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Economie politique de la redistribution : une approche comparative par la demande

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Chapitre 2

Mapping the French Voter Space : Change in Political Demand, 1978-2002[1]

In this chapter, we conduct an empirical analysis on French post-electoral surveys over the period 1978-2002. We draw a spatial map of voter policy preferences, and measure the relative salience of policy dimensions. We empirically identify a multidimensional political space and the evolution of the political demand of heterogeneous agents. The analysis highlights the roots of the French political crisis, which occurred in 2002 while a Far Right candidate reached the second round of the Presidential elections. The economic crisis during the 80s and the European integration process of the 90s determine the political demands and multiply the break lines : The two social blocs that used to support the Right and the governmental Left progressively break up, and a tripartition of the political space eventually occurs.

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1. This chapter is based on Guillaud and Palombarini (2006) "Evolution des Attentes Sociales et Comportement Electoral : France, 1978-2002", PSE working paper 2006-37 (in French).

2.1   Introduction

When is institutional change possible ? Which support does it gather, and from which political groups ? What are the social alliances that need to be relied on to guarantee the success of reforms ? All these standard questions for governments that aim to conduct reforms crucially depend on the composition of the political demand. Does this demand relates to one underlying dimension, like a single budget constraint, or does it rely on many dimensions ? In other words, how to define the political space where the demand and the supply meet each other ? Does this space evolve over time ?

In this chapter, we conduct an empirical analysis on French post-electoral surveys over the period 1978-2002. We draw a spatial map of voter policy preferences, and measure the relative salience of policy dimensions and its change over time. Indeed, very few empirical papers assess the effective number of dimensions in the political space, particularly on the demand side (voters' policy preferences). Even fewer papers do it in a dynamic perspective. Since we are interested in the support for reforms, we seek to identify the main cleavages in society, and to define the social blocs that hold heterogeneous demands. Our analysis relates to three different literatures : (i) The political science literature that deals with spatial models of voting (Downs, 1957 ; Enelow and Hinich, 1984 ; Iversen, 1994), (ii) The political economy literature that empirically tackles the question of multidimensionality of the political space (Laslier and Van der Straeten, 2004 ; Roemer and Van der Straeten, 2005), and (iii) The micro-economic literature that studies the determinants of voters' attitudes, the grouping of voters and the degree of homogeneity inside groups (Goux and Maurin, 2004 ; Pagano and Volpin, 2005). In the following, we use the spatial theory framework to study the composition of the demand ; we allow the space to be multidimensional and to evolve through time ; and we plot on this space the economic characteristics of voters as it relates to their labor market positioning. Doing this, we are able

to define which economic groups support which policies, and how this translates to voting behavior, in a dynamic perspective. We further detail our contribution to each of the related literatures in the next section.

Using a data reduction technique such as factor analysis to search for latent dimensions with which voters' attitudes are correlated, we are able to reduce the spatial representation of the French political space to two main dimensions. The first one is an economic policy left-right dimension, which maintains throughout the period studied (1978-2002). The second one is primarily an insecurity dimension (1978-1988), that translates into a European dimension (1997-2002) through a period of contest where the main cleavage is about the need for reforms (1995). This second dimension progressively dissociates moderate parties' electorate from extreme parties' electorate. Departing from most studies of voters' attitudes, we also characterize the political blocs who support these policy issues. The clustering of voters according to the distribution of their ideal points highlights the economic division of the society in terms of occupation type and employment status. This confirms the underlying assumption that individual preferences are rooted in the economic risks agents (subjectively) face.

The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents the related literature. Section 2.3 presents our data and the empirical strategy used in the analysis. Results of our factorial analysis are discussed in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes and proposes a discussion on the policy implications of our findings.

2.2   Related Literature

Our analysis is related to three strands of the literature. First, there is an extensive political science literature on spatial models of voting, that builds on rational voter theory. We briefly expose below how it relates to our work. Second, there is a growing political economy literature that aims to empirically link the

preferences of voters to economic policy outcomes, explicitly taking into account the multidimensionality of the demand. We review the most recent papers of this literature in order to point out which evidence is still to be found. Third, there is an empirical debate in the economic literature about the potentially vanishing importance of the traditional social cleavages as determinants of political blocs supporting economic policies. Below, we review the empirical studies that focus on the French case, and present our contribution to this debate.

Political Science Literature Spatial theory assumes that voters have single-peaked preferences and thus prefer candidates who best represent their policy positions (voters minimize the distance between the issue position of the candidate and their own position) ; it further assumes that candidates seek to maximize votes (Downs, 1957 ; Enelow and Hinich, 1984 and 1990). The standard spatial model assumes that electoral competition takes place along a single left-right dimension. However, refinements of the model (Cox, 1987 and 1990) allow a multidimensional policy space[2]. This has been empirically tested on French data (Grunberg and Schweisguth, 1997 and 2003 ; Andersen and Evans, 2003 and 2005 ; Chiche *et al.*, 2000 ; Laver, Benoit and Sauger, 2006)[3] or European data (Iversen, 1994 ; Benoit and Laver, 2006). In the following, we rely on the spatial voting framework to provide an explicit theoretical structure within which to interpret our results. We thus think of each voter as having an ideal position in a multidimensional policy space. Furthermore, we conduct the analysis over almost three decades in a dynamic perspective, and point to the change in the dimensions that structure the space.

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2. See Laslier (2004) for an encompassing presentation of spatial models, and Benoit and Laver (2006) for a discussion on the empirical use of these models.

3. Grunberg and Schweisguth (1997, 2003) and Andersen and Evans (2003, 2005) use French post-electoral survey data for the years 1988, 1995, 2002 ; Chiche *et al.* (2000) analyze French post-electoral survey data for the year 1997 only, while Laver, Benoit and Sauger (2006) analyze expert survey and French post-electoral survey data for the year 2002.

Political Economy Literature Roemer and Van der Straeten (2005) construct a model in which the policy space is bi-dimensional and constant over time. The following causal link is tested in their model : Anti-immigrants feeling among voters influences the political outcome on economic issues in a significant manner. The underlying theoretical model they use leans upon the PUNE concept (Party Unanimity Nash Equilibrium) developed by Roemer (2001). The model is calibrated with the French post-electoral survey data of years 1988, 1995 and 2002 (presidential elections, only)[4]. The authors show that there exists a negative correlation between the demand for redistribution and xenophobia. On a dynamic perspective, the article concludes there is an increasing importance of immigration issues on the French political arena, and it impacts the demand for redistribution much more in 2002 than in 1988. However, on the much longer and detailed period that we study (including not only presidential elections, but also legislative elections), xenophobia does not play a key role in structuring political demand. Instead, we find other dimensions to interact with attitudes towards public intervention and to impact the policy outcomes. The difference between these two results can be related to the method used : Roemer and Van der Straeten (2005) do not allow their bi-dimensional policy space (size of the public sector and xenophobia) to change over time, while we do[5]. Indeed, we do not constrain the French voter space, and allow the nature and the number of policy dimensions to vary : 1, 2, 3 or more dimensions might structure the policy space, and these can change from one year to another.

Laslier and Van der Straeten (2002, 2004) conduct a scientific experiment at the exit of the polls during the 2002 presidential elections. They construct a map of the political proximity of candidates. This map is based on the observed associations in the ballots issued by approval voting and obtained in two

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4. Roemer and Van der Straeten (2006) run the same analysis for Denmark.

5. In fact, the result of Roemer and Van der Straeten (2005) simply highlights the changing weight of the xenophobic dimension relative to the public sector size dimension, within an unchanged voter space that is fixed by the authors.

French cities. It allows to determine the degree of homogeneity of the electorate. The underlying assumption is that individuals reveal their preferences by their electoral behavior. The conclusions of the authors are very similar to ours : multidimensionality of the political space, and partial independence of the electorate of the Far Right candidate, relative to the electorate of the Right. However, the admitted aim of Laslier and Van der Straeten (2002, 2004) is not to study the determinants of the demand, but to study the statistical properties of a new voting rule. Consequently, they do not define the different dimensions of the political space.

Based on OECD countries (ISSP data "Role of Government III", 1996), the contribution by Kitschelt and Rehm (2004) aims to show the link between the socio-economic position of agents and their policy preferences. Using data analysis as we do, but only for year 1996, the authors show that the space of policy preferences is multi-dimensional : the positioning of agents on a left-right axis is directly related to their preferences in social and economic policies, which in turn are determined by the socio-economic positioning of agents. We confirm these two results on the much longer period we study, though the non-economic themes included in our data analysis do not appear to be significant at all. In the following, vote is only explained by policy preferences related to economic issues (See Lewis-Beck, 1983 and 2003 for a similar claim). Furthermore, using several periods of time for the same country, we are able to consider dynamics and to explore the changes in the structuring of the political space.

Socio-Economic Literature The book by Cautrès and Mayer (2004) sheds light on the French electoral "seism" of 2002, analyzing all the available post-electoral survey data, as we do. Some results are close to ours : tripartite division of the political space[6], importance of European integration on the preference

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6. See also Grunberg and Schweisguth (1997, 2003) for a confirmation of the result, and Andersen and Evans (2003, 2005) for a critics of the former.

formation stage (Bélot and Cautrès, 2004), relative importance of the division between public and private sector employees (Cautrès and Mayer, 2004). The main difference between their analysis and ours is to be found in the underlying theoretical approach : Cautrès and Mayer (2004) assume a direct link between the socio-economic positioning of agents and political parties, without taking into account the multi-dimensionality and the dynamics of the political space ; by contrast, we carefully look at the transition from preferences that are expressed through multiple demands with relative weights changing over time, to actual vote. Thus, vote is not directly determined by the social positioning of agents in our analysis, but depends on individual preferences, which are shaped by the objective economic context as by the subjective way political debates are perceived.

Goux and Maurin (2004) run an analysis of the French regional elections of year 2004, the results of which confirmed the strength of the Far Right and of the abstention (47% of voters in total). The authors refute two well established claims to explain the electoral behavior of voters : The one that suggests the electorate becomes more volatile, and the one which underlines that lower classes disaffect the Left and are captured by the Far Right. Goux and Maurin (2004) show that occupation categories still play a role to explain individuals' electoral behavior, providing the exposure to market risks (unemployment, income threatening) are incorporated into the analysis. According to the authors, the election results of year 2004 are close to those of 2002, the only difference lying in the fact that in 2004 the discontent of the electorate applied only to the Right, while in 2002 it applied to both Right and Left parties that shared power in a divided ("cohabitation") government.

Our contribution to this literature is twofold. First, our mapping of the French voter space is done on a very long period (1978-2002). Allowing for dynamics, our analysis shows that the political space evolves over time by the number

of structuring dimensions and by the nature of these dimensions. Second, we explicitly characterize voter blocs (Bartolini and Mair, 1990), according to their occupation type and employment status. Combining both results, we are able to infer the move of voters around the issues at stake, the composition and decomposition of social blocs, and the change in salient policy dimensions for the elections considered. This approach makes the reasons of the 2002 political crisis in France clear and tractable.

2.3   Data and Empirical Strategy

Before to turn to the empirical investigation of electorate's distribution of attitudes, we discuss our data and the empirical strategy chosen. We further give hints to interpret the results.

2.3.1   Data

We use French post-electoral survey data over the period 1978-2002. The surveys have been conducted by the CEVIPOF (Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po) and issued by the CDSP (Centre de Données Socio-Politiques)[7]. Our dataset covers five national elections : 2 legislative elections (1978 and 1997) and 3 presidential elections (1988, 1995 and 2002). Interviews have been done on a face-to-face basis[8] (4000 respondents per year, on average[9]), between the

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   7. Data available at http ://cdsp.sciences-po.fr
   8. Except for year 2002, where interviews were conducted by telephone.
   9. More precisely, our sample consists of 4507 individuals in 1978, 4032 individuals in 1988, 4078 individuals in 1995, 3010 individuals in 1997, and 4107 individuals in 2002.

two election rounds[10], following quotas methodology (age, gender, occupation categories) to guarantee the socio-demographic representativity of the sample[11].

Survey questions deal with the political attitudes of respondents (voting behavior, preferred candidate, party affiliation) and their opinions on societal (immigration, religion, crime) and economic questions (globalization, employment, taxation, purchasing power). The socio-economic positioning of individuals (occupation, employment status) is provided, along with standard socio-demographic characteristics (age, sex, location). While entering questions and preferences of agents into data analysis, we kept, as far as possible, the set of questions unchanged. However, if a new question appeared at a certain time, we assessed whether it was valuable to add it. Indeed, some specific demands barged into the political debate following an economic shock or potential parties' strategies, and it would have biased the analysis (selection bias) if we had completely ignored them.

Political Demands The political demands deal with the following themes, which are used to build the factorial axes : Inequalities, Taxes, Social Protection, Social Exclusion, Nationalizations, Privatizations, Employment Protection Legislation, Product Market Competition, Economic Growth, Profits, Stock Exchange, Unions, Purchasing power, Wages, Unemployment, Public Employment, Working Time, European Integration, Euro, Globalization. Answer modalities generally follow a Likert scale (otherwise indicated) : from "Strongly Agree" to

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10. The 2002 data consists of three waves (before the first round, between the two rounds, and after the second round of the elections). A total of $4,107$ individuals formed the first wave sample ; $4,017$ the second ; $2,013$ the third. Some $1,417$ persons have been interviewed three times. We solely used the first wave in this study.

11. Following the advise of the CDSP, we did not apply any weighting on votes, since we are primarily interested in the economic representativity of our sample. This implies that the proportion of extreme voters is underrepresented, in favor of more moderate voters (indeed, only 7% of respondents answer that they intend to vote for the Far Right in 2002, while 17% of voters did vote for the Far Right in reality). Notice however that the main results are unchanged if votes are weighted.

"Agree", "Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree", or from "Very Positive" to "Positive", "Negative" and "Strongly Negative". The precise wordings of questions is provided in the appendix.

Vote Individuals were asked to indicate for which party or candidate they voted in the first round of elections. Tables 2.1 to 2.5 in the appendix present a full description of the results of the French elections (1st round) for years 1978, 1988, 1995, 1997 and 2002.

Occupation Individuals are classified according to their occupation type and employment status. The following categories apply : Farmers, Craftsmen, Storekeepers, Industrials[12], Free-lance, Managers (private and public sector), Associate professionals (private and public sector), Foremen (private and public sector), Clerks (private and public sector), Service employees (private and public sector), Skilled blue-collars (private and public sector), Unskilled workers (private and public sector), Agricultural workers.

2.3.2   Multiple Factorial Analysis

We run data analysis to identify the composition of the political demand : We seek to know which political claims structure the political space, for each election year. The choice of the method is motivated by our problem setting, as by the qualitative character of our data[13].

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12. This category is very small (about 20 individuals), so we do not infer any conclusion regarding its electoral behavior, event though it appears in our graphs.

13. Data analysis is more often used in the political science literature (Benoit and Laver, 2006) where data are often qualitative, than in economics. Notice, however, the contribution by Amable (2003) that uses such a tool to infer correlations between different institutional features in order to define models of capitalism. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) also use factor analysis to determine the weight structure of their data while computing indicators of product market regulation.

The advantage of data analysis relative to econometrics is that no stringent assumption needs, *a priori*, to be done : We do not need to decide whether there is one or several dimensions structuring the political space, and which they are. To compare with econometrics, our dependent variable is a latent variable (the unobserved dimension) which is determined by a mix of independent variables (the observed variables). Variables that highly participate to the inertia of axes (far from the origin and along the reference axis) are simply those that best structure the political space in terms of demand. Each variable has several possible answer categories, which are called "modalities". They give an important indication on the main factors that explain the variability of answer profiles[14]. Once structuring variables have been selected, a series of graphs allow to quickly understand the relationships between variables (see Section 2.3.4 below).

Data analysis encompasses several analysis methods[15]. In our case, we run a Multiple Factorial Analysis (MFA). Indeed, MFA has two important advantages relative to Principal Components Analysis (PCA) : First, it allows to treat qualitative survey data with multiple choice categories and a unique answer ; Second, it allows for non-linear link between variables. For instance, while analyzing the voting behavior of individuals, an MFA is able to test the assumption according to which extreme votes, be it on the Far Left or on the Far Right of the political spectrum, are low differentiated, as they have the essential role to express a dissent. Consequently, we can assess that the political claims, which lie at the roots of these votes are the same.

The analysis is done in two stages. We first run an exploratory data analysis, entering all explanatory variables that could convey indivuals' preferences, namely (but not only) economic questions. We then give more focus to the analysis

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14. For our analysis, two types of modalities have been excluded : "Don't know" and "Not concerned", in order to preserve factorial axes from an instability due to extreme values. Indeed, factorial analysis is highly sensitive to missing points (Escofier and Pagès, 1998).

15. See Escofier and Pagès (1998) for a detailed review of the possibilities offered by data analysis.

by keeping only those variables that participate the most to the inertia of axes. From this second analysis, we define our factorial axes. The results we present below are those issued by the second stage analysis.

2.3.3   How to Interpret Results ?

The *quality of the representation* is measured by the cosinus-squared of variables that are projected on the factorial space. Cosinus-squared depend on the coordinates of points on the axis, and on the number of observations within the modality. Thus, the cosinus-squared informs us on the degree of distortion of the representation from reality : If $cos^2 = 1$, then the point is *on the axis* (no distortion of reality) ; If $cos^2 = 0$, then the point is *orthogonal to the axis* (reality is highly deformed). Hence, the higher the cosinus-squared, the better depicted the modality.

2.3.3.1   Location of Explanatory Variables

The *proximity of modalities of nominal active variables* (answer categories of explanatory variables) allows to establish a typology of individuals based on their answer profile. For instance, if the individuals scared by the raise of globalization are close to those who favor public intervention in the economy, then we gather them on a single category.

We observe the *distance of variables' modalities from the origin*, given that the origin represents the mean individual. This determines the size of groups of individuals : A *heavy modality* (close to the origin) means that there is a high number of individuals in the group, while a *light modality* (off-center) means that this modality has been chosen by few individuals.

At the more general level of *explanatory variables*, we observe *exclusion phenomenon*, or to the contrary *link phenomenon*. Thus, some active variables are mutually exclusive, while others are systematically on the same space. From these

observations, we are able to cluster theme (e.g. globalization and fiscality, public property and immigration).

2.3.3.2 Information Based on Illustrative Variables

The interpretation of *illustrative variables* (variables which do not participate in the construction of axes) like occupation or vote is done in two ways. First, we observe the *distribution of the modalities* of the illustrative variable on the space : How dispersed is it? This helps to determine the degree of differentiation of individuals. Second, we analyze the *link between each illustrative variable and factorial axes*. Thus, to determine the link between political demand and voting behavior, we plot the votes of individuals on our factorial axes. This informs us on the way candidates' or parties' answers are perceived, regarding the questions that structure the political demand. For instance, we observe that individuals who favor nationalizations are close to those who vote for the Left parties in 1978. We produce the same analysis to link occupation categories with the political demand encompassed in factorial axes. Notice that a direct interpretation of the proximity of two illustrative variables (occupation and vote) on the same factorial space is not possible. In order to infer such connections between the occupation category of individuals and their votes, we systematically conduct complementary computations (analysis of cosinus-squared).

2.3.4 How to Read a Graph ?

Factorial Axis Axes are *factorial axes* issued by the analysis. They are made up of a mix of questions' modalities. For instance, a question about "income redistribution" has four modalities, which are "strongly agree", "agree", "disagree" and "strongly disagree". Another question about "the abandon of European integration" has three modalities, which are "big regrets", "indifference" and "high relief". These two variables might be clustered together on the same axis if they

covariate. In particular, "high relief if EU is abandoned" might be combined with "strongly agree with income redistribution" on one side of the axis, while "big regrets" is gathered with "strongly disagree" on the other side. By contrast, the factorial analysis might produce two different axes, one encompassing the question about "income redistribution", while the other renders apparent the cleavage about "the abandon of EU". The figure (%) beside an axis is the proportion of the cloud's inertia explained by the axis. Indeed, axes go through the gravity center of clouds and maximize inertia (importance of correlations). Data analysis offers several ways to describe clouds. Several factorial axes are produced by the analysis. We generally select the first two axes that explain together the major part of variance. Once factorial axes are defined, an obvious difficulty is to interpret the underlying dimension that links all the variables of the same axis (see Section 2.3.3 above).

Explanatory Variables Black squares are exogenous variables (questions' modalities) that structure the factorial space (political demand). The bigger a square and the closer it is to an axis, the more it participates to the inertia of factors. For a single electoral year, axes do not change from graph to graph. However, while moving from one year to another, the composition of axes do change. To ease the reading of graphs, all the explanatory variables found to structure the space in an election year are not included in a single graph, but are spread over several graphs.

Illustrative Variables Triangles (or circles) are illustrative variables that do not participate in axis' inertia but do help to characterize individuals. Triangles are job occupations and circles are votes. The closer a triangle (circle) to a square, the better it fits the modality represented by the square. For instance, we could infer that Managers strongly disagree with Nationalizations, or Far Left voters

strongly agree with the reduction of Inequalities. A clustering of individuals is then possible, according to their proximity to common modalities.

2.4 Results

Mapping the French voter space means that we (i) decompose the political demand over several dimensions, but also (ii) characterize the voter groups that hold attitudes shown to structure the political space. We thus focus on the political demand side defined to be rooted in individual preferences on (mainly) economic questions. Using data spanned over almost three decades, we let this demand change over time, the change being conditioned by the macroeconomic context. The French political situation of year 2002, while a Far Right candidate reached the second round of the Presidential elections, was qualified by numerous observers to be a "political crisis". Our analysis sheds light on this issue and emphasizes its roots.

In France, throughout the period studied (1978-2002), the fundamental political divide that contributes to differentiate the political demand is linked to the State intervention in the economy. Indeed, variables that load highly on the first factor are traditional left-right issues about equality and the role of the state in the economy. Thus, even if we did not study the political supply, it appears that it is highly conditioned by this main divide : individuals who support public intervention generally vote for the parties at the Left side of the political spectrum, while others vote for parties on the Right. Thus, to simplify the argument, we call Left voters the electorate that supports State intervention, and Right voters the others. Such a definition has obviously no ambition to be general : it only applies to France, for the period studied. Furthermore, the data analysis highlights a second axis that structures the French political space. The nature of this second axis evolves over time, enhancing the division of the electorate and

the changing composition of political blocs. It goes from a demand relative to income protection (1978-1988) to a demand regarding the process of European integration (1997-2002), through a period of contest and recomposition of the political blocs (1995). In the following, we present our results for the 3 periods just defined.

2.4.1   1978-1988 : Economic Policy and Income Protection

At the beginning of the period, during the 1978 Legislative Elections, the demand for more or less State intervention in the economy divides the electorate. This demand is so important, that it translates into our two main axes. The first axis relates to labor and product market regulation, while the second axis relates to income redistribution.

As explained above (Section 2.3.3), the analysis of the contribution of each variable (and each modality) to the inertia of factors helps to characterize factorial axes. In order to interpret axes, we keep the variables whose contribution to the inertia of factors is above the mean[16].

The questions that best structure the political space in 1978 (and those which are best represented by our factorial space, having a relatively high cos^2) are thus the following :

1. Axis 1 (horizontal) (PMR, EPL) encompasses questions about *developing the nationalized sector, even if this implies a limitation of private firms* and *redundancy forbidden, providing no new job has been guaranteed* ;

2. Axis 2 (vertical) (Redistribution, Public Goods) encompasses *raise in taxes, in order to obtain completely free public services* and *suppress advantages,*

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16. For each axis, the sum of contributions equals 100. In 1978, 6 variables are included into the analysis (24 modalities) ; the mean contribution of variables is then equals to $100/6 = 16.66\%$ ($100/24 = 4.16\%$ for modalities). The same computation applies to the following analyses, adjusting the number of variables and modalities.

in order to reduce social inequalities (see appendix 2.B for the exact wording of questions).

We thus define the first axis to be related to Product Market Regulation (PMR) and Employment Protection Legislation (EPL), while the second axis is said to refer to Redistribution and the provision of Public Goods (Figures 2.1 and 2.2 in the appendix).

The Left electorate supports State intervention on both axes : We observe that the electorates of the Socialist Party (PS), Unified Socialist Party (PSU), French Communist Party (PCF) and Extreme Left (Extr G) locate at the upper right of our graph (Figure 2.1). These voters are pros PMR and EPL, and pros Redistribution and Public Goods. By contrast, at the lower left of our graph we find the electorate of the Ally for the Republic (RPR), Center of the Social Democrats (CDS), Presidential Majority (Div maj) and Extreme Right (Extr D). These voters ask for more deregulated product and labor market and less taxation and redistribution. We thus define the political space of year 1978 as being unidimensional : We read it as a traditional left-right dimension over economic policy. Indeed, there is no orthogonal differentiation between the electorate of Extreme parties and the one of moderate parties : parties are along a continuum. Results of the first round of these 1978 Legislative Elections (Table 1 in the appendix) show that the Left-wing and Right-wing parties have similar weights. Eventually, the Right-wing parties win the elections.

How are these two electorates characterized ? First, we notice that the two social blocs are relatively homogeneous (Figure 2.2). The agents who express support for State intervention are blue-collars and public employees in general. The ones who express negative attitudes towards PMR, EPL, redistribution and public goods are farmers, craftsmen, storekeepers, free-lance workers and managers of the private sector.

Ten years after, during the 1988 Presidential Elections, a second dimension further divides the electorate. This new cleavage is linked to the economic crisis of the economy : Between 1978 and 1988, the unemployment rate more than doubles, from 4.9% to 10.1%. However, the first dimension still refers to State intervention, maintaining the two social blocs of the 70s.

Mapping voters' attitudes during this election, we thus observe the following two main axes :

1. Axis 1 (horizontal) (PMR, Redistribution) encompasses *positive feeling about nationalizations*, *positive feeling about privatizations* and *wealth tax should be restored* ;

2. Axis 2 (vertical) (Economic risk and Insecurity) encompasses *positive feeling about profit*, *positive feeling about stock exchange* and *government should guarantee a minimum income for each household*. To help us interpret this second axis, we also plot the following illustrative variables on the space : *assessment of unemployment risk* and *expectations about evolution of purchasing power*.

We thus define the first axis to be related to PMR and Redistribution, while the second axis refers to the perception of Economic Risk and Insecurity (Figure 2.3).

Looking at the plot of individuals according to their vote, we notice that the left-right dimension is still present in the first axis (Figure 2.4). Indeed, the electorate of the Right (Chirac, Barre) is at the lower left of our graph, showing negative attitudes towards PMR and Redistribution, while the voters of the Left candidates (Mitterand, Waetcher, Boussel) lie at the lower right, supporting State intervention in the economy. However, the second dimension emphasizes the presence of insecure individuals (at the upper side of our graph) who vote for the candidates of the Far Right (Le Pen), or of the Communist Party (Lajoinie,

Juquin)[17]. Hence, in 1988, the two dimensions that structure the political space cannot be reduced to a single dimension, even though the main electorates are still represented by a single axis.

We now seek to characterize the individuals who express these attitudes (Figure 2.5). Individuals who support market regulation and redistribution are public employees and managers of the public sector (lower right side). By opposition, farmers, craftsmen, free-lance workers and managers of the private sector constitute the core individuals who reject market regulation and redistribution (lower right side). Finally, voters who perceive income insecurity are divided into two groups : on one side, storekeepers and foremen of the private sector demand a deregulation of the product market (upper left of our graph), and on the other side, workers of the public sector ask for more redistribution (upper right of our graph).

2.4.2   1995 : Breaking Point : The Raise of European Issues

Like in most European countries, the political demand remains highly structured by the debate on the nature of economic policies during the 1990s, as it relates to State intervention (Iversen, 1994). However, the 1995 Presidential Elections in France has two important novelties. First, the cleavage linked to the consequences of the economic crisis (stagnation of GDP in 1993, along with a 12% unemployment rate) translates to a debate about the functioning of the French democracy. Second, the European integration process becomes an important factor on the voters space (Grunberg and Schweisguth, 1997). Consequently, the first three main axes of our factor analysis best describe the voter political space (Figures 2.6 to 2.8) :

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17. During the 1988 elections, the FN candidate won more than 14% of the votes at the first round. See Table 2.2 in the appendix.

1. Axis 1 (horizontal) (Welfare state) encompasses *importance of social protection in vote* and *importance of unemployment in vote* ;

2. Axis 2 (vertical) (Reforms, Protest) : *positive feeling about reform, positive feeling about solidarity* and *positive feeling about equality.* Illustrative variable : *functioning of democracy in France* ;

3. Axis 3 (horizontal) (Europe) : *importance of European construction in vote* and *positive feeling about Europe.*

We thus define the first axis to refer to the Welfare State, while the second axis clearly emphasizes the debate on the necessity of Reforms. Finally, the third axis relates to European Integration issues. This third dimension, the emergence of which can probably be related to the 1992 Maastricht referendum, will become central in the design of the voter space during the following elections (1997 and 2002). For now, we notice the high correlation between Axis 2 and Axis 3 (Figure 2.6).

If the first axis continues to differentiate the electorate of the Left from the electorate of the Right (Figure 2.7), we notice that the position of the electorate of the Far Right candidate (Le Pen) looks centrist on this axis. Actually, these voters do not rely their vote on the traditional left-right dimension concerning the role of the welfare state. Indeed, voters of the Far Right candidate are better represented if we look at the two other dimensions (Figure 2.6). Importantly, they have negative attitudes towards Europe, and find that democracy in France does not function well. Since these two axes are highly correlated, we can infer that the two debates are linked, at least in the perception of the electorate.

Which profile do the voters have, in terms of occupation and employment status ? As in 1988, craftsmen and storekeepers have negative attitudes towards Europe (Figure 2.8). Moreover, blue-collars and elementary workers, from the private but also from the public sector, differentiate themselves from the other occupation categories that used to support the vision of governmental Left-wing

parties. Indeed, their opposition to Europe cannot be satisfied by the candidate of the Socialist Party (Jospin). Eventually, the core social group that supports the welfare state and the European integration is constituted by associate professionals and managers of the public sector, as by clerks. By opposition, the social group that asks for less welfare state and favors the European integration is limited to associate professionals and managers of the private sector, farmers and free-lance workers. We thus find a result already highlighted in other European countries (Thomassen, 2005) : mobile voters are to be found in low-income categories.

2.4.3   1997-2002 : Economic Policy and European Integration

In the 1997 Legislative Elections, the dimension linked to Europe plays a central role in the definition of the political space. It is the only year, where the first axis does not refer to the traditional left-right dimension about State intervention, but to the European Integration process that includes the issue of implementing a unique currency. The factorial space is very clearly divided by two axes :

1. Axis 1 (horizontal) (Europe) encompasses issues on *effect of the continuation of EU on the French economic growth, France benefited from its belonging to the EU, unique currency for the EU* and *feeling if France abandoned the EU* ;

2. Axis 2 (vertical) (PMR, EPL, Government size) relates to the *reduction of working time to 35 hours without any decrease in monthly wages, creation of* 350.000 *public jobs, raise by* 1000 *Francs per month of the minimum wage* and *positive feeling about privatizations.*

Thus, the first and main axis is defined by European issues, while the second axis is linked to the economic debate on Product Market Regulation, Employment Protection Legislation and Government Size (Figure 2.9).

The mapping of voters' attitudes on this factorial space reveals that the Right supporters are those who ask for a liberal policy on the national as on the international issues (Figure 2.9). Indeed, these are (however moderately) against the proposed increase in the minimum wage, the creation of public jobs and the 35 hours working time without any wage decrease ; they have positive attitudes towards privatizations. At the same time, they strongly agree with the implementation of a unique currency and consider that the EU reduces the negative impact of globalization. They would indeed feel great regrets whether France should abandon the EU. Notice however, that those voters who ask for a highly liberal policy at the national level (extreme modalities) lie further from the Right (RPR and UDF) and closer to the Far Right (FN) on this axis. Left-wing voters oppose any liberal policy at the national and at the international level. They hold extreme values for the national issues and moderate values regarding European issues. Symmetrically to what we observed for the Right, but this time at the international level, the electorate which expresses a strong demand for protectionist policies lie further from the Left parties (Verts, PS, Extr G, PCF) and closer to the Far Right (FN). Hence, the political space appears clearly divided into three political blocs : the Right, the Left and the Far Right, which are divided by two orthogonal dimensions.

Turning to the labor market position of the French voters, we notice that the electorate which supports PMR and EPL and has moderate attitudes towards Europe is mainly composed by employees and managers from the public sector (Figure 2.10). By opposition, the electorate which favors liberal policies on both axes encompasses managers and associate professionals from the private sector, as well as foremen and free-lance workers. Finally, the highly negative attitudes

towards Europe are to be found in blue-collar and elementary workers, while the high demand for liberal policies at the national level come from farmers, craftsmen and storekeepers.

Five years later, during the 2002 Presidential elections, the factorial space is the same, except that the two main dimensions have inverted their weights : the main dimension that structures the political demand is related to traditional left-right economic issues about equality and the role of the state in the economy (PMR, EPL, government size), while the second dimension refers to Europe :

1. Axis 1 (horizontal) (PMR, EPL, Government size) encompasses *positive feeling about privatizations*, *firms should be free to hire and fire* and *the number of public employees should be reduced* ;

2. Axis 2 (vertical) (Europe) encompasses *positive feeling about the replacement of Franc by Euro* and *feeling if France abandoned the EU.*

Mapping voters' attitudes on this factorial space, we observe that a high demand for liberal economic policies is coming from an electorate, which departs from the Right voters (Figure 2.11, lower left side). Moreover, there is a high protectionist demand among an electorate that is far from the Left or Extreme Left core voters (lower right side of the graph). Importantly, these two types of protests can be reconciled on the European dimension : they both oppose European integration. These are the voters of the Far Right candidates (Le Pen, Mégret) that lie at the lower side of our space. By contrast, the supporters of Left and Right candidates do support the European integration. They can be divided according to the first axis, which relates to attitudes towards PMR, EPL and the size of government. Indeed, the electorate of the Right candidates (Bayrou, Chirac) support Europe and have (moderate) positive attitudes towards privatizations and the reduction of the number of public employees. While the electorate

of the Left candidates (Jospin, Taubira, Chevenement) have positive attitudes towards Europe and negative ones towards privatizations and the reduction of public employees.

Looking at the occupational profile of individuals (Figure 2.12), we notice that the private sector, with the only exception of blue-collars and service employees, is closer to the positive positions towards privatizations and the reduction of the number of public employees (left hand side of the graph). By opposition, the public sector is on the other side of the axis (right-hand side of the graph). Concerning the opposition to Europe, we further notice that low-income workers are part of this electorate (blue-collars, service employees of the public sector, craftsmen, storekeepers).

Thus, in 2002, the move to the policy centre of the main Left candidate (Jospin) often told to be the cause of its first-round loss (Kuhn, 2002 ; Laver, Benoit and Sauger, 2006) indeed proves to be a strategic error here, since it does not allow to answer to the specific demand against Europe coming from the bunch of low-income workers.

2.5   Conclusion

Findings The analysis we conducted on French post-electoral surveys over three decades (1978-2002) implies two sets of results. The first one refers to the multi-dimensionality of the political demand. Indeed, our analysis shows that the political space is structured by several dimensions, mostly related to economic issues that cannot be reduced to a single dimension[18]. Not surprisingly, the main di-

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18. As Benoit and Laver (2006 :73) highlight : "A general problem that confronts any analyst who uses a spatial model of political competition has to do with determining the number and identity of the policy dimensions needed to generate a useful and valid representation of politics in any given setting. This is critical, because different models of political competition have different implications depending on whether decision making is seen as taking place within a policy space of one, two, three, four, or many dimensions. Most strikingly, many models make completely different predictions for policy spaces with one, as opposed to more than one,

mension, which holds throughout the period, refers to "Public intervention in the economic field". This can be assimilated to a left-right axis with an homogeneous electorate along a continuum. However, contrary to what is usually assumed by political economy models, the political space is also largely divided by a second dimension. From 1988 to 1995, the "Degree of satisfaction vis-à-vis the functioning of the democracy" divides the voters of moderate parties from the voters of extreme parties. 1995 is a breaking point : A third dimension barges into the political arena and deals with "European integration". Finally, the structuring power of this third dimension becomes major from 1997 onwards, although not weakening the debate on public intervention. We believe the change in political demands can be directly related to the economic context : The economic crisis of the 80s and the European integration process of the 90s are conveyed into the political space.

Our second set of results is related to the specification of socio-economic groups, who are holding these demands. In 1978, the division that exists in the political demand makes a strong differentiation between two homogeneous social blocs. Surrounding the Right, there is an alliance between the private sector (middle and high-level income), the agricultural sector and self-employed workers. All of them demand less taxation and less public intervention (privatization, labor market deregulation). But the bloc begins to split in 1988, as the economic crisis leads self-employed workers to hold-off the alliance. Indeed, self-employed workers demand an even more liberal policy to sustain their activity, which leads them later to oppose the involvement of France in the European construction in 2002[19]. As for the governmental Left, the alliance lies between the public sector and the blue-collars. Both demand more public intervention and reduced inequalities (more taxation). This alliance breaks up in 1995, the triggering fact being

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dimension.". Hence, there is a need to empirically look for the number of structural dimensions in any particular political space over time.

19. This is also the case during the 2005 Referendum on the European Constitution. See in the appendix.

the eruption of the European dimension into the political debate. Blue-collars are directly concerned with the market orientation of the European Union, an issue that leads them to turn themselves to the Far Left or the Far Right in 2002.

Policy Implications The evolving multidimensional configuration of the policy space we investigated has significant analytical implications. Indeed, our findings indicate significant changes in the social bases of voting and party proximity from 1978 to 2002, especially after the breaking point of 1995. We clearly showed that the outburst of the social blocs that traditionally supported the governmental parties in France implied a political crisis in 2002. We thus identified the roots of the crisis, but also determined which social blocs are today crystallized around the main dimensions of the French political space. Below, we further propose three ways to get out the crisis, which imply institutional change.

First, there should be a way to recompose the Right-wing social alliance. The main difficulty is to answer the demand for labor market deregulation issued by self-employed workers, given that this demand is opposed by private sector employees who wish to be protected against unemployment. To overcome this opposition, one could reform the labor market to induce a greater flexibility, while insuring private sector employees (e.g. through unemployment system reform, including lifelong learning strategies). This would be close to a "flexicurity" solution (Gautié, 2003 ; OECD, 2004 ; Barbier, 2007).

Second, institutional reforms on European integration modalities might help recompose the Left-wing social bloc. Indeed, low-revenue workers (i.e. blue-collars) are distant vis-à-vis the European integration, while it is well supported by middle and high-revenue categories of the public sector. The answer to this contradiction could be to break the apparent link between liberal policies and European integration process, e.g. by promoting European trade unions (Gabel, 1998 ; Ebbinghaus, 2002).

Finally, one could imagine the formation of a new social bloc. This bloc should no more be endorsed on the traditional pros-cons Public intervention, but might rely on the new divide pros-cons European integration. A dominant social bloc would then ally middle and high-revenue workers of the private and public sector (thus excluding self-employed workers and blue-collars). The political representation system would though probably need a change to integrate this new cleavage, by allowing a centrist party to strongly enter the political game (Myerson, 1999).

Hence, the three options we propose are strongly related to institutional reforms, to take place in the economic or political fields. Notice that these do not respond to economic efficiency need, nor to value judgment as an hypothetical social justice (Amable and Palombarini, 2005). The need is for a viable system, whose choice is contingent upon the selected political project. For the analysis to be complete then, there would be a need to study the dynamics of the supply, partly independent from the dynamics of the demand. Yet this task is left to another research[20] (See the contribution of Laver, Benoit and Sauger, 2006).

Extensions Despite offering a detailed empirical look at the spatial mapping of French voters ideal points in a dynamic perspective, our account remains preliminary. Indeed, there are numerous methodological issues to be tackled and substantive questions remain to be answered. Most importantly, our study does not allow to compute the political equilibrium, since our data does not inform us on the effective position of candidates or parties on the political space (policy platforms). It would thus be interesting to analyze the policy platforms of parties and candidates at stake during these elections. Attempting a matching of policy positions of parties or candidates to voter positions would indicate whether the

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20. As Benoit and Laver (2006 :99) wisely notice, "mass survey research is useful for telling us how citizens perceive parties, but inherently problematic when used in estimating where these parties are actually positioned in relation to different dimensions of policy".

dynamics of the supply is partly independent from the dynamics of the demand. However, this would certainly raise new methodological issues.

Annexe 2.A   Results of Elections

TAB. 2.1: 1978 French Legislative Elections : Results of the 1st Round

Party	%	Total (%)
RPR - Rassemblement Pour la République	22.62	
CDS - Centre des Démocrates Sociaux	21.45	
Majorité présidentielle	2.39	
Right		*46.46*
FN - Front National	1.60	
Far Right		*1.60*
PS - Parti Socialiste	22.58	
PCF - Parti Communiste Français	20.55	
Ecologistes	2.14	
MRG - Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche	2.11	
Left		*47.38*
Extrême gauche	3.33	
Far Left		*3.33*
Others	1.17	

TAB. 2.2: 1988 French Presidential Elections : Results of the 1st Round

Candidate	Party	%	Total (%)
Chirac	RPR - Rassemblement Pour la République	19.95	
Barre	UDF - Union pour la Démocratie Française	16.54	
	Right		*36.49*
Le Pen	FN - Front National	14.37	
	Far Right		*14.37*
Mitterrand	PS - Parti Socialiste	34.10	
Lajoinie	PCF - Parti Communiste Français	6.75	
Juquin	outsider PCF	2.09	
Waechter	Verts	3.77	
	Left		*46.71*
Boussel	PT - Parti des Travailleurs	0.38	
Laguiller	LO - Lutte Ouvrière	1.99	
	Far Left		*2.37*

Tab. 2.3: 1995 French Presidential Elections : Results of the 1st Round

Candidate	Party	%	Total (%)
Chirac	RPR - Rassemblement Pour la République	20.84	
Balladur	RPR - Rassemblement Pour la République	18.58	
de Villiers	MPF - Mouvement Pour la France	4.74	
	Right		*44.16*
Le Pen	FN - Front National	15.00	
	Far Right		*15.00*
Jospin	PS - Parti Socialiste	23.30	
Hue	PCF - Parti Communiste Français	8.64	
Voynet	Verts	3.32	
	Left		*35.26*
Laguiller	LO - Lutte Ouvrière	5.30	
	Far Left		*5.30*
Cheminade	S&P - Solidarité et Progrès	0.28	

Tab. 2.4: 1997 French Legislative Elections : Results of the 1st Round

Party	%	Total (%)
RPR - Rassemblement Pour la République	15.70	
UDF - Union Pour la Démocratie Française	14.22	
Divers droite	6.60	
Right		*36.52*
FN - Front National	14.94	
Far Right		*14.94*
PS - Parti Socialiste	23.53	
PCF - Parti Communiste Français	9.94	
Verts	6.81	
RDS - Réformateurs Démocrates Sociaux	1.45	
Divers gauche	2.80	
Left		*44.53*
LO (Lutte Ouvrière) + LCR (Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire)	2.52	
Far Left		*2.52*
Others	1.49	

TAB. 2.5: 2002 French Presidential Elections : Results of the 1st Round

Candidate	Party	%	Total (%)
Chirac	RPR - Rassemblement pour la République	19.88	
Bayrou	UDF - Union pour la Démocratie Française	6.81	
Boutin	Boutin2002	1.19	
Lepage	Ecolos	1.88	
Saint-Josse	CPNT - Chasse, Pêche, Nature et Tradition	4.23	
Madelin	DL - Démocratie Libérale	3.91	
	Right		*37.90*
Le Pen	FN - Front National	16.86	
Mégret	MNR - Mouvement National Républicain	2.34	
	Far Right		*19.20*
Jospin	PS - Parti Socialiste	16.18	
Hue	PCF - Parti Communiste Français	3.37	
Mamère	Verts	5.25	
Chevènement	MDC - Mouvement Des Citoyens	5.33	
Taubira	RG - Radicaux de Gauche	2.32	
	Left		*32.45*
Laguiller	LO - Lutte Ouvrière	5.72	
Glückstein	PT - Parti des Travailleurs	0.47	
Besancenot	LCR - Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire	4.25	
	Far Left		*10.44*

Annexe 2.B   Selected Questions

Variables from the 1978 survey For each of the following actions a society like ours could promote, are you "strongly in favor", "in favor" or "not in favor" of it ?

- To suppress the advantages of a number of people, in order to reduce social inequalities
- To enlarge and develop the nationalized sector, even if this implies a limitation of private firms
- To raise taxes, in order to obtain completely free public services like Health, Transportation, Schools, etc.
- To forbid any redundancy, providing no new job has been guaranteed

For the defense of your interests, do you "strongly trust", "trust", "distrust" or "strongly distrust" unions ?

If strikes were forbidden, would you say that it is "a very serious problem", "a serious problem", "not a serious problem" or "not a problem at all" ?

Variables from the 1988 survey Do you "strongly agree", "agree", "disagree" or "strongly disagree" with the following sentences :
"If everyone earned the same wage, it would not elicit effort."
"It is dangerous to have the will to deeply transform society."

To face economic difficulties, do you think :
- The government should be confident in firms and give them more freedom
- Or to the contrary, the government should control firms and strengthen market regulation ?

What do the following words evoke to you ? A "very positive", "positive", "negative" or "very negative" feeling ?

- Profit
- Stock Exchange
- Nationalizations
- Privatizations

Do you "agree" or do you "disagree" with the following action people sometimes engage in, to claim their opinions :

- Strike

The abolition of the following items would seem to you "a very serious problem", "a serious problem", "not a serious problem" or "not a problem at all" ?

- Strike Right
- Unions

Do you "trust" or do you "distrust" unions ?

Do you "strongly agree", "agree", "disagree" or "strongly disagree" with the following sentence :
"The government should guarantee a minimum income for each household."
"Wealth tax should be restored."

Variables from the 1995 survey Here are a number of problems which occur in France nowadays. Give a mark from 0 to 10 to indicate the importance of each in your voting behavior for the first round of the 1995 presidential election :

- Social Protection

- Purchasing Power and Wages

- Unemployment

- Working Time

- European Construction

- Social Exclusion

What do the following words evoke to you? A "very positive", "positive", "negative" or "very negative" feeling?

- Equality

- Reform

- Solidarity

- Europe

Variables from the 1997 survey Are you "Pros" or "Cons" implementing a unique currency for the European Union, given that it means "Franc" will be replaced by "Euro"?

Do you consider France benefited from its belonging to the European Union?

If, tomorrow, an announcement were done to say that European Union is abandoned, would you feel "big regrets", "indifference" or "high relief"?

Do you think the continuation of the European unification will have "positive effects", "negative effects" or "no particular effect" on the French economic growth?

Do you "strongly agree", "agree", "disagree" or "strongly disagree" with the following sentence:

"With the European Union, France will be better protected against the risks linked to globalization."

What do the following words evoke to you ? A "very positive", "positive", "negative" or "very negative" feeling ?

- Privatization

During the electoral campaign, we heard the following propositions. For each of them, are you "highly supportive", "supportive", "not supportive" or "not supportive at all" ?

- The raise by 1000 Francs per month of the minimum wage
- The creation of 350.000 public jobs
- The reduction of working time to 35 hours without any decrease in monthly wages

Variables from the 2002 survey Do you "strongly agree", "agree", "disagree" or "strongly disagree" with the following sentence :
"SNCF (French railways) would better work if it were managed by the private sector."

Which one of the two following opinions do you most agree with ?

- Firms should be free to hire and fire according to their needs
- Firms should be inspected by the state before to be allowed to fire

If, tomorrow, an announcement were done to say that European Union is abandoned, would you feel "big regrets", "indifference" or "high relief" ?

What do the following words evoke to you ? A "very positive", "positive", "negative" or "very negative" feeling ?

- United States of America

- Globalization

- Profit

- Privatization

Do you "strongly agree", "agree", "disagree" or "strongly disagree" with the following sentence :

"The number of public employees should be reduced."

Do you think the following actions had "very positive", "positive", "negative" or "very negative" effects ?

- The 35 hours working time

- The replacement of "Franc" by "Euro"

Annexe 2.C Graphic Analysis

FIG. 2.1 – 1978 : Policy preferences and vote

Fig. 2.2 – 1978 : Socio-economic positioning and preferences

FIG. 2.3 – 1988 : Policy preferences in 2-dimensions

FIG. 2.4 – 1988 : Policy preferences and vote

Fig. 2.5 – 1988 : Socio-economic positioning and preferences

FIG. 2.6 – 1995 : A third dimension barges into the space

Fɪɢ. 2.7 – 1995 : Policy preferences and vote

FIG. 2.8 – 1995 : Socio-economic positioning and preferences

FIG. 2.9 – 1997 : Policy preferences and vote in 2-dim

FIG. 2.10 – 1997 : Socio-economic positioning and preferences

FIG. 2.11 – 2002 : Policy preferences and vote

FIG. 2.12 – 2002 : Socio-economic positioning and preferences

Annexe 2.D Referendum on the European Constitution

TAB. 2.6: Referendum on the European Constitution, 2005

(in %)	Yes	No
Total	45	**55**
Maastricht referendum	*51*	*49*
Occupation		
Farmers	30	**70**
Maastricht referendum	*38*	*62*
Crafstmen, Storekeepers	49	**51**
Maastricht referendum	*51*	*49*
Managers	**65**	35
Maastricht referendum	*67*	*33*
Associate Professionals	47	**53**
Maastricht referendum	*62*	*38*
Clerks	33	**67**
Maastricht referendum	*47*	*53*
Blue-collars	21	**79**
Maastricht referendum	*39*	*61*
Employment status		
Private sector employees	44	**56**
Maastricht referendum	*50*	*50*
Publicly employed	36	**64**
Maastricht referendum	*51*	*49*
Self-employed	42	**58**
Maastricht referendum	*44*	*56*
Unemployed	29	**71**
Maastricht referendum	*41*	*59*
Students	**54**	46

To be continued next page...

TAB. 2.6: Referendum on the European Constitution (cont')

(in %)	Yes	No
Maastricht referendum	*59*	*41*
Retired	**56**	44
Maastricht referendum	*54*	*46*
Net family income		
Less than 1000 euros	40	**60**
1000 to 2000 euros	35	**65**
2000 to 3000 euros	42	**58**
More than 3000 euros	**63**	37
Partisanship		
Far Left	6	**94**
Maastricht referendum	*30*	*70*
Communist Party (PCF)	2	**98**
Maastricht referendum	*19*	*81*
Left (PS)	44	**56**
Maastricht referendum	*78*	*22*
Left (Green)	40	**60**
Maastricht referendum	*57*	*43*
Center-Right (UDF)	**76**	24
Maastricht referendum	*61*	*39*
Right (UMP)	**80**	20
Maastricht referendum (RPR)	*41*	*59*
Far Right (MPF)	25	**75**
Maastricht referendum	*-*	*-*
Far Right (FN)	7	**93**
Maastricht referendum	*8*	*92*
No party	31	**69**
Maastricht referendum	*45*	*55*

Source : IPSOS