

Contents

General Introduction	1
1 Updating Beliefs with Imperfect Signals	11
1.1 Introduction	11
1.2 Related Literature	14
1.3 Experimental Design	18
1.3.1 The game	18
1.3.2 Theoretical predictions	20
1.3.3 Procedures	23
1.4 Results	23
1.4.1 Consequences of belief updating on estimation accuracy	23
1.4.2 Do subjects play optimally?	27
1.4.3 Updating behaviors with validating signals	28
1.5 Conclusion	31
1.6 Appendix: Instructions (original in French)	33
1.7 Appendix: Predicted Probabilities	37
1.8 Appendix: Expected revenue	39
2 Biased Information and Effort	41
2.1 Introduction	41
2.2 Related Literature	44
2.3 Experimental Design	48

2.3.1	The game	48
2.3.2	Procedures	51
2.3.3	Theoretical Predictions	52
2.3.3.1	Perfect information	53
2.3.3.2	Imperfect information	53
2.3.3.3	Manipulated information	54
2.3.3.4	Efficiency	58
2.4	Results	59
2.4.1	Summary statistics	59
2.4.2	Decision to bias information	61
2.4.3	Effort level	66
2.4.4	Efficiency	69
2.5	Conclusion	70
2.6	Appendix: Instructions (original in French)	72
3	Lies and biased evaluation	77
3.1	Introduction	77
3.2	Related Literature	81
3.3	Experimental Design	82
3.3.1	The game	82
3.3.2	Predictions	86
3.3.3	Procedures	88
3.4	Results	90
3.4.1	The willingness to lie and the distribution of lies	90
3.4.2	Workers' beliefs and supervisors' second order beliefs	93
3.4.3	The determinants of the decision to lie	96
3.5	Conclusion	98
3.6	Appendix: Instructions for workers (original in French)	101
General Conclusion		105