Economie politique de la redistribution : une approche comparative par la demande

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Thèse au format PDF

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# Table des matières

Remerciements iii  
Résumé v  
Introduction Générale xix  

1 Preferences for Redistribution 1  
1.1 Introduction .................................. 2  
1.2 Literature ................................... 3  
1.3 Empirical Strategy ............................. 7  
  1.3.1 Estimation Process ......................... 7  
  1.3.2 Data ..................................... 9  
  1.3.3 Testing the Argument ...................... 11  
1.4 Results .................................... 15  
  1.4.1 The Supremacy of Economic Factors ........ 16  
  1.4.2 Does Religion Act as a Substitute to Redistribution? 18  
  1.4.3 How Does Individuals’ Social Self-ranking Affect their Support for Redistribution? 18  
  1.4.4 The Strong Impact of Subjective Social Mobility on Preferences for Redistribution .................. 19  
  1.4.5 Socio-demographic Controls and Country Dummies .... 20  
  1.4.6 Predicted Probabilities ..................... 24  
1.5 Robustness Checks ............................ 25  
  1.5.1 Binary Dependent Variable ............... 26  
  1.5.2 Generalized Ordered Logit ............... 26  
  1.5.3 Separated Country Regressions ............ 27  
1.6 Conclusion .................................. 29  
Annexe 1.A Further Results : Robustness Checks .......... 32  
Annexe 1.B Descriptive Statistics ................ 47  
Annexe 1.C Classification of Occupations .......... 51  
Annexe 1.D Econometric Specification ............. 52
# Table des matières

2 Mapping the French Voter Space

2.1 Introduction ................................................. 58
2.2 Related Literature ......................................... 59
2.3 Data and Empirical Strategy .............................. 64
  2.3.1 Data .................................................. 64
  2.3.2 Multiple Factorial Analysis ......................... 66
  2.3.3 How to Interpret Results? ......................... 68
  2.3.4 How to Read a Graph? .............................. 69
2.4 Results ...................................................... 71
  2.4.1 1978-1988 : Economic Policy and Income Protection .... 72
  2.4.2 1995 : Breaking Point : The Raise of European Issues ... 75
  2.4.3 1997-2002 : Economic Policy and European Integration .. 77
2.5 Conclusion .................................................. 80

Annexe 2.A Results of Elections ............................. 85
Annexe 2.B Selected Questions ............................... 90
Annexe 2.C Graphic Analysis .................................. 95
Annexe 2.D Referendum on the European Constitution .... 107

3 Party Fractionalization and Preferences for Redistribution 111

3.1 Introduction .................................................. 112
3.2 Conceptual Framework ...................................... 114
  3.2.1 Related Literature .................................. 114
  3.2.2 Our Argument ....................................... 118
3.3 Data .......................................................... 121
3.4 Estimation Strategy and Basic Results ................... 124
  3.4.1 Model Specification ................................. 125
  3.4.2 Interaction Term and Marginal Effect ............... 126
  3.4.3 Basic Results ...................................... 127
3.5 Criticisms and Further Results ........................... 128
  3.5.1 Introducing Fixed Effects .......................... 129
  3.5.2 Coping with Time-invariant Variables and Fixed Effects 132
  3.5.3 Dynamic Issues ..................................... 135
3.6 What Have We Learned? ..................................... 140
  3.6.1 What Drives the Generosity of the Welfare State? ... 140
  3.6.2 How is the Heterogeneity of Preferences Conveyed by Party Fractionalization? ....................... 141
  3.6.3 How Large is the Effect? ........................... 142
3.7 Conclusion .................................................. 143

Annexe 3.A Demand for Redistribution ....................... 146
  3.A.1 Basic Model of Welfare State Generosity ............ 146
Annexe 3.B Dispersion of Preferences for Redistribution .... 150
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.B.1 Basic Model of Welfare State Generosity</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.B.2 Fixed Effects Model of Welfare State Generosity</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annexe 3.C Descriptive Statistics</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion Générale</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliographie</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliographie


