactée mercredi à son siège de Vienne, l'agence de sûreté nucléaire des Nations unies a indiqué suivre "toutes les pistes solides", sans autre commentaire sur les accusations de l'opposition iranienne.

"Ce type d'accusations est lancé avant chaque session de l'AIEA", a par ailleurs indiqué un diplomate occidental proche de l'agence.

Pour David Albright, président de l'Institut pour la science et la sécurité internationale de Washington, ces accusations sont "très difficiles" à vérifier". "Mais elles semblent établir un lien entre un programme d'armes nucléaires et les militaires" iraniens, a-t-il ajouté.

Par ailleurs à Islamabad, le Pakistan a démenti mercredi les affirmations du

CNRI assurant que Abdul Qadeer Khan avait livré de l'uranium enrichi à l'Iran.

"Ceci est un rapport hautement exagéré. Quelqu'un a laissé courir son imagination", a indiqué à l'AFP sous couvert d'anonymat un membre du

gouvernement après les accusations lancées à Vienne.

Selon le responsable pakistanais, Islamabad a partagé avec la communauté internationale les résultats de ses enquêtes sur les exportations illégales de technologie nucléaire, révélées en février par M. Khan qui avait admis avoir transmis du matériel sensible à l'Iran, la Corée du Nord et la Libye.

msa-rok/eb eaf
AFP 171751 NOV 04

0496 ARE /AFP-EP68

Israël-Vanunu-nucléaire-USA

Vanunu met en garde contre un risque d'un "Tchernobyl" au Proche-Orient
DUBAI, 25 juil (AFP) - L'ancien technicien nucléaire israélien Mordechaï Vanunu a mis en garde contre le risque d'un "deuxième Tchernobyl" au Proche-Orient en raison de l'état vétuste de la centrale nucléaire israélienne de Dimona, dans des propos publiés dimanche par le quotidien arabe Al-Hayat.

M. Vanunu, l'homme qui a révélé les secrets nucléaires de l'Etat hébreu, soutient en outre qu'Israël serait impliqué dans l'assassinat du président américain John F. Kennedy.

L'ancien employé de Dimona, libéré de prison en avril après 18 ans d'incarcération, s'inquiète que la centrale nucléaire construite dans le sud d'Israël il y a 40 ans, devienne en cas d'accident "un deuxième Tchernobyl" par "l'infiltration de radiations nucléaires qui menacent des millions de personnes dans les pays voisins".

Il se réfère à la catastrophe provoquée par l'explosion en 1986 à la centrale nucléaire de Tchernobyl, en Ukraine, qui avait fait plus de trois millions de victimes selon les autorités de ce pays.

"La Jordanie doit soumettre ses habitants dans les régions frontalières avec

Israël à des examens médicaux pour s'assurer de leur éventuelle irradiation et leur administrer les médicaments nécessaires", ajoute-t-il.

Les autorités israéliennes ont interdit à M. Vanunu de parler à des médias étrangers, de sortir du pays et il doit avertir à l'avance la police de ses déplacements, depuis sa sortie de prison. Dans ses propos publiés par al-Hayat, extraits d'une interview à paraître lundi dans le supplément hebdomadaire de ce journal, M. Vanunu évoque en outre une possible implication de l'Etat hébreu dans l'assassinat de Kennedy en 1963,

mais sans fournir la moindre précision.

Selon des "indications quasi-sûres", Kennedy a été assassiné "en raison de pressions qu'il a exercées sur le chef du gouvernement israélien de l'époque, David Ben Gourion, pour qu'il fasse la lumière sur le réacteur nucléaire de Dimona", dit-il. M. Vanunu a en outre affirmé que ses révélations sur le potentiel nucléaire

israélien "sont suffisantes pour considérer Israël comme un danger réel qui menace l'ensemble du Moyen-Orient".

Il a en outre critiqué la visite début juillet du chef de l'Agence internationale pour l'énergie atomique (AIEA) Mohamed ElBaradei en Israël. "Il aurait dû refusé de visiter Israël (dès lors) qu'il n'était pas autorisé à inspecter le réacteur nucléaire" de Dimona, a dit l'ancien détenu.

M. Vanunu avait été condamné en 1986 à 18 ans de prison pour "trahison" et "espionnage" après avoir transmis au Sunday Times britannique des informations sur la centrale nucléaire de Dimona.

L'Etat hébreu n'a jamais reconnu détenir l'arme atomique, mais un certain nombre d'experts militaires étrangers lui prêtent un arsenal de 100 à 200 ogives nucléaires sur la foi, notamment, des informations transmises par M. Vanunu.

tm/ms/mj

AFP 251022 JUL 04

0457 JOR /AFP-IB95

Jordanie-Israël-Vanunu-nucléaire

Nucléaire: Amman dit n'avoir enregistré aucune radiation venant d'Israël
AMMAN, 26 juil (AFP) - La Jordanie n'a pas enregistré de radiations nucléaires provenant de la centrale atomique israélienne de Dimona, a indiqué lundi le gouvernement, après qu'un ancien employé de cette centrale eut estimé que celle-ci faisait courir au Proche-Orient le risque d'un nouveau Tchernobyl.

"A ce jour nous n'avons pas enregistré de radiations", provenant de la centrale de Dimona installée dans le désert du Néguev (sud d'Israël), a déclaré la porte-parole du gouvernement jordanien, Asma Khodr, lors d'un point de presse.

Mme Khodr réagissait aux propos de l'ancien technicien nucléaire israélien Mordechaï Vanunu, qui, dans des propos publiés dimanche par le quotidien arabe Al-Hayat, a mis en garde contre le risque d'un "deuxième Tchernobyl" au Proche-Orient, en raison de l'état vétuste des installations de Dimona.

"La Jordanie doit soumettre ses habitants dans les régions frontalières avec Israël à des examens médicaux pour s'assurer de leur éventuelle irradiation et leur administrer les médicaments nécessaires", a dit dans cet entretien cet ancien employé de Dimona.

"Notre inquiétude se concentre sur les risques d'éventuelles radiations nucléaires en cas d'explosion ou de problèmes techniques dans cette centrale", a dit Mme Khodr.

Selon elle, ces éventualités font l'objet "d'une attention permanente des parties concernées dans le royaume". "Nous soutenons les efforts arabes et internationaux pour faire de cette zone une région libre d'activités nucléaires et pour que des contrôles internationaux soient imposés", a-t-elle ajouté.

Le directeur de l'Agence jordanienne de l'énergie Atomique, Ziad Qoudah a de son côté affirmé que les trois centres de contrôle nucléaire dans le royaume "prélèvent quotidiennement des échantillons d'air et de terre pour les analyser".

Dans des déclarations à la presse il a indiqué que la Jordanie disposait "de stations d'alerte qui se déclenchent en cas d'accident nucléaire".

Il a reconnu que la centrale nucléaire de Dimona construite dans le sud d'Israël il y a 40 ans, a "dépassé l'âge acceptable", mais a-t-il ajouté, il s'agit d'études "sur des hypothèses qui ne sont pas soutenues par des faits précis, cette centrale étant une zone fermée à tout visiteur".

M. Vanunu a été libéré de prison en avril après 18 ans d'incarcération, pour avoir révélé les secrets nucléaires de l'Etat hébreu.

Israël n'a jamais reconnu détenir l'arme atomique, mais un certain nombre d'experts militaires étrangers lui prêtent un arsenal de 100 à 200 ogives nucléaires sur la foi, notamment, des informations transmises par M. Vanunu.

fi-rh/mj
AFP 261446 JUL 04

Iran Special Weapons Contractors

A variety of corporations have been identified as possible participants in the Iranian special weapons development and technology acquisition efforts.

- Amir Kabir Technical University
- Bonyad e-Mostazafan
- Dor Argham Ltd.
- Education and Research Institute
- GAM Iranian Communications
- Ghods Research Center
- Ibn-e Heysam Research and Laboratory Complex
- Imam Hussein University of the Revolutionary Guards
- Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (IAI)
- Iran Argham Co.
- Iran Electronic Industries
- Iran Fair Deal Company, Iran Group of Surveyors
- Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Industries (IHI)
- Iran Tehran Kohakd Daftar Nezarat, Industrial Development Group
- Iran Telecommunications Industry (Sanaye Mokhaberet Iran)
- Jabit bin al-Hayyan Laboratory
- Pars Garma Company
- Sadadja Industrial Group (Sadadja Sanaye Daryae)
- Sezemane Sanaye Defa
- Sharif University of Technology
- Sharif University (Tehran) Physics Research Center
- Taradis Iran Computer Company
- Zakaria Al-Razi Chemical Company

Sources and Resources

Selon Federation of American Scientists

<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/index.html>

Lettre de Avner Cohen

March 8, 2001

Dear friends and colleagues,

Over the past decade, many Israeli historians armed with newly declassified documents have been reexamining many of the myths that shaped the early history of the state of Israel. But while historians have taken a fresh look at seminal questions such as the origins of the Palestinian refugee problem, one area remains shrouded in official secrecy: the history of Israel's nuclear weapons program. In 1998, after almost a decade of research, I published in the United States my book [Israel and the Bomb](#) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), a political history of the origins and the early years of Israel nuclear project.

Ever since, I have been closely monitored, at times being harassed and spied on, by the office of the Chief of Security at the Israeli Ministry of Defense (MALMAB). The MALMAB has made numerous efforts, under the cloth of state legality, to repress the publication of the book.

When this effort failed the MALMAB tried to silence my voice by way of intimidation-invoking the air of unspecified suspicions, ongoing investigation, and even possible arrest. In recent years, and especially since the publication of the Hebrew translation of my book, I have been living with a dark cloud hovering over me regarding my legal situation in my native land. My lawyers are told that the MALMAB has some grounds for investigation against me, but they have been told nothing as to the nature of these allegations. This is a Kafkaesque situation.

In January the Israeli Society for History and Philosophy of Science has invited me to give the keynote speech in its annual meeting in Jerusalem on March 14. The two-day meeting is devoted to the theme

of "Science and Technology in Israel in the Making: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives." I accepted the invitation, not only because of the academic importance of the meeting, but also as an occasion to bring this affair to an end.

As the Hebrew saying goes, "if I am not for myself, who will be for me?" The longer I remain outside Israel with this cloud, the more it looks like I'm afraid to return because I've done something wrong, and I did not. I've been in a kind of exile, and I just don't want to continue to live with that. I am ready to confront it, if necessary.

While the MALMAB leaves the impression as if the issue is state secrets, the real issue at stake, apart of the MALMAB's vendetta about their failure to prevent the publication of my book, is the tension between the policy of "nuclear opacity" and the foundations of democracy. The real issue is the boundaries of discussion and the freedom of academic research on the nuclear subject in Israel.

Decisions about nuclear weapons -- research, development, deployment, and all aspects of that complex -- are among the most fateful decisions that the state can make. And these decisions have ramifications in many, many areas -- from the health of those employed in this effort to questions of regional politics, national security and peacemaking in the Middle East. When all factual discourse regarding nuclear issues is simply not allowed publicly, citizens cannot have even a semblance of an informed discussion. And informed discussion is the essence of democracy. I am convinced that the time has come to update the unwritten contract that Israelis signed with nuclear secrecy some two generations ago.

With some anxiety and trepidation, I intend to go to Israel. There is clearly some personal risk involved. The risk is not because I did something wrong-my conscience is clear-but due to the intrinsic

ambiguity, including legal ambiguity, of the nuclear issue in Israel. Also, the MALMAB has enormous power within the legal system. Since Israel has never openly acknowledged its nuclear weapons program, any reference could be construed as a disclosure of state secrets.

If troubles occur, I will need all possible support. I appreciate your interest in this matter and hope I can count on your support.

Avner Cohen

Senior Fellow

National Security Archive

FAS Note: Israeli scholar Avner Cohen, author of the book *Israel and the Bomb*, summarizes his encounter with Israeli legal authorities on the subject of nuclear secrecy in the following letter. For further background, see his [letter to Israeli Attorney General Elyakim Rubinstein](http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/avnercohen.html). <http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/avnercohen.html>

0260 USA /AFP-KA11

Iran: Bush affirme que parler de frappes américaines n'est pas fondé

WASHINGTON, 19 fév (AFP) - Le président George W. Bush a affirmé que parler de frappes militaires américaines contre les installations nucléaires iraniennes

ne correspondait "simplement pas à la vérité", tout en montrant des signes d'impatience grandissante face à la réponse de Téhéran aux démarches européennes.

"Les Iraniens n'ont pas besoin de quelconques excuses", a déclaré vendredi à

Washington devant des journalistes le président américain, qui effectue la semaine prochaine une visite en Europe : "ils doivent juste faire ce que le monde libre leur a demandé de faire. Et c'est parfaitement clair : abandonnez votre programme d'armes" atomiques.

M. Bush a en outre fait part de son fort soutien à l'activité diplomatique de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France et de l'Allemagne en vue de convaincre l'Iran de laisser tomber son programme d'enrichissement de l'uranium. Mais il a

rejeté les appels à un plus grand engagement de Washington dans les pourparlers

sur ce sujet avec Téhéran.

"Nous sommes déjà engagés dans le processus" du fait de l'appartenance des Etats-Unis à l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA), a dit à cet égard M. Bush.

Le président américain avait déclaré vendredi à une télévision belge, deux jours avant son arrivée à Bruxelles, qu'il ne voulait pas complètement exclure l'option militaire face à l'Iran, mais entendait résoudre la question de ses ambitions nucléaires par la "diplomatie".

ok/ksb/bds/phv

AFP 190858 FEV 05

0555 BEL /AFP-JF37

UE-USA-Bush-Iran-nucléaire 2ELED

Iran : Bush n'écarte pas l'option militaire mais privilégie la diplomatie

BRUXELLES, 18 fév (AFP) - Le président américain George W. Bush ne veut pas exclure toute option militaire face à l'Iran mais entend résoudre la question de

ses ambitions nucléaires par la "diplomatie", a-t-il déclaré vendredi dans une interview à une télévision belge deux jours avant son arrivée à Bruxelles.

"Un président ne peut jamais dire jamais. Mais l'action militaire n'est jamais le premier choix d'un président. La diplomatie est toujours le premier choix du président, en tous cas c'est mon premier choix", a déclaré M. Bush dans

cette interview, accordée à la chaîne publique flamande VRT.

"Nous avons un but commun : c'est que l'Iran ne devrait pas avoir l'arme nucléaire", a-t-il souligné, en référence aux négociations engagées par les trois grands Européens (Allemagne, France, Royaume Uni) avec Téhéran pour faire

renoncer la République islamique à ses ambitions.

"C'est ce que nous avons dit, c'est ce que les Britanniques ont dit, c'est ce que les Français ont dit, c'est ce que les Allemands ont dit... Donc nous voulons soutenir les efforts européens et j'applaudis aux efforts européens", a

ajouté le président américain.

Souriant, visiblement détendu, le locataire de la Maison Blanche a parlé de "mission commune" avec les Européens sur ce dossier. "C'est un but commun et je

veux m'assurer que nous continuons à parler d'une seule voix", a-t-il dit.

Officiellement, Washington a toujours soutenu la démarche européenne visant à négocier avec l'Iran l'abandon définitif de ses activités d'enrichissement d'uranium, susceptibles de doter Téhéran de l'arme atomique.

Lors de son passage à Bruxelles la semaine passée, la secrétaire d'Etat américaine Condoleezza Rice avait toutefois reproché à mots couverts à Paris, Londres et Berlin de ne pas suffisamment agiter devant les Iraniens la menace d'un renvoi de leur cas devant le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies.

Les Européens de leur côté appellent de leurs vœux un "soutien substantiellement plus actif" de la part des Etats-Unis, selon un diplomate européen de haut rang.

Deux ans après les déchirements de la guerre en Irak, le président Bush a adopté, dans son interview à la VRT, un ton tout aussi conciliant à l'égard des

pays, dont la Belgique, qui s'étaient opposés au conflit.

Il a affirmé ne rien exiger d'eux aujourd'hui, notamment pas un engagement sur le terrain à Bagdad, dans la mission de formation des forces de sécurité irakiennes conduite par l'Otan.

"Si vous êtes à l'aise à l'idée de soutenir cette mission avec des soldats, tant mieux. Sinon, vous êtes toujours notre ami", a-t-il affirmé. La Belgique a

annoncé vendredi qu'elle financerait à hauteur de 300.000 euros cette mission et

qu'elle s'engageait à former dix magistrats irakiens en Belgique.

"Nous avons eu nos différences, évidemment, mais ce n'est pas grave. L'essentiel est que nous surmontions ces différences", a ajouté M. Bush, se disant "impatient" de venir à Bruxelles.

Le président américain est attendu dans la capitale belge dimanche soir pour une étape de deux jours, dont le point d'orgue sera mardi un double sommet avec les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de l'Otan et l'Union européenne.

bpi-lb/siu/phc
AFP 182103 FEV 05

0334 BEL /AFP-WP03

USA-Bush-UE-Otan-sommet-Iran 2ELEAD

Bush juge "ridicule" les spéculations sur une attaque de l'Iran par les USA
= (PHOTOS) =

BRUXELLES, 22 fév (AFP) - Le président des Etats-Unis George W. Bush a qualifié mardi soir de "ridicules" les spéculations sur des préparatifs américains pour attaquer l'Iran, tout en répétant qu'il n'excluait aucune option si Téhéran ne renonce pas à ses ambitions nucléaires.

"L'idée que les Etats-Unis se préparent à attaquer l'Iran est simplement ridicule", a déclaré M. Bush à Bruxelles.

"Ayant dit cela, toutes les options sont sur la table", a-t-il ajouté lors d'une conférence de presse à l'issue d'un sommet extraordinaire avec les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de l'Union européenne.

Le président Bush a dit appuyer les efforts des trois grands Européens (Allemagne, France, Royaume Uni) qui négocient actuellement avec l'Iran pour tenter de faire renoncer la République islamique à toute activité d'enrichissement d'uranium à des fins militaires.

"Vous le savez, nous avons discuté de l'Iran", a indiqué M. Bush, en faisant

allusion à ses deux jours de conversations à Bruxelles. "C'est un lieu où je reçois des conseils avisés de la part de nos partenaires européens", a-t-il ajouté.

"Après tout, la Grande-Bretagne, l'Allemagne et la France sont en train de négocier avec les ayatollahs en ayant un objectif commun, quelque chose que nous voulons tous, à savoir que (l'Iran) ne dispose pas de l'arme nucléaire", a poursuivi M. Bush.

"Il est de notre intérêt qu'ils n'aient pas l'arme nucléaire", a insisté le locataire de la Maison Blanche.

Les Etats-Unis accusent ouvertement l'Iran de chercher à se doter de l'arme atomique sous le couvert d'activités nucléaires civiles.

Le président américain a par ailleurs réaffirmé sa condamnation de Téhéran, sommant ce pays de "cesser de financer des organisations terroristes comme le Hezbollah, qui cherche à empêcher le processus de paix au Proche-Orient d'aller

de l'avant".

bur-lb/phr/jh

AFP 221959 FEV 05

0461 GBR /AFP-DE50

USA-GB-Rice-Europe-Iran 2ELED

Rice: une attaque de l'Iran n'est "pas à l'ordre du jour"

LONDRES, 4 fév (AFP) - Une attaque contre l'Iran "n'est pas à l'ordre du jour en ce moment" et les Etats-Unis privilégient la diplomatie pour amener l'Iran à respecter ses obligations nucléaires, a déclaré vendredi la secrétaire

d'Etat américaine Condoleezza Rice.

"De nombreux outils diplomatiques" sont disponibles et les Etats-Unis ont "l'intention de les utiliser pleinement", a expliqué Mme Rice au cours d'une conférence de presse conjointe à Londres avec son homologue britannique Jack Straw.

La "question" d'une attaque de l'Iran "n'est tout simplement pas à l'ordre du jour en ce moment", a-t-elle précisé en réponse à une question.

Arrivée jeudi soir, Mme Rice a entamé par Londres, "meilleur ami" de l'Amérique selon elle, un marathon d'une semaine qui doit l'amener dans huit pays européens ainsi qu'en Israël et en Cisjordanie.

Après Londres qu'elle devait quitter en fin d'après-midi, elle devait se rendre à Berlin, Varsovie, Ankara, Rome, Paris, Bruxelles et Luxembourg, en Israël et en Cisjordanie.

La secrétaire d'Etat américaine a dénoncé "le bilan épouvantable du régime iranien en matière de droits de l'Homme", assurant que la population du pays "mérite mieux".

Mme Rice a fait part de ses "espoirs de réussite" à ce sujet, insistant sur les convergences de vues entre Washington d'une part, et la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Allemagne d'autre part.

Les trois pays tentent de convaincre l'Iran de cesser toute activité relative à l'enrichissement en échange d'une coopération nucléaire avec l'Union

européenne.

"Il y a très peu de différence", selon elle, "dans les défis auxquels nous faisons face avec le régime iranien". En particulier, a-t-elle insisté, "les Etats-Unis ne sont pas seuls à s'inquiéter des activités nucléaires iraniennes".

A la suite du président George W. Bush dans son discours sur l'état de l'Union, mercredi, elle s'est livrée à une attaque en règle d'un pays "engagé dans des activités qui déstabilisent la région, (...) en particulier quand il s'agit de soutenir le terrorisme, dans le but direct de déstabiliser et de ruiner les espoirs d'une paix israélo-palestinienne que nous recherchons tous".

"Nous sommes complètement unis", a-t-elle poursuivi, "dans l'idée selon laquelle l'Iran ne doit pas utiliser la couverture du nucléaire civil" pour développer des armes nucléaires.

Américains, Français, Allemands et Britanniques, a-t-elle insisté, ont été "en très étroite consultation afin d'amener les Iraniens à respecter leurs obligations".

Téhéran doit enfin, a demandé Mme Rice, "avoir des relations transparentes avec ses voisins et avec l'Afghanistan et l'Irak".

cs/bd/nl

AFP 041236 FEV 05

0645 FRA /AFP-WB68

France-nucléaire-Russie-défense PREV

Dissuasion nucléaire: la France et la Russie pratiquent le même modèle (ECLAIRAGE)

Par Emmanuel SEROT

PARIS, 17 nov 2004 (AFP) - Dans le club fermé des puissances nucléaires, la France et la Russie pratiquent une dissuasion globale héritée de la guerre froide, à la différence des Etats-Unis qui développent des mini-bombes et identifient des cibles potentielles, notamment les Etats dits "voyous".

Le président russe Vladimir Poutine a annoncé mercredi à Moscou que son pays

allait bientôt se munir de nouveaux systèmes d'armes nucléaires qui "n'existent

pas et n'existeront pas dans les prochaines années chez les autres puissances nucléaires".

Depuis le retrait en juin 2002 des Etats-Unis du traité antimissile ABM de 1972, qualifié d'"erreur" par Moscou, les Russes sont libres de développer de nouvelles armes nucléaires intercontinentales, mais leur doctrine n'a pas changé, selon les experts.

Ces armes, selon l'agence Itar-Tass, sont de nouveaux missiles d'une portée de 10.000 km qui pourraient franchir un bouclier anti-missiles et dont la production est inscrite aux prévisions des commandes d'Etat pour 2005.

La France, dont les députés ont adopté mardi soir le budget de la Défense pour l'an prochain, consacre aujourd'hui encore 20% de son budget d'équipement militaire au nucléaire, contre 50% à 60% au plus fort de la guerre froide.

Cette dissuasion nucléaire représente un "contrat d'assurance" toujours valable parce qu'il "garantit en premier lieu que la survie de la France ne sera

jamais mise en cause par une puissance militaire majeure animée d'intentions hostiles", jugeait en septembre le chef d'état-major des armées, le général Henri Bentégeat.

Outre la toute prochaine mise en service du troisième sous-marin nucléaire lanceur d'engins nouvelle génération Le Vigilant, Paris prévoit de dépenser l'an

prochain 600 millions d'euros au développement d'un missile intercontinental M-51, d'une portée de 8.000 km.

La dissuasion, explique François Géré, auteur d'un "Dictionnaire de la pensée stratégique", "vise à convaincre un adversaire de renoncer à l'action envisagée" même s'il est plus fort, comme c'était le cas pour la Russie face à la France durant la guerre froide. "L'effet dissuasif est obtenu dès lors que les dommages que l'on peut lui infliger excèdent l'enjeu".

refus d'identification

"Depuis la guerre froide, on est en France sur la même ligne que la Russie en matière de dissuasion", ajoute Barthélémy Courmont, spécialiste du nucléaire

à l'Institut de recherches internationales et stratégiques (IRIS), à ceci près

que l'ennemi visé à l'époque était essentiellement le bloc communiste alors qu'il est désormais multiple.

"La France et la Russie pratiquent le même type de dissuasion, qui consiste à refuser d'identifier l'adversaire tout en maintenant un niveau de suffisance nucléaire, un seuil qui permette de répondre à tous types d'attaques d'où qu'elles viennent", selon lui.

En revanche, les Américains ont remis en cause la notion même de dissuasion en développant depuis quelques années des "mini-nukes", armes nucléaires miniature destinées à percer des bunkers, souterrains ou autres cibles cachées sans avoir à tout vitrifier.

Et surtout, ils disposent depuis 2002 d'une "Nuclear Posture Review" qui identifie les cibles potentielles, essentiellement les Etats dits "voyous", de la Corée du Nord à l'Iran en passant par la Syrie, ainsi que la Chine et la Russie susceptibles de commettre des tirs accidentels.

Aux côtés des modèles de dissuasion franco-russe et américain, figurent le Britannique qui est intégré aux structures de l'Otan et ne dépend pas directement de Londres, et le modèle indo-pakistanaï où les armes indiennes sont tournées vers le Pakistan et les pakistanaïes vers l'Inde.

es/fa/aaa

AFP 171828 NOV 04

0635 RUS /AFP-UW41

Russie-armée-défense-nucléaire PREV

"Armes nucléaires sans pareil" bientôt en Russie: la dissuasion revient
(PAPIER GENERAL)

par Michel VIATTEAU

MOSCOU, 17 nov (AFP) - Le président russe Vladimir Poutine a annoncé mercredi que son pays allait bientôt se munir de nouveaux systèmes d'armes nucléaires, révélant du même coup que, à l'heure du terrorisme et des conflits régionaux, la doctrine de dissuasion nucléaire n'était pas complètement abandonnée.

Ces armes "n'existent pas et n'existeront pas dans les prochaines années chez les autres puissances nucléaires", a déclaré M. Poutine, lors d'une grande

réunion des cadres dirigeants des forces armées russes.

Il s'agit, selon l'agence Itar-Tass, de nouveaux missiles mobiles Topol-M, dont les derniers essais sont prévus fin décembre, et dont la production est inscrite aux prévisions des commandes d'Etat pour 2005.

Ainsi, ces engins de 10.000 km de portée pourraient être livrés à l'armée en

2006. Selon des experts cités par Itar-Tass, leur vitesse et leur manoeuvrabilité leur permettent de franchir un bouclier anti-missiles. Ils pourraient rester opérationnels jusqu'en 2040.

Dans son discours, le chef de l'Etat a cherché à expliquer pourquoi la Russie avait besoin de tels missiles, alors que, avec la fin de la guerre froide, le principal danger émergeant, qu'il cite fréquemment, est le "terrorisme international".

Le terrorisme, est, certes, un des principaux défis actuels, a souligné M. Poutine, mais "nous comprenons qu'il suffit d'affaiblir notre attention dans ces

composantes de notre défense qui forment notre bouclier de missiles nucléaires pour que nous nous trouvions confrontés à d'autres menaces".

Le discours du chef de l'Etat a été accueilli avec scepticisme par des analystes qui y ont vu une tentative de compenser les insuffisances de la Russie.

Pour Alexandre Golts, un expert militaire indépendant respecté, la Russie "mise toujours sur la doctrine de la dissuasion nucléaire comme dans les années

90, ce qui met en évidence la faiblesse de ses forces conventionnelles" et une "mentalité ancienne et dépassée".

"La dissuasion nucléaire suppose la présence d'un ennemi global, les Etats-Unis et l'Occident. Or, il est clair que la Russie n'a pas l'intention de

les frapper ni l'un ni l'autre", souligne M. Golts.

Evoquer de nouveaux systèmes d'armes, estime-t-il, montre que Moscou "n'est pas capable de réformer son armée, ce qui serait la meilleure solution".

Evgueni Volk, de la Fondation Heritage, juge que le président Poutine "est toujours sous l'emprise d'idées dépassées sur un monde bi-polaire".

"Tous les programmes militaires russes en cours vont dans le sens d'un

éventuel conflit nucléaire. Or, les armements nucléaires ne sont nullement efficaces contre le terrorisme", relève l'analyste. Selon lui, M. Poutine "veut

juste valoriser la Russie dans le contexte international, sur fond d'insuffisance de ses performances économiques".

Dans la même intervention, M. Poutine a apporté son soutien à une proposition de son ministre de la Défense Sergueï Ivanov de centraliser les commandes de matériels militaires, renouant avec une pratique de l'époque soviétique.

M. Ivanov, pour sa part, a énuméré les matériels que ses forces spatiales doivent recevoir en 2005: quatre fusées stratégiques (porteuses éventuellement d'ogives nucléaires), neuf satellites, cinq fusées-lanceurs.

Pour l'Armée de Terre, il y aura deux rampes de lancement de missiles Iskander-M, 17 chars T-90, et 92 transporteurs blindés BTR-80.

La Marine recevra deux navires.

L'Armée de l'Air sera dotée d'un nouveau bombardier stratégique Tu-160 et d'un autre remis à neuf, ainsi que de sept chasseurs modernisés Su-27SM, et de nouveaux missiles air-terre de haute précision.

via-ml/kat/bm

AFP 171520 NOV 04

0363 IRN /AFP-WS69

Iran-USA-nucléaire-espionnage

L'Iran confirme la présence d'engins d'espionnage US au-dessus de sa tête
TEHERAN, 16 fév (AFP) - Le ministre des Renseignements Ali Younessi a confirmé mercredi la présence au-dessus de l'Iran d'engins d'espionnage américains, qui seront abattus s'ils se rapprochent, ont rapporté des agences de presse iraniennes.

"Les objets lumineux observés dans le ciel iranien sont des instruments d'espionnage américains", a déclaré Ali Younessi.

Il a parlé de "satellites" mais non pas d'avions de reconnaissance sans pilote, évoqués récemment par le Washington Post, selon les propos rapportés par les agences estudiantine et semi-officielle Isna et Ilna.

Il a relevé que les officiels américains avaient démenti le survol de la République islamique par des drones à la recherche d'éléments prouvant l'existence d'un programme d'armement nucléaire iranien.

"Nous avons les moyens de les combattre (ces engins) et s'ils se rapprochent notre défense antiaérienne les prendra en charge", a ajouté M. Younessi.

Selon lui, "il y a longtemps que les Américains mènent des activités d'espionnage dans le ciel iranien".

Le Washington Post écrivait dimanche que les Etats-Unis avaient fait voler des avions de reconnaissance sans pilote depuis avril 2004 au-dessus de l'Iran, à partir de bases américaines en Irak. La République islamique a protesté officiellement par l'intermédiaire de la Suisse, en l'absence de relations diplomatiques entre les Etats-Unis et l'Iran, ajoutait le journal, mais les autorités iraniennes ont décidé de ne pas attaquer les engins.

L'installation de la nouvelle administration Bush a coïncidé avec un nouveau regain d'animosité entre les Etats-Unis et l'Iran. Le président américain n'a pas exclu l'hypothèse d'opérations militaires si, comme Washington en accuse Téhéran, l'Iran persistait à vouloir se doter de l'arme nucléaire.

Selon M. Younessi, "les Etats-Unis n'ont pas les moyens de leurs menaces". Ces dernières visent à "peser sur les négociations en cours avec les Européens" pour s'entendre sur des garanties que la République islamique ne fabrique pas l'arme nucléaire, a-t-il dit.

sgh-lal/ps
AFP 160919 FEV 05

0558 AUT /AFP-VV60

Iran-nucléaire-opposition-AIEA-Pakistan 2ELEAD

Khan a fourni de l'uranium enrichi à l'Iran en 2001, selon l'opposition

ATTENTION - Avec changement de lead ///

VIENNE, 17 nov (AFP) - L'Iran dispose à Téhéran d'une usine secrète d'enrichissement d'uranium et a pour objectif d'avoir la bombe atomique l'an prochain, a affirmé mercredi à Vienne l'opposition iranienne en exil.

Les militaires iraniens disposent au nord-est de Téhéran d'un site d'enrichissement "dirigé par Mohsen Fakhri-Zadeh, l'un des plus éminents savants nucléaires du régime", a déclaré Farid Soleimani, haut responsable du Conseil national de la résistance en Iran (CNRI, Moudjahidine du Peuple).

"Le site est dénommé +Centre pour le développement de la technologie de défense avancée+", a précisé M. Soleimani.

Selon lui, Abdul Qadeer Khan, le père de la bombe atomique pakistanaise, a fourni en 2001 de l'uranium hautement enrichi de qualité militaire à l'Iran, qui cherche à avoir l'arme nucléaire en 2005. "Khan a fourni une certaine quantité d'UHE à l'Iran en 2001", a-t-il affirmé.

Les militaires iraniens mènent des programmes secrets indépendamment des civils en Iran et se sont fixé 2005 "comme date cible pour avoir la bombe", a-t-il encore dit.

Ces accusations ont été lancées par le CNRI alors que l'Iran vient de s'engager à suspendre toutes ses activités d'enrichissement d'uranium à partir du 22 novembre en échange de promesses de coopération de trois pays de l'Union européenne (Allemagne, France, Grande-Bretagne).

Le 25 novembre, l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA) doit une nouvelle fois examiner la nature du nucléaire iranien, les Etats-Unis accusant Téhéran de vouloir mettre au point l'arme atomique sous couvert d'un programme civil.

Il y a deux ans, le CNRI avait révélé l'existence du site de Natanz situé à 250 km au sud de Téhéran et où 164 centrifugeuses sophistiquées pour l'enrichissement d'uranium ont été découvertes. Le site, entré en opération à la fin de l'été, a depuis été inspecté par l'AIEA.

Contactée mercredi à son siège de Vienne, l'agence de sûreté nucléaire des Nations unies a indiqué suivre "toutes les pistes solides", sans autre commentaire sur les accusations de l'opposition iranienne.

"Ce type d'accusations est lancé avant chaque session de l'AIEA", a par ailleurs indiqué un diplomate occidental proche de l'agence.

Pour David Albright, président de l'Institut pour la science et la sécurité internationale de Washington, ces accusations sont "très difficiles" à vérifier. "Mais elles semblent établir un lien entre un programme d'armes nucléaires et les militaires" iraniens, a-t-il ajouté.

Par ailleurs à Islamabad, le Pakistan a démenti mercredi les affirmations du

CNRI assurant que Abdul Qadeer Khan avait livré de l'uranium enrichi à l'Iran.

"Ceci est un rapport hautement exagéré. Quelqu'un a laissé courir son imagination", a indiqué à l'AFP sous couvert d'anonymat un membre du

gouvernement après les accusations lancées à Vienne.

Selon le responsable pakistanais, Islamabad a partagé avec la communauté internationale les résultats de ses enquêtes sur les exportations illégales de technologie nucléaire, révélées en février par M. Khan qui avait admis avoir transmis du matériel sensible à l'Iran, la Corée du Nord et la Libye.

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Israël-nucléaire-Sharon LEAD

Sharon : la centrale nucléaire de Dimona est "sûre"

JERUSALEM, 23 nov (AFP) - Le Premier ministre israélien Ariel Sharon a assuré que la centrale nucléaire de Dimona installée dans le sud d'Israël, en activité depuis 40 ans, est "sûre", ont indiqué mardi plusieurs médias.

"La centrale de Dimona est de petite dimension et sûre", a affirmé M. Sharon

durant une réunion de la commission de la Défense et des Affaires étrangères du

Parlement, en réponse à une question d'un député de gauche, Zahava Galon.

A cette occasion, le Premier ministre a exclu la possibilité que des experts

étrangers viennent vérifier la sécurité de la centrale construite avec l'aide de

la France à la fin des années 1950.

"Il existe un certain nombre de réacteurs du même genre dans le monde et Israël dispose des moyens d'assurer la maintenance et l'inspection des installations, une assistance étrangère n'est pas nécessaire", a souligné M. Sharon.

Le Premier ministre a ainsi rejeté une proposition de la député d'opposition

de gauche Zahava Galon qui avait suggéré que des experts étrangers inspectent la centrale.

"La durée de fonctionnement d'un réacteur du type de celui de Dimona est limitée à 40 ans, à moins qu'il soit rénové et modernisé ce qui permet au réacteur de continuer à fonctionner durant 20 ans", a affirmé Mme Galon durant la réunion.

"Cela nécessiterait une assistance technologique de la part d'organismes internationaux, mais Israël a un problème dans ce domaine en raison de son refus de signer le traité de non-prolifération des armes nucléaires", a ajouté la parlementaire.

Le 25 septembre dernier, l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA) de Vienne avait annoncé l'envoi d'experts en Jordanie pour vérifier d'éventuelles radiations pouvant provenir de la centrale de Dimona.

La demande adressée par la Jordanie à l'AIEA avait été soulevée par le Parlement, inquiète de possibles radiations après que l'ancien technicien nucléaire israélien Mordechaï Vanunu, eut mis en garde dans une interview contre le risque d'un "deuxième Tchernobyl", en raison de l'état vétuste des installations de Dimona.

Mordechaï Vanunu, un ex-technicien de la centrale de Dimona, avait été libéré en avril dernier après avoir purgé 18 ans de prison ferme pour avoir révélé au monde les secrets nucléaires de l'Etat hébreu.

Il y a quatre ans, le professeur Uzi Even, un scientifique israélien de haut

rang employé au réacteur de Dimona jusqu'en 1967, avait appelé à la fermeture de ce dernier en avertissant que ses infrastructures étaient obsolètes et dangereuses.

Par la suite, des employés de la centrale à la retraite ont accusé la direction d'avoir tenu secrets des incidents qui, selon eux, ont provoqué des cancers.

Les autorités ont refusé de les indemniser arguant que la proportion des cas de cancers dans la centrale n'était pas supérieure à celle dans l'ensemble de la population.

Israël n'a jamais formellement reconnu disposer d'un arsenal nucléaire, mais des experts militaires étrangers estiment qu'au fil des ans, l'Etat hébreu a produit au moins 200 ogives nucléaires à Dimona.

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PO-Israël-Iran-nucléaire PREV

Nucléaire: Israël accuse les Iraniens de "mensonges d'Etat" (PAPIER D'ANGLE)

Par Jean-Luc RENAUDIE

JERUSALEM, 21 nov (AFP) - Israël a accusé dimanche l'Iran, son ennemi numéro

un, de "mensonges d'Etat" à propos de son engagement de suspendre les opérations d'enrichissement d'uranium à partir de lundi et critiqué "l'aveuglement volontaire" des Européens.

"Les Iraniens se sont une fois de plus livrés à des mensonges d'Etat. Ils n'ont aucune intention d'arrêter leur programme nucléaire qui va se poursuivre secrètement", a affirmé à l'AFP un haut responsable des Affaires étrangères.

L'Iran a annoncé la suspension de l'enrichissement, trois jours seulement avant la réunion sur ce dossier de l'Agence Internationale de l'Energie Atomique (AIEA) installée à Vienne.

La décision de Téhéran est intervenue à la suite d'un accord sur l'arrêt de l'enrichissement de l'uranium en échange d'une coopération économique élargie avec la Grande-Bretagne, la France et l'Allemagne.

"Nous disposons pourtant, comme les Européens et les Américains, d'informations précises sur un réseau d'installations secrètes où les Iraniens vont poursuivre l'enrichissement de l'uranium. Seules les installations connues

seront inspectées", déplore un proche du Premier ministre Ariel Sharon.

"Si l'on se contente de l'accord conclu par les Européens, l'Iran entrera dans le club atomique d'ici 3 à 5 ans", prévoit-il.

Selon lui, le seul moyen de stopper le régime iranien serait de saisir le Conseil de sécurité de l'ONU et d'imposer des sanctions économiques à Téhéran.

L'arrangement européen a provoqué un profond mécontentement en Israël.

"Les Européens semblent ne pas réaliser le danger qui pèse sur eux: les Iraniens ont prévenu qu'ils allaient se doter de missiles à longue portée susceptibles d'être équipés de têtes nucléaires qui menaceront d'ici quelques années, Londres, Paris ou Berlin", souligne le responsable de la présidence du conseil.

"Les Européens sont à nouveau le maillon faible. Ils font preuve d'un aveuglement volontaire pour remporter une soi-disant victoire diplomatique sur les Américains", ajoute-t-on aux Affaires étrangères.

Moins catégorique, Ephraïm Tam, vice-président de l'Institut d'études stratégiques Jaffee à Tel Aviv, souligne qu'il faut donner une chance à l'accord irano-européen.

"Il est évident que les Iraniens veulent gagner du temps, mais il faut vérifier s'ils respectent leur parole et jouer la carte diplomatique", dit-il.

En 1981, les responsables israéliens avaient opté pour l'"option militaire" en lançant un raid israélien contre une centrale nucléaire près de Bagdad afin d'empêcher l'Irak de se doter d'un armement atomique.

Pour les responsables israéliens interrogés par l'AFP, la manière forte n'est toutefois pas d'actualité "pour le moment". Mieux vaut selon eux attendre

de voir les résultats des pressions que les Etats-Unis pourraient exercer.

Le président George W. Bush est revenu lui-même à la charge. Il a averti samedi que les Etats-Unis et leurs partenaires d'Asie et du Pacifique feront tout pour empêcher l'Iran et la Corée du Nord de développer des armes nucléaires.

Le secrétaire d'Etat américain Colin Powell a lui aussi maintenu ses accusations selon lesquelles l'Iran chercherait à adapter des ogives nucléaires

sur ses missiles balistiques.

Ces positions américaines et israéliennes ont en outre été étayées par des accusations lancées vendredi par des diplomates à Vienne selon lesquelles l'Iran

avait accéléré la production d'un dérivé d'uranium, l'UF6.

L'Iran continue pour sa part à assurer que son programme nucléaire est "à des fins strictement civiles".

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GB-Iran-Israël-nucléaire 3ELED

L'Iran saura "dans les six mois" comment faire une bombe nucléaire (Shalom)
 LONDRES, 16 fév (AFP) - L'Iran aura "dans les six mois" les connaissances nécessaires pour fabriquer une bombe nucléaire, a estimé mercredi à Londres le ministre israélien des Affaires étrangères, Silvan Shalom. "Ils essaient très sérieusement de développer la bombe nucléaire. La question n'est pas de savoir si les Iraniens vont développer une bombe nucléaire en 2009, 2010 ou 2011. La question principale est de savoir s'ils vont avoir les connaissances pour le faire", a déclaré M. Shalom. "Nous pensons que dans les six mois, ils achèveront tous les tests et expériences qu'ils mènent pour avoir ces connaissances", a ajouté le ministre lors d'un petit déjeuner de presse à Londres. Chris Rundle, un expert britannique de l'université de Durham, a émis de sérieux doutes sur les déclarations de M. Shalom, estimant qu'Israël exagérerait vraisemblablement la menace iranienne.

"Dans les années 90, les Israéliens disaient régulièrement que l'Iran aurait la bombe d'ici trois à cinq ans", a-t-il déclaré à l'AFP. "Un an plus tard, ils disaient la même chose..."

"Au fil des ans, les Israéliens ont été ceux qui, plus que n'importe qui d'autre, mettaient en garde contre la menace iranienne et la presse américaine a été influencée par ça", a-t-il ajouté.

"J'ai de sérieux doutes", a conclu M. Rundle, soulignant que le processus de militarisation d'une charge nucléaire "prend du temps" et que Téhéran "n'a pas procédé au moindre essai atomique".

Les déclarations de Silvan Shalom sont en contradiction avec celles du directeur de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA), Mohammed ElBaradei, selon lequel il n'y a pas de preuves que l'Iran se dote d'armes nucléaires.

"Sur l'Iran, il n'y a vraiment pas eu beaucoup d'évolution, ni à la suite de nos inspections, ni sur la foi de renseignements", a dit le chef de l'AIEA dans une interview publiée mercredi par le Washington Post.

Mardi, le ministre iranien des Affaires étrangères, Kamal Kharazi, s'est dit "optimiste" quant à la possibilité d'un "accord fructueux" avec l'Union européenne sur le programme nucléaire controversé de son pays, après avoir réaffirmé devant des journalistes que l'Iran "n'avait aucun programme de fabrication d'armements nucléaires".

Une troïka européenne, formée par la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Allemagne, cherche à persuader Téhéran de démanteler, en échange de contreparties technologiques, commerciales et politiques, un programme d'enrichissement d'uranium que, comme les Etats-Unis, les Européens jugent dangereux.

En novembre, la république islamique avait accepté de suspendre, mais seulement temporairement, l'enrichissement d'uranium, car elle estime avoir le droit de poursuivre un programme nucléaire civil. L'uranium enrichi peut servir aussi bien à fabriquer une bombe atomique qu'à faire fonctionner une centrale nucléaire civile.

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Israël-Iran-nucléaire

Israël doit être prêt à une attaque aérienne en Iran, selon un général
JERUSALEM, 21 fév (AFP) - Le commandant de l'armée de l'air israélienne, le général Eliezer Shkedi, a affirmé lundi que son pays devait être prêt à lancer une attaque aérienne contre les installations nucléaires iraniennes, a indiqué la radio militaire.

"Israël doit être prêt à mener une attaque contre les installations nucléaires en Iran", a affirmé le général, dont les propos ont été cités par la radio.

Le chef de l'armée de l'air s'est toutefois refusé de préciser si Israël était en mesure de mener seul une telle attaque, comme cela avait été le cas en

1981 lorsque l'aviation israélienne avait détruit une centrale nucléaire près de Bagdad.

Israël s'était félicité la semaine dernière de la "convergence de vue" de son pays avec Washington concernant le programme nucléaire iranien après les déclarations du président américain George W. Bush à ce sujet.

"Si j'étais dirigeant d'Israël et écoutais certaines déclarations des ayatollahs iraniens qui concernent la sécurité dans mon pays, je serais inquiet

du fait que l'Iran ait une arme nucléaire", avait déclaré le président Bush lors d'une conférence de presse à la Maison Blanche.

"Ces déclarations traduisent la convergence de vue entre nos deux pays sur les risques que pose le programme nucléaire de l'Iran, un pays qui est le plus grand ennemi d'Israël dans le monde", avait déclaré à l'AFP un proche du Premier ministre Ariel Sharon.

"Israël estime comme les Etats-Unis qu'à ce stade il faut donner ses chances à une action diplomatique pour forcer l'Iran par la menace de sanctions à renoncer à un armement nucléaire" avait-il ajouté.

L'Iran sera en mesure de produire sa première bombe atomique d'ici à 2008, avait pour sa part estimé le 12 janvier le chef des renseignements militaires israéliens, le général Aharon Zeevi.

"Si rien n'est fait, l'Iran pourra produire de l'uranium enrichi d'ici à six mois, ce qui devrait lui permettre de produire sa première bombe atomique d'ici à 2008", avait estimé le général Zeevi.

Il avait également estimé que si l'Iran se dote de l'arme nucléaire cela "aura un effet domino dans la région", laissant ainsi entendre que d'autres pays dans le monde arabe tenteront de développer des armements nucléaires.

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